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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between competition and co-operation and identifies 
how the interplay between the two can affect innovation in industry clusters. The guiding 
theories underpinning this thesis are drawn from key theories of industry clusters and cluster 
competitive advantage, the starting point for which is Michael Porter’s (1990) theory of 
national/regional competitive advantage. From Porter’s studies of industry clusters two key 
elements are cited as being crucial to the success or failure of an industry cluster, they are: 
the roles of ‘co-operation’ and ‘competition’. Since Porter’s original studies, many cluster 
theories have been developed to examine and explain the roles of co-operation (1) and 
competition (2) and their effects on innovation (3) within industry clusters (e.g., Audretsch 
and Feldman, 1996; Baptista and Swann, 1998; Audretsch, 2000; Tallman et al., 2004; 
Lorentzen, 2008). Other recent studies have contended that co-operation and competition 
vary across the different stages of the industry life-cycle (4) (e.g., Klepper, 1996; Swann et 
al., 1998; Brenner, 2005; Belussi and Sedita, 2009; Potter and Watts, 2010, 2014). 
Consequently, the theoretical framework for this research study is drawn primarily from 
these four key themes (and related sub-themes), it combines and synthesises key elements 
of cluster theories from researchers in such fields as Industrial Districts, Production Systems, 
Economic Geography, and Industry Life-cycle. In addition, several other related theories are 
referred to, where relevant, e.g. dominant firm theory and transaction cost theory. These 
theories, whilst not core to the research, are included to clarify terminology and concepts.  
 
A critical-realism paradigm is the core philosophical stance taken for this research study. A 
mixed/multi methods approach, that includes both deductive and inductive elements, is 
applied throughout the research process. Thus, this research study both tests and builds 
theory. To achieve the research objectives, three unique pieces of research are undertaken 
that, when integrated together, give important insights into the competitive advantage of the 
Stoke-on-Trent Ceramics Cluster (tableware and giftware sector). The first chapter of the 
empirical findings presents results of a longitudinal study of the cluster’s evolution between 
1960 and 2016. The empirical findings clearly identify that a prolonged period of 
consolidation occurred in the cluster between 1960 and 2010. Moreover, the emergence, 
pattern of acquisitions and growth of the Cluster’s two once dominant firms, Wedgwood and 
Royal Doulton, are established. The second empirical chapter presents a historic analysis of 
co-operative behaviours in the cluster between 1700 and 2016. The empirical findings 
indicate that cluster firms have a long history of minimal co-operation with each other, and 
with other firms and institutions. The research findings suggest several reasons that may 
explain the un-cooperative culture apparent in the cluster. The empirical evidence also 
suggests that cluster firms may be starting to co-operate more, possibly due to changes in 
local governance, i.e. the balance of power and control has shifted since the decline of 
Wedgwood and Doulton. The final empirical chapter presents unique data from a 
questionnaire and interview survey into innovation and co-operation in the cluster between 
2010 and 2016. The results indicate that strong innovative activity is evident in the cluster. 
However, co-operative activity appears to be relatively weak. The results also suggest that 
there are many opportunities for cluster firms to co-operate across a range of industry 
issues. Overall, the empirical findings indicate that the Stoke-on-Trent ceramics cluster is a 
relatively successful industry cluster but it could be stronger. 
 
Although the empirical results supported several of the research propositions, in some areas 
the findings did not clearly map to either the maintained, or alternative, propositions, but 
positioned the Stoke-on-Trent cluster somewhere between the two. Consequently, 
alternative propositions that more closely fitted the apparent reality of the situation are 
presented in the conclusions chapter. 
 
This thesis has contributed to knowledge by further developing the theory on industry 
clusters, i.e. through testing and further developing cluster theories a new framework for 
cluster analysis has been constructed. This new framework is based on Arikan’s original 
model (see chapter 2, Figure 2.2), which is aimed at identifying knowledge creating 
opportunities, but was further developed by the researcher to include other factors identified 
in the various literatures as important to knowledge creation and competitive advantage (see 
chapter 2, Figure 2.4 for an extension of Arikan’s original model). After application to the 
SOT cluster, the model was developed even further to include a  new determinant, ‘factors 
affecting the propensity to co-operate’. The new determinant examines other historical 
antecedents not included in Arikan’s original model. Figure 7.1 Presents the new model for 
analysing industry clusters. Thus, the research makes a significant contribution to extant 
literature on clusters, industrial districts, networks and governance by providing new 
knowledge and new perspectives on the importance of co-operation in industry clusters. The 
empirical findings make a further contribution to cluster theory in that they develop the 
literature on dominant firm effects on the competitive advantage of clusters, an area that is 
somewhat under-reported in the extant literature. Finally, the research also contributes to the 
theory on evolutionary economics through the findings of the longitudinal study into the 
Stoke-on-Trent ceramic cluster’s evolution. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins by briefly outlining the overall aim of the research (1.1). Secondly, it 
presents an overview of the Stoke-on-Trent (SOT) ceramics cluster, the central case study in 
the research, including some of the key challenges that the cluster has faced over recent 
years (1.2). Thirdly, the academic literature on competitive advantage in industry clusters is 
introduced (1.3). Fourthly, the aims and objectives of the research study are stated (1.4). 
Fifthly, the research methodological approach and design are explained (1.5). Finally, a brief 
overview of each of the findings and conclusions chapters is provided (1.6), along with a 
chapter summary (1.7). 
 
 
1.1: The Research Aim 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the competitive advantage situation of the Stoke-on-
Trent (SOT) ceramics industry cluster, tableware and giftware sector, as measured by 
innovative output. In particular, it looks at the interaction between competition and co-
operation within the cluster itself and assesses the contribution that each has made to the 
competitive advantages that the industry has today.  
 
 
1.2: History & Profile of the Stoke-on-Trent Ceramics Industry 
An abundance of natural materials, e.g. clay, salt and lead for glazing and, most importantly, 
coal for firing, were the main reasons for the Pottery Industry becoming established in North 
Staffordshire1. Starting as a small community of farmer-potters in the mid-seventeenth 
century, the trade of making butterpots for the easier marketing of butter developed in the 
town of Burslem2. From Burslem, potters started small factories in the nearby hamlets of 
Tunstall to the north, and Cobridge, Hanley, Shelton, Stoke, Fenton and Longton to the 
South. All these towns lay along a belt of coal and clay and they eventually formed into the 
City of Stoke-on-Trent (Federated 1910). White burning clays from Dorset, Devon and 
Cornwall were brought into North Staffordshire from 1720 onwards3. By 1740, a substantial 
industry had been established, and benefited from a wealth of skilled craftspeople 
                                                 
1 Thepotteries.org. (2008), Stoke-on-Trent the world's largest and most famous pottery producing city, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
   http://www.thepotteries.org/sot/five.htm [Accessed 27 June 2017] 
2 Ellis, S. (2010), Pots of Appeal in Stoke-on-Trent, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://britishheritage.com/pots-of-appeal-in-stoke-on-trent/. 
[Accessed 27 June 2017] 
3 Wedgwood, J. C. (1913), Staffordshire Pottery and Its History, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
https://archive.org/stream/staffordshirepot00wedg/staffordshirepot00wedg_djvu.txt. [Accessed 27 June 2017] 
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composing at least half the population of the area. The nature of the industry changed 
constantly as new materials and ideas were tried. Although there is evidence from various 
local sources4 that many pottery companies had a short life, there is also evidence that 
some firms operated successfully for long periods of time (see Henrywood, 2002). Moreover, 
some of these firms are still in existence today. Many of the more successful companies 
were founded by master potters, with two of the most famous names being Wedgwood and 
Spode. The provision of machinery and supplies for the specialised industry led to 
concentration in the areas of ceramic colour-makers, pottery machinery-makers, as well as 
the millers who prepared the body and glaze materials essential for the pottery 
manufacturers. At its peak in the late 19th century the region was the epicentre of the world’s 
ceramic production and home to more than 2,000 kilns firing millions of products a year5. 
Today Stoke-on-Trent is still famous for its tablewares, giftwares, tiles and hi-tech ceramics 
sold globally6. 
 
 
The researcher first became interested in the SOT ceramics cluster in 1997, after starting 
employment as a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Management at Staffordshire University. The 
Business School at the University is situated in the heart of the ceramics cluster. Through 
lecturing and researching in the field of Strategic Management the author began to develop 
an interest in theories of national competitive advantage, in particular Michael Porter’s 
(1990) work on industry clusters. As the author’s knowledge and understanding of both the 
theory and the local industry developed, it emerged that, although the SOT cluster appeared 
to fit the criteria of an industry cluster, it did not, however, seem to exhibit many of the 
characteristics of a successful Porter-type cluster. In particular, competitive rivalry and 
interdependencies between firms in the cluster appeared to be weak. Moreover, SOT cluster 
firms have a long history of not co-operating with each other (e.g. Imrie, 1987; Whipp, 1990). 
Interestingly, cluster theories (e.g. Porter, 1990; Dei Ottati, 1994) identify extensive co-
operative linkages as a key success factor in the competitive advantage of clusters, yet 
these linkages appear to be missing or minimal at best throughout the SOT cluster’s history, 
despite it having been a very successful industry for several hundreds of years. Thus, this 
was an important area of investigation for the research, i.e. there was a desire to determine 
the ‘reality’ behind the apparent phenomena. Furthermore, whilst it was not the main aim of 
this research study to predict the future direction of the Stoke-on-Trent ceramics industry, 
                                                 
4 For example, the Potteries Museum and Art Gallery and visitstoke.co.uk 
5 Nicholls, D. (2011), All Fired Up: The Future of Pottery, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/interiors/8281433/All-
fired-up-the-future-of-pottery.html. [Accessed 27 June 2017] 
6 visitstoke.co.uk, (2017), Ceramics in Stoke-on-Trent Today, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.visitstoke.co.uk/ceramics-trail/history-
ceramics-today.aspx. [Accessed 27 June 2017] 
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the ambition is that the findings will be of interest to the wider ceramics industry community 
in that they may highlight issues for further discussion and debate. On a more personal level, 
the researcher hoped to test and develop the theory on industrial clusters, and thus 
significantly contribute to the existing body of literature.  
 
 
Between 1960 and 2008, the UK ceramics industry experienced a period of rapid and 
profound change. Firstly, a process of consolidation occurred in the SOT cluster resulting in 
the loss of many ceramics jobs, and indeed ceramics manufacturers, from the cluster. This 
period also saw the emergence of the cluster’s two then largest firms, Wedgwood and Royal 
Doulton (hereinafter called Doulton). Between 19807 and circa 2008  the industry suffered a 
prolonged period of decline (Tomlinson and Branston, 2017), mainly due to increasing 
competition from overseas and changes in lifestyles and disposable incomes. Consequently, 
there were many demand-side pressures on SOT cluster firms, such as design of products 
and response times, as well as price. In addition, there were many supply-side pressures on 
SOT cluster firms too, such as competition from overseas, pressures of outsourcing and 
costs. Many of these issues forced some SOT cluster firms to make redundancies, close 
factory sites and, in some cases, cease production altogether (Jackson, 2000). For example, 
in 2009 Wedgwood, the SOT cluster’s largest ceramics manufacturer who had acquired 
Doulton in 2005, went into administration resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs. In 2009, 
Wedgwood was purchased by American KPS group and renamed WWRD Holdings. In 
2015, WWRD was purchased by Norwegian homewares group Fiskars8. Although 
Wedgwood is still producing ceramic goods in Stoke-on-Tent today, it is significantly smaller 
than it was in 2008. 
 
 
In 2001, the results of a research project carried out by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) to map existing cluster activity in the UK were published. The UK ceramics 
industry was classed as a ‘regional cluster’, belonging to the West Midlands region but highly 
concentrated around Stoke-on-Trent. Clusters were further classified according to their stage 
of development with the research suggesting that the deepest clusters, those with the most 
industries and institutional and other linkages, often perform the best. However, the ceramics 
cluster in the West Midlands is cited in the report as an example of “a deep and globally 
                                                 
7 The SOT industry’s sales peaked in 1978 and then declined (Imrie,1987). 
8 Armstrong, A. (2015), Waterford Wedgwood sold to Finnish heritage brand, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11597355/Waterford-Wedgwood-sold-to-Finnish-heritage-brand.htm. 
[Accessed 27 June 2017] 
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competitive cluster which is losing employment and is perceived to be in decline” (DTI, 2001: 
Executive Summary, p. 4). However, recent reports on the industry are claiming that the 
SOT ceramics cluster is recovering and is currently experiencing a revival (Tomlinson and 
Branston, 2014), with sales in both domestic and export markets increasing year-on-year 
over the past five years (see chapter 4, Table 4.2). 
 
 
1.3: An Overview of Cluster Theories 
To identify the current strategic position of the SOT ceramics cluster, key theories of industry 
competitive advantage were reviewed, the starting point for which was Michael Porter’s 
(1990) National Diamond framework, applied at the cluster level. From Porter’s studies of 
industry clusters, two key elements were identified as crucial to the success or failure of an 
industry cluster. They are, co-operation (strong vertical and horizontal linkages enabling 
innovation) and competition (vigorous domestic rivalry resulting in innovation), which both 
have to be present for a cluster to be successful. In addition to Porter’s original studies, 
cluster theories have been developed by researchers in the fields of: economic geography 
(e.g. Audretsch and Feldman, 1996); industrial districts (e.g. Belussi and Sedita, 2009); 
production systems (e.g. Scott, 1988b); and, networks (e.g. Brusco, 1995). Other areas of 
research also relevant to cluster studies include: innovation/knowledge studies (e.g. Matusik 
and Hill, 1998; Arikan, 2011); and, industry life-cycle studies (e.g. Klepper, 1996, 2000). 
From an extensive review of the academic literature, and drawing all of the key success 
factors and failure factors together, a theoretical framework was constructed and a set of 
research propositions (see chapter 2, Table 2.3) and objectives were formulated (see 
chapter 2, Table 2.4). The overall research question and the main research objectives are 
presented next. 
 
 
1.4: The Research Question: 
“To what extent does the SOT ceramics cluster exhibit characteristics of a successful 
industry cluster, or a failing industry cluster, as defined by the theory on industry 
clusters?” 
 
1.4.1: The Research Objectives and Research Stages (for a full set of objectives see 
table 2.4): 
1. To track the development of SOT tableware & giftware manufacturers from 1960 – 
2016 (stage 1 of the research); 
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2. To examine the nature of demand for the SOT cluster’s products and its effect on 
competition between 2000 and 2016 (stage 1); 
3. To determine the breadth of knowledge required to offer the products that 
characterise the cluster (stage 2); 
4. To determine the degree of modularity in the product technologies underlying the 
products that characterise the cluster (stage 2); 
5. To determine the level of technological dynamism surrounding the products that 
characterise the cluster (stage 2); 
6. To determine the number of core firms in the cluster in 2015 that leverage the same 
general purpose technology (stage 3); 
7. To determine the output of innovative activity in the cluster between 2010 and 2015; 
8. To establish the degree of inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the cluster between 
2010 and 2015 (stage 3); 
9. To establish the  balance of power and control within the SOT cluster in 2016 (stage 
4); 
10. To determine whether dominant firms have had a positive or negative effect upon 
competition and co-operation in the SOT cluster between 1980 and 2016 (stage 4); 
11. To synthesise findings and draw accurate conclusions about the competitive 
advantage of the SOT cluster (research conclusions). 
 
 
1.5: The Research Approach and Design 
A post-positivist/critical realist approach was selected as the most appropriate core research 
paradigm for this research study. This is because ‘ontologically’ there was a need to identify 
the reality of causal relationships in the SOT cluster, and ‘epistemologically’ because theory 
is partially how such discovery can take place. Another reason for this approach is because 
the research required both quantitative and qualitative elements in order to meet the 
objectives and answer the research question. For example, some objectives (e.g. elements 
of 1-8) require primary research in the form of a questionnaire survey and this requires the 
researcher to be independent and objective (positivist stance). However, the researcher 
cannot remain truly independent as interpretation and explanation of the findings are 
potentially subjective and value laden, i.e. findings are interpreted by the researcher in light 
of theory. In addition, several of the objectives (9-11) call for a purely qualitative approach, 
and thus findings are again potentially subjective and value laden (critical theory approach). 
Given that the research objectives are linked to several competing paradigm approaches, 
i.e. positivism, critical realism and critical theory, this research study utilises a mixed 
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paradigms approach (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006). Full details of the adopted 
paradigm approach are located in the methodology chapter (see chapter 3.3). 
 
 
From a critical review of the strategic management literature pertaining to industry clusters, 
eleven propositions and a theoretical framework for the research were carefully constructed 
to guide the empirical investigation. A mixed/multi methods approach (Trochim, 2002; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Small, 2011) is adopted for this research study. Multiple 
methods, e.g. a longitudinal study, a questionnaire survey and interviews, are employed and 
the different quantitative and qualitative findings are combined and nested (Lieberman, 
2005, 2013) in each other in order to fulfil the overall research aim. The mixed/multi method 
approach is also consistent with a critical realism paradigm, as it is both deductive, i.e. 
theory testing, and inductive, i.e. theory building (Saunders et al., 2003). Thus, both 
inductive and deductive elements are incorporated into the research design, i.e. the research 
starts with a theoretical framework, to identify, describe and analyse what is happening in 
the SOT cluster, and then progresses onto an inductive approach, which further develops 
the theory on industry clusters. 
 
 
As the main ‘object’ of the research is the theory on industry clusters, a single case study is 
adopted as the ‘subject’ of the research. According to Thomas (2011), the subject of the 
research can act as a lens through which the theoretical focus, i.e. the object, can be viewed 
and explicated. The SOT cluster is defined as a single case study for the purposes of this 
research study because it represents virtually the whole of the UK ceramics production 
industrial sector, i.e. approximately 80%, and is therefore of high relevance to both the local 
(West Midlands) and UK economies. Furthermore, a single case study approach is 
particularly suited to investigating the SOT industry cluster, as it has been the strategy 
adopted in many previous cluster studies where the cluster is viewed as a single case (e.g. 
Porter, 1990; Dayasindhu, 2002; Zhang et al., 2004). 
 
 
The research approach and design are discussed in more detail in chapter three of this 
thesis, where details are provided of how knowledge is intended to be discovered and of 
how the aims and objectives are intended to be met. In addition, a full discussion of the 
relevant research paradigm, alternative paradigms, mixed/multi methods approach, data 
requirements, sampling, data collection/analysis techniques and ethical consideration are 
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included. Chapter seven of this thesis presents a reflection on the adopted methodologies 
(see chapter 7.7). 
 
 
The objectives and the theoretical framework provided a roadmap for the research 
consisting of many complementary elements that were mostly linear, in that they built on 
each other, but some findings from later stages are integrated into findings from earlier 
stages of the research. The main elements comprise: a longitudinal study of the evolution of 
the SOT ceramics cluster from 1960-2016; several historic analyses of competition, co-
operation and demand in the SOT cluster; a questionnaire survey on the innovation and co-
operation activities of six representative SOT ceramics manufacturers; and, an in-depth 
interview survey of six SOT core manufacturers’ views on co-operation and dominant firm 
effects in the SOT cluster.  
 
 
The research objectives are divided into three main stages. Stage 1 (objectives 1 and 2) is 
aimed at identifying the development of the SOT ceramics cluster, and resultant effects on 
competition between 1960 and 2016. Stage 2 (objectives 3-5) is aimed at identifying the 
historical need for co-operation in the SOT ceramics cluster up to 2016. Stage 3 (objectives 
6-8) is aimed at identifying innovation and co-operation activities in the SOT cluster as at 
2015. Finally, stage 4 (objectives 9-10) is aimed at identifying further evidence of co-
operation, the balance between power and control, and dominant firm effects on the SOT 
cluster in 2015/16. 
 
 
1.6: The Three Findings Chapters 
In this section each of the three findings chapters, and the final conclusions chapter, are 
briefly outlined. 
 
1.6.1: Chapter 4 (Research Stage 1, Objective 1) -  SOT Cluster Evolution (1960 – 2016)  
In order to meet this objective it was necessary to collect time-series data from historical 
sources to create a unique longitudinal secondary data set. Based on multiple secondary 
data sources, that were cross-referenced and triangulated with each other, an initial 
database of SOT core manufacturing firms still operating in the early 1960s was compiled. 
This starting data set was brought up-to-date (2016) by utilising a variety of additional 
sources of raw secondary data, e.g. company websites, trade publications, company listings, 
etc. A listing of sources used to construct the database is included in the appendices section 
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of this thesis (see Appendix 4a). The resultant data set is unique in that, as well as spanning 
a period of 56 years, no other data set of its kind exists for the SOT cluster, or for any other 
mature industry cluster that the researcher is aware of. From this initial data set, it was 
possible to distil the number of firms operating in each of the decades from 1960 up to 2016. 
Moreover, it was also possible to track the destination of firms’ decade-by-decade, e.g. 
acquisitions, new entrants, firm closures, and to identify the number of tableware and 
giftware manufacturers still operating in the SOT cluster in 2016. The final list of firms in 
2016 formed the total population for the primary research (survey questionnaire), required 
for objectives 6-8. Full details of data collection and analysis techniques are provided in 
chapter three (see chapter 3.7) and findings from the longitudinal study are presented in 
chapter four of this thesis. 
 
 
1.6.2: Chapter 4 (Research Stage 1, Objective 2) – Historical Analysis of Competition 
and Demand in the SOT Cluster up to 2016 
Objective 2 had two main aims. Firstly, it aimed to examine the external environment 
surrounding the SOT cluster in order to determine the nature and level of demand for the 
SOT ceramics cluster’s products as at 2016. Secondly, it aimed to determine the pattern of 
competitive activity apparent in the SOT cluster between 2000 and 2016. In order to meet 
this objective it was necessary to collect compiled secondary data from multiple sources. 
This involved gathering historical data from a wide variety of industry specific secondary 
sources. These sources included both raw data and published summaries. This type of data 
is useful in both descriptive and explanatory research (Saunders et al., 2012). Moreover, the 
data was a mix of quantitative and qualitative data, which is in-line with the critical realist, 
mixed-methods approach. Moreover, by using data from well-established organisations and 
researchers the data was considered reliable and trustworthy. Data analysis at this stage 
involved assigning relevant units of the data to appropriate categories identified in the 
theoretical framework. Through a further process of filtering and selection, the data was 
reduced into key findings, tentative conclusions were drawn and issues were highlighted for 
further exploration in later stages of the research.  
 
 
1.6.3: Chapter 5 (Research Stage 2, Objectives 3-5) – Identifying the Need for Co-
operation in the SOT Cluster up to 2016 
In order to meet objectives 3-5, it was necessary to collect compiled secondary data from 
multiple sources. This involved gathering historical data from a wide variety of industry 
specific secondary sources, such as historical books and academic research papers, e.g. 
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papers based on research into the structure of processes and technologies in the UK 
ceramics industry include: “The illusion of flexible specialization: the case of the 
domesticware sector of the British ceramics industry” (Rowley, 1994); “Technological 
Innovation in the UK Ceramics Industry” (Warren et al., 2000); and, “Turning the tide: 
Prospects for an industrial renaissance in the North Staffordshire Ceramics Industrial 
District” (Tomlinson and Branston, 2014). Examples of books include: “The British Pottery 
Industry” (Gay and Smyth, 1974); and, “Industrial Restructuring in the British Pottery 
Industry” (Imrie, 1987). A similar approach to the data analysis techniques used for objective 
2 was taken for objectives 3-5. Analysis involved assigning relevant units of the data to 
appropriate categories identified from the theoretical framework (pattern matching 
/explanation building). Through a further process of filtering and selection the data was 
reduced into key findings and tentative conclusions were drawn in light of theory. Findings 
from objectives 3-5 were also utilised in later stages of the research to explain and/or 
reinforce primary research findings, e.g. to explain why firms do/don’t co-operate. This is a 
further example of ‘nesting’ and of ‘triangulation’ of data and is consistent with a mixed-
methods research design. 
 
 
1.6.4: Chapter 6 (Research Stage 3, Objectives 6-8) – Establishing Levels of Innovative 
and Co-operative Activity in the SOT Cluster Between 2010 and 2015 
Stage 3 of the research was aimed at determining the current situation regarding: the 
number of core firms in the SOT cluster leveraging the same general-purpose technologies; 
and, innovation and co-operation in the Stoke-on-Trent Ceramics Cluster as at 2015. In 
order to ensure reliability and validity in the research instrument a questionnaire that had 
already been employed by researchers in the recent past, i.e. a questionnaire that was 
previously administered by the European Union GPrix project9, was adapted and 
administered to SOT firms.  
 
 
In addition to adapting the existing questions to meet the specific needs of this research 
project, several new questions are included. Full details and a rationale for the questionnaire 
are provided in chapter three of this thesis (see chapter 3.7). Validity and reliability of the 
survey instrument are ensured in several ways. Firstly, ‘content validity’ (Saunders et al., 
2012) was achieved by adapting a widely applied, existing research instrument from an 
                                                 
9 Gprix. (2012), GPrix Innovation Policy Support Survey, [Online]. Available from: http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/en/survey.htm 
[Accessed 30 June 2017] 
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extremely reliable source. This ensured that the participants would understand the 
questions, as the questions had been asked before for similar purposes. Secondly, 
questions were carefully matched to the specific objectives and propositions of the research, 
thus ensuring ‘construct validity’ (Saunders et al., 2012). In addition, several different types 
of questions were included in the questionnaire for different uses, e.g. ranking, listing, rating, 
quantity and open questions. A copy of the questionnaire is included in the appendices 
section of this thesis (see Appendix 9). Finally, a ‘pilot study’ was conducted in order to 
ensure that respondents would have no problems in answering the questions, and also so 
that their responses could be recorded correctly (Saunders et al., 2012). The pilot study was 
issued to small number of people working in or connected to the SOT industry and was 
conducted between October 2015 and October 2016. Firstly, two academics with knowledge 
of the SOT ceramics industry, including one who had been involved in the GPrix innovation 
survey, appraised the questionnaire. After making adjustments to several questions, the 
questionnaire was administered to one of the SOT cluster firms (company ‘D’, see Appendix 
13 for company profiles). The pilot study respondent is a senior manager of a medium sized 
ceramics firm who has been employed in the industry for many years. As a result of the final 
pilot, one question was refined further to enhance validity. 
 
 
The questionnaire was administered to firms in the total research population (see chapter 
3.6) by the researcher in person. Such face-to-face interviews are called structured 
interviews (Saunders et al., 2012). Firstly, several different methods, e.g. telephone, e-mail, 
letter, were utilised to make contact with the firms and to identify ‘appropriate persons’ within 
the companies, i.e. owners or senior managers. During this initial contact, the nature of the 
research study was explained and requests made for company participation. Secondly, a 
copy of the questionnaire and covering letter was sent to every company in the population 
(all 16 firms). In order to convince companies to participate, the covering letter ensured 
anonymity of the company data (confidentially agreement) and offered to make the research 
findings available to participants. Despite exhaustive efforts to contact, and re-contact, all 
sixteen firms in the population over a six-month period, only six firms agreed to take part in 
the questionnaire survey. Subsequently, the questionnaire survey was completed by these 
six firms between November 2016 and April 2017.  
 
 
The data collected from the questionnaire responses was mostly quantitative and the original 
intention had been to analyse the data using statistical software. However, due to the 
comparatively small number of respondents, and hence the small number of data points, it 
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was decided not to use software to analyse the data but to use simple one-way frequency 
tables instead. Since the questions were standardised, the data collected from the 
questionnaire responses was analysed and included in both descriptive and explanatory 
research findings. For example, SOT cluster firms’ innovative activities were described from 
the numerical analysis of the questionnaire responses, and explanations of what the findings 
meant were made in light of theory (theory testing). Moreover, relationships across the data 
were identified, described and explained. For example, the relationships between firm size 
and innovation were firstly identified from the data, then described and explained in light of 
theory. The descriptive and explanatory approach was in keeping with the intended research 
design as discussed previously in this chapter. Full results, analysis and evaluation of the 
innovation questionnaire are presented in chapter six of this thesis (see chapter 6.3-6.4). 
 
 
1.6.5: Chapter 6 (Research Stage 4, Objectives 9-10) Establishing Power and Control, 
and the Role of Dominant firms Past and Present, in the SOT Cluster up to 2016 
Stage 4 of the research was aimed at: 1) exploring in more depth some of the findings on 
innovation and collaboration from earlier stages of the research; 2) identifying the balance of 
power and control within the SOT cluster; and, 3) determining the roles that dominant firms 
have played in the competitive advantage of the cluster. The research method employed at 
this stage involved the collection of primary data from semi-structured interviews. This is 
because a qualitative approach was required to further explore the ‘what’, and to be able to 
explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ behind the reality. The semi-structured interview approach was 
consistent with exploratory studies (Saunders, et al., 2003) and was used to explore and 
explain themes that had emerged from earlier stages of research, in addition to validating 
findings from the earlier stages (Wass and Wells, 1994). The number of interviews that took 
place was six, i.e. the six firms who had also completed the questionnaire survey. In four 
cases, the interviews followed on directly after the questionnaire meeting and, in two cases, 
a future appointment was required to complete the interviews. For this stage of the research 
a list of themes and questions was derived from three sources: 1) from the questionnaire 
results, e.g. emergent themes and issues on innovation and co-operation were explored in 
more depth; 2) from the theoretical framework, e.g. questions on co-operation, dominant 
firms and power and control were pre-constructed; 3) from earlier findings (chapters four and 
five), questions on co-operation and competition were pre-constructed. 
 
All interviews were recorded to ensure accuracy of data and were later professionally 
transcribed. As all interviewees held senior management positions, e.g. some were company 
owners and thus had high-profile roles in the industry, the identities of all respondents were 
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kept anonymous. The rigorous approach adopted in preparation for the interviews, in 
preparing respondents, and in recording and analysing the data, ensured validity, reliability 
and consistency in the way the data was collected and analysed.  
 
 
The interview data was analysed by firstly assigning relevant units of the data to appropriate 
categories. By having a well-defined research question and objectives, and a clear 
framework and propositions derived from the theory, it was relatively simple to identify the 
categories/units (see conceptual framework) for analysing the data for all stages of this 
research project. Thus, analysis of ‘embedded units’ (Yin, 1994) was as an appropriate 
strategy as it allowed individual units to be compared across the firms surveyed and for 
conclusions to be drawn. Through a further process of filtering and selection, the data was 
then reduced into key findings, rearranged into a series of tables, and responses were 
compared (see Appendix 19). The next stage of analysis involved the deductively based 
approach ‘explanation building’, which is a similar approach to ‘pattern matching’ (Yin, 1994). 
This approach was deemed appropriate, as attempts had not been made to predict in 
advance which of the alternative propositions, if any, applied to the SOT ceramic cluster. 
Thus, it was the maintained and alternative propositions that generated different expected 
patterns, which were then compared with the actual ones to identify the degree of 
association. As discussed in chapter seven of this thesis (see chapter 7.6), the depth of 
evidence collected from the questionnaire and interview responses contributed towards the 
development of cluster theory, and further demonstrates the inductive nature of the research 
at this stage. Whilst, it was not intended that the interview responses would establish 
reliability in any quantitative or statistical way, i.e. due to not having a large number of 
respondents, it was intended that the interview findings would provide sufficient context and 
evidence of validity so the informed reader could decide whether, or not, the findings 
generalise to their circumstances.  
 
 
1.6.6: Chapter 7 (Objective 11) - Conclusions 
The final chapter of this thesis involves synthesising the findings from all stages of the 
research and mapping them back to the theoretical framework (objective 11). From this, 
overall conclusions were drawn regarding the competitive advantage of the SOT cluster, 
recommendations were made, and theory developed. In addition, chapter seven also 
provides: a discussion of the research contribution to theory (see chapter 7.6); a reflection 
on the methodologies adopted for the research (see chapter 7.7); and, an identification of 
areas for future research. (see chapter 7.8).   
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1.7: Chapter 1 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the aims and objectives of the research and has given brief 
overviews of the case study, theoretical background and methodologies adopted for the 
research. In the next chapter, a critical review of the academic literature is provided. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
2.1: Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis is to determine the ‘strategic health’ of the Stoke-on-Trent (SOT) 
Ceramics Industry Cluster, Tableware & Giftware sector. In this study, the term ‘strategic 
health’ refers to the ‘competitive advantage’ of the cluster as a whole. Competitive 
advantage rests on making more productive use of inputs, which requires continual 
innovation (Porter, 1998). Consequently, a nation’s competitiveness depends on the 
capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade (Porter, 1990). The competitive advantage 
situation of the SOT ceramics cluster will be determined by analysing and evaluating the 
roles that co-operation, competition, path-dependence and dominant firm decisions have 
had on the evolutionary processes and innovative output of the industry cluster. Therefore, a 
key objective of the literature review is to develop a theoretical framework for the empirical 
research. 
 
 
The literature review will concentrate on key theories of industry clusters and competitive 
advantage, the starting point for which will be a brief review of Michael Porter’s (1990) theory 
of national competitive advantage;11 more specifically, the determinants and variables that 
make up the National Diamond Model, which has been widely applied by practitioners and 
policy makers globally (e.g. Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993; Cartwright, 1993; Clancey and 
Twomey, 1997). In addition, and most important to this study, the review will focus on the 
‘local diamond system’ or geographic industry cluster. From Porter’s studies of industry 
clusters two key elements are cited as being crucial to the success or failure of an industry, 
or region, they are: the roles of ‘co-operation’ and ‘competition’ in industry clusters.  
 
 
Since Porter’s original studies many cluster theories have been developed that examine the 
roles of co-operation (1) and competition (2) and their effects on innovation (3) within the 
cluster (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Baptista and Swann, 1998; Audretsch, 2000; 
Tallman et al., 2004; Lorentzen, 2008). In addition, more recent studies have contended that 
co-operation and competition vary across the different stages of the industry life-cycle (4) 
(e.g., Klepper, 1996; Swann et al., 1998; Brenner, 2005; Belussi and Sedita, 2009; Potter 
                                                 
11 Michael Porter wrote "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" in 1990. The book is based on studies of ten self-selected nations and 
argues that a key to national wealth and advantage was the productivity of firms and workers collectively, and that the national and 
regional environment supports that productivity. 
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and Watts, 2010, 2014). The majority of the literature review is structured around these four 
key themes (and related sub-themes) and involves examining cluster theories from 
researchers in such fields as Industrial Districts, Production Systems, Economic Geography, 
and Industry Life-cycle. The final section of the literature review draws together, from across 
the different literatures, the most commonly cited reasons why clusters decline or fail. For 
example, regularly cited reasons are over consolidation in an industry (Porter, 1990; Dei 
Ottati, 1994; Rosenfeld, 1997), and negative dominant firm effects (Lorenzen and Mudambi, 
2013; Bell et al., 2009). This is an area of cluster theory which has been somewhat 
neglected in the literature as theories tend to focus more on the positive benefits of 
geographic clustering. Therefore, this is an aspect of cluster theory where the thesis will 
make a significant contribution to the body of existing research. Throughout the chapter, 
different theoretical perspectives will be linked to relevant themes and/or sub-themes, in this 
way synergies across the different literatures can be identified. From this synthesis, 
conclusions will be drawn and a theoretical framework for the empirical research will be 
constructed. Finally, a series of testable propositions will be formulated and the research 
objectives identified. 
 
 
2.2: National Competitive Advantage 
Michael Porter (1990) takes the view that the national environment plays a central role in the 
competitive success of firms and, that some national environments seem more stimulating to 
advancement and progress than others. The unit of analysis is at the national level, unlike 
Porter’s earlier work (1980, 1985) where the focus was on firm-level competitive strategy. 
Porter advocates that a dynamic and challenging national environment must also be in place 
to encourage and support an industry. The determinants of national advantage are drawn 
together into a mutually reinforcing system, i.e. the ‘National Diamond’ model. There are four 
main determinants in the formation of the diamond: factor conditions; demand conditions; 
related and supporting industries; and, firm strategy, structure and rivalry. In addition, there 
are two variables that can influence the diamond: chance events; and, the role of 
government. The National Diamond system is depicted in Figure 2.1 and the key points from 
Porter’s theory are summarised in appendices 1 and 1a. 
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Figure 2.1: The National Diamond System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author, adapted from Porter 1990, p.127) 
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2.2.1: The Dynamics of National Advantage 
According to Porter (1990), the National Diamond system as a whole is more important than 
the individual parts, as the determinants reinforce each other and proliferate over time in 
fostering competitive advantage in an industry (p. 132). The dynamic effect is to create a 
unique environment that is difficult for foreign competitors to replicate and, in which case, 
domestic firms appropriate the benefits. Two main elements in particular, domestic rivalry 
and geographic concentration, exert most impact upon the dynamics of the system: 
domestic rivalry (competition) as it promotes upgrading of the entire national diamond (e.g. 
through new entrants and innovation); and geographic concentration, as it elevates and 
magnifies the interactions (co-operation) within the diamond, e.g. through speed of 
information and knowledge transfer (Porter, 1990: 131). A consequence of the diamond 
system is that competitive industries in a nation are not spread evenly throughout the 
economy but are geographically concentrated in clusters, consisting of industries related by 
links of various kinds. Clustering does not appear as a separate point of the national 
diamond; rather, the effects of clustering permeate all determinants of competitiveness 
highlighted by Porter’s model (Porter, 1990). Appendix 2 demonstrates the dynamic nature 
of the diamond and how the ‘system’ benefits are reinforced and magnified through cluster 
effects (i.e. geographic concentration and proximity to rivals). 
 
 
2.3: The Importance of industry clusters 
One of the most striking findings in Porter’s studies of successful industries is that 
geographic industry clusters are a central feature of all the advanced national economies 
that he studied. One competitive industry within a cluster helps to create another in a 
mutually reinforcing process, and it is the combination of both national and local conditions 
that fosters competitive advantage (Porter, 1990). According to Lorentzen (2008), a 
functioning diamond is a cluster, and the quality of the cluster is decisive for the 
development of competitive advantage of individual firms. 
 
 
There is a wealth of empirical evidence to support Porter’s view that geographic 
concentration of rivals enhances competitiveness and stimulates innovative activity, firm 
growth and entry (e.g. Jaffe, 1989, 1993; Glaser et al., 1992; Dei Ottati, 1994; Feldman, 
1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Rosenfeld, 1997; Baptista, 1998, 1999, 2000; Baptista 
and Swann, 1996, 1999; Audretsch, 2000; Tallman, et al., 2004; Jenkins and Tallman, 2012; 
Fundeanu, 2015).   
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According to Porter (1990) “a nation’s successful industries are usually linked through 
vertical and horizontal relationships” (p.149)…”entire clusters of industries are often located 
in a single region or town” (p.154).  
 
 
As stated in the Introduction chapter of this thesis (see chapter 1.2), the UK ceramics 
industry is classed as a ‘regional cluster’, belonging to the West Midlands region but highly 
concentrated around SOT. Therefore, the SOT ceramics cluster is an appropriate case for 
the application and development of cluster theories, as well as a rich source of analytical 
findings.  
 
 
The idea of clustering is not new, as the prominent economist Alfred Marshall first wrote 
about industrial districts in 1890. Marshallian districts, like clusters, represent a division of 
labour between firms and formal and informal institutions, which helps to reduce uncertainty. 
The ‘industrial atmosphere’, inside as well as between firms, enables the transmittance of 
tacit knowledge within the district (Marshall, 1890, 1923). Thus the district, like the cluster, is 
considered to be a ‘space of knowledge’, bound to a particular place, since this industrial 
atmosphere cannot be moved (Corolleur and Courlet, 2003; Lorentzen, 2008). Being part of 
a cluster allows companies access to specific benefits that can help them to operate more 
productively in sourcing inputs; accessing information, technology, and needed institutions; 
coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement (Porter, 
1998). Cluster benefits can be likened to ‘agglomeration economies’ that come when firms 
and people locate near one another in cities and industrial clusters. Agglomeration benefits 
ultimately come from transport costs savings (Glaeser, 2010: 1). 
 
 
2.3.1: Towards a Working Definition of a Cluster 
Definitions of clusters in the literature vary widely. Rosenfeld (1997), describes the usual 
problems of defining the term ‘cluster’. Government agencies typically use too broad, 
general classifications, e.g. metals, tourism, etc., but nothing that binds firms into a 
production system. Academics and researchers rely too heavily on statistical and 
econometric analyses, e.g. SIC codes, agglomerations, transactions, etc., again resulting in 
very broad classifications. Business Schools (e.g. Harvard) have favoured models based on 
comparative advantages in global markets, and the most widely accepted of these models is 
Michael Porter’s Diamond Model (Tallman, et al., 2004). Related to cluster theory is network 
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theory which focuses on inter-firm co-operation (e.g. Piore and Sabel, 1984; Rosenfeld, 
1997; Braczyk et al., 1998; Simmie and Hart, 1999; Simmie, 2010; Giuliani, 2007; Lorentzen, 
2008). According to Porter (2008), cluster theory bridges network theory and competition 
because a cluster is a form of network that occurs in a geographic location (p. 242). The key 
difference between clusters and industrial districts is that cluster theory builds on the theory 
of the firm (e.g. Coase, 1988; Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 2002) by explaining, for 
instance, not only the firm boundaries but also their heterogeneity and their performance. On 
the other hand, the industrial district concept aims to provide an alternative way to analyse 
industries, by taking equally social and economic issues into account (Ortega-Colomer et al., 
2016). 
 
 
Despite the differences across the literature there are many common elements to be found 
in the definitions. For example, in the literature on industrial districts, Becattini (1990) defines 
the industrial district as:  
“A socio-economic entity which is characterised by the interactive presence of a 
community of people and a population of firms in one both historically and naturally 
bounded area” (p. 38).  
 
 
Dei Ottati (1994) develops this definition further by defining the productive system of an 
industrial district as: 
“A concentration, in a specific area, of a large number of firms, each of which carries 
out a specialised activity that may regard either the realisation of a certain phase in 
the production process of the typical industry of the district….the division of labour 
within the industrial district is both vertical and horizontal” (p. 464).  
 
 
Industrial district theory, like cluster theory, also stresses the importance of the involvement 
of formal institutions, such as trade associations, trade unions and local government, 
involved in supporting, regulating and spreading constructive co-operation within the 
industrial district (Becattini, 1990; Dei Ottati, 1994; Rosenfeld, 1997). However, it should be 
noted that specialisation (fragmentation of the production process that provides more 
opportunities for co-operation) is mentioned more in the literature on industrial districts than 
it is in the cluster literature. Indeed, in some industries, opportunities for specialisation are 
limited due to the integrated nature of technological processes within the specific industry. 
The issue of specialisation will be discussed subsequently in this chapter.  
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According to Rosenfeld (1997), the absence of sound methods for analysing clusters as 
production and social systems was the impetus for convening 26 academics, practitioners 
and policy analysts, with an interest in and/or experience of developing clusters. The group 
arrived at a working definition: 
“A geographically bounded concentration of interdependent businesses with active 
channels for business transactions, dialogue, and communications, and that 
collectively shares common opportunities and threats’’ (p. 8).  
 
 
This definition asserts that ‘active channels’ are as important as ‘concentration’ and without 
active channels even a critical mass of related firms is not a local production or social 
system and, therefore, does not operate as a cluster. Similar to Porter’s view: “the dynamics 
of the cluster are the key to synergy and thus its competitiveness” (Rosenfeld, 1997: 8). 
 
 
In 1998, Porter further developed his definition of the term ‘cluster’: 
“A geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associated 
institutions in a particular field, which encompass an array of linked industries and 
other entities important to competition” (p. 78).  
 
 
According to Porter, linked industries and other entities can include foreign firms (his original 
definition excluded foreign firms), providing they make permanent investments in a 
significant local presence. Thus, both domestic and foreign firms contribute to the prosperity 
of a location. Although this definition is similar to Rosenfeld’s, Porter, in addition to the 
emphasis upon co-operation, stresses the importance of competition. 
 
 
Although only a few examples of cluster/district definitions are discussed in this chapter, the 
literature acknowledges a wide variety of theoretical approaches. For example, as Newlands 
(2003) stated: “the striking feature of different theories of clusters is their diversity” (p. 521); 
and, according to Bell et al., (2009), 
“Although Porter may have popularised the cluster concept, his work on clusters can 
be viewed as a synthesis of ideas derived from a range of social scientists” (p. 624).  
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Despite that fact that clusters and industrial districts are often dealt with separately in the 
literature, many commonalities have been established and will be explored in more detail 
throughout the rest of this chapter. In this research study, clusters and the industrial district 
concept will be used without distinction, although differences in both concepts are noted 
where relevant.  
 
 
A growing number of researchers (Storper and Harrison, 1991; Markusen, 1996; Gordon and 
McCann, 2000; Bell et al., 2009; Arikan, 2009; Arikan and Schilling, 2011; McCann and 
Folta, 2009; Delgado et al., 2014, 2016), do not view clusters as homogenous but rather that 
they vary significantly in terms of why and how they emerge, how they are governed, and 
consequently what types of costs and benefits they create for firms located within them. For 
example, according to Bell et al., (2009): 
“There is considerable descriptive evidence of successful clusters that exhibit a 
fundamentally different design principle – hierarchical command, involving unilateral 
rules originating from a dominant firm” (p. 623).  
 
 
Different influences on an industry’s emergence, growth and governance are explored 
further in subsequent sections of this chapter (see 2.7). So far, the literature review has 
focused on Porter’s original model and on defining the term ‘industry cluster’. From the 
definitions reviewed there is a clear focus on ‘co-operation’ and, to a lesser extent, 
‘competition’. Both of these central themes are now considered separately. 
 
 
2.4: Co-operation and Clusters 
Underlying the operation of the national diamond and the phenomenon of clustering, is the 
exchange and flow of information and knowledge between buyers, suppliers and related 
industries that ultimately leads to innovative output (Porter, 1990). These interchanges are 
termed ‘positive’ forms of co-operation and are considered in the in the economic literature 
as ‘cluster externalities’ (Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009). There is much evidence 
to be found, across a range of different literatures that links co-operation and successful 
clusters. For example, Dei Ottati (1994) in his work on industrial districts, argues that co-
ordination through co-operation and the inseparable linking of this with the market is what 
distinguishes the industrial district as a model of organisation. According to Camagni (2002), 
the industry cluster or region is described as “a system of localised technological 
externalities, social relations and local governance” (p. 2396). This idea of cluster 
22 
 
externalities is not new, such externalities were highlighted by Marshall in 1890, when he 
first used the term ‘industrial atmosphere’. Since then a variety of terms have been used to 
refer to a cluster’s external resources including, ‘social complexity’ (Piore & Sabel, 1984), 
and ‘non-traded interdependencies’ (Storper and Scott, 1989; Storper, 1992, 1997). 
According to Bell et al., (2009): 
“Cluster macro-cultures can have important effects on the organisation of individual 
transactions. At the transaction level particular attributes (i.e. specific assets, 
tacitness) provide a motivation for partner firms to deploy appropriate governance 
mechanisms, whereas the shared cluster macro-culture influences firms' ability to 
deploy” (p. 629).  
 
 
2.4.1: Co-operation and Knowledge Spillovers 
Essentially, the economists’ view of clusters has centred on the idea of knowledge spillovers 
and their link with innovation (Arrow, 1962; Audtretsch and Feldman 1996; Baptista and 
Swann, 1998; Giuliani, 2007; Roper et al., 2017). A number of studies have focused on the 
role of a firm’s internal resources as crucially important in accessing this external knowledge, 
i.e. to absorption capacity which, according to Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos (2009), “is 
crucial to the effective exploitation of external know-how and to obtaining benefit from 
complementarities between internal and external resources” (p. 263). Therefore, to 
understand competitiveness, consideration needs to be made of both internal factors and 
external resources in clusters (McEvily and Zaheer,1999; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Bell et al., 
2009; Laursen and Salter, 2014). 
 
 
2.4.2: Co-operation and Knowledge Transmission Mechanisms 
The main knowledge transmission mechanisms in clusters include linkages between the 
different agents located nearby, such as clients, suppliers and other related industries, 
through informal and formal collaboration and relationships (Becattini, 1990; Porter, 1990; 
Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009). Linkages within a cluster can be classified as 
first-order embeddedness (firm-to-firm relations), second-order embeddedness (relationships 
with social and economic institutions) and third-order embeddedness (firms indirectly related 
through social and economic institutions) (Johannisson et al., 2002). Moreover, it is the lead-
firms in the industry who are called upon to expand and develop the number of linkages in 
the cluster in order to increase the potential to generate innovation (Burt, 1992). However, 
although firms have the potential to exploit external resources, the extent to which they do so 
may vary, i.e. firms have different absorptive capacities.  
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2.4.3: Knowledge Transfer and Absorptive Capacity 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of any firm to acquire, assimilate, adapt, and apply new 
knowledge, that is ‘to learn’ (Zahra and George, 2002; Lorentzen, 2008; Grandinetti, 2016). 
Internal resources (capabilities to exploit external resources) determine how external 
resources are accessed, combined and exploited in clusters. Consequently, a lower level of 
a firm’s internal resources leads to constrained absorption of external resources. Thus, 
investing in developing internal resources can lead to greater success in exploiting external 
resources and, the synergistic interaction effect can positively influence a firm’s innovative 
performance in clusters. Moreover, the effects on the whole cluster can be dynamic (Porter, 
1990, 1998; Giuliani, 2007; Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009). Furthermore, industry 
conditions can create incentives or disincentives to invest in developing absorptive capacity. 
Participation in a cluster network may provide access to resources, but, it may also involve 
relations of dominance and dependence. Therefore, the balance among actors depends on 
the governance structure of the network (Lorentzen, 2008; Bell et al., 2009; Belso-Martinez, 
2010). Governance structures are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
 
2.4.4: Co-operation and Transaction Costs12 
Common across the literature is the view that co-operation is a crucial requirement in 
transactions where sunk costs are high (e.g. transactions involving developing innovation) 
and, where firms from different phases are engaged in the realisation of a customised 
product (Marshall, 1920; Rosenfeld, 1997; Bianchi, 1993). These types of transactions 
require trust and discretion between those involved. Rosenfeld (1997) also takes the view 
that close proximity allows firms to transact business more cheaply and easily, resolve their 
problems more quickly and efficiently, and learn earlier and more directly about new and 
innovative technologies and practices (p. 3). This idea that the cost of communication and 
transactions can be lower within industry clusters is also a feature of the work of Glaser et 
al., (1992). However, certain transactions in labour markets, inter-firm relations, innovation 
and knowledge development require appropriate co-ordinating institutions (Storper 1997), 
and this is particularly true during the later stages of the industry’s development. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Transaction costs are the economic costs of using the price mechanism over and above production costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
 
24 
 
2.4.5: Co-operation and Networking 
The literature on ‘networking’ also places importance on the link between co-operation and 
innovative activity. Tassey (1991) argues that networking is essential for the development of 
a region’s knowledge infrastructure. Ebadi and Utterback (1984) have demonstrated that 
network cohesiveness is positively correlated to the degree of innovative success. Roberts 
et al., (1992) found that network cohesiveness has a positive impact on the diffusion of 
industrial innovations. However, there are some differences in the literature regarding the 
definition of a network. According to Braczyk et al., (1998), local networks are suggested to 
represent both personal networks and trust among the agents, and on this background the 
emergence of new and competitive regions can be understood. However, Rosenfeld (1997) 
takes the view that clusters are different to networks: 
“clusters are systems in which membership is based on interdependence and making 
a contribution to the functioning of the system, unlike networks or inter-firm co-
operation where collaborative business activities are carried out by discrete, usually 
small, groups of firms in order to generate sales and profits through, e.g. joint 
exporting, production, R&D, product development or problem solving” (p. 3). 
 
 
Asheim et al., (2011: 879) also acknowledge several differences between networks and 
clusters: 
1) Cluster firms may exist in a geographic area but may not take part in networking 
relationships; 
2) Clusters are inherently geographic and spatial, while the network concept is ‘by 
definition an a-spatial concept’; 
3) Clusters and networks each give rise to different types of external economies, and 
thus each has different effects on regional competitive advantage. 
 
 
The main difference between clusters and networks has already been noted in this thesis 
(see 2.3.1). For this research study, key aspects of network theory are combined with key 
aspects of cluster theories and industrial district theories into a comprehensive theoretical 
framework, which will be applied to analyse the SOT ceramics industry cluster (see Figure 
2.4).  
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2.4.6: Co-operation and Trust 
Similar to the view of Braczyk et al., (1998), modern Industrial District Theory also 
emphasises the interdependence of firms and the importance of trust in creating and 
sustaining collaboration between economic actors within the districts (Maskell, 2001; 
Newlands, 2003). These types of interdependent networks permit the establishment of trust 
between actors. Firms within networks of trust benefit from the reciprocal exchange of 
information (particularly tacit information that cannot be codified) but are simultaneously 
bound by ties of obligation which regulate behaviour (Brusco, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Dei Ottati, 2004). The implicit assumption is that social trust is more likely to be sustained in 
geographically concentrated networks than more dispersed ones (Belussi, 1996; Lorenzen, 
2002; Newlands, 2003). According to Casson (2000), to be of theoretical distinction trust 
must denote a form of market coordination that is different from the spot transactions treated 
by orthodox economics. A useful definition of trust in this context could be: 
“The expectation held by a trustor (i.e., a representative of a firm) that one or several 
trustees (i.e., representatives of another firm or firms) will cooperate (i.e., not act 
dishonestly or otherwise opportunistically against the trustor), even if the trustor holds 
no power over the trustee to ensure that he does so” (Lorenzen, 2002: 17). 
 
 
Trust lowers coordination costs, e.g. by having common objectives and by lowering contract 
costs (Lorenzen, 2002, 2007). A distinction is drawn in the literature between ‘dyadic’ trust 
and ‘networked’ trust. Dyadic trust facilitates dyadic trade, and trust that is mutual within a 
small group of firms, networked trust facilitates trade within this exclusive network of firms. 
However, another term, ‘social trust’ (Coleman, 1984; Lorenzen, 2007; Belussi and Sedita, 
2009), describes trust that facilitates trade within a whole environment of potential suppliers 
and customers through lowering contract costs, hence allowing for a mix of long-term, short-
term and shifting economic relations (Lorenzen, 2002). The social capital and mutual trust 
within such networks is what makes firms, associations and public agencies engage in 
processes of self-organised, interactive learning (Simmie, 1997; Storper, 1997; Braczyk et 
al., 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Lorentzen, 2008). 
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2.4.7: Co-operation and the Strength of Network Ties 
According to Lorentzen (2008), the outcome of network relations can be said to depend on 
two factors: 1) the quality of the network ties, i.e. weak ties13 are thought to have higher 
value, and; 2) the quality of the firm (Lorentzen, 2008). Ties can be either strong or weak. 
Strong ties are intense relations between agents of great similarity (similar to Rosenfeld’s 
1997 view), they offer a great depth of knowledge but little diversity of knowledge. Weak ties 
offer access to diverse information, they call existing knowledge into question and add new 
elements leading to innovation (Julien et al., 2004; Tallman et al., 2004).  This concept of 
strong and weak ties is similar to Johannisson’s classifications of embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1973; Johannisson et al., 2007). 
 
 
Empirically, it has been shown that weak ties can trigger technological innovation (Julien et 
al., 2004: 266-267). Moreover, ‘non-redundant’ ties, those ties of network members that are 
not connected with each other, are also important in knowledge sourcing (Lorentzen, 2008). 
Another important factor determining the outcome of networking is the capability of firms to 
network and to use the resources provided by the network (Lorentzen, 2008; Tallman et al., 
2004). Furthermore, it is also mentioned in the literature that some firms in an industry 
cluster will follow exploration-based search strategies (weak ties) which involve conducting 
searches in technologically proximate domains, typically generating incremental knowledge 
closely related to their existing knowledge. The more firms in a cluster that follow 
exploration-based search strategies, the more opportunities arise for inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges within the cluster (Arikan, 2009). Knowledge exchange in clusters refers to 
cluster firms transferring and using each other’s knowledge, through both formal and 
informal mechanisms (Biggiero, 2006; Malmberg and Maskell, 2002, 2005; Maskell, 2001b). 
According to Tallman, et al. (2004), economic geographers have come to see knowledge 
exchange (through knowledge spillovers14, informal exchange, movement of people, and so 
forth) as critical to defining performance in regional clusters (p. 254). However, whether a 
firm chooses to make its knowledge available to other firms in the cluster is dependent on 
whether external exploitation of knowledge endangers the firm’s competitive standing inside 
the cluster15.  
                                                 
13 In 1973 the sociologist Mark Granovetter published a paper titled “The Strength of Weak Ties” in which he explains and discusses the 
value of weak ties. Granovetter analogizes weak ties to being bridges which allow us to disseminate and get access to information that we 
might not otherwise have access to. 
14 Knowledge spillovers are the direct or indirect transfer of knowledge from one party to another. They are typically generated by firms 
engaging in innovation activities and are valued because they provide knowledge that is new, even novel to the receiving firm. (Source: 
Gilbert et al., 2008) 
15 Network capability is linked to the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ and has been discussed in more detail previously in this chapter.  
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2.4.8: Co-operation with Agents Outside the Cluster 
An emerging theme in the literature on clusters and networks acknowledges the need, in 
response to changing technological and global economic conditions, for non-local knowledge 
relations in order to maintain and vitalise the local characteristics of clusters (Belussi and 
Asheim, 2003; Bathelt et al., 2004; Cook, 2005; Giuliani and Bell, 2005; Anderson and 
Lorenzen, 2007; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011; Lai et al., 2014; Boschma, 2015). Although 
network theory focuses on the benefits of weak ties and non-redundant information in closely 
knitted networks, network theory has no geographic focus. Strong and weak ties may 
develop on all spatial scales (MacKinnon et al., 2002). Moreover, strong ties and redundant 
network ties, characterised by proximity, trust, common values and so on, are likely to result, 
eventually, in the circulation of redundant information, In other words, a ‘technological lock-
in’ (Bell et al., 2009). One way of overcoming negative lock-in effects is to develop the 
cluster’s external ties, i.e., to develop relationships with agents outside the cluster or with 
foreign firms (Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011). Reasons for lock-in situations can originate, not 
only in an exhausted regional trajectory, but also in ‘long existing, closed, and homogeneous 
networks’, which are unable to renew the cluster with new knowledge (Lazzeretti and 
Capone, 2016). According to Lorentzen (2008), "such close networks must be supplemented 
by loose networks, with odd partners, if knowledge leading to innovation is to be sourced" (p. 
542). This view is similar to those of Lai et al., (2014), who suggests that cluster firms need 
to ‘consciously cultivate’ distant linkages in their network ties in order to neutralize the 
tendencies for lock‐in and to arrest entropic deterioration in their respective clusters, and 
also Tavassoli and Carbonara (2014), who suggest that the intensity of external knowledge 
flowing into a region has a positive effect on innovation of a region.  
 
 
In the modern day global economy, the majority of clusters are connected in global value 
chains. However, regions and clusters should be more open to ‘newcomers’ that act as 
knowledge diffusers and create both inflows and outflows of knowledge (Cook, 2005; 
Giuliani, 2011; Boschma, 2015). The transfer of knowledge from local to a global scale has 
received names such as ‘non-cluster economies’ (Yeung et al., 2006), ‘extra-cluster 
linkages’ (Giuliani and Bell, 2005; Giuliani, 2011), or ‘global pipelines’ (Anderson and 
Lorenzen, 2007; Maskell, 2014; Fitjar and Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). The concept of pipelines 
takes its origin from the fact that new knowledge could come from outside the cluster and so 
encourage firms to establish pipelines to global customers of excellence. However, it should 
also be noted that clusters may be incapable of moving away from traditional ways of 
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working, perhaps due to historical reasons and/or path dependency. For example, a type of 
intellectual lock-in made it hard for the Detroit automobile cluster to shift out of large-car 
production in the 1970s (Audretsch, 1998). Lock-in effects and other reasons for cluster 
failure are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
 
2.4.9: Co-operation and Governance Structures 
Arikan and Schilling (2011), in their work on governance structures in industrial districts, 
contend that different governance types in clusters lead to radically different types of 
interactions inside clusters, as well as different bases of competitive advantage for member 
firms (p. 774). They describe two continuous dimensions along which they argue that 
clusters vary in their structure and governance: the ‘need for co-ordination’; and, 
‘centralisation of control’. In many clusters, firms are co-located but otherwise exhibit little co-
ordination, co-operative behaviours may exist but they are usually the outcome of market 
forces, rather than through explicit control or negotiation between firms. According to Arikan 
and Schilling, the primary factor that leads to a high need for co-ordination is a combination 
of ‘complexity’ and ‘imperfect separability’.  
 
 
2.4.9.1: Governance Structures and Complexity 
Complexity can take two forms: firstly, high or low technological complexity. High 
technological complexity may require firms to break down product systems into more 
manageable components, leading to specialisation and hence the need for co-ordination. In 
contrast, industries such as furniture and wine-making (and possibly ceramics sectors like 
tableware and giftware) are characterised by relatively simpler technologies (low 
technological complexity), where individual firms may possess most or all of the knowledge 
and capabilities needed in production, and thus have little need for inter-firm co-ordination. 
For example, some clusters are single industry clusters where firms are dependent on a 
common knowledge base. In such cases opportunities for specialisation may be limited (few 
components in the production system) and, firms’ may engage in direct competition with 
each other (St. John and Pouder, 2006). Therefore, in industries that are characterised by 
relatively simple technologies, where individual firms may possess most or all of the 
knowledge and capabilities needed in production, they may have little need for inter-firm co-
ordination (Arikan and Schilling, 2011). Moreover, in such industries firms are likely to be 
hesitant to make their valuable knowledge available to other firms in the cluster for fear of 
endangering their competitive position (Arikan, 2009). Consequently, the structure of the 
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industry plays an important role in cluster firms’ willingness to engage in inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges. 
 
 
The second form of complexity relates to the nature of the business environment. When an 
industry has many different types of customers with varying and rapidly-changing demand 
characteristics, the firms in that industry will experience pressure to produce more alternative 
configurations from available inputs and frequently change product characteristics in order to 
meet idiosyncratic customer preferences (Arikan and Schilling, 2011). Firms may 
disaggregate activities across a group of participants, each can specialise in a narrow range 
of activities. Such disaggregation will lead to a greater need for inter-firm co-ordination. 
Firms in industries that have relatively simpler technologies, and have not previously had a 
great need for inter-firm co-operation, may experience sudden changes in the external 
environment, e.g. increased and unprecedented global competition, and this may create a 
greater need for inter-firm co-operation. In such cases, due to historical reasons and path 
dependency, cluster firms may not possess the necessary capabilities to forge co-operative 
linkages.  
 
 
Complexity may provide the motivation for firms to pool their efforts to break down that 
complexity into more manageable pieces, but it is the separability of activities and resources 
that determines the ease or effectiveness of doing so (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Schilling, 
2000; Arikan and Schilling, 2011). In clusters where product systems are characterised by 
inseparability, joint production within a single firm might be the most effective form of 
governance due to the difficulty of separating production activities in a way that allows 
multiple firms to act in parallel, e.g. in the steel industry (and possibly ceramics). Conversely, 
if the activities in the production system are highly independent, they can be performed by 
different firms with little or no co-ordination. Most industries lie in-between these two 
extremes, e.g. the computer industry (Arikan and Schilling, 2011). 
 
 
2.4.9.2: Governance Structures and Control 
Centralisation of control refers to the degree to which one or more parties have 
disproportionate authority or influence over which interactions take place and how they are 
carried out (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). For example, a cluster can vary from being 
almost purely market-like with no centralised control and characterised by governance only 
in the form of the invisible hand, to being very hierarchy-like with a single powerful entity 
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exerting great control over others in the cluster (Bell et al., 2009; Arikan and Schilling, 2011). 
Control over the architecture of the final system may be highly concentrated within the hands 
of a single (or few) firms (Brusoni et al., 2001; Belso-Martinez, 2010). For example, when a 
firm retains control over a dominant technology standard in an industry it may be able to 
exert some degree of architectural control over the system in which the technology is 
embedded (Schilling, 2000), e.g. the firm may also be able to control the rate at which the 
technology is upgraded or refined. Thus, the firm that possesses control can rise to become 
hubs that dictate much of the behaviour in the district due to their large potential bargaining 
power (Belso-Martinez, 2010; Arikan and Schilling, 2011). Moreover, these powerful actors 
may use their position to further their own strategic interests, possibly to the detriment of 
others (Cowling and Sugden, 1998). For example, smaller firms might find themselves 
‘closed out’ of markets because of the anti-competitive strategies of larger competitors, or 
they might be coerced into accepting an iniquitous set of contract conditions from a large 
powerful contractor (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). 
 
 
2.4.10: Examples of Cluster Governance Structures 
An example of clusters where some opportunities for co-ordination exist (low-medium 
technological complexity) are the ceramic tile and textile clusters in ‘Third Italy’ (Becattini, 
1990; Becattini and Rullani, 1996). These clusters consist of predominantly small and 
medium-sized firms with relatively little market-power differentials, i.e. no one firm has 
enough power to influence other cluster firms strategic postures, a degree of flexible 
specialisation (some separability of the production process) is a feature of these clusters. 
Other clusters emerge around powerful, globally connected, vertically-integrated16 lead firms 
surrounded by less powerful suppliers. For example: Detroit’s automotive cluster (Markusen, 
1996; Gordon and McCann, 2000; Hannigan et al., 2015); and, Pittsburgh’s steel cluster 
(Treado, 2010). Although lead firms are vertically-integrated, separability exists within the 
supply chain. In clusters of this type hierarchical control by the lead firm can replace 
institutional norms as the dominant co-ordinating mechanism for inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges (Arikan, 2009, 2011).  
 
 
                                                 
16 Vertical integration is the expansion of a firm into different steps along its production path or supply chain. A vertically integrated 
produce company, for example, might hold a farm, a produce distribution business and a green grocery. A farm's acquisition of a 
distributorship would constitute forward integration, while the green grocer’s launch of a distributorship would be considered backward 
integration. (Source: Small Business Chronicle (2018), Examples of Vertically Integrated Companies, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/examples-vertically-integrated-companies-12868.html. [Accessed 20th February 2018] 
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According to Giuliani and Bell (2005), the presence of firms with a stronger knowledge base 
in clusters is associated with denser and better connected intra-cluster knowledge systems. 
These ‘leading firms’ (Lazerson and Lorenzioni, 1999) or ‘technological gatekeepers’ 
(Giuliani, 2011, 2013; Grandinetti, 2016) are mainly responsible for acquiring external 
knowledge and subsequently transferring it as specific ‘know-how’ adapted to each cluster, 
or as operational knowledge to be exploited in local clusters. When knowledge is transferred 
in this way it contributes to the ‘industrial atmosphere’ (Marshall, 1923: 287) of the cluster 
and also helps to avoid lock-in. However, as Marshall also acknowledges, lead firms in 
clusters do not always share their knowledge with other cluster members and this can be to 
the detriment of the cluster. Examples of clusters that are characterised by low technological 
complexity and imperfect separability are the steel industry and, possibly, the UK ceramics 
industry cluster (tableware and giftware sector). In the UK ceramics cluster, possibly due to 
these conditions, the need for co-ordination has historically been low. Moreover, according 
to Sacchetti and Tomlinson (2009), since the 1970s the cluster has consolidated and 
evolved towards a more hierarchical mode of economic governance, with lead firms having a 
major negative impact on the ‘shape’ and ‘direction’ of the cluster. As Sacchetti and 
Tomlinson state: “…the larger ceramics firms have neglected the cluster’s longer-term 
development, in particular in relation to new investment capacity and the skills base” (p. 
1854).  
 
 
2.4.11: Other influences on Co-operation 
Another factor that influences whether a cluster firm chooses to exploit a particular body of 
knowledge internally is the level of technological dynamism surrounding the cluster’s 
products. The higher the level of technological dynamism surrounding the products that 
characterise the cluster, the more opportunities arise for inter-firm knowledge exchanges 
within the cluster (Arikan, 2009). 
 
 
Initial governance choices made by transacting firms within clusters can enable and 
constrain the design of future transactions between these firms owing to path 
dependencies17 that reside in the governance devices themselves. Such path dependencies 
influence firms’ ability to adapt to new circumstances (Bell et al., 2009; Belussi and Sedita, 
2009). Successful clusters display the capacity to match governance mechanisms with 
                                                 
17 In this thesis, path dependency refers to ‘the historical pattern of technological development that is thought to play a central role in 
determining the pace of future technological change’, (Redding, 2002). 
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transaction attributes, both cross-sectionally at the level of individual transactions, and over 
time across related transactions. However, the number of clusters that manage to reinvent 
themselves over time in changing circumstances is small in relation to those that decline as 
new technologies and competitors emerge elsewhere (Pouder and St. John, 1996). Path 
dependency may also be strongly related to issues discussed earlier in this chapter, such as 
the need-for co-ordination, technological complexity and separability of the production 
processes. 
 
 
The literature emphasises that the most successful districts tend to be those that are the 
most racially and culturally homogeneous (Harrison, 1992). Wider national influences, such 
as economic, legal and policy traditions, can also influence the development of inter-firm co-
operation. Various studies have shown that the development of inter-firm co-operation is 
more likely in some countries, e.g. Italy, than in others, e.g. the UK, because of differences 
in the operations of competition policy and labour markets (Porter, 1990, 2000a; Becattini, 
1991, 2000; Saxenian, 1994). There is also some evidence that differences in the cultures of 
regions may contribute to differences in attitudes towards co-operation. For example, 
Saxenian (1994) argues that a culture of greater interdependence and exchange among 
individuals in the Silicon Valley region contributed to a superior innovative performance than 
found around Boston’s Route 128, where firms and individuals tended to be more isolated 
and less interdependent. However, it must be noted that Silicon Valley is a high technology 
cluster with a high degree of separability in the production process and, therefore, not 
comparable to the comparatively low-tech SOT ceramics cluster. In the case of Silicon 
Valley, due to separability, the need for co-ordination would be high. Saxenian’s view is 
similar to the concept of ‘shared vision’ (Exposito-Langa et al., 2015; Tomlinson and 
Branston, 2017), whereby cluster members who share a vision are more likely to influence 
local industry issues and initiatives. 
 
 
2.5: Competition and Clusters 
As noted previously in this chapter (see 2.2.1), competitive rivalry promotes upgrading of the 
entire national (local) diamond, e.g., through new entrants and innovation (Porter, 1990). To 
be most effective, interchanges (co-operation) between firms in the cluster must occur at the 
same time as ‘active competitive rivalry’ is maintained in each separate industry. Thus, the 
city or region becomes a unique environment for competing in the industry. Not only does 
the increased number of firms provide greater competition for new ideas, greater competition 
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across firms facilitates the entry of a new firm specialising in some particular new product 
niche (Jacobs, 1969; Dei Ottati, 1996).  
 
 
2.5.1: Positive versus Negative Competition 
Geographic concentration of rivals then can promote efficiencies and specialisation and, 
more importantly, influence improvement and innovation. Rivals located spatially close 
together often tend to be jealous and emotional competitors (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000a). As 
discussed earlier, innovation is widely viewed as a driver of competition, thus a firm may 
possess technologies which are superior to others regardless of the level of factor prices 
(Newlands, 2003). Distinctions are drawn in the economic literature between ‘negative’ 
versus ‘positive’ competition (Porter, 1990), and ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ competition (Hudson, 
1999).  
 
 
Positive or strong competition involves the creation of new goods or new technologies to 
produce existing goods. Weak or negative competition involves the search for lower cost 
means of producing existing goods with existing technologies, often leading to price-based 
competition. According to Dei Ottati, (1994, 1996), price competition can lead to: conflict and 
tensions that act as an obstacle to co-operation among individuals and firms in a district; a 
reduction in financial resources (lower profits) available to invest in innovative activity; 
decreased willingness to collaborate on the part of workers within the firms (due wage 
reductions); and, decreased willingness on the part of other local specialised firms engaged 
in complementary activities to co-operate. This outcome occurred in the Prato textile district 
in Italy after a period of decline in demand for the woollen fabrics in which the district 
specialised (Dei Ottati, 1996).  
 
 
2.5.2: The Balance Between Competition and Co-operation 
Dei Ottati (1994) also recognised the need for a balance between co-operation and 
competition in the industrial district, ”the stability of the industrial district over time calls for 
internal competition and co-operation to be well behaved and to stay together in a 
reciprocally balanced relationship” (p. 474), hence the need for the involvement of formal 
and informal institutions to support and regulate the industry. According to Newlands, (2003), 
“there is no necessary contradiction between collaboration and competition” (p. 528). 
Moreover, the benefits of collaboration can overcome the negative externalities of corrosive 
competition and diseconomies of scale (Raco, 1999). Particularly for small firms, co-
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operation in the establishment of marketing or training facilities, or of R&D laboratories, may 
allow them to gain access to economies of scale, scope and agglomeration, whilst 
enhancing competition in the product market (Oughton and Whittam, 1997; Newlands, 
2003). Competition between firms may provide market disciplines which ensure the 
continued competitive advantage of a cluster and, in turn, attract new firms to it. Thus, co-
operation and competition become a mutually reinforcing positive relationship (Newlands, 
2003), that raises the average level of competitiveness of firms and systems (Belussi and 
Sedita, 2009). When the cluster reaches a balance between co-operation and competition 
the interplay between the two can be dynamic and can act to prime a kind of virtuous circle 
(Dei Ottati, 1994).  
 
 
Constructive competition may involve firms constantly searching for some kind of 
competitive advantage. This may be through product/process innovation or through 
emulating industry leaders. Such competition promotes new firm start-ups, possibly as spin-
offs from existing firms by ex-employees with new ideas. This increases competition and 
innovation further. Constructive competition in an industry can lead to co-operation based on 
local customs, reciprocity and trust. If all firms agree (informally) to adhere (behave) to local 
norms, an environment that facilitates knowledge transfer can develop. Thus, stimulating 
further investments in reputation and innovation, which lead to a further increase in 
constructive competition.  
 
 
Both Porter (1990), and Dei Ottati (1994), acknowledge that certain types of co-operation 
and competition can also be destructive. For example, when restrictive agreements are 
made which act as barriers, and when competitive behaviour leads to predatory practices 
with the precise aim of eliminating not the least efficient competitors but those with lower 
market power or who offer better quality goods, often by fraudulent means to obtain 
monopoly power. Cost leadership strategies are another strongly path-dependent triggering 
factor that can lead to lock-in trajectories. Such strategies tend to be myopic and firms 
adopting them risk being stuck in a perverse spiral, or ‘vicious circle’ (Dei Ottati, 1994) of  
cost reduction, which does not provide any relevant resources to face global competition 
from low-cost countries (Belussi and Sedita, 2009). When the cluster experiences mounting 
pressures of competition it may have a negative effect on the creation and maintenance of 
trust within the cluster, as firms may choose to trade-off between the benefits of mutual 
collaboration and the potential loss of competitive advantage (Newlands, 2003). The view 
that competition is more conducive to knowledge externalities than is local monopoly is also 
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found in the literature on Economic Geography and Industrial Districts (e.g. Jacobs, 1969; 
Dei Ottati, 1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996), i.e. an increased number of firms provides 
greater competition for new ideas and facilitates the entry of new firms specialising in some 
particular new product niche.  
 
 
Thus far, the Literature Review has focused on knowledge in clusters, and on how 
knowledge is created through various forms of: 1) local inter-organisational co-operation and 
collaborative interaction; and, 2) increased local competition and intensified rivalry. The 
benefits of increased local co-operation and local competition should lead to innovation 
(Porter, 1990, 1998; Dei Ottati, 1994, 1996). Innovation can be linked to the ability to come 
up with new and better ways of organising the production and marketing of new and better 
products (Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Malmberg and Power, 2005). Hence, the next 
section of this chapter examines the literature on innovation in industry clusters and its link to 
knowledge creation and knowledge transfer. 
 
 
2.6: Innovation and Clusters 
As discussed in earlier sections, firm innovation18 is a function of the strength of the cluster 
in which it is located and, as stated in earlier sections of this chapter, cluster theories have 
already identified external localisation economies as drivers of innovation in industry 
clusters. According to Jaffe (1989) and Jaffe et al., (1993), the transmission of technological 
knowledge works better within spatial boundaries because this type of knowledge has a tacit 
and uncodified nature. Audretsch & Feldman (1996) and Baptista and Swann (1998), 
through their work on measuring the extent of knowledge spillovers and linking them to the 
geography of innovative activity, suggest that location and proximity clearly matter in 
exploiting knowledge spillovers (innovation). Glaser et al., (1992) also suggest that an 
increase in concentration of a particular industry, within a specific geographic region, 
facilitates knowledge spillovers across firms and, therefore, facilitates innovative activity. 
However, numerous studies have shown that clusters vary widely with respect to their 
innovative outcomes and, in particular, in their ability to enhance individual firms’ knowledge 
creation efforts (Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 1998; Tallman et al., 2004). 
 
 
                                                 
18 Innovation is taken to mean, “the successful introduction of new products and processes. The sources of novelty may include, new 
technology, new skills, new forms of organisation and new markets and frequently a combination of any or all of these” (Barber and 
Lambert, 1997 cited in Simmie, 2002, p. 887). 
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2.6.1: The Distinction Between Knowledge and Information 
Audretsch (2000), in response to claims that new communications technologies have 
reduced the need to cluster spatially (as information can be transferred more easily and 
cheaply), reaffirmed that geographic location “is indeed important to the process of linking 
knowledge spillovers to innovative activity” (p. 157). According to Porter (2000a) geographic 
co-location, “still allows special access, special relationships, better information, powerful 
incentives and other advantages that are hard to tap from a distance” (p. 32). Since his 
original research in 1990, Porter further developed his work on national competitive 
advantage to address claims that global competition has diminished the importance of 
proximity to suppliers and customers. The main conclusions from this research also show a 
growing importance of location and clusters in increasingly complex, knowledge-based and 
dynamic economies (Porter, 1998, 2000a).  
 
 
However, Audretsch (1998: 21) also argues that it is ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘information’ 
that can be fully exploited within the cluster and therefore a distinction must be made 
between the two. Knowledge that is simpler, codified, less tacit,19 and less path dependent is 
more likely to be mobile (Tallman et al., 2004). Although the costs of transmitting 
information, e.g. prices, exchange rates and other data, may have been significantly reduced 
as a consequence of the telecommunications revolution, knowledge is very different, it is 
vague, difficult to codify and, according to Audretsch (2000), “the cost of transmitting 
knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, rises with distance” (p.157). This view is supported 
by Simmie (2002), who states: “successful knowledge transfer decays with distance” (p. 
889). 
 
 
Other empirical evidence to support the ‘tacit knowledge’ argument has been provided by: 
Von Hipple (1994), who believes high context, uncertain knowledge, or ‘sticky knowledge’ is 
best transmitted via face-to-face interaction and through frequent and repeated contact; and, 
Glaser et al., (1992), who claims that intellectual breakthroughs can “cross hallways and 
streets more easily than oceans and continents”. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Tacit knowledge incorporates so much embedded learning that its rules may be impossible to separate, thus it is almost impossible to 
reproduce in a document or database. That is, tacit knowledge normally cannot be spoken, but rather demonstrated and imitated (Source: 
Polanyi, 1966). Tacit knowledge is also called artistry that expresses itself in occupational know how of an expert. It develops as a result 
of a long practice. It is shown as a skillful, intuitive-like action and it is completely dependent on its holder. (Puusa and Eerikaenen, 2010) 
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However, in recent studies there is some evidence that the internet and social media are 
making it easier to transfer information (not tacit knowledge) about companies and products. 
For example, according to Negrusa et al., (2014), “it is very easy for a company to obtain 
information about the industry in general, competitor’s intentions, consumer behaviour etc.” 
(p. 590). Moreover, by applying new forms of communication, such as different tools of 
social media, the network or cluster may collectively employ initiatives to gain strong 
reputation and brand image in the market. Presence in a branded cluster, or network, can 
also help remote members find companies or partners, and to trust them to perform the 
kinds of activities needed and cooperate (p. 591).  
 
 
2.6.2: Component versus Architectural Knowledge 
In 1998, Matusik and Hill developed a typology of organisational knowledge which focuses 
on two types of knowledge ‘component’ versus ‘architectural’. Component knowledge ranges 
in nature from straightforward technical (simple, tangible, explicit) know-how through to 
highly systemic (complex, intangible, tacit) scientific knowledge. Highly technical knowledge 
includes blueprints, product patents, step-by-step instructions for an operation, and so forth, 
in other words ‘information’. Whereas, systemic component knowledge includes scientific 
theory, complex process patents, activities that require learning-by-doing, organisational 
routines and so on. The more technical, as opposed to systemic, a piece of component 
knowledge is, the faster and more coherently it will be disseminated within a regional cluster 
(Tallman et al., 2004; Jenkins and Tallman, 2012). This view is linked to the concept of 
transaction costs, which has the paradigm problem to make or buy (Williamson, 1985). 
 
 
However, when a cluster’s product technologies are highly modular, it is possible for different 
firms in the cluster to specialise in different bodies of knowledge associated with different 
components. Under perfect modularity, each firm would be able to integrate its component 
into the overall product architecture without exchanging any knowledge associated with the 
design and manufacture of its component, thanks to the presence of standardised 
component interfaces (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Arikan, 2009). Low modularity in product 
technology reduces the number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges within 
the cluster. Therefore, component knowledge will only provide short-term competitive 
advantage to firms within a cluster while it remains private, and component knowledge that is 
public only within the cluster provides short-term competitive advantage to the cluster as a 
whole (Tallman et al., 2004).  
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Architectural knowledge relates to an organisation as an entire system and to the structures 
and routines for co-ordinating and integrating its component knowledge for productive use, 
and for developing new architectural and component knowledge (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994; Matusik and Hill, 1998; McGaughey, 2002; Tallman et al., 2004). Architectural 
knowledge evolves endogenously as an inseparable part of the firm rather than existing 
independently and, as no two firms are exactly the same, is highly individual. Although the 
body of architectural knowledge is not coherently assembled, and so not readily transferable, 
elements may leak-out through constant interaction with other firms in the cluster. As a 
result, through constant interaction, the firms in a regional cluster will develop a stock of 
architectural knowledge over time, i.e. understandings that develop at the regional level and 
distinguish the cluster from the rest of the industry (Matusik and Hill, 1998; Tallman et al., 
2004; Lorentzen, 2008). Such architectural knowledge is identified in the Strategic 
Management literature as: ‘core competencies’ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990); ‘organisational 
resources/competences’ (Barney, 1991); ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece et al., 1997); and, is 
widely viewed as the key to sustained competitive advantage for individual firms providing it 
remains private to the firm for an extended time period (Porter, 1990; Sanches et al., 1996).  
 
 
2.6.3: Innovation Mechanisms 
The arguments presented above suggest that firms located in clusters should be more likely 
to innovate than firms outside these clusters. Several types of mechanisms leading to new 
knowledge and innovations have been identified (Bellandi, 1992; Tallman et al., 2004; Boix 
and Trullen, 2010). They include: R&D; learning by doing; learning by using, 
entrepreneurship; and, the breaking up of the production chain into many phases. According 
to Becattini (1991), R&D is not the main source of innovations, the main amount of 
innovations seem to proceed from spontaneous creativity. However, direct co-operations 
between firms are not the usual ways of diffusing innovations, this takes place through a 
social process (weak-ties) in which there is informal exchange of information in public 
spaces or domestic life between the workforce and, sometimes, between entrepreneurs and 
managers (Becattini, 1991; Bellandi, 1992; Asheim, 1994; Boix and Trullen, 2010).   
 
 
Another factor is the spin-off mechanism of entrepreneurship, where new ideas or 
conceptions lead to the creation of new firms, or vice versa (Boix and Trullen, 2010). Thus, 
entrepreneurship can serve as a conduit for the spillover of knowledge and is, thereby, 
conducive to economic growth (Acs et al., 2012). Furthermore, there is a growing body of 
research claiming that smaller firms account for a disproportionate share of product 
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innovations (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Acs et al., 1994; Klepper, 1996; Audtretsch, 2002; 
Hall et al., 2009). These studies have identified vigorous innovative activity emanating from 
small firms in certain industries. As Acs and Audretsch (1990) and Acs et al., (1994) 
demonstrated, small and frequently new firms are able to generate innovative output while 
undertaking generally negligible amounts of investment in knowledge generating inputs such 
as R&D. One explanation for this is that small firms exploit knowledge created by 
expenditures on research made by others, e.g. Universities and R&D departments in large 
corporations.  
 
 
2.6.4 : Innovation Communication Channels 
Several communication channels for knowledge exchange exist in clusters (Arikan, 2009). 
One is ‘local-buzz’ (Bathelt et al., 2004), created by face-to-face interactions between 
members of cluster firms that take place within local community organisations as well as 
informal forums such as bars and restaurants. The second channel is local collaboration 
networks (Arikan, 2009).Thus, the partners involved in the innovation process have to 
understand each other very well, i.e. they must ‘share codes’. It has been suggested in the 
literature that only partners belonging to the same social, cultural and institutional 
environment are able to understand each other so well (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; 
Lorentzen, 2008; Bell et al., 2009). Other ways in which innovations are diffused include 
inter-firm mobility of workers (Porter, 1990; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Arikan, 2009), 
when moving employees carry information to their new employers about their previous 
employers’ knowledge assets and possible uses of knowledge in different contexts. As a 
result, higher levels of labour mobility lead to higher connectivity among cluster firms. Other 
channels include media (Arikan, 2009) and the chain of specialised suppliers and their 
innovations (Boix and Trullen, 2010). Therefore, it can be assumed, that the more 
information channels and knowledge brokers there are present in a cluster to establish 
connectivity between cluster firms, the greater the number of opportunities for inter-firm 
knowledge exchanges there will be. 
 
 
2.6.5: Measuring Innovation 
The measurement of innovation is a widely discussed topic in the literature, and there is no 
widely accepted agreement as to which indicator is the most appropriate (Griliches, 1990; 
Acs et al., 1992; Boix and Trullen, 2010). The most commonly used innovation indicators are 
usually either ‘input indicators’, such as R&D expenditure or employment (e.g. Beaudry and 
Breschi, 2003), or ‘output indicators’ such as patents and new product announcements (e.g. 
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Jaffe, 1989; Santarelli, 2004; Boix and Galletto, 2009; Boix and Trullen, 2010), or 
combinations of any or all of these (Barber and Lambert, 1997; Simmie, 2002). The main 
problem with measuring innovation based only on input indicators is that it fails to take into 
account those activities related to contextual knowledge, which are more important in 
smaller firms, thus underestimating their innovative capacity (Boix and Galetto, 2009). 
Patents and new product announcements represent some of the outcomes of the innovative 
process. However, there is a commonly held view that patents are not always suitable 
indicators of innovation in industrial clusters, as firms in clusters commonly do not always 
register innovations. Where patent data is available, possibly from several different sources, 
it is common practice to consider that data over a period of about 4-5 years (Griliches, 1992; 
Boix and Trullen, 2010). Hence, it is likely that several input/output variables may need to be 
measured in order to achieve a more accurate picture of innovation in an industry cluster 
(Massa and Testa, 2008). Table 2.1 presents some possible innovation variables that could 
be considered in attempts to measure innovation. A full discussion of innovation measures 
utilised for the research will be provided in the Methodology chapter of this thesis.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Possible Variables When Measuring Innovation 
Processes Products Markets 
Technology uptake Designs New markets 
Labour/employment Patents New segments 
 
 
2.6.6: Innovation and Knowledge Creation Capability 
It is widely recognised in the literature that innovative activities in clusters have a highly 
cumulative nature, moreover inventive activity will tend to concentrate in locations where 
invention rates have long been high and where a market for technology has evolved more 
fully, irrespective of the share of industry production (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1996; 
Beaudry and Breschi, 2003). Thus, a firm is more likely to innovate if located in a cluster 
where the presence of innovative firms and supporting institutions in its own industry is 
strong, and where there is a large pool of potential spillovers associated with a large 
accumulated stock of knowledge. On the contrary, quite strong disadvantages arise from a 
strong presence of non-innovative companies in a firm’s own industry. There is also some 
evidence in the literature that clustering in itself may be necessary, but not sufficient, to 
explain all of a firm’s propensity to innovate. Bridging institutions that provide information 
about technological opportunities and mediate relations among inventors, suppliers, and 
those that commercially develop or exploit new technologies, also play an important role in 
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the cluster (Saxenian, 1994; Beaudry and Breschi, 2003). Overall, the propensity to innovate 
is linked to the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ (p. 10).  
 
 
In 2009, Andac Arikan developed a framework that identifies contributors to a cluster’s 
knowledge creation capability (Figure 2.2). Many of these contributors have already been 
discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter. In the author’s opinion, this framework 
can be adapted and developed into a model that can be applied to identify a cluster’s 
innovative output. By including other important influences on knowledge creation and 
innovation already identified in this literature review, a ‘testable’ model can be developed, i.e. 
a model from which hypotheses or propositions can be developed, and utilised to examine 
the SOT ceramics cluster. Additions to the original framework could include, for example, 
‘industry life-cycle stage’, ‘demand conditions’, ‘absorptive capacity’ and ‘innovative output’ 
(as measured by R&D expenditure, uptake of new technology, patent registrations, labour, 
etc.). The newly formulated model will be presented towards the end of this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Antecedents of a Cluster's Knowledge Creation Capability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Arikan, 2009, p. 661) 
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2.7: The Industry Life-cycle and Clusters 
Much of the literature reviewed in this chapter focuses on the benefits of 
clustering/agglomeration for firms in industry clusters. Some of the negative aspects of 
agglomeration have also been highlighted and will be further developed in later sections of 
this chapter. This section of the literature review attempts to link the positive and negative 
aspects of agglomeration to industry life-cycle stages, and to examine the resultant effects 
on innovation. 
 
 
More recently, a growing literature from a range of disciplines, argues that agglomeration 
benefits are linked to the industry life-cycle stage, i.e. agglomeration20 (clustering) generates 
increasing returns or diminishing returns dependent on the specifics of the evolution of the 
industry. Moreover, the literature also suggests that who innovates, and how much 
innovative activity is undertaken, is also closely linked to phases of the industry life-cycle 
(Klepper, 1996, 2007; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Breziz and Krugman, 1997; Simmie, 
2002; Maskell and Malmberg, 2007; Potter and Watts, 2011). This idea that an industry’s 
life-cycle stage is linked to the degree of agglomeration benefits is not new. Marshall (1890), 
in addition to highlighting the possible benefits of agglomeration, also warned explicitly that 
the agglomeration of firms in close geographical proximity could have a substantial negative 
impact on the development of firms, cities, and regions. For example, if an agglomeration is 
dependent on one industry for its economic development, the industry (cluster) is likely to 
suffer from diminishing returns over time, and even ‘extreme depressions’ (Marshall, 1890, 
p. 273). 
  
 
Modern industry life-cycle theories argue that industries evolve according to a similar pattern 
known as the industry life-cycle (Klepper, 1996; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996), the concept 
of which is similar to product life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966). According to this theory, the 
archetypal evolution of an industry (or product) follows a curve, which consists of a series of 
stages: an embryonic stage; followed by a growth stage; which is succeeded by a mature 
stage, and; an eventual decline stage (see Figure 2.3). Figure 2.3 also shows various stages 
of the industry life-cycle for the SOT cluster. Although some industries and clusters have 
their own idiosyncrasies, that can alter the nature of their development, many do evolve 
according to the industry life-cycle pattern (Storper, 1985, Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
                                                 
20 According to Porter et al., (2000) The locus of agglomeration is increasingly the cluster and not urban areas or narrowly defined 
industries (p. 259). 
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Moreover, recent studies (Potter and Watts, 2011), argue that incentives to agglomerate and 
disperse actually evolve over time, and that the industry life-cycle changes the relationship 
between agglomeration benefits and cluster performance.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Industry Life- Cycle Stages 
 
(Source: Author, based on Klepper, 1996, p. 564) 
 
 
2.7.1: The Embryonic Stage 
The beginning of the industry life-cycle starts with a mutation process (Schumpeter, 1942; 
Potter and Watts, 2011). This occurs when a small group of inquisitive individuals, 
entrepreneurs, scientists, technologists, and R&D-intensive firms begin to develop new 
knowledge, routines, technology, radical innovations, products and services that do not exist 
within the marketplace (Schumpeter, 1942; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Klepper, 1996). 
Other triggering factors include the pre-existence of certain endowments and the availability 
of craft skills (Belussi and Sedita, 2009). Founder firms will experience a first-mover 
advantage by being the first firms to enter the embryonic industry, and will become the 
common ancestors from which different descendants and species of firm will evolve within 
the industry (Potter and Watts, 2011). During this creative period, the embryonic industry is 
characterised by high rates of new start-up firms, spin-off firms and firm entry (i.e. migration). 
As the number of firms in the cluster increases, so does competition within the cluster. 
Competition is seen as one of the most important drivers of evolution.  
 
 
Geographic proximity is crucial during this embryonic stage because a number of 
evolutionary processes occur which encourage firms to cluster in close geographical 
SOT cluster sales peaked in 
1978. (see Tomlinson and 
Branston, 2014: 7) 
SOT cluster decline phase 
1979-2008. (see Tomlinson 
and Branston, 2014: 7) 
SOT cluster rejuvenation 
2008 - ongoing. (see chapter 
4.2.3) 
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proximity (Boschma and Frenken, 2006). First, a small number of firms begin to cluster in 
close geographical proximity to the founders, entrepreneurs, and star scientists who create 
start-up firms within the industry, a process known as the founder effect (Zucker and Darby, 
2006). Second, owing to heredity conditions and the spin-off process, the firms that spin-off 
from their parent firm will naturally inherit some of the knowledge and routines that enabled 
their parent firm to become successful. Spin-off firms often co-locate near to their parent firm 
(Potter and Watts, 2011). A key endogenous triggering factor at this stage is technological 
innovation (Belussi and Sedita, 2009). At this stage, the tacit knowledge created within the 
new industry remains inherently difficult to transfer between firms, except when they in close 
proximity (Audretsch, 2000). Third, firms may begin to specialise in particular stages of 
production, although this is dependent on the characteristics of the production system (see 
earlier sections of this chapter: 2.4.8-2.4.9). Specialisation increases the cluster's 
biodiversity and results in the development of a local supply chain and a local production 
network. Fourth, During this period firms begin to develop cluster linkages, i.e., local social 
ties, network connectivity, and supply chain linkages, characterised by a high degree of 
embeddedness, relational trust, altruism, reciprocity and cognitive proximity. Fifth, 
eventually, through the imitation process, competing firms begin to imitate, mimic, and 
reverse engineer the new products and routines developed by the first movers within the 
industry and, because imitation is facilitated by geographical proximity, this encourages firms 
to cluster as well (Potter and Watts, 2011). Consequently, during the embryonic stage, firms 
experience greater economic performance and increasing returns by agglomerating in close 
geographical proximity (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
 
 
2.7.2: The Growth Stage 
After a long process of learning-by-doing and incremental innovations, the embryonic stage 
eventually evolves into the growth stage of the industry life-cycle, characterised by a rapid 
increase in the rates of firm entry, start-up, spin-off and survival, combined with a continued 
low rate of firm exit from the industry (Potter and Watts, 2011). During this period in the 
industry life-cycle there can be increases of 30% or more in the number of firms within the 
industry (Klepper, 1996; Agarwal and Gort, 2002). Within this environment, firms continue to 
compete by pursuing product differentiation strategies and the number of segments in the 
market increases. Diversification and differentiation strategies enlarge local capabilities and 
pave the way for new development and growth trajectories (Brenner, 2005; Belussi and 
Sedita, 2009). The early growth stage is also called the ‘fluid phase’ in the early life-cycle 
literature (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). In this early stage the firm is in pursuit of product 
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innovations and the rate of product innovation is at its highest, aimed at achieving highest 
technological standards (Sabol et al., 2013). 
 
 
It is during the early stages of the industry life-cycle that institutional investors, trade 
associations, supportive institutions, universities, colleges (post-16 years), and professional 
gatherings become involved with the industry, often choosing to co-locate in close proximity 
to the firms within the cluster to ensure network centrality and connectivity (Boschma and 
Frenken, 2006). As both new and existing firms continue to cluster in close proximity, a large 
growth agglomeration, that has a positive lock-in effect for regional development, emerges 
(Porter, 1990; Pyke et al.,1990; Saxenian, 1994). Agglomeration economies (as discussed 
earlier) play an important role within the cluster, as they allow cluster firms to experience 
external economies of scale that are external to any single firm, but are internal and place-
specific to the agglomeration as a whole.  
 
 
By having such a large cluster of firms at the growth stage of the industry life-cycle, the 
surrounding region benefits from a phenomenal period of economic growth and prosperity. 
However, the rapid growth in the number of firms also causes the returns within the industry 
to begin to diminish (Klepper, 1996). A number of negative externalities emerge within the 
cluster at this stage, such as higher labour costs, greater land rents, congestion costs, and 
pollution (Phelps and Ozawa, 2003). Put simply, the growth cluster becomes a victim of its 
own success and eventually, because of the changes that take place within the industry and 
the cluster, returns from agglomeration begin to diminish. Consequently, the cluster starts to 
spread out across geographical space (Potter and Watts, 2011). 
 
 
2.7.3: The Mature Stage 
Few industries are capable of sustaining growth indefinitely and the growth stage is 
eventually succeeded by the mature stage of the industry life-cycle (Klepper, 1996), although 
it is noted that the rate of evolution varies between different industries (Potter and Watts, 
2011). During this period, a number of evolutionary changes occur that cause the industry to 
mature. First, as a result of the knowledge codification process, some knowledge within the 
industry becomes codified and transferable across geographical space with lower 
transaction costs (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Bathelt et al., 2004, see earlier references 
too). Second, due to rapidly increasing demand (Brenner, 2005), a dominant design 
emerges within the industry that enables products to become standardised, and produced 
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using capital intensive high-volume mass production processes, rather than craft production 
processes (Klepper, 1996). Third, firms begin to shift their R&D emphasis away from a 
product differentiation strategy that focuses on product innovation and towards a cost-saving 
strategy that emphasises production innovation (Klepper, 1996; Brenner, 2005). Finally, a 
shakeout happens, whereby many firms exit the industry and are no longer replaced by new 
entrants, which ultimately reduces the total number of firms within the industry (Brenner, 
2005).  
 
 
During this stage of the industry life-cycle, the development path of the cluster can become 
locked in to the path dependent trajectory of the industry life-cycle (Belussi and Sedita, 2009; 
Potter and Watts, 2011). Consequently, the growth cluster evolves into a mature cluster, with 
an increasing number of firms experiencing diminishing returns from agglomeration 
economies, especially from the persistence of: local negative externalities; a large shake-out 
of firms; slowdown in industry growth; local market saturation; and, fierce local competition 
(Phelps and Ozawa, 2003; Brenner, 2005). At the same time, evolutionary changes, such as 
the codification of knowledge, the standardisation of products, and lower transaction costs, 
enable many firms to experience increasing returns from dispersion economies (Audretsch 
and Feldman, 1996; Potter and Watts, 2011). 
 
 
2.7.4: The Decline Stage 
The final stage of the industry life-cycle is characterised by a period of decline that affects 
the whole industry and has implications for the survival of the cluster. A number of different 
factors can trigger the decline stage including, a large shake-out of firms, intensive price 
competition, market overcapacity, disruptive innovations, product substitution, exogenous 
shocks, or unpredictable changes in the supplier or customer markets (Porter, 1990; 
Klepper, 1996; Potter and Watts, 2011). The decline stage can be characterised by falling 
product prices, small profit margins, low firm survival probabilities, a high rate of firm exit 
from the industry, and the closure of firms with unfit routines (Agarwal, 1997). During this 
stage, a large shake-out can occur that changes the nature of competition within the 
marketplace, with some industries experiencing net decreases of 50–80% of firms (Klepper 
1996; Swann et al., 1998). Consequently, the firms that remain within the industry, attempt to 
adapt their routines and place greater emphasis on a variety of new management routines 
and strategies. These new routines may include geographic relocation, industry 
diversification, increasing plant size, business mergers and acquisitions (Swann et al., 
1998). As the cluster matures, there is consolidation as weaker firms exit or are taken over 
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by the larger rival firms. At this point the economic power and strategic decision making 
becomes more concentrated within the leading firms (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009: 1842).  
 
 
During this period of structural change, if a cluster is approaching the end of the industry’s 
life-cycle, it is likely that agglomeration economies will decrease the economic performance 
of firms, create a negative lock-in effect, and tend to generate diminishing returns for the 
development of the cluster (Porter, 1990; Klepper, 1996; Pouder and St. John, 1996; Belussi 
and Sedita, 2009). At this time, firms that continue to depend upon a local pool of skilled 
labour will specialise in outdated technology, replicate established routines through labour 
mobility, and experience higher labour costs (Frenken and Boschma, 2007; Maskell and 
Malmberg, 2007). The firms that maintain local supplier linkages may become locked-in to 
old supply chain networks of uncompetitive local suppliers that supply outdated, low-quality, 
highly-priced products within the cluster. The firms that rely only upon local knowledge 
spillovers will receive out-dated technological know-how, and will, via the lock-out effect, 
become locked out of the new knowledge developed by new industries and emerging 
agglomerations in other parts of the world (Potter and Watts, 2011). This view is also 
supported by Tavassoli (2012), who purports that for firms belong to a declining industry (like 
manufacture of office machinery), it is better to invest in exploring the international market as 
this would create new channels of learning from customers abroad, which eventually can 
enhance firm’s innovation (p.19)21.  
 
 
It is during these later stages of the industry life-cycle that these diminishing agglomeration 
economies can decrease the economic performance of cluster firms and create widespread 
diminishing returns that have a negative impact on the development of the whole cluster 
(Pouder and St. John, 1996; Belussi and Sedita, 2009). For example, a large shake-out out 
of the number of firms within an industry can have a substantial negative impact on the local 
economy if many of these firms remain agglomerated within a single region (Potter and 
Watts, 2011). According to Tomlinson and Branston (2014): 
“The prospects for mature (and declining) districts depend upon their own adaptive 
capacity to reconfigure internal structures and instigate the necessary changes in 
adapting to new (and very different) market and technological challenges: this is 
essentially a measure of their resilience” (p. 4). 
                                                 
21 See also section 2.8 ‘when the cluster stops working’. 
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Elsewhere in the literature, clusters can also renew themselves (Trippl and Todtling, 2008; 
Menzel and Fornahl, 2009; Boschma and Frenken, 2011; Ter Wal and Boschma, 2011). This 
stage of the life-cycle has been called ‘rejuvenation’ (Boschma, 2005). Renewal can occur 
by integrating and applying new technologies and knowledge that lead to new growth 
phases. Another cause for rejuvenation can be an exogenous shock, like the development of 
a radical technological breakthrough that leads to a new cycle of industry evolution and an 
associated evolution of new networks (Ter Wal and Boschma, 2011: 928). 
 
 
2.7.5: The Life-cycle and its Link to Governance Systems 
It is apparent from the literature reviewed in earlier sections (see 2.4.10), that governance 
systems within clusters develop over time and change according to the different life-cycle 
stages. It has also been noted that clusters are not all homogeneous, each cluster develops 
differently, and the nature and distribution of economic power will change over time.  In 
2003, Sacchetti and Sugden identified two broad types of governance systems inherent in 
traditional clusters. They classified these networks as ‘networks of mutual dependence’ and 
‘networks of direction’.  
 
 
2.7.5.1: The Life-cycle and Mutual Dependence Systems 
Networks of mutual dependence exhibit a relatively 'flat' or 'heterarchical’ governance 
structure, whereby firms are engaged in a series of ongoing economic relationships with 
each other, which are such that their mutual interdependencies, e.g. their dependence upon 
each other’s resources and activities, tend to support and re-enforce co-operation, 
reciprocity and mutually supportive actions across the network. It is the mutual dependence 
of these interactions which tends to reduce the dominance of any one particular firm, thus 
maintaining heterarchy and promoting pluralism in the decision-making processes (Sacchetti 
and Sugden, 2003). Such forms of heterarchy can be difficult to supervise due to logistical 
reasons. For example, trust within inter-personal relations may not be easy to manage and 
maintain as networks grow, while co-ordinating resources between organisations is 
problematic, particularly where resource synergies are not easily transparent and individual 
organisations are inert in adapting to changing circumstances (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 
2009).  
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As the cluster grows, social mechanisms develop that include collective sanctions, where 
participants may be ostracised by others if they engage in opportunism or breach accepted 
norms and/or reputation effects, whereas reliability and commitment among participants is 
rewarded. Moreover, in the later stages of the life-cycle, transparency, fluidity and 
adaptability of mutual dependence network exchanges can provide all firms involved in the 
production process with the flexibility to deal with both changing output demands and varying 
product mixes, often at short notice (De Propris, 2001, 2008). Furthermore, repeated 
interaction between firms, leading to knowledge and information exchanges, can be the 
source of new (collective) learning opportunities. However, as discussed previously in this 
chapter (see 2.4.8), an over-emphasis upon co-operation and consensus building within 
clusters can also impede creativity and constrain problem solving in times of crisis, 
especially in times of economic turbulence, where quick and immediate solutions maybe 
required (Jessop, 1998). 
 
 
2.7.5.2: The Life-cycle and Networks of Direction Systems 
Networks of direction are predominantly hierarchical in the sense that the core firms 
independently pursue their own strategic objectives, often with little consultation with their 
trading partners and/or other stakeholders in the locality (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). Such 
a network might typically be observed in a vertical production chain, where there is either a 
monopolistic buyer or monopolistic seller, which engages in activities with less empowered 
partner firms, e.g. smaller subcontractors. The terms of such engagements are often 
dictated by the dominant or core firm, with the smaller partners playing a largely subservient 
role, often being required to deliver lower production costs and meet tight (output) efficiency 
criteria (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009; Belso, 2010). For such partner firms, there is little 
room for manoeuvre and few opportunities to influence the whole production process, which 
is geared towards serving the flexibility requirements of the core firms (Sacchetti and 
Tomlinson, 2009).  
 
 
The implications of the networks of direction model for the cluster can be both positive and 
negative. On the positive side, the emergence of large dominant firms within a cluster can 
lead to new investment in technology on a scale which might not have been undertaken by 
smaller firms (Lazonick, 1993; Belso, 2010). This can lead to greater economies of scale, 
thus improving the cluster's competitiveness. A further advantage is that core firms may 
possess strong brand identities on a national and international scale, and these may act as a 
reflected demand for smaller cluster-based subcontractors. Strong brand identities of 
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particular firms could, over time, become synonymous with the cluster/region itself, with 
positive effects such as attracting new firm entry into the district and the promotion of 
industrial tourism. On the other hand, the networks of direction model raises particular 
concerns for the cluster. These issues primarily relate to the cluster becoming locked-in to 
the objectives and strategic direction of a few or even a single firm (Sacchetti and 
Tomlinson, 2009). A more detailed discussion of 'lock-in effects' and the role of the 
'dominant firm' is presented later in this chapter. 
 
 
It is obvious from the literature presented so far, that the nature of a cluster's inter-firm 
relations evolve over time, as firms enter/exit the cluster, and as the nature and control of 
technologies change (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). These changes can be linked to the 
cluster's development path and life-cycle stages. According to Swann et al., (1998), a 
cluster's dynamism (and growth) begins to tail off once congestion costs and the increased 
competition between firms (in both input and output markets) within a cluster begin to 
outweigh the benefits of agglomeration. In such cases, entry levels begin to stabilise and 
then eventually fall. As the cluster matures, there is consolidation as weaker firms exit or are 
taken over by larger rival firms. At this point, the cluster begins to resemble the networks of 
direction model, as economic power and strategic decision making become more 
concentrated within the leading firms. These firms may have little interest in sharing new 
knowledge. Indeed, its core organisation might prefer such knowledge to remain hidden 
since it strengthens its hold over its strategic options and capabilities, particularly in relation 
to technological change (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). 
 
 
2.7.6: The Life-cycle and Innovation 
As identified earlier, innovative activity is promoted by knowledge spillovers that occur within 
a distinct geographic region (see section 2.6) and, this is particularly apparent in the early 
stages of the industry life-cycle (positive effect on cluster), but as the industry evolves 
towards maturity and decline it may be dispersed (negative effect on cluster) by additional 
increases in concentration of production that have been built up within the cluster. Therefore, 
it can be claimed that technological change varies from the birth of technologically 
progressive industries through maturity (Klepper, 1990, 1996; Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Swann et al., 1998; Brenner, 2005; Giuliani, 2013; Sabol et al., 2013). Technological 
change is also seen as path dependent since it involves sequenced, and not simultaneous, 
choices which are often irreversible (Newlands, 2003). What is particularly relevant to this 
research study is the relationship between life-cycle stage and the type of innovative activity, 
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e.g. product or process. Also relevant are the number of new entrants at each stage of the 
life-cycle as new-entrants affect technological change and competition within industry 
clusters. 
 
 
There is also much evidence in the literature on inter-firm networks that suggests a strong 
relationship between the level and nature of co-operation in an industry and the life-cycle 
development of an industry (Gemser et al., 1996; Balland et al., 2013; Huggins et al., 2015). 
For example, Gemser et al., (1996) carried out a study that examined the dynamics of inter-
firm networks and from this produced a conceptual framework for explaining why inter-firm 
networks change over time. The framework focuses on horizontal (between rivals) and 
vertical (complementary products) inter-firm linkages between firms. As discussed, inter-
organisational linkages are considered to be a major source of innovation.  
 
 
Gemser (1996), takes the view that firms’ abilities to appropriate the profits of innovations 
are especially difficult at the beginning and end of the industry life-cycle because of the high 
costs of R&D and marketing and the high capital needs of production. Therefore, horizontal 
inter-firm linkages should be particularly dense at these stages. However, in the decline 
stage of the life-cycle they may be weak, due to negative competition or dominant firm 
effects that may be a feature of the cluster. Huggins et al., (2015) also link different types of 
network relationships to different stages of the industry life-cycle. Their work suggests that 
demand for network relationships is strong at the emergence stage, but as firms become 
more established and less vulnerable, the demand for network formation falls (p. 477).  
 
 
The relevant conclusions drawn from Gemser’s research suggest that firms can rejuvenate 
an industry’s pattern of development by adapting their co-operative and competitive 
behaviour with rivals and/or suppliers up and down the value chain. For example, in the 
Italian furniture industry cluster (which bears many similarities to the SOT ceramics cluster) 
the emergence of dominant firms has changed the dynamics of the competitive environment 
in a positive way. Large core firms are called upon to act as ‘lighthouses’, sourcing small 
firms with information on foreign markets and new technologies, while the small firms should 
function as a production base for the large core firms. Table 2.2 below combines key 
aspects of life-cycle theory with Gemser’s studies to demonstrate the relationship between 
inter-firm linkages, competition, innovation and industry development.  
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Table 2.2: Inter-firm Linkages, Competition, Innovation and Industry Development 
Environmental Conditions That Increase/Decrease the Necessity to Establish: 
Life-cycle 
phase 
Horizontal Linkages Between 
Competing Firms 
Vertical Linkages between 
Firms &  Suppliers 
Competition and Innovation 
Emergence Establishment of linkages to pool 
resources, to create the necessary 
industry infrastructure and to enhance 
appropriability conditions. 
Forging linkages to create 
the necessary infrastructure. 
There are only one or few firms in the 
market. Product life-cycles are short. 
Focus is on product innovation 
Growth Decrease of linkages. The fast 
expansion of firms induces de-
concentration process. Firms start to 
specialise and vertical disintegration 
occurs. 
Increase of linkages 
because of specialisation. 
The number of new entrants grows. 
Incremental innovators and imitators enter 
the industry. De-concentration takes place 
and firms start to specialise. Focus is on 
Product innovation. 
Maturity Stagnant growth of demand causes 
excess production. Further decrease 
of linkages owing to take-overs and 
mergers which must enlarge 
resources and create economies of 
scale and scope. 
Decrease of linkages 
because firms integrate 
vertically and because the 
overall number of firms 
reduces significantly. 
The number of new entrants slows, 
declines and eventually stops. Focus is 
on cost-cutting process innovation 
Slow/stagnant growth of demand causes 
excess production capacity. 
Decline Increase of linkages in order to 
reduce competition, to rationalise 
(over-capacity) and to enhance 
appropriability conditions 
Increase of linkages 
because firms focus on ‘core 
capabilities’ and/or enhance 
innovative capability 
The number of new entrants has stopped. 
Firms try to escape from price competition 
by focusing on product differentiation. 
Many firms are taken-over to reduce 
competitive pressure. Ultimately, the 
number of firms in the industry declines. 
(Source: Author, based on Gemser, 1996) 
 
 
2.8: When the Cluster Stops Working - Loss of Cluster Advantage   
According to Porter (1990), national competitive advantage in an industry is lost when 
conditions in the national diamond no longer support and stimulate investment and 
innovation to match the industry’s evolving structure. The ability of a nation’s firms to adapt 
to change is a function of the national diamond. The national industry may not perceive the 
need for change, may fail to invest aggressively enough to advance, or may have assets and 
skills that are specialised to outmoded ways of competing. Therefore, if national and local 
conditions no longer support the cluster, the theory predicts that this will lead to a loss of 
competitive advantage in the cluster, and ultimately a decline in the ‘strategic health’ of the 
cluster. The remainder of this section examines some of the main reasons for loss of cluster 
advantage in more detail. 
 
 
2.8.1: Globalisation 
According to the literature, improvements in global transport, communications and 
organisational management skills have reduced the importance of cluster benefits 
(Newlands, 2003; Tallman et al., 2004).  Some writers argue that cluster effects will 
increasingly be observed at the regional, or frequently much larger scale (Johansson and 
Quigley, 2004; Lorentzen, 2008; Belussi and Sedita, 2009). Moreover, the incidence of 
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larger scale effects can be expected to increase as new communications technologies 
reduce a whole variety of spatial distance transactions costs (Newlands, 2003). 
 
 
As discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, most of the reasons given in the literature for 
clustering are based around the benefits accruing within the cluster from both traded and 
untraded interdependencies. Transactions between cluster members contribute to the 
cluster’s ‘industrial atmosphere’, by which knowledge and information is developed and 
exchanged. As already noted, untraded interdependencies, or weak ties, are more closely 
linked to uncodified knowledge and information flows, traded interdependencies are more 
commonly associated with codified knowledge. According to Lorentzen (2008), codified 
knowledge can be shared by people globally. This view is supported by other writers who 
argue that different kinds of knowledge, even some tacit knowledge, can be shared ‘virtually’ 
through different forms of representation (Foray and Steinmuller, 2003; Belussi and Sedita, 
2008). The codification infrastructures become global, and codes can be shared by people 
around the globe (Lorentzen, 2008). If personal contact or geographic proximity is needed 
on some point, short visits may suffice to share knowledge or solve problems. Such 
‘temporary proximity’ of actors is facilitated by the advance in transport technology. In 
addition, personal encounters can be substituted by the meeting in cyberspace of economic 
actors through the use of the Internet (Lorentzen, 2008). 
 
 
According to Belussi and Sedita (2009), globalisation has played a relevant role in clusters 
from the early 1990s.22 It is defined as a process of opening up an economic system and it is 
characterised by the global reorganisation of production processes. Nevertheless, it is based 
on the increasing integration of the local system within a pattern of international division of 
labour (p. 510). The need for a ‘coupling’ between local and global production, and 
consequently the need to develop an integrated local/global network, is widely cited in the 
literature (Cooke et al., 1997; Maskell, 1999; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Lorentzen, 2008; 
Arikan, 2009). The flows of commodities, capital, workers, information and knowledge, along 
with entry of multinational organisations or relocation processes, can work as triggers for the 
evolution of clusters and represents a shift in the industry structure from a local/national 
model to an open local/global interdependent system. The challenge for clusters is to 
become nodes of global networks, keeping their historical and social identity, and absorbing 
                                                 
22 The pace of global economic integration accelerated during the decade of the 1990s, as many governments reduced policy-induced 
barriers that impeded international trade and investment flows (Das, 2011).  
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knowledge and technologies developed elsewhere (Belussi and Pilotti, 2002; Simmie, 2002; 
Belussi and Sedita, 2009; Boschma, 2015). The most open clusters, i.e. outward looking and 
receptive, will gain competitive advantage because they will be the first to receive ‘new 
knowledge’, and to receive larger amounts of knowledge compared to other clusters 
(Lorentzen, 2008).  
 
 
However, as noted previously, co-operation between firms in a cluster often depends on 
motives and incentives of firms. In times of comparably high uncertainty, firms may choose 
to sink few investments into co-operative ventures and share only a little information with 
partner firms, because of the risk of opportunism and loss of investments, ideas, and so on. 
Due to limited information about each other, agents may differ in terms of their expectations 
or beliefs, even when a fear of opportunism is unwarranted (Lorenzen, 2002). If a firm is 
operating in an effective cluster, the learning it acquires through relationships outside of the 
cluster is more apt to be rapidly diffused to other firms, multiplying its impact (Rosenfeld, 
1997). Moreover, small firms may not have access to external knowledge resources without 
the regional network provided by industry institutions (Simmie, 2002).  
 
 
If cluster firms do not make external linkages outside the cluster, i.e. knowledge partners are 
limited only to other firms inside the cluster, little or no new knowledge from outside the 
cluster will enter the cluster (Lorenzen and Mudambi, 2013). Over time, as more cluster firms 
exchange their knowledge with others inside the cluster, the knowledge overlap between 
cluster firms will increase (Pouder and St. John, 1996). This, in turn, will weaken the positive 
relationship between the number of realised inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the 
cluster and the cluster's knowledge creation capability (Arikan, 2009). Marshall (1923) also 
warned of the risks that firms’ collaboration, in the development of shared inputs, risked 
blunting competitive forces. Untraded interdependencies can not only facilitate effective 
collective learning and action but also impede it, especially where familiar conventions 
become well established, ‘sclerosis’ can set in. Areas can become locked-into outdated and 
inferior technologies and institutions (Newlands 2003).  Global linkages can help to de-lock 
negative evolutionary paths of clusters through infusing them with knowledge, technology 
and capital from worldwide sources (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Lorenzen and Mudambi, 
2013). 
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2.8.2: Changing Demand Conditions 
Competitive challenges currently facing traditional industrial districts (clusters) include the 
saturation of their traditional markets, changes in patterns of consumer demand, the growth 
in low-cost international competition and moves by leading cluster firms towards global 
outsourcing strategies. According to Newlands (2003), intensified global competition poses 
significant problems for the survival of local clusters, and efforts to develop local institutional 
capacities may produce only short-term benefits if similar competitive pressures are in 
operation elsewhere (p. 527). These growing competitive challenges have undermined many 
clusters’ abilities to retain and also to attract new firms. According to Sacchetti and 
Tomlinson (2009), in many European regions, the growth in international competition, mainly 
from low-cost operators in the Far East, along with the increased use of global outsourcing 
by cluster firms, “has often had a painful impact upon local industry and employment levels, 
raising serious concerns of industrial hollowing-out” (p. 1837).  
 
 
One response to these challenges is that some clusters have attempted to avoid competing 
at the bottom end of the market, focusing instead upon the higher end through technological 
upgrading and higher value added activities. This is a strategy that has been recommended 
in the cluster literature for dealing with increasing low-cost competition from abroad (Porter, 
1990; Pyke & Sengenberger, 1992). However, again possibly due to path-dependency, 
some traditional clusters have had limited success in making this transition. Moreover, 
increased competition in output markets, resulting in lower profit margins, often reduces the 
amount of resources devoted to R&D (Beaudry and Breschi, 2003), making it even more 
difficult for cluster firms’ to focus on the higher end of the market. 
 
 
Porter also cites some of the most common and most fatal reasons for loss of cluster 
competitive advantage as: diminished competitive rivalry; perhaps as a result of industry 
consolidation or an over reliance on informal agreements; and, widespread negative forms of 
co-operation (e.g. cartels). Both can stifle innovation as rivals are no longer aggressive, i.e. 
there is a lack of pressure and challenge (Porter, 1990). This view is supported by Dei Ottati 
(1994), who claims that when important disequilibria between the forces of competition and 
co-operation occur, their interaction can produce a chain reaction in the opposite direction to 
that of the virtuous circle (see section 2.5.4). Two examples are offered to demonstrate this 
effect: 
• A prolonged period of slack demand for goods produced in the cluster leads to price 
competition. The weakest firms are hit the hardest and this results in conflicts and 
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tensions that reduce the innovative impulse of firms and blocks the mechanism of co-
ordination. This may be because price pressures mean that firms do not have the 
necessary finances to invest in innovation, and/or because firms may be more 
suspicious of competitors and so are less willing to co-operate. Less innovation and a 
reduction in the propensity to co-operate feeds a vicious circle that can lead to the 
decline of the cluster. 
• A process of economic concentration takes place. Transactions become 
hierarchically co-ordinated. This reduces the need for co-operation and obstructs 
competition. This process, giving rise to the formation of a few large firms, leads to 
the breaking up of what was a single, compact production system. 
 
 
2.8.3: Other Influences on Knowledge Exchange Capability 
Apart from the lack of new ‘external’ knowledge there are several other reasons for 
knowledge creation failures within clusters cited in the literature. The first type of failure 
occurs when opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges do not emerge (see sections 
2.4.3, 2.4.9, 2.4.11). The lack of opportunities may be due to characteristics inherent in the 
cluster, such as low knowledge intensity or narrow breadth of knowledge requirements 
(Arikan, 2009). Alternatively, a cluster may originate as a knowledge-based cluster, but the 
number of opportunities for knowledge exchanges may change over time. For example, 
environments surrounding the cluster's products may become more stable over time, making 
self-sufficiency in terms of knowledge requirements a more valued goal to pursue than 
flexibility. Or technologies underlying the cluster's products may become increasingly 
modular over time, reducing cluster firms' need for external knowledge. These developments 
are dangerous for knowledge-based clusters, because when the knowledge-related benefits 
lessen or disappear, firms are left with immense competitive pressure due to intense local 
rivalry (Baum & Mezias, 1992; Arikan, 2009). 
 
 
The second type of failure occurs when opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges 
exist within the cluster, but the exchanges do not materialise and the cluster fails to realise 
its innovative potential (Arikan, 2009). One reason may be failure in local knowledge 
markets, possibly due to the lack of mechanisms that connect knowledge buyers and sellers, 
and/or lack of an appropriate institutional environment in the cluster for co-operative 
relationships. As discussed earlier, closer co-operation among regional actors, regional 
universities, industry associations and technology transfer organisations is essential for 
international competitiveness of an industry cluster (Cooke et al., 1997; Lorentzen, 2008). 
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However, increasing competitive challenges make the development of co-operative norms 
highly difficult while at the same time creating numerous reasons to break them once they 
are established (Arikan, 2009). 
 
 
2.8.4: Consolidation and Dominant Firm Effects 
Rosenfeld (1997), identifies a ‘latent or underachieving cluster’ as one where scale and 
geographic concentration exist but the potential is not fully realised, generally because the 
social fabric is weak. Interaction among workers and employees is weak and the businesses 
involved neither share a vision of the future nor think of themselves as a cluster. According 
to Rosenfeld, one reason for this may be that the cluster is dominated by branch plants and 
large corporations. It is not uncommon for a regional cluster to be dominated by a small 
number of very large companies and they can wield considerable power over smaller 
subordinate suppliers (see section 2.4.9). This situation can undermine reciprocity and trust. 
Insular clusters, e.g. the British cutlery industry (Porter, 1990: 171), can be a negative effect 
of clusters that have become too consolidated, i.e. one or few large firms dominate the 
industry. This can potentially act as a barrier to new entrants and overall there is a decline in 
domestic rivalry. According to Porter (1990), complacency and inward focus are the main 
problems of an insular cluster, typified by a failure to constantly innovate and a hesitancy to 
employ global strategies. This view is similar to those of Audretsch & Feldman (1996) who 
have identified a link between industry consolidation and a decline in innovative activity 
within the cluster. The concept is known as the ‘congestion effect’, which can result in 
greater dispersion of innovative activity outside of the cluster and is most likely when the 
industry is in the mature and declining phases of the life-cycle. This type of intellectual 
‘supply-side’ congestion refers to ‘lock-in’ with respect to new ideas, whether from inside the 
cluster or from innovations generated elsewhere (Suarez-Villa and Walrod, 1997). In other 
words, the ‘industrial atmosphere’ as a general system of rules for local organisation can be 
an obstacle to rapid change (Bianchi, 1993). Thus, the cluster may be incapable of moving 
away from traditional ways of working, e.g., as in the case of the Detroit automobile cluster 
(see 2.4.8). 
 
 
The view that branch plants and large corporations can undermine the value and 
sustainability of clusters is quite common across the literature (Porter, 1990; Bianchi, 1993; 
Rosenfeld, 1997; Audretsch, 1998; Schilling, 2000; Brusoni et al., 2001; Sacchietti and 
Sugden, 2003; Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009; Bell et al., 2009; Arikan, 2009; Belso, 2010; 
Arikan and Schilling, 2011; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011; Tomlinson and Branston, 2017). It is 
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not uncommon for a regional cluster to be dominated by a small number of very large 
companies. Branch plants may be subject to strategic decisions made by the parent some 
distance from the core of the cluster. Some may abandon the cluster for places where costs 
are lower. Moreover, the shared macro-cultures of hub-and-spoke clusters dominated by 
one or several large, vertically-integrated firms might be disproportionately influenced by the 
governance choices, or even the organisational cultures, of the hub firms, (Bell, et al., 2009).  
 
 
This view is supported by Tomlinson and Branston (2017), who suggest that clusters can be 
dominated by a few core actors who are able to exert their economic strength to gear local 
development paths to suit their own strategic aims, often without consultation (p. 5). Lead 
firm strategies can range from highly co-operation oriented to highly competition oriented. 
Some lead firms are more likely to emphasise cost considerations over co-operation 
considerations while managing their partner networks. They may encourage high levels of 
competition within their supplier networks by pitting one supplier against the other to achieve 
more favourable exchange terms. In such a competitive environment, few incentives exist for 
firms to engage in inter-firm knowledge exchanges (Arikan, 2009).  It may be argued then 
that when firms refrain from networking, it is often because of misaligned expectations about 
each other (Lorenzen, 2002). This kind of situation may lead to intellectual lock-in. Once 
intellectual lock-in becomes sufficiently rigid, the evidence suggests that new ideas need 
new space outside the cluster (see 2.8.1). Network structures can also be completely 
centralised so that a single actor, e.g. a dominant firm, controls all access to global linkages 
(Lorenzen and Mudambi, 2013), and this can have a detrimental effect on the health of the 
overall cluster (Audretsch, 1998). Large-scale firms can also negatively affect 
entrepreneurship, due to low levels of human capital and entrepreneurship skills and, 
ultimately, can contribute towards an entrepreneurship deterring regional culture (Stuetzer, 
et al., 2016). 
 
Considering that negative effects of dominant firms in a cluster appear to be a commonly 
cited reason for cluster failure, it is worth briefly reviewing the economics theory on dominant 
firms to determine whether the theory is relevant for this research study.  
 
Dominant firm theory was developed by the German economist Heinrich von Stackelberg in 
1934 and is an extension of Cournot’s 1838 model. Stackelberg’s duopoly model assumed 
that one firm acts as a dominant firm in setting quantities and dominance implies knowledge 
of the way competitors will react to any given output set by the leading firm (in the Cournot 
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model neither firm had the opportunity to react). A dominant firm can then select that output 
which yields the maximum profit for itself. It is assumed, by von Stackelberg, that one 
duopolist is sufficiently sophisticated to recognise that his competitor acts on the Cournot 
assumption23. 
 
In some highly concentrated industries, a single ("dominant") firm serves a majority of the 
market and a group of smaller ("fringe") firms supply the rest. This is not the case with the 
SOT ceramics industry as there is much evidence that, in the past, there were several 
hundreds of firms of differing sizes manufacturing ceramic wares in the cluster, so not a 
monopolistic structure. According to Martin (1994), a dominant firm differs from a monopolist 
in one important respect. The only constraint on the monopolist's behaviour is the market 
demand curve: if the monopolist raises price, some customers will leave the market. Like the 
monopolist, the dominant firm is large enough to recognize that a price increase will drive 
some customers from the market. But the dominant firm faces a problem that the monopolist 
does not: the possibility that a price increase will induce some customers to begin to buy 
from firms in the fringe of small competitors. That dominant firm, in other words, must take 
into account the reaction of its fringe competitors (p. 68). The evidence on the SOT industry 
cluster (see chapter 4), indicates that this is likely to be the situation, i.e. if larger dominant 
firms increase their prices, then smaller firms may benefit, as some customers may switch to 
smaller competitors. However, there is no evidence of price-based competition existing in 
the SOT cluster at the current time. This is an area that will be explored further in the 
empirical research stages of this research study. 
 
Similar to monopoly theory, oligopoly can also be defined as a market model of the imperfect 
competition type, assuming the existence of only a few companies in a sector or industry, 
from which at least some have a significant market share and can therefore affect the 
production prices in the market (Severova et al., 2011). A duopoly is a form of oligopoly 
where only two sellers exist in one market. In practice, the term is also used where there are 
many firms in the market but where only two firms have dominant control over a market. 
Although, the SOT industry cluster is comprised of many firms, it is often referred to as a 
‘two-tier’ cluster (Padley and Pugh, 2000), with a few (two up until fairly recently) large firms 
                                                 
23 The Cournot model, which shows that two firms assume each other's output and treat this as a fixed amount, and produce in their own 
firm according to this. (Cournot, 1838). 
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and many SMEs. Consequently, it can be classified as an oligopoly for the purposes of this 
research study. 
 
Many models of oligopoly are found in economics literature and differ from each other mostly 
in the nature of the competitive companies’ behaviour. These different models agree in 
several assumptions (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2004; Severova et al., 2011): 
1) The existence of a small number of companies in a sector - It is usually about big 
companies with a deciding part in the offer of a sector. Some models describe only 
the behaviour of two companies in the monitored market (duopoly), others describe 
several companies of the same power (cartel), still others assume that one of the 
companies has a dominant position in the market. As previously discussed, several 
large ceramics firms appear to dominate the SOT cluster. Positive and negative 
effects of these large firms will be explored in the primary research stages of this 
research study. 
2) The nature of production, e.g. If companies in an oligopoly create differentiated 
goods and services that are substitute to each other - the theory refers to a 
heterogeneous oligopoly with differentiated market prices. If differences among 
products of the individual oligopolistic companies are usually not significant, then 
products can be defined as close substitutes. However, at the same time, 
competition exists both in the price and non-price forms, represented by product 
innovations and advertisement. There is some evidence from early investigations to 
indicate that the SOT cluster’s products are highly differentiated. Moreover, cluster 
firms appear to operate in different segments of the market to each other. However, it 
is not clear whether the cluster’s products can be classed as close substitutes to 
each other and, therefore, this is another area that will be investigated further in this 
research study. 
3) The possibility of each company in a sector to make real estimates regarding the 
reactions and actions of competitors -  The empirical evidence does not fully comply 
with the theory in this respect.  This outcome may be the result that the SOT firms 
simply do not have sufficient available data to react to the other firms due to 
incomplete or asymmetric information. 
4) Limitation (barriers) of the entry of new companies into a sector, allowing for a 
longer-lasting existence of several few big companies in a sector - typical forms of 
barriers against the entry of new companies into an oligopolistic sector are: relatively 
high costs of the capital needed to start a new company, patent limitations, the 
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preference of consumers in relation to the existing companies and the arrangements 
or agreements among the existing companies. Preliminary investigations into new 
firm entry into the SOT cluster indicate that there have been few new entrants into 
the cluster over recent years. However, it is not clear whether this is due to barriers 
imposed by large firms in the SOT cluster. This is yet another area that will be 
investigated further in this research study. 
 
 
2.9: Literature Review Conclusions 
The main conclusions drawn from the literature review are that positive forms of co-operation 
and interdependence tend to be the most essential feature of successful industry clusters 
and, therefore, the most important determinant in influencing the whole cluster system. The 
next most important feature of successful clusters involves positive forms of vigorous 
domestic rivalry that results in strong innovative output. These two influences promote 
robust, rapid and on-going innovation activity within the cluster which, it would appear, is the 
key to the long-term strategic health of the cluster. The geographic clustering of firms linked 
through vertical and horizontal relationships has a reinforcing and magnifying effect upon the 
cluster benefits. It can also be concluded from the literature that the level and nature of co-
operation and competition in an industry cluster will vary according to the industry life-cycle 
stage, i.e. in successful clusters competition and co-operation should be balanced at each 
stage of the life-cycle, despite changes in the numbers of firms and focus of innovative 
activity. 
 
 
From the literature a number of characteristics of declining or failing clusters are identified. 
Most important is a lack of co-operation and interdependence between firms in the cluster, 
which is seen as detrimental to the cluster’s knowledge creation capabilities and innovative 
output. Another important feature of a failing cluster is a significant reduction in competitive 
rivalry within the cluster, which also contributes to a decline in innovative activity. A number 
of reasons are given to explain why these two phenomena may occur. The most common of 
these is the emergence of one/few dominant firms in the industry cluster. Over-concentration 
in the cluster results in a reduction in the overall number of firms in the industry. The 
dominant firm(s) may engage in negative forms of competition and other predatory practices 
which can undermine trust and reciprocity and lead to a reduction in co-operation and 
interdependence. Ultimately this will have a negative effect on innovative activity within the 
cluster. 
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The remainder of the Literature Review conclusions focuses on these identified 
characteristics for successful and failing industry clusters. From these conclusions a 
theoretical framework for the research is developed (see Figure 2.4) and a series of testable 
propositions formulated. Finally, propositions and objectives have been drawn together into  
two tables (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). 
 
 
2.9.1: Conclusions on Co-operation in Clusters 
Co-operation in clusters is based on interchanges that facilitate the exchange and flow of 
information and knowledge in the cluster (between buyers, suppliers and related industries) 
that ultimately leads to innovative output. These interchanges (linkages) accrue unique 
agglomeration benefits to cluster members by lowering transaction costs. Linkages in 
clusters consist of ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’. Strong ties are more formalised, intense 
relationships that offer depth but not diversity of knowledge. Moreover, strong ties can lead 
to technological lock-in over time, possibly due to path dependency. Weak ties are more 
informal, they offer access to diverse information and are said to trigger innovation. In 
transactions where sunk costs are high, i.e. transactions involving developing innovation, 
trust and discretion between actors is a requirement. Relationships in networks of trust are 
bound by ties of obligation which regulate behaviour, i.e. the cluster is self-regulating, and 
this lowers transaction costs.  
 
Proposition 1. Successful industry clusters will exhibit a strong network of cluster 
interrelationships involving both strong and weak ties. 
Proposition 1a. Failing industry clusters will exhibit a weak network of cluster 
interrelationships. 
 
 
The effective exploitation of external know-how depends on firm-specific factors as well as 
external cluster resources. Firms have different absorptive capacities, hence a lower level of 
a firm’s internal resources leads to constrained absorption of external resources. Industry 
conditions will also affect a firm’s absorptive capacity. For example, clusters may involve 
relations of dominance and dependence, which may constrain or facilitate co-operation. 
Therefore, governance structures are an important consideration in researching co-operation 
within a cluster. Control may be balanced across firms within a cluster or may be 
concentrated within the hands of a single (or few) dominant firms. Dominant firms may have 
positive (knowledge facilitator) or negative (abuse of power) effects on the cluster.  
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Proposition 2. Firms in successful industry clusters will demonstrate strong absorptive 
capacity as evidenced by a significant number of inter-firm linkages.   
Proposition 2a. Firms in failing industry clusters will demonstrate weak absorptive capacity 
as evidenced by few (no) inter-firm linkages. 
 
Proposition 3. In successful industry clusters, control will be equally balanced across firms, if 
there are dominant firms they do not abuse their powerful positions. 
Proposition 3a. In failing industry clusters, control will be concentrated into the hands of a 
few dominant firms who use their power to exert control over other cluster firms. 
 
 
The need for co-ordination is another important consideration when examining the level of 
co-operation within a cluster. Factors influencing the need for co-ordination are the 
technological complexity of the cluster’s production processes (highly technical or simpler 
technologies) and the separabilty (potential to break down the production system into 
components) of the processes. Highly technical and separable processes result in a higher 
potential for specialisation and thus co-ordination. Firms that have historically had little need 
for co-ordination (lower technology and inseparable) may not possess the necessary 
capabilities to forge co-operative linkages if external (outside the cluster) conditions change. 
 
Proposition 4. Firms in successful industry clusters are more likely to have a higher need for 
co-ordination as evidenced by high technological complexity and highly separable 
processes. 
Proposition 4a. Firms in failing industry clusters are more likely to have a little need for co-
ordination as evidenced by low technological complexity and inseparable processes. 
 
 
Co-operation in successful clusters also features the involvement of formal institutions who 
are involved in supporting, regulating and spreading constructive co-operation within the 
industrial district. Another feature of successful clusters is the ability to develop ‘extra-cluster’ 
linkages or ‘global pipelines’ to access new-knowledge from outside the cluster that leads to 
innovation. Such external knowledge can help to avoid technological lock-in. Therefore, co-
operation in clusters should have a global/local element.  
 
Proposition 5. Successful clusters facing the challenges of globalisation will have adopted 
global/local strategies, characterised by a strong global network of agents from the core 
industry, plus related and supporting industries. 
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Proposition 5a. Failing clusters, facing the challenge of globalisation, will not have made new 
linkages with firms and institutions outside the cluster. Moreover, the number of inter-cluster 
linkages will have reduced. 
 
 
The key points identified in the literature on co-operation have been drawn together, linked 
to the research propositions, and implications for the research are identified (see Appendix 
3). 
 
 
2.9.2: Conclusions on Competition in Clusters 
Competition is a key driver of innovation within clusters. The greater the number of firms 
there are in the cluster, the more vigorous competition will tend to be between cluster firms 
and, hence, the greater the potential to innovate. Moreover, because of dynamic 
agglomeration benefits, innovations will happen earlier and will be brought to market more 
quickly. Thus, cluster firms will have a competitive advantage over firms from outside the 
cluster. However, competition can take either ‘positive’ forms or ‘negative’ forms. Positive 
competition leads to the creation of new goods or new technologies to produce existing 
goods. Competition is particularly important in attracting new firms to the cluster, which 
further increases competitive rivalry (more firms equals more competitors equals more 
innovations). Negative competition involves cost-cutting strategies and/or low-price 
strategies. Both of these strategies can result in less being spent on R&D and 
product/process innovations. In addition, such strategies can lead to de-motivation of 
employees and can reduce the number of co-operative linkages within the cluster. Moreover, 
negative forms of competition can drive firms out of the industry and act as a barrier to new 
entrants (fewer firms equals fewer competitors equals less innovation).  
 
 
Competition and co-operation are balanced in successful industry clusters. Particularly for 
small firms, co-operation in areas such as marketing, training, bulk purchasing or R&D can 
result in innovations and/or cost-savings that benefit the whole industry. The resulting 
innovations, which may not have been possible without collaboration, raise the level of 
competition within the cluster. Trust is a key element in such co-operative agreements within 
the cluster and is based on local norms that govern the cluster. Thus, in successful industry 
clusters, competition and co-operation become a mutually reinforcing positive relationship. 
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However, certain types of competition and co-operation can be destructive, e.g. restrictive 
agreements between firms which: may act as barriers to new entrants; lead to predatory 
practices (with the aim of eliminating cluster competitors); lead to technological lock-in. 
Moreover, in the face of external changes in key markets, such as rising global competition, 
adoption of cost or low-price strategies can have a detrimental effect on co-operation and 
trust within the cluster. The key points identified in the literature on competition have been 
drawn together, linked to the research propositions, and implications for the research are 
identified (see Appendix 3a). 
 
Proposition 6. Successful industry clusters will demonstrate vigorous competition between 
cluster firms as evidenced by a large number of firms in the industry and a constant stream 
of new entrants. 
Proposition 6a. Failing industry clusters will demonstrate weak competition between cluster 
firms as evidenced by a declining number of firms in the industry and few (no) new entrants. 
 
Proposition 7. In successful industry clusters firms compete mostly on the basis of 
differentiation. 
Proposition 7a. In failing industry clusters firms compete mostly on the basis of low-
cost/price. 
 
 
2.9.3: Conclusions on Innovation in Clusters 
Innovation, amongst other things, is a function of the strength of a cluster, i.e. a successful 
industry cluster will exhibit evidence of strong innovative output. Typical categories where 
innovations can be made are processes, products, markets and organisational (e.g. the 
supply chain). Innovation in successful clusters is strongly linked to the transmission of 
knowledge between cluster members. Knowledge can be classified as tacit knowledge or 
information based knowledge. Tacit knowledge is viewed as more important because it is 
uncodified and less capable of being transferred easily outside the geographically 
concentrated cluster. Information, on the other hand, is more codified, and therefore more 
easily transferred within and outside the cluster. Over time, some tacit knowledge may 
become codified, and thus can be transferred more easily to cluster firms, and eventually, 
outside the cluster itself.  
 
Proposition 8. In successful industry clusters there will be evidence of strong innovative 
output as measured by the adoption of new technologies, new markets and new product 
developments. 
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Proposition 8a. In failing industry clusters there will be evidence of weak innovative output as 
measured by the lack of adoption of new technologies, new markets and new product 
developments. 
 
 
Knowledge can consist of ‘component’ knowledge and ‘architectural’ knowledge, with each 
category containing both information and tacit knowledge. Component knowledge ranges 
from, simple and straightforward technical know-how linked to different components of its 
operations (easily transferred), to systemic knowledge which is more closely to the 
organisation’s whole ‘system’. If the cluster’s product technologies are highly modular, i.e. 
capable of being broken-down into components, there are more opportunities for 
specialisation, co-operation and knowledge transfer within the cluster. However, such 
knowledge can eventually spill-out beyond the cluster. Therefore, component knowledge can 
bestow only short-term competitive advantages on the cluster, providing such knowledge 
remains private to the cluster. Low modularity in product technology reduces the number of 
opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges.  
 
Proposition 9. In clusters where there is high modularity in product technology, there will be 
a high number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
Proposition 9a. In clusters where there is low modularity in product technology, there will be 
a low number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
 
 
Architectural knowledge relates to an organisation as an entire system and is an inseparable 
part of the firm. This is because architectural knowledge is highly individual, it is closely 
linked to the idea of ‘core competencies’. Bodies of architectural knowledge are not 
coherently assembled (no easily identifiable components) and, therefore, not easily 
transferrable outside of the firm. However, elements of architectural knowledge may leak out 
of the firm over time through constant interaction with other firms in the cluster. Thus, 
eventually, the cluster will develop a stock of architectural knowledge that is unique. 
However, the degree of knowledge transfer will depend on the cluster’s propensity to co-
operate, which in turn is dependent on the degree of technological dynamism of the 
industry’s products and the balance of power and control in the industry (see earlier 
sections). A firm is more likely to innovate where; there is a presence of strong innovative 
firms in its own industry; where there is a large pool of potential knowledge spillovers 
associated with a large stock of knowledge; and, where there is a strong network of 
supporting institutions that provide information about technological and other opportunities. 
67 
 
Thus, the more information channels and knowledge brokers there are present in a cluster to 
establish connectivity between cluster firms, the greater the number of opportunities for inter-
firm knowledge exchanges there will be (see section on co-operation). 
 
 
The most widely used methodologies in previous cluster studies for measuring innovation 
include both input and output indicators, such as R&D expenditures, technology uptake, 
employment, patents and new product announcements. In order to achieve an accurate 
picture of innovation in an industry cluster several input/output variables may need to be 
measured. The key points identified in the literature on innovation have been drawn 
together, linked to the research propositions, and implications for the research are identified 
(see Appendix 3b). 
 
 
2.9.4: Conclusions on the Industry Life-cycle and Clusters 
According to the literature, incentives to cluster and disperse evolve over time and can be 
linked to the industry’s life-cycle pattern. Moreover, the relationship between cluster benefits 
and cluster performance will vary according to the life-cycle stage. Therefore, an initial 
objective of this research study is to identify the life-cycle stage of the SOT ceramics cluster. 
The key points from the life-cycle literature have been drawn together and are summarised 
in Appendix 3c. From the summary it is clear that many of the issues relating to the industry 
life-cycle and clusters are linked to issues that will be analysed and discussed in other 
sections of the research, e.g. outcomes of the investigation into co-operation, competition 
and innovation. The results of these various analyses will be used to determine the life-cycle 
stage of the SOT ceramics cluster. Moreover, outcomes from this analysis will be linked to 
conclusions about co-operation, competition and innovation. 
 
 
2.9.5: Conclusions on Failing Industry Clusters 
Globalisation is seen as one of the key challenges for traditional industry clusters. 
Improvements in global transport, communications and organisational management skills 
may have reduced some cluster benefits as now some ‘codified’ knowledge is capable of 
being transferred to agents outside the cluster, i.e. on a national/global scale. Moreover, if 
personal contact (geographic proximity) is needed, this can be facilitated through advances 
in transport technology which enable short visits to be made. Virtual meetings, via the 
internet, can also facilitate personal encounters. Globalisation is also characterised by the 
global reorganisation of production processes, which may involve re-location of some cluster 
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firms or outsourcing to lower-cost countries. A common response in the literature to clusters 
facing these problems is that cluster firms should develop an integrated global/local network. 
The addition of ‘new learning’ from outside the cluster can act as a trigger for the evolution 
and/or re-generation of clusters. The key for the cluster is to keep its historical and social 
identity (industrial atmosphere), and absorb knowledge and technologies developed 
elsewhere. The learning the cluster acquires through relationships outside the cluster will be 
more rapidly diffused within the cluster if the cluster already has a history of co-operation. 
 
 
However, if cluster firms do not make linkages outside the cluster, then no new knowledge 
will enter the cluster. Moreover, in times of high uncertainty, such as increasing competition 
from outside the cluster, firms may choose to co-operate less because of risk of 
opportunism, loss of ideas, etc. This is even more likely to happen in clusters that have 
historically had little need to co-operate. Moreover, limited information about each other may 
lead to distrust and misunderstanding of each other’s expectations. Overall, the net result is 
a reduction in opportunities for knowledge exchange. Furthermore, as no new knowledge is 
entering the cluster, the cluster can become locked-into out-dated and inferior technologies. 
 
 
Apart from lack of new external knowledge there are several other reasons for knowledge 
creation failures in clusters, including: 
• Opportunities for knowledge exchanges do not emerge; 
• Opportunities for knowledge exchanges have changed over time (as environments 
became more stable); 
• The breadth of knowledge requirements is low (simple technologies); 
• There are few mechanisms to facilitate networking and knowledge transfer. 
 
 
Many of these issues are linked to issues that will be analysed and discussed in other 
sections of the research, e.g. outcomes of the investigation into co-operation, competition, 
innovation and life-cycle. Therefore, the results of these various evaluations will be used to 
determine the degree of knowledge creation that takes place in the SOT ceramics cluster.  
 
 
Competitive challenges currently facing traditional clusters include: the saturation of their 
traditional markets, possibly due to growth of low-cost international competition and/or 
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changes in patterns of consumer demand; and, moves by leading cluster firms towards 
global outsourcing. These growing challenges have undermined many clusters’ abilities to 
retain firms and attract new firms. The subsequent reduction in the number of cluster firms 
has had a negative impact on many traditional clusters who have experienced many firm 
closures and significant reductions in employment. Diminished competitive rivalry is cited in 
the literature as one of the most fatal reasons for loss of cluster competitive advantage. One 
common response to low-cost competition from abroad has been to shift focus from the 
lower end of the market to the higher end segments. However, some clusters have had little 
success in making this transition, possible due to path-dependency and other historical 
reasons, and/or because of reduced financial resources to invest in higher end products. 
The key points identified in the literature on failing clusters have been drawn together, linked 
to the research propositions, and implications for the research are identified (see Appendix 
3d). 
 
2.9.6: Conclusions on Dominant Firm Effects 
Another key reason given in the literature for cluster failure is over-concentration in an 
industry that reduces the need for co-operation and obstructs competition. Consolidation has 
been linked in the cluster literature to a decline in innovative activity (fewer firms equates to 
fewer cluster competitors equates to less innovation). This is called the ‘congestion effect’ or 
‘intellectual lock-in’ and is seen as an obstacle to rapid change. The concentration process is 
said to give rise to the formation of one or few large firms. 
 
Proposition 10. Failing clusters will have undertaken a significant process of consolidation 
resulting in a reduction in the number of firms and, in the emergence of one/few dominant 
firms who do not act in the best interests of the cluster as a whole.  
 
 
According to the literature, it is not uncommon for a cluster to be dominated by a small 
number of very large companies. Lead firm strategies can range from highly co-operation 
oriented to highly competition oriented. Cost oriented lead firms can wield considerable 
power over smaller subordinate suppliers which, in turn, can undermine reciprocity and trust 
within the cluster. In such an environment few incentives exist for firms to engage in inter-
firm knowledge exchanges that may result in innovation. The presence of large firms can 
also act as a barrier to new entrants, which also reduces the potential for innovation.  
 
Proposition 11. Failing clusters are dominated by a few large firms who engage in 
competitive strategies resulting in a reduction in co-operation and innovation. 
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The key points identified in the literature on dominant firms have been drawn together, linked 
to the research propositions, and implications for the research are identified (Appendix 3e). 
 
 
The full set of propositions is presented in Table 2.3. By drawing all of the key points from 
the literature together, a theoretical framework for the research has been constructed and is 
presented in Figure 2.4. From the theoretical framework four distinct research stages have 
been identified and detailed research objectives and data requirements have been 
formulated and are all presented in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.3: The Research Propositions 
P1 
 
P1a 
Proposition 1. Successful industry clusters will exhibit a strong network of cluster interrelationships involving both strong and 
weak ties. 
Proposition 1a. Failing industry clusters will exhibit a weak network of cluster interrelationships. 
P2 
 
P2a 
Proposition 2. Firms in successful industry clusters will demonstrate strong absorptive capacity as evidenced by a significant 
number of inter-firm linkages.   
Proposition 2a. Firms in failing industry clusters will demonstrate weak absorptive capacity as evidenced by few (no) inter-firm 
linkages. 
P3 
 
P3a 
Proposition 3. In successful industry clusters, control will be equally balanced across firms, if there are dominant firms they do 
not abuse their powerful positions. 
Proposition 3a. In failing industry clusters, control will be concentrated into the hands of a few dominant firms who use their 
power to exert control over other cluster firms. 
P4 
 
P4a 
Proposition 4. Firms in successful industry clusters are more likely to have a higher need for co-ordination as evidenced by high 
technological complexity and highly separable processes. 
Proposition 4a. Firms in failing industry clusters are more likely to have a little need for co-ordination as evidenced by low 
technological complexity and inseparable processes. 
P5 
 
P5a 
Proposition 5. Successful clusters facing the challenges of globalisation will have adopted global/local strategies, characterised 
by a strong global network of agents from the core industry, plus related and supporting industries. 
Proposition 5a. Failing clusters, facing the challenge of globalisation, will not have made new linkages with firms and institutions 
outside the cluster. Moreover, the number of inter-cluster linkages will have reduced. 
P6 
 
P6a 
Proposition 6. Successful industry clusters will demonstrate vigorous competition between cluster firms as evidenced by a large 
number of firms in the industry and a constant stream of new entrants. 
Proposition 6a. Failing industry clusters will demonstrate vigorous competition between cluster firms as evidenced by a declining 
number of firms in the industry and few (no) new entrants. 
P7 
P7a 
Proposition 7. In successful industry clusters firms compete mostly on the basis of differentiation. 
Proposition 7a. In failing industry clusters firms compete mostly on the basis of low-cost/price. 
P8 
 
P8a 
Proposition 8. In successful industry clusters there will be evidence of strong innovative output as measured by the adoption of 
new technologies, new markets and new product developments. 
Proposition 8a. In failing industry clusters there will be evidence of weak innovative output as measured by the lack of adoption 
of new technologies, new markets and new product developments. 
P9 
 
P9a 
Proposition 9. In clusters where there is high modularity in product technology, there will be a high number of opportunities for 
inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
Proposition 9a. In clusters where there is low modularity in product technology, there will be a low number of opportunities for 
inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
P10 
 
Proposition 10. Failing industry clusters will have undertaken a significant process of consolidation resulting in a reduction in the 
number of firms and, in the emergence of one/few dominant firms who do not act in the best interests of the cluster as a whole. 
P11 Proposition 11. Failing industry clusters are dominated by a few large firms who engage in competitive strategies resulting in a 
reduction in co-operation and innovation. 
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Figure. 2.4: The Theoretical Framework for the Research (Source: Author, developed from Arikan, 2009) 
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Table 2.4: The Research Objectives 
 
Stage 1 Research Objectives – Industry life-cycle, demand and competition 
 
Propositions 
Data Requirements and Examples of Sources Link between Objectives 
 
1. To track the development of SOT tableware & giftware manufacturers from 1960 – 2016: 
i. Establish the total number of firms operating in each decade from 1960 – 2016 
ii. Establish the total number of new entrants in each decade from 1960–2016  
iii. Establish the number of firm closures in each decade from 1960-2016  
iv. Establish the number of acquisitions & mergers in each decade from 1960-2016  
v. Determine the degree of consolidation in the cluster as at 2016 
vi. Establish the life-cycle stage of the cluster as at 2016 
vii. Establish the emergence of dominant firms in the industry and their history of 
mergers and acquisitions 1960-2016 
 
P5, P5a 
P6, P6a 
P7, P7a 
P10, P11 
 
Secondary Data (examples) 
 
Various market intelligence reports, Keynote Reports, Business 
Monitor Reports and other secondary sources including various 
internet websites, e.g. 
Godden (1964) 
Keynote (1997) 
ECOTEC (1999) 
MINTEL (various dates) 
DTI (1994) 
Ceramic Ambitions (2000) 
 
Objectives 1 & 2 are aimed at determining: the 
life-cycle development of the SOT cluster; the 
ownership structure of the SOT cluster; the 
nature and type of competitive activity in the 
SOT cluster and the presence of dominant 
firms in the SOT cluster. A longitudinal study 
will be compiled (based on existing historical 
data) that tracks the development of the SOT 
cluster between 1940 and 2016.One key aim 
is to identify the number of tableware & 
giftware manufacturers operating in the cluster 
in 2016. This final list of firms will form the 
total population for stage 3 of the research. 
 
2. To examine the nature of demand for the SOT cluster’s products and its effect on competition 
between 2000 and 2016. 
i. Establish whether demand is increasing or declining 
ii. Establish the level and sophistication of demand as evidenced by increasing 
segmentation and product variations 
iii. Establish the pattern of local competitive activity (cluster) between 2000 and 2012 
iv. Establish the extent of competition from abroad, including competitors from low-cost 
countries 
 
P5, P5a 
P6, P6a 
P7, P7a 
 
Staffordshire TEC (1996) 
Tableware Strategy Group (1995) 
UK Markets Central Statistics Office 
FWC Sector Competitiveness Studies: Competitiveness of the 
Ceramics Sector EU (2008) 
Day et al. (2000) 
 
Plus Primary Data 
 
Findings from section 1 in the innovation/co-operation questionnaire. 
A descriptive and explanatory study will be 
compiled. 
 
Stage 2 Research Objectives – Establishing the ‘Need for Co-operation’ 
 
Propositions 
Data Requirements Link between objectives 
 
3. To determine the breadth of knowledge required to offer the products that characterise the cluster 
i. Is a wide breadth of knowledge required? 
ii. Is a narrow breadth of knowledge required? 
 
 
P4, P4aa 
P9, P9a 
 
 
Secondary Data (examples) 
 
Rowley (1994, 1996, 1998), Manufacturing and Flexible 
Specialisation in the British ceramics Manufacturing Industry 
(academic papers). 
 
Gay & Smyth (1974), The British Pottery Industry (Book). 
 
Imrie (1989), Industrial Restructuring in the British Pottery Industry 
(book). 
 
As discussed in the Literature Review, there is 
a need to discover the ‘need’ for co-operation 
in the SOT cluster. The literature indicated 
that this need depends upon issues such as: 
the degree of technological dynamism; the 
degree of separability of product technologies; 
and, the degree of vertical integration 
apparent in cluster firms. Hence, objectives 3-
5 are aimed at identifying the need for co-
operation. 
 
4. To determine the degree of modularity in the product technologies underlying the products that 
characterise the cluster 
i. Are product technologies separable? 
ii. Are product technologies inseparable? 
iii. Is knowledge within the cluster mostly ‘component’ knowledge or ‘architectural’? 
 
 
P4, P4a 
P9, P9a 
 
Niblett (1990), The British Pottery Industry 1940-1990 (Book). 
 
Day et al. (2000), A case study of British ceramics Production 
(Academic paper). 
 
Warren et al. (2000), Technological Innovation in the UK Ceramics 
Industry (Book). 
 
 
5. To determine the level of technological dynamism surrounding the products that characterise the 
cluster 
i. Is the industry’s technology highly dynamic? 
ii. Is the industry’s technology slow changing? 
 
 
P4, P4a 
P9, P9a 
 
Caroll et al. (2001), Outsourcing in the UK Ceramics Industry 
(Academic paper). 
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Whipp (1990), Patterns of Labour, Work and Social Change in the 
Pottery Industry (Book). 
 
Stage 3 Research Objectives – Continuing to Establish the ‘Need for Co-operation’ and Establishing 
Levels of Innovative and Co-operative Activity  
 
Propositions 
Data Requirements Link between objectives 
 
6. To determine the number of core firms in the cluster in 2015 that leverage the same general 
purpose technology 
i. Are all core firms fully vertically-integrated? 
ii. Is there any evidence of specialisation? 
 
P4, P4a 
Primary Research 
 
Questionnaire on Innovation: 
i. Q1.4 
ii. Q1.4 
 
 
7. To determine the output of innovative activity in the cluster between 2010 and 2015. 
i. Establish whether product innovation has increased/decreased 
ii. Establish whether process innovation has increased/decreased 
iii. Establish whether other forms of innovative activity have increased/decreased, e.g. 
markets and marketing 
iv. Identify the main reasons why some firms innovate and others don’t. 
v. To determine the success of the cluster’s innovative activities 
 
P8, P8a 
 
Questionnaire on Innovation: 
i. Q 2.1 – 2.4 
ii. Q 3.1 – 3.2 
iii. Q4.1 – 4.4 
iv. Q7.1 – 7.2 + Interview question 
v. Q5.4 – 5.5  
The target will be core manufacturers of 
tableware and giftware as determined by the 
findings from the longitudinal study on the 
SOT cluster’s development. Links to 
objectives 9 & 10. 
 
8. To establish the degree of inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the cluster between 2010 and 
2015. 
i. Establish the existence and nature of horizontal co-operation & collaboration  
ii. Establish the existence and nature of vertical co-operation and collaboration  
iii. Establish the presence of formal and informal institutions that support the SOT 
industry cluster 
iv. Establish lead firm’s level of co-operative orientation 
v. Identify the number of  knowledge exchanges within the cluster 
vi. Identify the type and depth of knowledge exchange relationships within the cluster 
vii. Identify the main reasons why some firms co-operate and others don’t. 
viii. Identify the number of firms who exchange knowledge with outside (the cluster) 
entities 
 
P1, P1a 
P2, P2a 
P3, P3a 
P10, P11 
 
 
Questionnaire on Innovation and other sources: 
i. Q 6.1 – 6.4 
ii. Q 6.1 – 6.4 
iii. Secondary research (data exists) 
iv. Primary research interviews 
v. Q 6.1 – 6.4 plus interviews 
vi. Interview question 
vii. Interview question 
viii. Interview question 
This objective will only be partially achieved 
through the questionnaire survey. The 
number, type and depth of collaborative 
relationships will be explored further in stage 4 
of the research 
 
Stage 4 Research Objectives – Power & Control and The role of Dominant Firms 
 
Propositions 
Data Requirements Link between objectives 
 
9. To establish the  balance of power and control within the SOT cluster in 2016 
i. Is power and control balanced across firms? 
ii. Is balance and control hierarchical, i.e. do dominant firms have more control? 
 
 
P3, P3a 
 
 
Primary Research 
 
i. Interviews 
ii. Interviews 
iii. Builds on findings from Chapter 4 of this thesis 
(objective 1 (vii)) 
 
Stratified purposeful sampling from the 
questionnaire respondents will be employed to 
identify firms for the interview stage of the 
research. Respondents will be selected from 
small/medium/large categories and also from 
firms who innovate and from firms who do not 
innovate (as indicated on questionnaire 
responses). Links to objectives 1, 6, 7, 8. 
 
10. To determine whether dominant firms have had a positive or negative effect upon competition 
and co-operation in the SOT cluster between 1980 and 2016. 
i. Ascertain the motivations behind dominant firm strategies and their effects upon 
competition and co-operation in the cluster 
ii. Establish whether dominant firms have taken a prominent role in facilitating 
knowledge exchange within the cluster 
iii. Establish whether dominant firms have established linkages outside the cluster 
 
 
P10, p11 
 
Primary Research 
 
i. Interviews 
ii. Interviews 
iii. Interviews and questionnaire  
Q 6.2 
 
As above. 
11. To synthesise these findings and draw accurate conclusions about the ‘strategic health’ of the 
SOT cluster.  
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1: Introduction  
The previous chapter identified a series of propositions based on key issues arising from 
a synthesis of the different cluster literatures. It was noted from the literature reviewed 
that a gap exists relating to the role and effects of dominant firms in industry clusters. 
Several key points from the literature were drawn together into a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for this research study (see literature review conclusions). 
Subsequently, a set of research objectives were developed from the theoretical 
framework in order to answer the research question: 
“To what extent does the SOT ceramics cluster exhibit characteristics of a 
successful industry cluster, or a failing industry cluster, as defined by the theory 
on industry clusters?” 
 
 
This chapter sets out the methods that will be utilised to achieve the aims and objectives 
of this research study. When undertaking research of this nature it is important to fully 
consider different research paradigms and matters of ontology and epistemology. 
Consequently, this chapter begins by exploring alternative research paradigms along 
with associated ontological and epistemological stances. This discussion is followed by 
the identification of an appropriate paradigm for this research study. Thirdly, an 
appropriate research design is identified and covers issues such as, the methods to be 
employed, data collection and data analysis. The final section discusses aspects of 
validity, reliability and ethics. A reflection on the research process is presented in chapter 
seven of this thesis (see chapter 7.7). 
 
 
3.2: The Research Paradigm 
Research paradigms can be viewed as basic belief systems representing different 
worldviews and can be explained as a function of how the inquirer (researcher) thinks 
about the development of knowledge. Inquiry paradigms define for inquirers what it is 
they are about, as well as what falls within and outside the limits of legitimate enquiry 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The research paradigm should combine the research 
philosophy and the research methods as, according to the definition given by Gliner and 
Morgan (2000), “The paradigm is a way of thinking about and conducting a research, It is 
not strictly a methodology but, more a philosophy that guides how the research is to be 
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conducted” (p. 17). However, different paradigms relate to different ontological stances 
and are therefore “deeply embedded in the socialisation of practitioners” (Patton, 1990, 
p. 69).  This relationship between the researcher and what is to be researched is also 
acknowledged by Guba and Lincoln (1994), who purport “any given paradigm represents 
simply the most informed and sophisticated view that its proponents have been able to 
devise, given the way they have chosen to respond to three defining questions” (p. 108). 
The three appropriate questions are: 
1. The ontological question, i.e. what is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, 
what is there that can be known about it? Ontology identifies the claims and 
assumptions about what constitutes reality (Grix, 2001), as well as the 
configuration and character of reality (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Different 
ontologies can be explained as a continuum, with the positivist ‘natural/scientific’ 
worldview at one end, and the constructivist ‘individual constructs of reality’ 
worldview at the other. Somewhere between the two ends of the continuum lies 
the post-positivist/critical realist approach. 
2. The epistemological question, i.e. what is the nature of the relationship between 
the knower or would-be knower and what can be known? Epistemology is linked 
to ontology in that it is about how one gains access to knowledge and about the 
relationship between knowledge and truth (Kilduff et al., 2011). For example: if a 
positivism ‘real’ reality is assumed, then the posture of the inquirer must remain 
one of objective detachment and value freedom; if a critical realist posture is 
assumed (reality can only be imperfectly known), then the inquirer, whilst trying to 
remain objective, will not be totally independent from that which is being 
observed. 
3. The methodological question, i.e.  how can the inquirer (would-be knower) go 
about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known? 
 
 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) purport that the answer given to any one question, taken in any 
order, constrains how the others may be answered. However, with this research study 
the research started with the object of investigation, i.e. the SOT ceramics cluster, and 
then progressed on to the theory on industry clusters which helped to clearly identify 
what knowledge was needed. Therefore, the research did not consider Guba and 
Lincoln’s three questions in any order, as implied above, but matched the ontological and 
epistemological stances to the proposed research task and selected appropriate 
methods to best achieve the specific aims and objectives of the research. Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) also advocate that no paradigm is or can be incontrovertibly right. Here 
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the research has attempted to devise the most appropriate paradigm, given the nature of 
the research task, whilst also acknowledging that the chosen paradigm will not be 
perfect, by definition. 
 
 
The following section presents key issues in the paradigm selection process and 
culminates in the selected paradigm for this research study. The main focus for the 
discussion is the debate around positivism and critical realism, as they are deemed to be 
most closely linked to the research to be undertaken. For example, parts of the research  
require positivist, quantitative methods (objectives 6-8) and other parts of the research 
require a more critical-realist perspective and application of qualitative methods 
(objectives 9-10). However, paradigms other that positivism and critical realism have not 
been completely overlooked in this chapter, the main arguments and rationale for 
rejection of such alternatives are presented subsequently in Table 3.1. 
 
 
3.2.1: Positivism, Post-positivism and Critical Realism 
The main positivist methodologies include experimentation and manipulation, where 
questions and/or hypotheses are subjected to empirical testing under strict control 
conditions. Positivist methodologies are those associated with the independence of the 
researcher from that being researched, they do not take into consideration the value-
determined nature of enquiry. Hence, the investigator is assumed to be capable of 
studying the object without influencing it or being influenced by it (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). There is a strong positivist element in this research study in that it starts with 
theory, which is used to develop and test hypotheses and this is positivism. However, the 
theory is only a starting point as it is conditional and needs to be modified in order to 
understand more deeply the object of enquiry. Consequently, a purely positivist approach 
would not allow the research to achieve all of the objectives, i.e. the UK ceramics 
industry is unique in that it is a function of a particular set of circumstances and 
individuals (an ‘open system’) and, therefore, there is a need to discover the details of 
the situation and understand the reality, or perhaps a reality working behind them 
(Remenyi et al., 1998). It is this requirement to discover the ‘how’ and ‘why’ behind the 
apparent reality that pushes this research beyond a textbook approach to positivism.  
 
 
A purely positivist approach would also not recognise the researcher’s influence in 
interpreting and explaining what is happening in the SOT cluster. The researcher is 
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aware of the need to exercise caution when conducting the research in order to reduce 
personal biases. For example, the researcher has worked in the SOT area for many 
years and has a long-standing interest in the local ceramics industry and, therefore, may 
be prone to bias, albeit subconscious. Such biases may include some degree of 
emotional attachment and intellectual curiosity and, perhaps, a predisposition to favour 
certain expected outcomes. The researcher is aware of such potential problems and will 
work hard to maintain a professional distance where possible and to keep an open mind. 
Moreover, the mixed methods approach (discussed later) should also assist in ensuring 
that the research findings are valid and reliable. 
 
 
In an attempt to find a more suitable paradigm this next section looks at alternatives to 
the positivist world view. Since the middle part of the 20th century there has been a shift 
in the way some researchers’ view science based research. One of the most important 
developments has been the shift away from positivism into ‘post-positivism’. Post-
positivism assumes that the world or ‘reality’ may only be probabilistically and imperfectly 
known (Fischer, 1998). This idea seems to make sense, especially in the complex field of 
management research. One of the main components, or strands of thought, contributing 
to post-positivism is ‘Critical Realism’. Critical Realism seems particularly appropriate to 
this research study as the critical realist asserts that while there is a reality to investigate, 
‘real objects are subject to value laden observation’, accordingly the reality and the 
value-laden observation of reality operating in two different dimensions (Bhaskar, 1978, 
1979, 1991).This approach can be both objective, in that quantitative data may form part 
of the study, and subjective in that it recognises that researcher biases and values may 
influence explanations and interpretations of more qualitative research findings. Hence, 
critical realism is an eclectic approach that is theoretically informed. 
 
 
The post-positivist critical realist approach also recognises the importance of using 
multiple measures and observations. Each single measure may possess different types 
of error, but by using ‘triangulation’ across multiple sources the researcher is more likely 
to obtain a more accurate picture of what's happening in reality. The use of multiple 
measures and the importance of triangulation will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
 
Moreover, the post-positivist considers that all observations are theory-laden and that 
scientists (and everyone else, for that matter) are inherently biased by their cultural 
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experiences, world views, and so on (Moutinho and Hutcheson, 2011). According to 
Guba and Lincoln (1994), “theories and facts are quite interdependent – that is, that facts 
are facts only within some theoretical framework” (p. 107). Another supporter of this view 
is Karl Popper who argued, “we approach everything in the light of a preconceived 
theory” (Popper, 1970, p. 52). In this research study propositions and observations will 
not be independent, as the facts about the SOT cluster will be viewed through a 
theoretical ‘window’ formulated from the different cluster literatures. Furthermore, the 
facts determined by the theory window will be subject to value-ladenness (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994); namely, the values attached to them by the researcher in light of theory, 
e.g. whether a particular fact has had a positive or negative influence, according to 
cluster theory, on the strategic health of the SOT cluster. Therefore, the facts of this 
research study will be determined through interaction between the researcher and the 
phenomenon. This approach where facts and values are seen as interrelated, offers 
further evidence to reject a positivist approach, which takes the view that the researcher 
does not influence the phenomena or vice versa and, therefore, facts are value-free 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
 
 
So far, this chapter has discussed two ontological stances, positivism and post-
positivism/critical realism. However, there are several other important ontological stances 
that the researcher has considered in deciding on the most appropriate paradigm for this 
research study, e.g. critical theory and constructivism. Table 3.1 presents the basic 
beliefs of Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) main alternative enquiry paradigms. It presents the 
main ontological stances and then links-in associated epistemological characteristics and 
methodologies. The author has extensively adapted and added to Guba and Lincoln’s 
original table (p. 109), and has also attempted to link the discussion to aspects of the 
research to be undertaken in order to provide a rationale for the paradigm chosen for this 
research study (discussed in more detail in section 3.3).  
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Table 3.1 Basic Beliefs of Alternative Enquiry Paradigms Mapped to the Current Research 
 POSITIVIST 
(Objectivist/ Realist) 
CRITICAL REALISM 
(post-positivist) 
CRITICAL THEORY (and related ideological 
positions, e.g. postmodernism/ post-
structuralism) 
CONSTRUCTIVIST 
Ontology Naïve realism – ‘real’ reality but 
apprehendable. Knowledge of the ‘reality’ is 
conventionally summarised in the form of 
time and context-free generalisations, some 
of which take the form of cause-effect laws 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Aims are 
explanation, prediction and control (Willmott, 
1997). 
Critical Realism – ‘real’ reality but only imperfectly and 
probabilistically apprehendable – due to basically flawed 
human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally 
intractable nature of phenomena. Claims about reality must be 
subjected to the widest possible critical examination to 
facilitate apprehending reality as closely as possible. Aims are 
still explanation, prediction and control (Willmott, 1997). 
 
Historical Realism – virtual reality shaped by 
social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and 
gender values: crystalised over time into a series 
of structures that are now taken as ‘real’. The 
structures are seen as a virtual or historical reality 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Discourse is 
deconstructed to reveal hidden structures of 
domination particularly dichotomies, then 
reconstructed to offer alternative, less exploitative 
social arrangements. Critical theory focuses more 
on the macro level, whilst critical postmodernism 
focuses more on the micro level (Boje, 2001). 
 
Relativism – local and specific 
constructed realities. Realities are 
apprehendable only in the form of 
multiple, intangible mental 
constructions (realities), socially and 
experientially based, local and 
specific in nature, and dependent for 
their form and content on the 
individual persons or groups holding 
the constructions. Constructions are 
alterable, as are their associated 
realities (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Epistemology Dualist/objectivist; findings are true. The 
investigator and the investigated object are 
assumed to be independent entities and the 
investigator to be capable of studying the 
object without influencing it or being 
influenced by it. Values and biases are 
prevented from influencing outcomes. 
Findings can be replicated (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). Deductive methods of enquiry 
are utilised to seek knowledge and test 
theory, outcomes are often in value-free, law-
like generalisations (Reige, 2003) 
Modified dualist/objectivist; critical tradition/community; 
findings probably true. The investigator and the investigated 
object are linked, the investigator attempts to maintain 
objectivity. However, findings are, to some extent, value-laden. 
Special emphasis is placed on external ‘guardians’ of 
objectivity such as critical traditions (do the findings fit with pre-
existing knowledge?) and the critical community (such as 
editors, referees, and professional peers). Replicated findings 
are probably true (but always subject to falsification) (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994). Critical realism is associated with both 
deductive and inductive methods and relies on multiple 
methods of discovery. Post-positivist, critical realists review 
literature before formulating research questions and setting 
hypotheses/propositions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) 
Transactional/subjectivist; value mediated 
findings. 
The investigator and the investigated object are 
assumed to be interactively linked, with the 
values of the investigator (and of situated ‘others’) 
inevitably influencing the enquiry. Findings are 
value mediated. Thus, the boundary between 
ontology and epistemology becomes blurred 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
 
Transactional/subjectivist; created 
findings. The investigator and the 
investigated object are assumed to 
be interactively linked so that the 
‘findings’ are literally created as the 
investigation proceeds.  
Again, the boundary between 
ontology and epistemology becomes 
blurred (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
The focus is on the case itself and 
inductive methods of enquiry are 
utilised. 
 
 
Methodology Experimental/manipulative; verification of 
hypotheses; chiefly quantitative methods. 
Questions and/or hypotheses are subjected 
to empirical test. Conditions are carefully 
controlled to prevent outcomes from being 
improperly influenced (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). Examples include, laboratory tests, 
other experiments and sample surveys 
(Saunders and Lewis, 2012). 
Modified experimental/manipulative; critical multiplism (version 
of triangulation) as a way of falsifying hypotheses; may include 
qualitative methods. Inquiry takes place in more natural 
settings and discovery is re-introduced as an element 
(especially in social sciences where emic viewpoints are 
solicited to assist in determining the meanings and purposes 
that people ascribe to their actions). Contributes to ‘grounded 
theory’ (Glaser and Straus, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Dialogic/dialectical. 
The transactional nature of the inquiry requires a 
dialogue between the investigator and the 
subjects of the inquiry. The dialogue is aimed at 
transforming ignorance and misapprehensions 
into more informed consciousness about how the 
structures might be changed and what actions 
are required to affect change (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). The researcher takes the role of 
‘transformational enquirer’ (Giroux, 1988). 
Positivist and interpretivist methodologies can be 
Hermeneutical/dialectical. 
Individual constructions are created 
and refined through interaction 
between and among investigator 
and respondents. Constructions are 
interpreted using conventional 
hermeneutical techniques, and are 
compared and contrasted through a 
dialectical interchange. The final aim 
is to distil a consensus construction 
that is more informed and 
sophisticated than any of the 
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used but the overall commitment is to dialectical 
analysis (Gephart, 1999). 
predecessor constructions (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994). Methods include 
the intrinsic case-study, grounded 
theory methods, ethnography and 
observation. 
Summary & 
Discussion 
There exists a single external 
reality.  
The researcher is objective. 
The researcher is independent from that 
being researched. 
Findings are value-free. 
Utilises quantitative methods such as 
experiments and surveys. 
Deductive approach. 
Is explanatory. 
Driven by laws and mechanisms. 
Replicable and generalisable. 
 
Positivism, along with associated 
epistemology and methodologies, was not 
deemed appropriate as a single, overall 
research paradigm for this study as 
positivism is based mainly on finding out 
the facts about ‘what’ exists. Although 
this research study IS concerned with 
discovering the ‘reality’ that is the SOT 
ceramics cluster, it is not only concerned 
with gathering quantitative data, but also 
with gathering ‘rich’ qualitative data in 
order to interpret, explain and predict 
what is happening in the SOT cluster. 
Therefore, whilst this paradigm may be 
appropriate for partially achieving some 
of the research objectives (Objective 7, for 
example), it is not appropriate as a 
paradigm for the whole research study. 
Multiple realities exist. 
The researcher attempts to maintain objectivity. 
The researcher is interlinked with that being researched. 
Findings are to an extent value-laden. 
Utilises both quantitative and qualitative mixed-methods 
approach. 
Is both deductive (mostly) and inductive. 
Is both explanatory and interpretive, and can be predictive. 
 
The researcher started with a review of literature and the 
formulation of a theoretical framework and propositions. 
The researcher is not independent from the research and 
there will be a degree of value-ladenness. Multiple 
methods are required to achieve the objectives (see 
Figure 3.2). Triangulation will be achieved through 
integration and synthesis of multiple sources. Both 
quantitative methods and qualitative methods are required 
to achieve the objectives. Therefore, this paradigm is 
particularly appropriate for this research study.  
 
 
Multiple realities exist. 
Is about de-constructing (and re-constructing) the 
current ‘reality’ with the aim of making structures 
more visible and by encouraging self-conscious 
criticism, and by developing emancipatory 
consciousness in social members. 
The researcher is both objective and subjective. 
Findings are to an extent value-laden. 
Focus is on qualitative but some quantitative 
methods may support. 
Is both deductive and inductive (mostly). 
Uses positivist and interpretive but the focus is on 
dialectical analysis 
 
There are some aspects of critical theory 
ontology that may be appropriate in achieving 
some of the objectives of this research study. 
For example, to discover, through in-depth 
interviews, deeper explanations/reasons 
pertaining to the proposed innovation & 
collaboration questionnaire survey findings 
(objectives 7 & 8), and also to achieve 
objectives 9 & 10. This stage of the research 
involves deconstructing interview discourse 
and analysing/re-constructing in light of the 
theoretical framework. Therefore, this 
paradigm is appropriate for the final stage of 
the research. 
Multiple realities are socially and 
empirically based. 
Is about constructing the ‘truth’. 
The researcher operates a 
subjective relationship with 
respondents. 
Inquirer and the inquired are 
interactively locked into an 
interactive process of talking, 
listening, reflecting, etc. 
Research is heavily value laden. 
Focus is mostly on qualitative 
methods at the micro level 
(dialectical), although quantitative 
methods may supplement. 
Is inductive. 
 
This paradigm is rejected outright 
on the grounds that this research 
study starts with a theoretical 
framework and a series of 
propositions closely linked to the 
literature. This paradigm 
approach is inductive in that it 
does not start with theory. 
Therefore, this approach is not 
suitable for this research study. 
Decision 
 
Rejected Accepted for objectives 1-10 Accepted for objectives 9 and 10 Rejected 
(Source: Author)
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3.3: The Research Paradigm Selected for this Research Study 
As demonstrated in Table 3.1 (decision row), this research study involves elements of three 
of the four main research paradigm categories. The research requires both quantitative and 
qualitative elements. Some objectives, for example, require the researcher to be 
independent and objective (Positivist stance) in determining the ‘reality’ that is the current 
situation of the SOT ceramics cluster, e.g. elements of objectives 1-8 will be achieved 
through analysis of extant data and from a questionnaire survey. However, the researcher 
cannot remain truly independent as interpretation and explanation of such findings will be 
subjective and value laden, i.e. the researcher will interpret the findings in light of the theory. 
Some of the objectives call for a purely qualitative approach, e.g. elements of objectives 1-8 
and all of objectives 9 and 10 can only be achieved through discourse, deconstruction and 
reconstruction in light of theory (Critical Theory approach). Therefore, a greater degree of 
subjectivity is required for these objectives.  
 
 
After careful consideration of all research paradigms presented above, along with the 
specific requirements of this research study, the post-positivist/critical realist approach is 
deemed to be the most appropriate as the core research paradigm for this research study. 
However, given that the research objectives can be linked to several competing paradigm 
approaches, i.e. positivism, critical realism and critical theory, the researcher intends to 
utilise a mixed paradigms approach for this research study. This approach is in line with that 
of Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006) who, whilst acknowledging that combining quantitative 
and qualitative approaches may sometimes be considered as tenuous because of competing 
dualisms, purport that both viewpoints can be used in a study by having a pure qualitative 
part and a pure quantitative part, and then by constructing meaning from both pure 
components of the study. They also offer another approach, which is to assess in terms of a 
continua rather than dualisms and then take more moderate positions on each continuum (p. 
59).  
 
 
It is the researcher’s intention to carry out qualitative and quantitative research to satisfy 
differing objectives as mentioned in Table 3.1 above. Moreover, it is also the researcher’s 
intention to combine the different quantitative and qualitative elements in order to fulfil the 
overall research aim which is to discover whether the SOT ceramics cluster is functioning as 
a ‘successful’ industry cluster, as determined by the cluster literature. For example, one of 
the key reasons given in the literature for cluster failure is an imbalance of power between 
firms, where dominant firms may not act in the best interests of the whole industry cluster. 
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Quantitative methods will establish if dominant firms are present in the SOT cluster 
(objectives 1 & 2), qualitative methods will establish the nature and effects of dominant firms’ 
power and control (objectives 9 & 10). The findings from both components will be considered 
together by the researcher and value-laden inferences will be made in light of theory 
(objective 11). The researcher is also aware that particular findings might not support 
existing theories as, according to Shannon-Baker (2016) “theories cannot offer an all-
encompassing view of a phenomenon” (p. 329). 
 
 
Table 3.2 draws together the key characteristics of the different paradigm approaches and 
identifies the combined paradigm approach adopted for this research study. However, such 
a simple table does not fully demonstrate, with accuracy, the adopted elements from the 
different paradigm approaches as it is only two dimensional. Consequently, Figure 3.1 (next 
page) has been constructed as a three-dimensional depiction of where the chosen paradigm 
‘sits’ along the three axes. 
 
 
Table 3.2: The Paradigm Adopted For This Research Study 
  
Positivism 
 
 
Critical Realism 
 
Critical Theory 
 
Constructivism 
Ontology Natural world. 
Facts/laws. 
Verified hypotheses. 
Social world. 
Human behaviour. 
Time bound. 
Non-verified hypotheses 
that are probable 
facts/laws. 
Falsification. 
Structural/historical 
insights. 
Individual 
reconstructions 
coalescing around 
consensus. 
Epistemology Independent from that 
being studied. 
Objective. 
Value free. 
‘Disinterested scientist’. 
 
Not totally independent 
from that being studied. 
Objective and subjective. 
Not value free. 
Elements of disinterested 
scientist and 
‘transformative intellectual’ 
Interdependent with 
that being studied. 
Subjective. 
Value laden. 
Transformative 
intellectual 
Interdependent with that 
being studied. 
Subjective. 
Value laden. 
‘Passionate participant’ 
as multi-voice 
reconstruction. 
Methodology Laboratory tests 
Quantitative 
Validation 
Hypo-deductive 
 
Modified experimental/ 
manipulative 
Critical Multiplism 
Quantitative & qualitative 
Case studies 
Questionnaires 
Falsification 
Deductive & inductive 
Dialogic 
Dialectical 
Deconstructs 
Observation 
Qualitative 
Deductive and 
Inductive 
Hermeneutical 
Dialectical 
Constructs 
Observation 
Description 
Qualitative 
Inductive 
  
 
 
 
 
  THE PARADIGM 
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Figure 3.1: The Philosophical Research Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 locates this research study on each of three axes. The first axis on the left 
represents different epistemological positions. The selected epistemological stance (see 
dashed oval line) is located in-between positivism and constructivism, it is positioned slightly 
closer to positivism on the axis as the proposed research does not follow constructivist 
principles but does include elements of positivism. The top axis represents the main 
ontological stances available. The current research is firmly located in the critical realism 
position as, although the chosen research paradigm includes elements from positivism, 
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critical realism and critical theory (discussed earlier), critical realism combines elements of 
all three approaches. The central axis represents different methodologies. Again, the 
proposed research is positioned centrally along this axis to demonstrate the multiple method 
approach (quantitative and qualitative), which is required to achieve all of the objectives. 
 
 
A multiple-method approach is in-line with a critical realism paradigm as it is both deductive 
(theory testing) and inductive (theory building). According to Saunders et al., (2003), it is not 
only possible to combine these approaches it is often advantageous. By starting with a 
coherent theory, the researcher can derive, by deduction, at a series of facts that ought to 
exist. However, a key aim of this research study is to further develop the theory on industry 
clusters, especially the theory on dominant firm effects where a gap in the literature has 
already been identified. Therefore, there are also inductive elements to this research study.  
 
 
3.3.1: The Paradigm and Deductive/Inductive Elements 
There are a number of aspects of the deductive approach that are appropriate to this 
research task, e.g. the research study involves developing a theoretical framework and 
testing it through a case study of the SOT ceramics cluster. In addition, causal relationships 
between the variables can be explained, e.g. the relationship between the number of firms in 
the industry and innovative output. The main purpose of the deductive approach will be to 
describe and analyse what is happening. For example, an increase or decrease in the 
number of firms in the SOT cluster, and who innovates and what the nature and level of such 
innovation is. Thus, the deductive approach is particularly appropriate for achieving 
objectives 1-8. Data requirements at this stage will be mostly quantitative and will rely upon 
both existing secondary data (objectives 1-5) and, primary data gathered through 
questionnaires (objectives 6-8). However, not all elements of objectives 6-8 can be achieved 
through questionnaires as a qualitative approach is required to determine reasons and 
motivations for why firms may/may collaborate.  
 
 
The inductive approach is particularly suitable for achieving objectives 9-11 because it 
reflects the changing research emphasis as the research progresses, i.e. from identifying 
“what” is happening in the SOT ceramics cluster to explaining ‘why’ and ‘how’. This stage of 
the research seeks to gather qualitative data in order to answer these questions and to fill 
gaps arising from research stage 1 (objectives 1-8). The main data collection method at this 
stage (objectives 9-10) will be semi-structured interviews (discussed in detail later in this 
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chapter). Objective 11 will involve: combining, refining and synthesising all of the findings 
from the various stages and attempting to validate/falsify the theoretical propositions; and, 
developing the theory, in particular the theory on dominant firm effects. Robson’s (1993) five 
sequential stages of the deductive research process have been modified and mapped to the 
research task and are presented in Table 3.3 below. 
 
 
Table 3.3: The Deductive/Inductive Research Process 
 
Deducing Propositions 
 
Propositions 1-10 
 
Expressing the Propositions 
in operational terms 
 
Research Objectives 1-8 (mostly quantitative) 
 
 
Expressing the Propositions 
in operational terms 
 
Research Objectives 9-10 (mostly qualitative) 
 
Testing the Propositions 
 
Through a case-study of the SOT ceramics cluster 
(Tableware & Giftware sector) 
 
Examining the specific 
outcome of the inquiry 
 
Through mapping findings to the theoretical 
framework developed in the literature review and 
drawing conclusions. 
 
If necessary modifying the 
theory 
 
In light of the conclusions. Research Objective 11 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 demonstrates the ‘overlapping’ nature of the deductive and deductive elements of 
the research. The research starts with theory (see literature review and theoretical 
framework) from which a set of propositions was developed. This stage of the research is 
deductive, however as the research progresses it is envisaged that theory will be refined and 
possibly modified along the way. For example, cluster theory purports that in successful 
industry clusters there is strong evidence of co-operation between members. However, there 
is some evidence that some industry clusters can be successful with minimal co-operation, 
perhaps because historically industry technologies and processes have not necessitated a 
need for firms to establish strong co-operative links. The proposed research intends to 
identify the need for co-operation in the SOT ceramics cluster at an early stage (objectives 
3-5). The results of this stage of the research will influence the findings from later stages, 
e.g. when analysing and evaluating actual levels of innovation and co-operation in the SOT 
ceramics cluster. The theory on industry clusters will be developed and possibly modified 
Theory 
Building 
INDUCTIVE 
Theory 
Testing 
DEDUCTIVE 
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throughout the research process. Hence, some stages of the research will be both inductive 
and deductive simultaneously. The final stage of the research will be inductive and will 
include a review, modification and new contribution (if appropriate) to existing cluster theory. 
 
 
3.4: Research Strategy 
As already noted in this chapter, the post-positivism/critical realist approach emphasises the 
importance of multiple measures and observations, each of which may possess different 
types of error, and the need to use triangulation across these multiple errorful sources to try 
to get a better bead on what's happening in reality (Trochim, 2002). According to Small 
(2011), mixed-method thinking should inform all stages of the research process, from 
problem definition through write-up, rather than only measurement or the assessment of 
evidence (p. 61). The author has already employed a mixed-methods approach in selecting 
an appropriate paradigm and will employ a mixed-method approach in utilising differing 
methods for data collection and data analysis in order to meet the objectives, e.g. historical 
review, questionnaires and interviews for data collection, and quantitative techniques such 
as statistics and numerical tables, pattern-matching and triangulation for data analysis. 
However, it is first necessary to define what is meant by mixed methods research and this is 
not straightforward to achieve.  
 
 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) define mixed methods research as “the class of research 
where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, 
methods, approaches, concepts, or language into a single study” (p. 17). One problem with 
this definition is that it does not state ‘how’ the different methods, etc. should be combined. 
The problem is further identified by Bryman (2009) who states “mixed methods research is 
an approach to the research process that is in an ambiguous position” (p. 516). The 
ambiguity is caused because it is not always obvious what mixed methods research denotes 
in specific terms.  
 
 
This is an important issue as different authors attach different meanings to the term ‘mixed 
methods’. For example, according to Yin (2006), a frequent practice in carrying out mixed 
methods research is to split the original set of questions, so that different research methods 
address different questions. However, according to Small (2011), different methods can be 
used to answer the same questions.  
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Yin’s definition of mixed methods appears to be more aligned with what Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (2003) call ‘multi-methods’ design. According to Tashakkori and Teddlie, “the major 
difference between multi-method and mixed method designs is that in multi-method design 
all studies are complete in themselves” (p. 199). With multi-method design there is one over-
arching research question, but there can be two or more interrelated studies. The results of 
each method are ‘pulled together’ to address the overall research question. With mixed 
methods design, however, textual data can be transformed to numerical data and used in 
analysis of a quantitative study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Maxwell, 2016). Thus, this 
definition of mixed methods is much more consistent with Small (2011), who also purports 
that one of the main approaches to data analysis in a mixed methods design is ‘crossover 
analysis’ where quantitative techniques are applied to qualitative data or vice versa. 
However, Small (2011) also identifies ‘integrative analysis’ as another technique in mixed 
methods analysis where two or more different analytical approaches or techniques are 
merged into a single study, and this second technique appears to be more in-line with 
Tashakkori and Teddlie’s multi-methods approach. In addition, other researchers also 
advocate the use of mixed methods in the analysis of data (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009; 
Sandelowski et al., 2009; Molina-Azorin and Lopez-Gamero, 2016).  
 
 
Such confusion over the meaning of the term ‘mixed methods’ calls for the researcher to 
define clearly at this point exactly what mixed methods means within the context of this 
research study. For the purposes of the research, i.e. to achieve all of the research 
objectives, and thereby answer the research question, a multi-methods approach will be the 
overriding strategy. Different methods will be employed to achieve different objectives and 
data will be analysed using integrative data analysis techniques. However, it should also be 
noted that the research will also involve a true mixed methods approach to achieve 
objectives 9-10 (discussed in more detail later), where some of the findings from the 
quantitative study will be combined with the qualitative findings. 
 
 
3.4.1: Mixed Methods and Verification 
One of the advantages of using a mixed-methods approach is that the author can attempt to 
verify the findings derived from one type of data with those derived from another, e.g. 
outcomes of the questionnaire survey will be compared to those of the in-depth interviews. 
This approach is sometimes referred to as ‘triangulation’ where different kinds of data are 
collected to measure the same phenomenon (Kadushin, et al., 2008; Farquhar and Michels, 
2016). According to Yin (2006), mixed methods within a single study are valuable for 
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producing converging evidence that may provide a more compelling argument than evidence 
from any single method alone. Although the research will mostly use different methods to 
address different objectives there will, as stated earlier, be some combining of methods to 
obtain a fuller picture of innovation and co-operation in the SOT cluster (objectives 6-8). 
 
 
 Another advantage of a mixed methods approach is that alternative types of data can also 
produce conflicting results (Small, 2011). Thus, weaknesses in single-source findings can be 
minimised by using different methods to answer the same questions. For example, this 
research study intends to utilise questionnaires followed by in-depth interviews to find out 
about innovation in the SOT cluster. It will be interesting to discover if the findings from both 
methods match. According to Brewer and Hunter (2006), one of the greatest values in 
combining different types of data lies in the ability of one type to compensate for the 
weaknesses of the other.  
 
 
3.4.2: Mixed Methods and Sequencing 
A mixed-methods approach can also be adopted when deciding on the sequencing of the 
data collection (Small, 2011; Hong et al., 2017). The basic issue is whether two or more 
types of data are collected concurrently (at the same time) or sequentially (one after the 
other). In this research study data will be collected data both concurrently and sequentially. 
For example, the data required (secondary data) to achieve objectives 1 and 2 will be 
collected and analysed first, as the one of the aims at this stage is to identify the research 
population (all ceramic firms left in the SOT cluster in 2016) which will form the target for the 
questionnaire. Secondly, the data required to achieve objectives 3-8 will be collected 
concurrently after objectives 1 and 2 have been achieved, i.e. objectives 3-5 can be 
achieved through extant secondary data collection and analysis and objectives 6-8 can be 
achieved (partially) through questionnaire survey.  
 
 
The final stage involves drawing a sample from the questionnaire survey responses for in-
depth interviews. One aim in this respect is to assess the believability of the survey 
responses in addition to achieving objectives 9-10. In this way objective 11 (conclusions) can 
be achieved from a process in which prior data collection has informed the nature and form 
of the subsequent alternative type of data. The strength of this approach derives from the 
ability of the different stages to resolve specific questions that emerge in the process of data 
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collection with additional data collection (Small, 2011; Subedi, 2016).  All of these stages are 
in-line with a mixed-methods approach as, according to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003): 
“when used sequentially the method that theoretically drives the study is usually 
conducted first, with the second method designed to resolve problems/issues 
uncovered by the first study or to provide a logical extension to the findings of the first 
study” (p. 199).  
 
 
Another characteristic associated with mixed data-collection studies is the extent to which 
the design employs ‘nested’ data (Small, 2011; Lieberman, 2005, 2013). Nesting refers to 
the extent to which multiple data types are collected from the same actors, organisations, or 
entities (Lieberman, 2005). The data collection methods and the sequencing of those 
methods, as described above, demonstrate the intended nested design of this research 
study. For example, individual SOT ceramics manufacturers will be surveyed and some of 
those respondents will be selected for in-depth interviews. In this way findings from the 
interviews will be used to reinforce or refute the survey findings (triangulation).  
 
 
3.4.3: Mixed Methods in Data Analysis 
A final consideration in a mixed-methods research approach are the methods employed in 
analysing the data. Most researchers analyse multiple data sources the way they examine 
single data sources, e.g. when analysing interview transcripts, ethnographic field notes, or 
historical texts, researchers have approached the data qualitatively, e.g. developed 
narratives, inferred meanings, quoted passages, etc. When analysing survey responses, 
census tabulations, or large sample data, they have approached the data quantitatively, e.g. 
calculating averages, plotting distributions, etc. (Small, 2011).  
 
 
In this research study a number of different analytical techniques to analyse the data at 
different stages. For example, objectives 1 and 2 will involve the construction of a 
longitudinal study to track the development of the SOT cluster from 1960-2016 and to arrive 
at the number of firms left in the industry in 2016 (the population to be surveyed). It is 
intended to use data reduction techniques along with descriptive statistics at this stage so 
that percentages and averages can be calculated. However, the subsequent analysis of 
those findings will involve mapping findings to the theoretical framework and providing a 
narrative to explain their meaning in light of theory, e.g. the effects of consolidation on 
competition in the industry will call for value-laden assumptions on the part of the researcher.  
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Objectives 3-5 will involve qualitative techniques in analysing existing historical texts and 
other secondary data, such as providing narrative and drawing inferences in light of theory 
(as before). Objectives 6-8 can be achieved from the survey questionnaire responses which 
will be analysed using statistical software or simple frequency tables (depending on the 
number of responses). Findings will again be mapped to the theoretical framework and 
narrative/inferences provided. Objectives 9 & 10 can be achieved from the semi-structured 
interview responses and will involve purely qualitative techniques such as pattern matching, 
based on themes arising from the literature review and presented in the theoretical 
framework, followed by narrative and inferences. The final stage of analysis will involve 
combining all of the data and mapping it to the theoretical framework and to the propositions, 
from which overall conclusions will be drawn (objective 11).  
 
 
3.5: Research Design – the Single Case Study 
This research study started with a theoretical focus, i.e. the theory on industry clusters from 
which an analytical framework was developed. Thus, the main ‘object’ of the research is the 
theory on industry clusters. Subsequently the SOT ceramics industry cluster, tableware and 
giftware sector, was selected as the ‘subject’ of the research. The subject of the research will 
be a case study which acts as a lens through which the theoretical focus, the object, will be 
viewed and explicated (Thomas, 2011). A recent definition of a case study is provided by Yin 
(2014), who defines case study analysis as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon (the case) in-depth and within its real world context” (p. 16). The 
SOT cluster is defined as a single case study for the purposes of this research study 
because it represents virtually the whole of the UK ceramics production industrial sector and 
is, therefore, of high relevance to both the local (West Midlands) and UK economies. 
 
 
According to Stake (1995), although the case study approach can involve analysis of a 
relatively small number of situations, the number of cases can be only one. Such intensive 
study of one case can lead to the discovery of relationships that may not be found by any 
other means. A single case study methodology is appropriate to this research study as it is 
suited to the empirical enquiry that investigates bounded contemporary phenomena within a 
real life context (Creswell, 1997). Moreover, a case study must be reasonably bounded, i.e. 
it should not stretch over too wide a canvas, either temporal or spatial (Remenyi et al., 
2002). As seen in the literature review, cluster theory views the cluster as a ‘whole’, a 
functioning, dynamic ‘system’. Furthermore, according to Porter (1990), cluster analysis 
starts with a large core firm, or several core firms, and spreads out from there (see literature 
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review). Thus, a single case study approach is particularly suited to investigating the SOT 
industry cluster. It has also been the strategy adopted in many previous cluster studies 
where the cluster is viewed as a single case. For example: the ten key case studies from 
Porter’s original work on industry clusters (Porter, 1990); the Indian software industry 
(Dayasindhu, 2002); and, Malaysia’s multimedia cluster (Richardson, 2013). 
 
 
However, it should be noted that what may appear to be a single case study may consist of 
“many potential observations, at different levels of analysis, that are relevant to the theory 
being evaluated” (King, et al.,1994, p. 208). In this study, as in previous studies (e.g. Porter, 
1990), only one industry cluster was adopted as the case study. However, the theoretical 
framework for this research study requires many observations to be made, at different levels, 
e.g. from secondary data, questionnaires and interviews, etc. if a full picture of the 
functioning of the SOT cluster is to be gained. 
 
 
Thus, the research strategy for this study is a multi-strategy approach that combines case 
study, descriptive studies, explanatory studies and longitudinal studies. However, the 
overriding focus of this research study is a single case study of the SOT Ceramics Cluster 
(i.e. the tableware and giftware sector), which is defined here as the unit of analysis. 
According to the research methods literature, the unit of analysis is what holds a study 
together (Yin, 2006, 2014; Harrison et al., 2017). A further refinement of the unit of analysis 
is required at this point. It is not the researcher’s intention to survey all firms belonging to the 
SOT ceramics cluster, e.g. suppliers and distributors, but to only survey the cluster’s 
manufacturers of tableware and giftware (core firms). These firms will be identified by 
achieving objective 1, which seeks to track the development of SOT tableware and giftware 
manufacturer’s from 1960-2016. At the end of this process all core manufacturers still 
operating in this industry sector will be identified. This final list of firms will form the total 
population for the primary research. 
 
 
3.5.1: Case Studies and Nested Samples 
Despite the varied methods that will be utilised to achieve the objectives, the researcher will 
consistently maintain the SOT ceramics cluster as the same point of reference and an 
integrated approach is taken to blend all of the methods into a single study. Sampling 
procedures are also carefully considered in maintaining a single study. According to Yin 
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(2006), “most desirably, the samples of each method maybe nested within that of the 
other.......nesting may be in either direction” (p. 44).  
 
 
In this research study samples will be nested as follows: achievement of objective 1 will 
determine the whole population to be surveyed; to achieve objectives 6-8 the whole 
population will be targeted to be surveyed; to achieve objectives 9 and 10 a sample will be 
drawn from the actual survey responses for in-depth interviews. In this way the researcher 
will achieve nesting of samples. Figure 3.2 shows how the research will integrate the unit of 
analysis. 
 
Figure 3.2: The SOT Cluster as an Integrated Unit of Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
(Source: Author) 
 
 
 
3.5.2: Case Studies and Critical Realism 
The case study method, as described above, fits perfectly with the critical realist approach 
and is deemed appropriate for this research study as, according to Robson (2002), it is “a 
strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence” (p. 
178). In fact, multiple data collection methods are one of the distinguishing features of a 
case study (De Vaus, 2001; Saunders et al., 2003). In this study, the empirical investigation 
is concerned with finding out whether the SOT ceramics cluster functions as a successful or 
failing industry cluster, according to cluster theory. Multiple sources of evidence include 
Stage 1: Identification of the 
whole SOT Ceramics Cluster 
(Tableware & Giftware 
Manufacturers) 
Stage 3: Questionnaire survey 
on innovation & co-operation 
targeted to all SOT (Tableware 
& Giftware Manufacturers) 
Stage 4: In-depth interviews on 
co-operation and dominant firm 
effects. Smaller sample of SOT 
(Tableware & Giftware 
Manufacturers) 
Questionnaire data 
will be combined with 
secondary data 
findings from stages 
1 & 2 
Interview data will be 
combined with 
questionnaire data and 
secondary data 
findings from stage 1 & 
2  
Stage 2: Historical study based 
on secondary data to identify 
co-operation up to  2016 
Stage 1 identifies the 
population for stages 
3 & 4. Findings are 
fed-forward into 
subsequent stages 
Stage 3 identifies the 
sample for stage 4. 
Findings from stages 
3 & 4 are combined 
and linked to stages 1 
& 2 
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various published secondary data, and primary data gathered from the questionnaire survey 
and in-depth interviews.  
 
 
The case study strategy was selected as the core strategy for this research study for two 
main reasons: 
1. Case studies are consistent with the critical realist approach where there is an 
interest in testing and developing external theory. 
2. The complexity of the SOT cluster requires both a holistic perspective (whole cluster 
as the main unit of analysis), as well as individual management and industry expert 
perspectives. The research requires an examination of historical and documentary 
evidence as well as responses to questionnaire and in-depth interviews. Thus, the 
case study approach allows for real-life interactions of variables to be examined, e.g. 
the relationship between co-operation and innovation, thereby allowing for 
‘identification of detailed interactive processes’ (Remenyi et al., 1998).  
 
 
One of the unique strengths of the case study approach is its ability to deal with a full variety 
of evidence and this is particularly useful in combining deductive and inductive approaches 
within the research frame. The single case study strategy was selected as the core unit of 
analysis as it allows for both holistic and sub-units to be investigated and for findings to be 
combined. Failure to research holistic as well as sub units of data may result in research that 
cannot test the propositions. Furthermore, the case study approach, with mixed methods, 
supports the requirements for theoretical generalisation (De Vaus, 2001). The carefully 
formulated propositions and theoretical framework for this research study provide clear 
direction for what the researcher needs to examine within this study. Subsequently, the case 
study strategy should facilitate in carrying out the necessary secondary and primary 
research required to fulfil the research objectives and to test the propositions. 
As mentioned previously, whilst the single case study will be the overall focus of the 
research, several other research strategies will be incorporated into the case study approach 
for this research study. For example, ‘longitudinal’, ‘descriptive’ and ‘explanatory’ studies 
(Robson, 2002), will be applied at various stages throughout the research.  
• Longitudinal - the main strength of longitudinal research is the capacity that it has to 
study change and development (Saunders et al. 2003). This approach will be 
particularly relevant to objective 1. There is much published data, constructed over a 
long time, pertaining to the UK and SOT ceramics industry. From these sources it will 
be possible to produce a series of snapshots of the SOT cluster over a period of time 
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which, when joined together, will give a ‘moving image’ (McGivern, 2002). Valuable 
data can be gained in this way which when analysed may give powerful insights into 
developments in the SOT ceramics cluster.  
• Descriptive – to construct an accurate profile of firms, events and situations in the 
SOT ceramics cluster. Appropriate for all stages of the research. 
• Explanatory – to establish causal relationships between variables and to explain the 
relationships between them, e.g. the relationship between competition and 
innovation.  
 
 
The approaches used in this study to achieve objectives 1-5 are also similar to what 
Jankowicz (1995) calls ‘historical review’, where the purpose is to describe what has 
happened in the past and to trace the development of issues. The various research 
strategies and methods described above are presented in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: The Research Strategies and Methods Employed at Various Stages of This 
Research Study 
 
 
 
3.6: Sampling Approaches 
This section presents a discussion of the different sampling approaches and techniques that 
will be employed to achieve the objectives of this research study. It has already been stated 
that the unit of analysis for this research study is the Stoke-on-Trent Ceramics 
manufacturing cluster, tableware and giftware sector. It has also been stated that the 
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research will focus on core manufacturers of tableware and giftware only, i.e. those firms 
who carry out all/most stages of production. It is the researcher’s intention to include all such 
manufacturers who are located within the main Stoke-on-Trent postcode areas, i.e. ST1 - 
ST6, in defining the SOT cluster. Moreover, only firms with 10 or more employees will be 
included in the survey. The rationale for selecting only core manufacturers for the study is 
supported by Michael Porter’s technique for cluster identification where he advocates 
starting with a “large firm or concentration of like firms” at the core of the industry (Porter, 
1998b: 5). 
 
 
3.6.1: The Research Population – Research Stages 1 and 2 
Stage 1 and 2 (objectives 1-5) will be achieved through the collection and analysis of 
existing secondary data pertaining to the SOT ceramics cluster (discussed in more detail 
later). It is the intention to construct a unique database that tracks the number and 
movement of all core ceramics firms from 1960 to 2016 including all firms entering the 
industry and all firms exiting the industry. This first stage of the research involves gathering 
and analysing existing quantitative and qualitative data and identifying patterns that match 
they key themes identified in the theoretical framework. Subsequently, this exploratory and 
explanatory process will lead to initial assumptions being made about the competitive 
advantage of the SOT cluster, in particular about competition, collaboration and innovation in 
the cluster.  
 
 
The next stage of the research will require the researcher to check out the viability of these 
emergent findings with new data, i.e. it will involve testing assumptions and 
confirming/disconfirming the importance and meaning of identified patterns. According to 
Patton (1990), the source of questions or ideas to be confirmed or disconfirmed may be from 
previous scholarly literature. This approach is in-line with the deductive nature of the 
research at this stage where findings will be analysed and discussed in light of the cluster 
literature. Confirming or disconfirming emergent findings from stages 1 and 2 will require 
further primary research. For example, the research will enable some early assumptions 
regarding competition and cooperation to be made at this stage, but questionnaire and 
interview surveys are required in order to gain a more accurate picture. Consequently, a 
further key outcome for this initial stage will be the identification of all core manufacturers of 
tableware and giftware remaining in the SOT cluster in 2016. These remaining firms 
represent the total population, or research frame, for the following two stages of the 
research.  
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3.6.2: The Research Population – Research Stage 3 
Stage 3 (objectives 6-8) will involve a questionnaire survey (quantitative) of all firms 
identified from stage 1, i.e. the total population. Existing unsubstantiated evidence estimates 
the number of firms to be somewhere between 15 and 30 in 2011 (see chapter 4.2.1), and 
so the whole population is small enough to be surveyed in its entirety. According to Yin 
(2006), sampling procedures need to be considered carefully in maintaining a single study 
while using mixed methods. The different logics that underpin quantitative studies and 
qualitative studies are also reflected in different sampling approaches (Patton, 1990). 
Quantitative inquiry typically depends on large samples selected randomly. Qualitative 
studies tend to focus in-depth on relatively small samples (Patton, 1990). However, despite 
the quantitative nature of stage 3 of this research study, the intention is to survey the whole 
population of ceramics firms, if possible, and therefore random sampling is not required. 
Surveying the whole population in this way will permit confident generalisations to be made.  
 
 
3.6.3: The Research Sample – Research Stage 4 
Stage 4 of the research (objectives 9 and 10 and further in-depth inquiry into issues raised 
from stage 3) will involve purposeful sampling techniques to select from the questionnaire 
survey responses a sample of the total population for in-depth interviews. This approach is 
appropriate, as in a mixed-methods study, the samples of each method may be nested 
within that of the other (Yin, 2006). In this study, the sample for the interviews is nested 
within the questionnaire total population. Stratified, purposeful25 sampling (Patton, 1990) will 
be the main technique at this stage. The questionnaire responses will be categorised, using 
standard industry classifications, into small, medium and large sized firms. Within each of 
these classifications the responses will be analysed and further categorised into three 
subgroups, e.g. those firms who: innovate/collaborate most; engage in some 
innovation/collaboration; do not engage in any innovation/collaboration. Subsequently the 
sample for interviews will be drawn from each subgroup within each category 
(small/medium/large). By carrying out this process the research will account for ‘maximum 
variation’ (Patton, 1990) in the sample, i.e. the researcher can be sure that the size variation 
among firms is represented in the study. In this way common patterns that emerge from 
great variation will be of particular interest and value in capturing core experiences and 
central, shared aspects or impacts of/on innovation and collaboration. Purposeful sampling 
                                                 
25 Stratified purposeful sampling involves, “taking a stratified purposeful sample of above average, average, and below average cases. This is less than a 
full maximum variation sample. The purpose of a stratified purposeful sample is to capture major variations rather than to identify a common core, although 
the latter may also emerge in the analysis. Each of the strata would constitute a fairly homogeneous sample. This strategy differs from stratified random 
sampling in that the sample sizes are likely to be too small for generalization or statistical representativeness” (Patton, 1990, p.174. 
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techniques are deemed appropriate for this stage of the research as they allow for the 
selection of information-rich cases for studying in-depth (Patton, 1990). Furthermore, 
according to Saunders et al., (2003), non-probability sampling techniques are commonly 
used in case study research. The difference between probability and non-probability 
sampling is that non-probability sampling does not involve random selection. 
 
 
3.6.4: Other Sampling Techniques 
In addition to stratified sampling, another specific type of purposeful sampling intended for 
this stage of the research is ‘extreme or deviant case sampling’ (Patton, 1990, p. 69). 
Extreme or deviant case sampling focuses on cases that are rich in information because 
they are unusual or special in some way. Unusual cases may be particularly troublesome or 
especially enlightening, such as outstanding successes or notable failures. For this research 
study, information will be gathered from the questionnaire survey on innovation and co-
operation in the SOT cluster. The evaluation focus at stage 4 will be on understanding the 
conditions under which firms do/do not collaborate. According to Patton (1990), it is not 
necessary to randomly sample from within the subgroups as the researcher should “think 
through what cases they could learn the most from and those are the cases that are selected 
for the study” (p. 170).  
 
 
3.6.5: Rationale for sampling Methods 
In many instances more can be learned from intensively studying extreme or unusual cases 
than can be learned from statistical depictions of what the average case is like. An example 
of how this sampling approach has been used before in management research is Peters and 
Waterman’s (1982) study of America’s best run companies, where their sample list of 
‘innovative and excellent’ companies was drawn from information provided by a group of 
business experts. Thus, the researcher’s intended strategy of purposeful selection of 
extremes from the subgroups identified above is justified.  However, this thesis also intends 
to interview firms from in-between the two extremes. Moreover, extreme or deviant cases 
may not be found, in which case the researcher may use ‘intensity sampling’ (Patton, 1990), 
or a combination of the two sampling methods, as an alternative strategy. Intensity sampling 
involves the same logic as extreme case sampling, but with less emphasis on the extremes. 
The researcher may decide to select cases from the questionnaire responses that manifest 
sufficient intensity to illuminate the nature of success or failure, but not at the extreme. If the 
questionnaire responses show minimum variation then the researcher may use a 
combination approach, where stratified purposeful sampling is used to determine the small, 
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medium and large sized firms and then random sampling is utilised to select firms from 
within each category. According to Patton (1990), more than one qualitative sampling 
strategy may be necessary and, moreover, purposeful sampling and random sampling 
approaches are not mutually exclusive (p. 181).  
 
 
It has already been stated that it is the intention to further explore emergent findings from 
stages 1 and 2 in the subsequent two stages of this research study. It is also the intention to 
utilise some of the findings from stage 4 to confirm/disconfirm and further explain findings 
from stage 3 (objectives 7 and 8 in particular), in addition to fulfilling the specific objectives 
for stage 4 (objectives 9 and 10). As well as demonstrating a mixed-methods approach to 
sampling, by outlining the different sampling techniques to be adopted for this single-case 
research study, the research has also demonstrated the ‘nested data’ approach that is 
another feature of mixed-methods research. The objectives for the four stages of the 
research and the differing approaches to sample selection at each stage are presented in 
Table 3.4. 
 
 
Table 3.4: Research Approaches for the Total Population and Sample Selection 
Stage 1 &2 Total Population Technique Comments 
 
Objectives 
1-5 
 
The SOT ceramics 
cluster, tableware & 
giftware 
manufacturers 
 
No sampling technique 
required as research is 
based on secondary 
sources of published data 
pertaining to the whole 
population of this sector 
 
The unit of observation is a specific sector of the SOT Ceramic 
Industry Cluster (tableware & giftware. The sample for this 
study is comprised of core tableware and giftware 
manufacturers only. Moreover, the research is focused only on 
those ceramics manufacturers with 10 employees or more and 
who are engaged in most or all stages of production.. The 
rationale for choosing only core manufacturers for the sample is 
supported by Michael Porter’s technique for cluster 
identification (Porter, 1990).  
All core-manufacturing firms in the cluster will be included.(so is 
representative) 
Stage 3 Total Population Technique Comments 
 
Objectives 
6-8 
 
The SOT ceramics 
cluster, tableware & 
giftware 
manufacturers 
 
Construct own sampling 
frame based on empirical 
work by the author. Again, 
the whole population is 
studied. 
 
A unique database will be constructed in stage 1. (based on 
quantitative data and tracking the number and movement of all 
core firms between 1960 and 2016 (so is representative)). From 
this database the whole population will be identified. 
Stage 4 Sample Technique Comments 
 
Objectives 
9-10 
 
The sample will be 
drawn from stage 3 
questionnaire 
responses. 
 
Purposeful/ Judgmental 
sampling. Purposeful 
sampling strategy 
employed was 
“‘heterogeneous” or 
“‘maximum variation” 
sampling (Saunders, et 
al., 2003) 
 
Respondents will be selected according to the three main 
categories of small/medium/large firms to provide the qualitative 
data required to validate/falsify key themes identified in stage 1 
and to determine the role of dominant firms. Another criteria for 
selection will be respondents’ level of involvement/non-
involvement in innovation and co-operation. “A sample 
containing cases that are different can be a strength as any 
patterns that do emerge are likely to be of particular interest 
and value and represent key theme” (Patton, 2002) 
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3.7: Specific Data Requirements 
As stated earlier in this chapter, a combination of both secondary and primary data is 
required to achieve the objectives of this research study. The research objectives have been 
divided into four distinct stages: 
Stage 1, (secondary research) The development of the Stoke-on-Trent Ceramics cluster and 
resultant effects on competition (1960 – 2016); 
Stage 2, (secondary research) Identifying the historical need for co-operation in the Stoke-
on-Trent ceramics cluster (up to 2016); 
Stage 3, (primary research) The current situation regarding competition, co-operation and 
their effects on innovation in the Stoke-on-Trent ceramics cluster 2010-2015; 
Stage 4, (primary research) Further evidence on co-operation and, power and control and 
the role of dominant firms in the Stoke-on-Trent cluster (1980 – 2016). 
 
 
Some of the above stages can be carried out sequentially and some in parallel. For 
example, stages 1 and 2 can be carried out in parallel as one stage is not dependent upon 
the next. However, stage 1 must be completed before stage 3, as the population for stage 3 
will be identified from the results from stage 1 (explained in more detail later). Similarly, 
stage 4 cannot take place until stage 3 is complete, as again the sample for this stage will be 
drawn from the questionnaire responses returned in stage 3. As discussed earlier (sampling 
section), this further demonstrates the ‘nested data’ approach that is a feature of mixed-
methods research. The rest of this section is structured around identifying and justifying the 
data collection and data analysis methods required for each of the four stages and their 
associated objectives.  
 
 
3.7.1: Research Stage 1 Aims: The Development of the SOT Cluster and Competition 
(1960 – 2016) 
Stage 1 of the research is aimed at determining: the life-cycle development of the SOT 
cluster; the current (2016) ownership structure of the SOT cluster; the nature and type of 
competitive activity present in the SOT cluster; and, the presence (or not) of dominant firms 
in the SOT cluster. This data is required in order to fully/partially test the following 
propositions (see chapter 2, Table 2.3 for a full list of propositions): 
P5 and P5a – Will be partially achieved through objective 2, e.g. the challenges of 
globalisation on the SOT cluster will be determined. The identification of linkages 
inside/outside the cluster will be achieved through objective 8 (see 3.7.14 – 3.7.18). Cluster 
literature indicates that successful clusters form internal and external linkages. 
101 
 
P6 and P6a – Will be partially achieved through objective 1, which requires analysis of 
competition in the SOT cluster as measured by the numbers of firms, including new entrants. 
The cluster literature emphasises the need for vigorous competitive activity for cluster 
success. The literature indicated that a reduction in the number of firms equals less 
competition, i.e. fewer firms to compete with each other. 
P7 and P7a – Will be partially achieved through objective 2, which requires identification of 
the nature and type of competitive activity existing in the cluster. Cluster literature 
distinguishes between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ forms of competition and their effects on 
innovative output. The nature and type of competitive activity will be further 
identified/explored in stages 3 and 4 (questionnaire survey and interviews). In this way 
verification/falsification of objective 2 results can be achieved. This is further evidence of the  
intent to achieve ‘triangulation’ across multiple data sources where possible and is in 
keeping with the ‘critical realist’ approach. 
P10 and P10a – Will be partially achieved through objective 2 which requires identification of 
consolidation in the industry and the presence of dominant firms. Both are identified in the 
literature as possible contributors to cluster decline. The presence and role of dominant firms 
will be further identified/explored in stages 3 and 4 (questionnaire survey and interviews). 
 
 
3.7.2: Research Stage 1 Objective 1 – Data Collection 
In order to meet this objective it is necessary to collect historical, time-series data. This will 
involve the author creating a unique longitudinal secondary data set. The starting point for 
the longitudinal study will be Godden’s (1964) ‘Encyclopaedia of British Pottery and 
Porcelain Marks’, which lists UK ceramics manufacturers’ according to the various ‘back-
stamps’ used on their products and contains listings of manufacturers’ dating back to the 
origins of the industry in the early eighteenth century. It is considered to be a valuable and 
reliable26 source of information for company names, periods of operation and name-
changes. By carefully sifting through the data the research aims to construct a database of 
SOT core manufacturing firms still operating in the early 1960s. However, the initial data set 
will need to be checked and be brought up-to-date (2016), so a variety of additional sources 
of raw secondary data will be utilised, e.g. company websites, trade publications, company 
listings, etc. A listing of sources used to construct the database is included in the appendices 
section of this thesis (see Appendix 4a). A further aim of objective 1 is to identify the number 
of tableware and giftware manufacturers operating in the SOT cluster in 2016. This final list 
                                                 
26 Godden’s Encyclopaedia was recommended as a useful source of data by the Chief Executive Officer of the British Ceramics 
Confederation (the UK Ceramic Industry’s leading Trade Association) 
102 
 
of firms will form the total population for the primary research (survey questionnaire) required 
for objectives 6, 7 and 8. 
 
 
3.7.3: Research Stage 1 Objective 1 – Suitability of Secondary Data 
As stated, each of the sources that will be analysed to construct the longitudinal study will 
be, where possible, cross-checked with each other (triangulated) to ensure that the findings 
are as accurate as possible. Furthermore, every firm listed in the final database will be 
subjected to further rigorous internet searches, e.g. utilising popular search engines such as 
Google27. In this way consistency and accuracy of the data can be ensured. If it is found that 
there are still ‘gaps’ remaining in the data, and if company contact details are available, firms 
will be emailed or telephoned with a request for company information. Furthermore, the 
researcher will use her own contacts in the SOT industry to further verify the results. The 
final version of the database along with an explanation of how data is classified is included in 
the appendices section of this thesis (see Appendix 4). 
 
 
3.7.4: Research Stage 1 Objective 1 – Data Analysis 
Once complete, the database will be analysed using quantitative techniques. Firstly, a series 
of simple tables and diagrams will be derived from the database, identifying the movement of 
firms within each decade (1960-2016). For example, firms existing in 1960 will be examined 
to see if they are still there in 1969, if firms existing in 1960 are not there in 1969 then further 
secondary data investigation will be carried out to determine what happened to them, e.g. 
closure, merger or acquisition. New firms appearing within the decade will be identified as 
‘new entrants’, investigations will be made to determine if they are ‘true’ new firms and not 
the result of mergers or name changes. A full set of tables for each decade will be included 
in the appendices section of this thesis (see Appendices 5a-5g). From the tables, diagrams 
in the form of flow charts will also be constructed to show the pattern of mergers and 
acquisitions taking place in the SOT cluster between 1960 and 2016. Also from the tables, a 
series of bar charts will be constructed for each decade using Microsoft Office Excel 
spreadsheet software. The second part of the data analysis will involve qualitative 
techniques, e.g. a descriptive analysis of statistics (what is happening) will be provided along 
with an explanation of relationships and trends (possible explanations of ‘how’ and ‘why’). At 
this stage findings will be explained in relation to key themes identified from the literature, 
e.g. life-cycle theory and the effects of consolidation on competition. Throughout the data 
                                                 
27 Google is a search engine for finding resources on the World Wide Web 
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analysis a series of cross-checks will be carried out on the data to eliminate error, e.g. 
analysed data will be checked back to source tables and the database. 
 
 
3.7.5: Research Stage: 1 Objective 2 – Data Collection 
Objective 2 has two main aims. Firstly, it examines the external environment surrounding the 
SOT cluster in order to determine the nature and level of demand for the SOT ceramics 
cluster’s products as at 2016. Secondly, it determines the pattern of competitive activity 
apparent in the SOT cluster between 2000 and 2016. In order to meet this objective it is 
necessary to collect compiled secondary data from multiple sources. This will involve the 
researcher gathering historical data from a wide variety of industry specific secondary 
sources. Examples of reports include marketing intelligence reports such as MINTEL reports 
“China & Earthenware UK” (2004 - 2014), and Keynote Reports “China & Earthenware 
Market Report” (2008), as well as specialist commissioned reports such as ECOTEC 
Research & Consulting Report “Strategic Analysis of the Ceramics Industry in Staffordshire” 
(1999) and FWC Sector Competitiveness Studies Report “Competitiveness of the Ceramics 
Sector” (2008). Examples of academic papers based on research into the ceramics industry 
include: “Economic Governance and the Evolution of Industrial Districts Under Globalisation: 
The Case of Two Mature European Industrial Districts” (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009), 
which is a paper based on structure and governance in the North Staffordshire Ceramics 
District and, “A Case Study of British Ceramics Production”’ (Day et al., 2000). Examples of 
books include: “The British Pottery Industry 1940-1990” (Niblett, 1990).  
 
 
3.7.6: Research Stage 1 Objective 2 – Suitability of Secondary Data 
The sources that will be utilised for objective 2 include both raw data and published 
summaries. This type of data is useful in both descriptive and explanatory research 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Moreover, the data will be a mix of quantitative and qualitative data 
which, again, is in-line with the critical realist, mixed-methods approach. Moreover, by using 
data from such well-established organisations and researchers the data can be considered 
reliable and trustworthy. 
 
 
3.7.7: Research Stage 1, Objective 2 – Data Analysis 
Data analysis for objective 2 will involve assigning relevant units of the data to appropriate 
categories identified from the theoretical framework. By having a well-defined research 
question and objectives, and a clear framework and propositions derived from the theory, it 
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should be relatively straightforward to identify the categories (see conceptual framework: 
chapter 2, Table 2.4) for analysing the data for all stages of this research study. Through a 
further process of sifting and selection the data will then be reduced into key findings and 
tentative conclusions will be drawn in light of theory, to be explored further in later stages of 
the research. 
 
 
The analytical procedure that will be adopted here is the deductively based approach 
‘explanation building’ which is a similar approach to ‘pattern matching’ (Yin, 1994). However, 
unlike pattern matching, which involves testing a predicted explanation, explanation building 
attempts to build an explanation while collecting data and analysing them. This approach is 
appropriate as the research does not attempt to predict in advance of the research which of 
the alternative propositions is correct.  According to Yin (1994) the hypothesis/proposition 
testing approach is related to an ‘explanatory case study’ strategy, which is the dominant 
research strategy adopted for objectives 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 & 10. Throughout the data analysis a 
series of cross-checks will be conducted on the data to eliminate error. 
 
 
3.7.8: Research Stage 2 Aims: Identifying the Historical Need for Co-operation in the 
SOT Custer  
Stage 2 of the research is aimed at identifying the ‘need for co-operation’ in the SOT cluster. 
This theme was identified from the literature as being important in helping to explain the 
existence, or lack, of extensive networks of collaborative relationships in an industry cluster. 
Cluster literature purports that such networks of relationships are a feature of successful 
industry clusters. However, if an industry has had little need to co-operate, perhaps because 
of low technological dynamism and/or a high instance of full vertical integration within 
individual firms, then firms may historically have had little need to co-operate. Hence, there 
is a need to determine the structure of production processes, along with the technologies 
that underpin them within core manufacturing firms in the SOT cluster. 
 
 
This data is required in order to fully/partially test the following propositions: 
P4 and P4a – Will be partially achieved through objectives 3, 4 and 5, e.g. whether 
processes are highly technical or not and/or highly separable or not. Objective 3 will identify 
knowledge requirements which, whilst not specifically linked to any one set of propositions, 
are closely linked to the need for co-operation and also to ease of knowledge transfer. 
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Objective 6 will also contribute to identifying the ‘need for co-operation’ but requires primary 
research and so is included in stage 3 of this research study (questionnaire survey). 
P9 and P9a – Will also be partially achieved through objectives 3, 4 and 5, e.g. modularity in 
the cluster’s manufacturing processes. Findings from these objectives will help to determine 
the number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges. However, the number of 
opportunities will also be determined from the achievement of objective 6 and 8 
(questionnaire survey and interviews – see stages 3 and 4 discussion).   
 
 
3.7.9: Research Stage 2, Objectives 3-5 – Data Collection 
In order to meet these objectives it is necessary to collect compiled secondary data from 
multiple sources. This will involve the gathering of historical data from a wide variety of 
industry specific secondary sources. So far, early investigations indicate that the data 
required will be found in historical books and academic research papers. Examples of 
academic papers based on research into the structure, processes and technologies in the 
UK ceramics industry include: “Economic Governance and the Evolution of Industrial 
Districts Under Globalisation: The Case of Two Mature European Industrial Districts”, 
(Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009); and, “Technological Innovation in the UK Ceramics 
Industry”, (Warren et al., 2000). Examples of books include: “The British Pottery Industry”, 
(Gay and Smyth, 1974); “Work and Social Change in the Pottery Industry”, (Whipp, 1990); 
and, “Industrial Restructuring in the British Pottery Industry”, (Imrie, 1987).  
 
 
3.7.10: Research Stage 2 Objectives 3-5 – Suitability of Secondary Data 
Similarly to the approach taken for objective 2, the sources utilised for objectives 3-5 include 
both raw data and published summaries of both a quantitative and qualitative nature. By 
using data from such reputable authors and researchers the data can be considered reliable 
and trustworthy. 
 
 
3.7.11: Research Stage 2 Objectives 3-5 – Data Analysis 
A similar approach to the data analysis techniques used for objective 2 will be taken for 
objectives 3-5. Analysis will involve assigning relevant units of the data to appropriate 
categories identified from the theoretical framework (pattern matching/explanation building). 
Through a further process of sifting and selection the data will then be reduced into key 
findings and tentative conclusions will be drawn in light of theory. Findings from objectives 3-
5 will also be utilised in later stages of the research to explain and/or reinforce primary 
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research findings, e.g. to explain why firms do/don’t co-operate. This is a further example of 
‘nesting’ of data and of ‘triangulation’ of data and is consistent with a mixed-methods 
research design. Furthermore, it is hoped that some of the key trends identified in stage 1 of 
the research will be supported by stage 2 findings and, moreover, may be more accurately 
defined. (See objective 2 data analysis discussion for a more detailed explanation and 
justification for the data analysis methods adopted here). 
 
 
3.7.12: Research Stage 1 & 2 – Possible Limitations of Secondary Data 
It is envisaged that some of the aggregations and definitions found in sources of secondary 
data (e.g. ECOTEC Report, MINTEL and Keynote Reports) may not be entirely consistent 
with each other, or with the researcher’s definitions, due to the different approaches and 
methodologies. For example, ECOTEC (1999) lists firms by business unit and the 
researcher intends to lists firms by ownership (firms may consist of several business units). 
However, as the researcher is interested in general trends over time, and it is intended that 
the methods of collecting the data will remain constant, any differences found will not be 
deemed to be that important in achieving the overall research objectives. 
 
 
It is also likely that some of the data in published reports may also be subject to 
‘measurement bias’ in that they may represent interpretations of those who produced them, 
rather than offer an objective picture of reality (Jacob, 1994). For example, the ECOTEC 
report (1999), which was commissioned by the then Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
to prove a case for funding, has come under some criticism from industry experts for the way 
the data is presented, and for being based on a very small and unrepresentative sample of 
respondents. However, this report is only one of several such reports that will be used in 
stages 1 and 2 of the research. By using multiple sources of data in this way to answer the 
research questions, reliability and validity of the findings should be ensured.  
 
 
3.7.13: Research Stage 3 Aims: Competition, Co-operation and Innovation in the SOT 
Cluster 2010-2016 
Stage 3 of the research is aimed at determining the current situation regarding competition 
and co-operation and their effects on innovation in the Stoke-on-Trent Ceramics Cluster as 
at 2016. Furthermore, stage 3 is also aimed at determining the number of core firms in the 
SOT cluster that leverage the same general purpose technology. This data is required in 
order to fully/partially test the following propositions: 
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P1 and P1a – Will be achieved through objective 8, e.g. establishing whether there are inter-
firm knowledge exchanges taking place within the cluster, and determining the nature and 
pervasiveness of such knowledge exchanges. Moreover, mechanisms for knowledge 
exchanges will also be identified. As mentioned earlier, cluster literature indicates that 
successful clusters exhibit a strong network of external and internal linkages consisting of 
both strong and weak ties. 
P2 and P2a – will also be achieved through objective 8, e.g. an examination of inter-firm 
knowledge exchanges should enable the researcher to draw conclusions about the 
‘absorptive capacity’ of the SOT cluster. However, according to the literature, there are other 
factors that contribute to absorptive capacity, such as ‘the need to co-operate’. 
Consequently, the findings from objectives 3, 4, 5 and 6, will also contribute to conclusions 
drawn about absorptive capacity. According to the literature, a cluster’s ‘need to co-operate’ 
has a direct relationship with the degree of co-operation that takes place within an industry 
cluster. Objectives 3-5 have already been discussed in this chapter. 
P4 and P4a – will be partially achieved through objective 6 (see earlier discussion, 
objectives 3-5), e.g. by determining the number of core firms in the cluster that utilise the 
same technologies, the researcher should be able to draw conclusions on the degree of 
vertical integration and/or specialisation apparent within the cluster. This will be another 
important determinant in identifying the need for cluster firms to co-operate. 
P8 and P8a – Will be fully achieved through objective 7, e.g. by identifying the output of 
innovative activity in the cluster between 2010 and 2015 the researcher will be able to draw 
conclusions about the success of the SOT cluster. Moreover, the researcher will be able to 
identify the focus of innovation and whether innovative activity has increased or decreased 
during the period in question. Strong innovative activity, leading to successful innovative 
output, is widely cited in the literature as a key success factor in industry clusters. 
 
 
3.7.14: Research Stage 3 Objectives 6-8 – Data Collection 
In order to meet objectives 6-8 it is necessary to collect primary data from the core firms in 
the SOT cluster. The research population and sampling procedures have already been 
discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. However, from preliminary research already 
undertaken (see chapter 4.2.1), it is envisaged that the total population will be approximately 
15-30 firms. The research method employed will be a survey questionnaire. Based on the 
detailed objectives of this research study, it was relatively simple to identify the types of 
question that would be required to achieve the objectives. Furthermore, by having such 
detailed objectives from the beginning of the research process, the survey questionnaire to 
be constructed in advance of other stages of the research. In order to ensure reliability and 
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validity in the research instrument the questionnaire was constructed by utilising another 
survey questionnaire (GPrix, see below), which had been employed by researchers in the 
near past. In addition to adapting the existing questions to meet the specific needs of this 
research study, several new questions specific to the research were included. 
 
 
As stated, the innovation questionnaire for this study was adapted from a questionnaire used 
previously by the European Union GPrix project28. The project was carried out to assess a 
set of regional innovation support measures (2005-2009 inclusive) in a representative set of 
European regions characterised by a large number of SMEs from traditional sectors, 
including the automotive, textiles, leather, ceramics, mechanical/metallurgy and food 
sectors. Seven European Union regions were surveyed in the project, with the West 
Midlands being the UK region surveyed. The online GPrix questionnaire was filled out by 
333 people, mostly from traditional SMEs29. Two-thirds of firms were from the manufacturing 
sector. Regarding employment, 37% were micro, 38% small, 21% medium and 3% big 
companies. Most GPrix SMEs (28%) were from the metallurgy/mechanical engineering 
sector, followed by food sector (15%), automotive supplier and textile industry (both 12%). 
Below 10 % of participants were from ceramics (8%) and leather (4%) industries. Within the 
case study subset, 61 SMEs out of the 333 took part in subsequent interviews. The results of 
the GPrix survey are available in a variety of reports30 and relevant findings from the reports 
are utilised in chapter six as a comparator for the SOT cluster survey results. The research 
acknowledges that any comparisons made between the GPrix survey data and the SOT 
survey data cannot be strictly reliable given the differences between the two samples in 
terms of size and the range of industries involved. However, the GPrix data is considered 
useful in this research as it provides a benchmark against which to measure the comparative 
performance of the SOT survey firms. 
 
 
The final questionnaire for objectives 6-8 of this research study is described as follows. The 
questionnaire has been designed to include seven key sections, with each section aimed at 
achieving different objectives. In addition to objectives 6-8, some of the questions are aimed 
at gathering information that will help to achieve, or reinforce, several other research 
objectives (see below). The data to be gathered through the questionnaire spans a period 
                                                 
28 GPrix, (2012), GPrix innovation policy support survey. [ONLINE]. Available at: http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/en/survey.htm. 
[Accessed 30 June 2017]. 
29 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017]. 
30GPrix, (2012), Reports, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/en/reports.htm. [Accessed 30 June 2017]. 
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between 2010 and 2015. This will enable the research to identify trends across this period, 
e.g. whether innovation is increasing/decreasing. A full copy of the questionnaire is included 
in Appendix 9, and an explanation of each section of the questionnaire, along with a 
description of how questions link to the objectives, is provided in Appendix 10.  
 
 
3.7.15: Research Stage 3 Objectives 6-8 Administering the Questionnaire and 
Maximising the Response Rate 
It is intended to administer the questionnaire to the total population (see sampling section of 
this chapter) by the researcher in person. Firstly, telephone contact will be made to identify 
an ‘appropriate person’ within the company, i.e. owner or senior manager. During this initial 
contact the researcher will explain the nature of the research study and request that the 
company participates. Secondly, the researcher will post/email out the questionnaire and a 
covering letter (see Appendix 11), explaining that the questionnaire will need to be 
completed in a face-to-face meeting with the researcher. The questionnaire and letter will be 
sent to each company in the population. In order to convince companies to participate the 
covering letter will ensure anonymity of the company data (confidentially agreement) and will 
also offer to make the research findings available to participants. An appointment will then 
be made with the ‘appropriate person’ for the questionnaire to be completed in the presence 
of the researcher. Because the questionnaire is quite complex it is though that this will be the 
best approach as the researcher will be able to explain questions and how the data will be 
used. The researcher will retain the completed questionnaire at the end of the meeting. It is 
estimated that the whole meeting, including completion of the questionnaire, will take 
approximately 45 minutes. 
 
 
3.7.16: Research Stage 3 Objectives 6-8 Validity and Reliability of the Survey 
Instrument 
Validity and Reliability of the survey instrument is ensured in several ways. Firstly, by 
adapting a widely applied existing research instrument from extremely reliable sources as 
detailed above, there is confidence that the participants will understand the questions 
because they have been asked before for similar purposes. This is called ‘content validity’ 
(Saunders and Lewis, 2012). Secondly, the questions have been carefully matched to the 
specific objectives and propositions of this research study (detailed above), and this is called 
‘construct validity’ (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). Moreover, several different types of 
questions are included in the questionnaire for different uses, e.g. ranking, listing, rating, 
quantity and open questions are all included in the questionnaire. Finally, a pilot study will be 
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conducted to make sure that respondents will have no problems in answering the questions, 
and also so that their responses can be recorded correctly (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). The 
a pilot study will be issued to small number of people working in, or connected to, the SOT 
industry. This pilot sample will be identified from the researcher’s list of existing contacts in 
the SOT ceramics cluster and includes academics researching the industry and existing 
managers within the industry. 
 
 
3.7.17: Research Stage 3 Objectives 6-8 Data Analysis 
As explained previously, the data collected at this stage will be mainly quantitative and will 
be analysed by either using statistical software or simple one-way frequency tables, 
depending on the number of responses. The questionnaire allows a set of standardised 
questions to be asked to a large number of respondents (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). 
Because the questions are standardised, the data collected by the questionnaires will be 
used for both descriptive and explanatory research. For example, SOT cluster firms’ 
innovative activities can be described from the statistical analysis of the questionnaire 
responses and explanations of what the findings mean can be made in light of theory (theory 
testing). Moreover, relationships across the data can be identified, described and explained. 
For example, the relationship between collaboration and innovation can be identified 
(statistically) and described (e.g. it might be found that firms who innovate more also 
collaborate more), then explained in light of theory. This descriptive and explanatory 
approach is in keeping with the intended research design as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
 
 
3.7.18: Research Stage 4 Aims: Co-operation, Power and Control and Dominant Firms 
in the SOT Cluster (1980 – 2016) 
Stage 4 of the research is aimed at further identifying co-operative activity in the SOT 
cluster, as well as determining both the balance of power and control within the SOT cluster 
and the roles that dominant firms have had upon the overall strategic health of the cluster. 
From the relevant academic literature, it was identified that an even distribution of power and 
control was a feature of successful clusters. It was also identified from the literature that 
dominant firms can contribute towards the success or failure of an industry cluster 
depending on the role they take. Moreover, it has also been identified that there is a ‘gap’ in 
the literature on dominant firm effects and, therefore, this is where the research hopes to 
make a significant contribution to the small amount of existing research. Hence, there is a 
need to investigate fully the ‘reality’ behind power and control in the SOT cluster. Stage 4 is 
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also aimed at exploring in more depth some of the findings on innovation and collaboration 
from earlier stages of the research (see below). 
 
 
This data is required in order to fully/partially test the following propositions: 
P3 and P3a – Will be partially achieved through objective 6, e.g. to discover individual 
managers’ views about power and control in the industry. Objective 6 will also be partially 
achieved from the findings of objective 1 (consolidation and the emergence of dominant 
firms) and from stage 3 questionnaire results (firm size).  
P10 and P10a – will be achieved partially from objective 10. For example, managers’ views 
will be sought about the motivations behind dominant firms’ strategies and about their role in 
facilitating knowledge transfer within the cluster. Objective 10 findings will also be 
triangulated with the questionnaire survey findings from stage 3. For example, data on the 
largest firms, such as levels of innovation and co-operation will be compared with managers’ 
views from stage 4 interviews. 
P1, P1a, P8 and P8a – as mentioned earlier, some of the findings from earlier stages of the 
research will be further explored in more depth during the interview stage. For example, to 
further explore the reasons why some firms do/don’t co-operate (partially fulfilling objectives 
7 and 8). 
 
 
3.7.19: Research Stage 4 Objectives 9-10 Data Collection 
The research method employed at this stage involves the collection of primary data from 
semi-structured interviews. This is because a more qualitative approach is required to further 
explore the ‘what’ and to be able to explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ behind the reality. A main 
strength of interviews within a case study is that they are targeted and focused. Semi-
structured interviews are consistent with exploratory studies (Saunders, et al., 2003) and can 
be used to explore and explain themes that have emerged from earlier stages of research in 
addition to validating findings from the earlier stages (Wass and Wells, 1994). As mentioned 
in the sampling section of this chapter, respondents will be purposefully sampled based on 
the questionnaire survey results. As the number of core firms is envisaged to be between 15 
and 30, based on early indications from secondary data, it is further envisioned that the 
number of interviews will be between 7 and 15. However, the final number will be 
determined based on the questionnaire findings. For this stage of the research a list of 
themes and questions will be derived from two sources: 
1. From the survey questionnaire as described in the previous section, quantitative 
findings on innovation and collaboration will be explored in much more depth. For 
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example, questions will be aimed at discovering the reasons and motivations behind 
why firms do/don’t collaborate with each other; 
2. From the theoretical framework in order to meet the requirements of objectives 9 and 
10. For example, questions will be aimed at discovering more about power and 
control within the SOT cluster. This relates to the structure of the cluster itself, which 
will be identified from objective 1 and also from questionnaire responses about firm 
size. However, in stage 4 of the research more questions will be asked about specific 
managers’ views on which firms have more power and control in the cluster. 
Questions will also be asked about the role of dominant firms in the cluster, e.g. the 
role they take in knowledge sharing within the cluster and, whether they act in the 
best interests of the cluster (these findings will be mapped back to quantitative 
findings from stage 1).  
 
 
It is envisaged that the interviews will be approximately 30-45 minutes each. All interviews 
will be recorded to ensure accuracy of data and later will be professionally transcribed. Once 
a schedule of interview questions has been formulated they will be pilot tested in an informal 
interview with one of the intended interview respondents. A final interview schedule will then 
be constructed (see Appendix 12). The interviews will be standardised, respondent 
interviews where the interviewer will direct the interview and the interviewee will responded 
to the questions of the researcher. 
 
 
Senior managers such as Chief Executive Officers or owner-managers will be selected as 
interview subjects. Due to the high profile roles in the industry of the respondents, and the 
sensitivity of some of the questions to be asked the researcher will keep the identities of all 
respondents anonymous. Therefore, they will be referred to as respondent ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, etc. A 
profile of the companies (anonymous) and of the respondents will be provided in the 
appendices section of this thesis (see Appendix 13). Although the respondents will, at this 
stage, be already known to the researcher through of their participation in the questionnaire 
survey, the researcher will aim to further establish credibility by following a strict protocol, as 
follows: 
• During the questionnaire survey stage of the research the respondents will be asked 
if they will be willing to participate in the subsequent interview survey should they be 
selected for further study; 
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• Prior to the start of the interview stage, selected respondents will be further contacted 
initially by telephone (or email), to clarify research intentions, to confirm participation 
in the interview process and to set a date for the interview; 
• Results of the questionnaire survey and a schedule of interview questions will be 
sent (post and/or email) to the respondents one-week in advance of the interviews to 
allow participants the opportunity to prepare themselves for the discussion. 
 
 
3.7.20: Research Stage 4 Objectives 9-10: Suitability of Data Collection Method 
A rigorous and systematic approach will be adopted by the researcher in preparation for the 
interviews, in choosing and preparing respondents, and in recording and analysing the data. 
In this way validity and reliability can be ensured, both in the data that will be collected, and 
in the way it will be analysed (see 3.7.21). However, it is not intended that the interview 
research will be able to establish reliability in any quantitative or statistical way because the 
research may not result in a sample size sufficiently large to be fully representative, e.g. the 
total population is estimated at between 15 and 30 firms. It is intended, though, that the 
interview findings will provide sufficient context and evidence of validity so the informed 
reader can decide whether or not the findings generalise to their circumstances.  
 
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the research medium most suited to this stage of 
the research because of their potential to reduce interviewer bias due to the open-ended 
nature of the questions, e.g. the interviewer cannot easily guide the interviewee to answer in 
a certain way. Prior to the interviews the researcher will attempt to avoid holding a view as to 
which of the propositions is the most likely outcome and this should reduce bias in the way 
that questions are asked. However, given that the research will have already completed 
stages 1-3 at this point and will be aware of the findings, it is highly likely that some 
interviewer bias will be evident. In an attempt to reduce interviewee bias the author will also 
be careful to select respondents who are likely to have opposing views on some issues, e.g. 
those who see the importance of innovative activity and those who do not. This approach is 
discussed in more detail in the sampling section of this chapter. Furthermore, the researcher 
will attempt to reduce bias by seeking negative examples and alternative explanations during 
the interviews but, again, the researcher will be careful not to direct the interviewee to pre-
chosen answers.  
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A further justification for choosing semi-structured interviews for this stage of the research is 
that, according to Easterby-Smith et al., (1991), interviews are advantageous when: 
• There are a large number of questions. This is the case with stage 4 of this research 
study, e.g. there will be several questions on each topic of co-operation and, power 
and control; 
• Where questions are open-ended or complex. As all questions will be open ended 
and are sufficiently complex not to be included in the questionnaire survey, e.g. 
questions that explore the issues of weak and strong ties in relationships; 
• If the logic or order of the questions may require variance the interviewer may lead 
the discussion based on the schedule of questions but will be prepared to vary the 
order dependent upon the interviewee responses. 
 
 
3.7.21: Research Stage 4 Objectives 9-10 Data Analysis 
The first stage of analysis will involve assigning relevant units of the collected data to 
appropriate categories. By having a well-defined research question and objectives, and a 
clear framework and propositions derived from the theory, it will be relatively straightforward 
to identify the categories/units (see conceptual framework) for analysing the data for all 
stages of this research study. The analysis of ‘embedded units’ (Yin, 1994) is seen as an 
appropriate strategy as it allows individual units to be compared across the firms surveyed 
and conclusions drawn. Through a further process of filtering and selection the data will then 
be reduced into key findings and rearranged into a table, or series of tables, that compares 
responses from the interviewees.  
 
 
The second stage of data analysis will be the deductively based approach ‘explanation 
building’ which is a similar approach to ‘pattern matching’ (Yin, 1994). However, unlike 
pattern matching which involves testing only a predicted explanation, explanation building 
goes further by attempting to build, if necessary, alternative explanations while collecting 
data and analysing them. This approach is appropriate as the research will not attempt to 
predict in advance which of the alternative propositions, if any, apply to the SOT ceramic 
cluster. The maintained and alternative propositions will generate different expected 
patterns. The predicted patterns will be compared with the actual ones to identify the actual 
degree of association. Where minimal associations are found with the predicted patterns 
then alternative explanations will be sought. In this way the research may throw new light on 
existing theory, or new theoretical propositions may emerge. The depth of evidence 
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collected from the questionnaire and interviews will contribute towards the development of 
cluster theory and demonstrate the inductive nature of the research at this stage. According 
to Yin (1994), the hypothesis (proposition) testing approach is related to an ‘explanatory 
case study’ strategy, which is one of the research strategies adopted for this study and this 
demonstrates the deductive nature of the research at this stage. Thus, the research at this 
stage is both inductive as well as deductive. 
 
 
The final stage of analysis will involve synthesising the findings from all stages of the 
research and then mapping back to the theoretical framework (objective 11). From this 
overall conclusions will be drawn, recommendations made and theory developed and 
extended. 
 
 
3.8: Validity and Reliability 
Throughout this chapter, issues of validity and reliability have been discussed in different 
sections. For example, in the section on research strategy, it has already been discussed 
how mixed/multi-methods research uses triangulation as a way to reinforce or refute findings 
from one particular source or method, thus providing greater validity and reliability in the 
overall findings. In this section, previous points made about validity and reliability in research 
studies are pulled together and discussed as a whole. A definition of ‘validity’ in research is 
useful before commencing with the discussion of how the researcher has endeavoured to 
design a research paradigm that ensures, as much as is possible, validity and reliability 
throughout the whole research process.  
 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a mixed/multi-methods approach is the principal strategy 
for this research study. According to Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006), assessing the 
validity of findings in mixed methods research is particularly complex (p. 60). Furthermore, 
Bryman (2009), building upon the work of other researchers (e.g. Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2003, 2006; Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006), recommends that validity in mixed methods 
research be termed ‘legitimation’ rather than ‘validity’, as validity is a term most commonly 
associated with a ‘positivist’ philosophy and has a strong association with quantitative 
research. The qualitative researcher is more concerned with ‘contextualisation’, e.g. where 
legitimation represents the standards set by a particular community at a specific time and 
place (Schwandt, 2001).  
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The term ‘legitimation’ is thought to be more acceptable to both quantitative and qualitative 
researchers (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006: 55). Legitimation is the degree to which 
mixed methods research integrates both quantitative and qualitative findings to strengthen 
and provide legitimacy, fidelity, authority, weight soundness, credibility, trustworthiness and 
even standing in the results and interpretations in mixed methods research (Brown, 2014). 
Legitimation can be divided into ‘internal’ validity and ‘external’ validity (Ryan et al., 2002). 
Internal validity can be defined as “the logic between a piece of research and existing theory” 
(Arbnor and Bjerke, 1977: 217). External validity determines whether more general 
conclusions can be drawn, based on the model used and data collected, and whether results 
may be generalised to other samples, time periods and settings (Ihantola and Kihin, 2011). 
Because the research is based on a carefully constructed theoretical framework, i.e. the 
findings of cluster studies from several fields, e.g. strategic management, industrial districts, 
network studies, etc. (see chapter 2.1), internal contextual validity in this research study is 
ensured. External validity (generalisability) is discussed in the next section of this chapter 
(see 3.9). As the research adopts a mixed/multi methods approach that combines both 
quantitative and qualitative elements, the legitimation approach is deemed appropriate for 
this research and, consequently, the term ‘legitimation’ will be used to represent issues 
concerning validity throughout the rest of this chapter. 
 
 
In 2006, Onwuegbuzie and Johnson outlined a new typology of nine legitimation types in 
mixed research (p. 57). The following table (Table 3.5) has been adapted from Onwuegbuzie 
and Johnson’s ‘Typology of Mixed Methods Legitimation Types’ framework, it links each of 
the nine legitimation types to corresponding stages in this proposed research study. Types 
1-8 can be classified as ‘internal’ legitimisation and type 9 can be classed as ‘external’ 
legitimation, as it is concerned with generalisability.  
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Table 3.5: Legitimation of Mixed Methods Approaches in This Research Study 
LEGITIMATION 
TYPE 
DESCRIPTION LINKS TO THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
SAMPLE 
INTEGRATION 
The extent to which the 
relationship between 
the quantitative and 
qualitative sampling 
designs yields quality 
meta-inferences. 
The researcher has conducted a concurrent design in which 
inferences from the secondary data are integrated with inferences 
from the quantitative questionnaire and with subsequent 
inferences from the qualitative interviews. As the questionnaire 
target is the whole population of core manufacturers identified from 
the secondary research, and the interview participants are 
purposefully selected from the questionnaire responses, findings 
should be generalisable and legitimisation problems reduced. 
Further details of validity in the sampling design are provided in 
section 3.6 of this chapter. 
INSIDE-OUTSIDE The extent to which the 
researcher accurately 
presents and 
appropriately utilises 
the insider’s view and 
the observer’s views for 
purposes such as 
description and 
explanation. 
Through the proposed pilot testing of both the questionnaire and 
the interview (see sections 3.7.16 and 3.7.19) with proposed 
respondents and industry experts the ‘insider’ view will be 
obtained. Moreover, through the PhD supervisory process peer 
review will take place. In this way the ‘outsider’ (disinterested and 
trained in social research) view will be sought on interpretations, 
conceptualisations and relationships between data and 
conclusions. In addition, the carefully designed ‘theoretical 
framework’ resulting from the review of cluster literatures will 
provide clear guidelines as to how data are interpreted. In this way 
a balanced perspective, that accurately links insider/outsider views 
to a clearly defined theoretical framework, will be achieved. 
WEAKNESS 
MINIMISATION 
The extent to which the 
weaknesses from one 
approach are 
compensated by the 
strengths from the other 
approaches. 
The researcher has already carefully assessed the extent to which 
weaknesses in one method are compensated by strengths in 
another (see various paragraphs in section 3.7 of this chapter).  
SEQUENTIAL The extent to which one 
has minimised the 
potential problem 
wherein the meta 
inferences could be 
affected by reversing 
the sequence of the 
quantitative and 
qualitative phases. 
One way the researcher has been careful in attempting to reduce 
any threats to legitimation is through the sequencing design, which 
represents a ‘multiple wave’ design (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 
2006), where the quantitative and qualitative phases oscillate. For 
example, stage 1 is both quantitative and qualitative, stage 2 is 
mostly qualitative, stage 3 is mostly quantitative, and stage 4 is 
qualitative. (see section 3.4.2) 
CONVERSION The extent to which the 
quantitising or 
qualitising yields quality 
meta inferences. 
The researcher does not propose to carry out any significant 
quantitising of qualitative data. This issue has been discussed 
earlier (see section 3.4 and 3.7). However, one way of quantitising 
the interview findings will be to count the themes present in the 
qualitative data and to add-in new, emergent themes into the 
theoretical framework if considered sufficiently important 
(Sandelowski, 2001). This is another theory building element of the 
research. Finally, both qualitative and quantitative findings will be 
combined and therefore should yield high-quality meta inferences.  
PARADIGMATIC 
MIXING  
The extent to which the 
researcher’s 
epistemological, 
ontological, axiological, 
methodological and 
rhetorical beliefs that 
underlie the quantitative 
and qualitative 
approaches are 
successfully (a) 
combined or (b) 
blended into a usable 
package. 
The chosen critical realism paradigm, as described in detail in 
section 3.3. The approach blends both positivist and critical 
theorist approaches, which are appropriate for the different stages 
of the research. Methodologies are based on a multi-method 
approach where different data will be blended and mapped to the 
theoretical framework. The paradigm assumptions have been 
made very explicit in section 3.3., and the research has been 
designed to fit with the stated assumptions. This should ensure 
legitimation for the chosen paradigm. 
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COMMENSUR- 
ABILITY 
The extent to which 
meta inferences made 
reflect a mixed 
worldview based on the 
cognitive process of 
Gestalt switching and 
integration. 
The researcher has shown, through previous sections of this 
chapter, how the research switches from qualitative to quantitative 
and back again. Through this process a ‘third’ viewpoint is formed, 
a viewpoint that is informed by, is separate from, and goes beyond 
what is provided by either a pure qualitative viewpoint or a pure 
quantitative viewpoint (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006). 
Therefore, meta-inferences drawn from both sets of data should 
represent a more fully-mixed worldview that goes beyond the 
provision of both traditional viewpoints. 
MULTIPLE 
VALIDITIES 
The extent to which 
addressing legitimation 
of the quantitative and 
qualitative components 
of the study result from 
the use of quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed 
validity types, yielding 
high quality meta 
inferences. 
Validity of both the qualitative and quantitative components of this 
research study has already been discussed in section 3.7 of this 
chapter. The relevant validities has been addressed for each 
component and further legitimation will be gained when the data 
from each stage of the research is combined into a whole and 
mapped back to the theoretical framework. 
POLITICAL The extent to which the 
consumers of mixed 
methods research value 
the meta inferences 
stemming from both the 
quantitative and 
qualitative components 
of a study. 
Political legitimation will be achieved as the researcher will be 
acting alone in carrying out the different stages of the research. 
Therefore, there will be no value or ideology conflicts that could 
occur if different researchers were to be involved in the study. 
However, the researcher acknowledges that the research 
participants also hold much power (being senior managers of 
ceramics firms). The researcher will endeavour to achieve political 
legitimation through careful construction and communication of 
research questions that, whilst being important in achieving the 
research objectives, will also be of value to the participants 
because the results should answer important questions and also 
provide workable solutions. 
(Source: Author. Adapted from Onwuegbuzie and Johnson’s Legitimation Typologies, 2006) 
 
 
Table 3.5 summarises the discussions from relevant sections of this chapter under the nine 
legitimation types. Cross-referencing to specific sections has been included where deemed 
useful to the reader. The resultant table provides evidence that the research has attempted 
to address validity issues throughout all stages of the research design. Onwuegbuzie and 
Johnson’s legitimation framework was useful in helping to provide evidence that the various 
mixed/multi method approaches discussed in this chapter could ensure internal validity of 
the research process and findings. However, the framework appears to be somewhat limited 
in its coverage of external validity issues. The following section of this chapter examines 
issues of external validity, e.g. generalisation; whether the study’s findings can be 
generalisable beyond the SOT ceramics cluster to other industry clusters. 
 
 
3.9: Generalisability and Replication 
By repeating a past study on a different population, a researcher conducting an empirical 
generalisation tests how far the results of the study are generalisable to another population. 
The research procedures of the original study are closely followed (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). 
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In this research study, it is not the intention to closely follow the procedures of other cluster 
studies. The particular elements of the theoretical framework for this research have been 
drawn-together from a range of previous studies on industry clusters, industrial districts, 
production systems, networks, etc. (see literature review). The resultant framework is 
therefore new and constructed from what the researcher considers to be significant 
theoretical contributions (common themes and issues) arising from these previous studies. 
According to Tsang and Kwan (1999): 
“By comparing knowledge accumulated in several focal areas, researchers clearly 
demonstrate the explanatory power of a theory with respect to these areas; some 
theories are good at explaining certain phenomena only.” (p. 775).  
 
 
The main advantage of a multi-focal pattern in this research is that, in the literature review, 
the researcher compared and contrasted empirical evidence generated from several focal 
areas, then refined and constructed the theory into a usable framework for enquiry. Also 
according to Tsang and Kwan (1999), researchers’ do frequently introduce new concepts or 
conceptual relations that help to develop theories (p. 771). In this research study, for 
example, the researcher has introduced several new concepts including the ‘need for co-
ordination’ (based on Arikan, 2009; see Table 2.12), which is absent from previous cluster 
studies. Thus, it is the intention that, through the research process, knowledge of cluster 
theory will grow by extension in a multi-focal pattern, whereby relatively full explanation of a 
focal area is carried over to an explanation of the adjoining areas (Kaplan, 1964). For 
example, if the need for co-ordination is found to be minimal, it may explain the absence of 
co-operation activities within an industry cluster. 
 
 
In keeping with the critical realist approach, it is not envisaged that the study into the SOT 
ceramics cluster will provide conclusive verification or falsification of cluster theories. This is 
because in the SOT ceramics cluster study (the replicated study), there is a completely 
different set of contingencies that may call for modification of the postulated mechanisms, or 
may invoke previously inactive countervailing mechanisms (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). In other 
words, a different set of events is being observed. In addition, this research employs 
different research procedures and draws from a sample of a different population of subjects. 
By repeating elements of past studies on different populations, the research will conduct an 
empirical generalisation that tests how far the results of previous studies are generalisable to 
the SOT ceramics cluster. For example, the research will be able to test whether competition 
and co-operation are really as important as cluster literature indicates to the success of 
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industry clusters. Although it is not envisaged that by replicating elements of previous cluster 
studies conclusive verification or falsification of the theories will be achieved, it is envisaged 
that the findings will help to support or discredit theories. 
 
 
As every industry cluster is potentially different, it is not the intention that the findings for the 
SOT cluster study will be generalisable to other industry clusters. The intention is that the 
theoretical framework will be strengthened and developed further and, moreover, will be able 
to be applied to other industry clusters as a tool of analysis and evaluation. 
 
 
3.10 Ethical Considerations 
According to Resnik (2015), there are several reasons why it is important to adhere to ethical 
norms in research. First, norms promote the aims of research, such as knowledge, truth, and 
avoidance of error. Second, since research often involves a great deal of cooperation and 
coordination among many different people in different disciplines and institutions, ethical 
standards promote the values that are essential to collaborative work, such as trust, 
accountability, mutual respect, and fairness (p. 1). As a result of the growing interest in 
research ethics, many research and management institutions have introduced their own 
codes of ethics for management research studies. For example, the British Academy of 
Management (BAM) has their own code for ethics and best practice in management 
research31.  
 
 
This research study followed Staffordshire University’s ethical approval policy32. Moreover, 
Bell and Bryman’s (2007) eleven principles of ethical considerations33, were also adopted as 
a suitable code of ethics for this research study as they reflected many of the elements of 
Staffordshire University’s ethics policy. Appendix 14 presents Bell and Bryman’s eleven 
ethical considerations mapped to the research process for this study. 
 
 
                                                 
31 British academy of management, (2013), [ONLINE]. Available from: 
Https://wwwbamacuk/sites/bamacuk/files/The%20British%20Academy%20of%20Management%27s%20Code%20of%20Ethics%20and%
20Best%20Practice%20for%20Memberspdf. [Accessed 2 July 2017] 
32 Staffordshire University, (2017), [ONLINE]. Available from: http://www.staffs.ac.uk/assets/Ethical%20Review%20Policy_tcm44-
81619.pdf. [Accessed 2 July 2017] 
33 Bell and Bryman’s ethical considerations were compiled as a result of analysing the ethical guidelines of nine professional social 
sciences research associations. 
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The concept of informed consent (Kaiser, 2009) will applied to this research study by 
explaining to senior managers (respondents) the research aims and objectives, the duration 
of the research, the purpose and possible consequence of the research and the 
dissemination strategy. Providing such information to respondents addresses some issues 
connected to deception by ensuring that participants are fully informed in a transparent way. 
In addition, the respondents will be informed that they can abandon the questionnaires or 
interviews at any time during the procedure. Before the survey, both in the covering letter 
and at the start of the questionnaire survey, managers will be told how the findings will be 
used, they will also be offered a copy of the published findings. Although the respondents 
will be assured of anonymity in the published research findings, the researcher recognises 
the potential for ‘deductive disclosure’ (Kaiser, 2009), also known as internal confidentiality 
(Tolich, 2004, cited in Kaiser, 2009), to occur. For example, the unique characteristics of the 
companies involved in the research could make them identifiable in research findings reports 
(Sieber, 1992, cited in Kaiser, 2009). Given that this research will contain rich descriptions of 
study participants (see Table 6.1), confidentiality could be breached via deductive 
disclosure. However, the researcher will be truthful and honest with the respondents in 
informing them that the target population will be fairly small, and they will have the 
questionnaire in advance and so will know the questions in section 1 are about company 
details. 
 
 
According to Guillemin and Gillam (2004), ethical research is much more than research that 
has gained the approval of a research ethics committee. They suggest that there are at least 
two major dimensions of ethics in qualitative research: a) ‘procedural ethics’, which usually 
involves seeking approval from a relevant ethics committee to undertake research involving 
humans (e.g. Staffordshire University’s Ethics Policy); and, b) ‘ethics in practice’ or the 
everyday ethical issues that arise in the doing of research (p. 263). A reflective diary is a way 
for researchers to reflect and articulate the complexities of their approach to ethical 
considerations that arise in doing their research (Gibbs, et al., 2007). Moreover, Reflexivity in 
qualitative research is also a way of ensuring rigor (Cypress, 2017). According to 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983), reflexivity should not be restricted merely to the planning 
and execution of a piece of research, but should be regarded as an integrated element of 
the writing process (p. 209). Consequently, in this research study, the researcher will keep a 
reflective diary of the research process, including the methodology stage and the data 
collection and analysis stages, and will use this diary to continuously reflect on ethical issues 
and adjust the research during the process. 
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3.11: Reflection on the Research Methodologies Adopted for this Research 
Study 
Throughout the research process alternative methods and their appropriateness have been 
considered and discussed at various stages throughout this chapter. In chapter seven 
(conclusions) a detailed reflection on the research process is presented, along with a 
consideration of the limitations of the research as well as identification of areas for future 
research (see chapter 7.7). In summary, the main limitations of the research were: 1) The 
researcher’s original intention was to survey all sixteen core firms in the SOT cluster, i.e. the 
total population. Unfortunately, despite exhaustive efforts in contacting all sixteen firms, only 
six firms agreed to take part in the questionnaire and interview surveys, this is a limitation of 
the research, and possible further evidence of a lack of willingness to co-operate. However, 
the six firms that did take part in the two surveys represent 38% of the total number of firms 
in the population, and over 60% of sales turnover and employees in the whole identified 
population (see chapter 6.3). Therefore, the sample, despite not capturing all sixteen firms in 
the population, was still deemed large enough to represent the SOT cluster, and for 
confident generalisations to be made; 2) The difficulty in persuading SOT firms to take part 
in the surveys also affected the approach taken for selecting respondents for interview. It 
was originally intended to use stratified purposeful sampling techniques (Patton, 1990) to 
select a number of firms suitable for interviewing from the firms who had completed the 
questionnaires (see chapter 3.6). However, due to the small number of questionnaire 
responses (six), it was decided to interview all six firms who had taken part in the 
questionnaire survey. The six firms were deemed truly representative of the SOT cluster as 
they comprised two small firms, two medium sized firms and two large firms. Moreover, the 
six firms operated in either the domesticwares or hotelwares sectors, or in a combination of 
both (see chapter 6, Table 6.1). Consequently, the sample of interviewees still accounted for 
‘maximum variation’ (Patton, 1990).  3) Another limitation of the research was that it was not 
possible to undertake ‘extreme’ or ‘deviant case’ sampling (Patton, 1990) as also intended 
(see chapter 3.6.4) due to the small number of responses. The research did, however, 
attempt to present opposing views, and also to identify possible interviewee bias, and these 
are acknowledged accordingly in chapter six findings. 
 
 
The next chapter of this thesis presents the first chapter of the research findings, which: 1) 
determines the evolution of the SOT cluster from 1960 up to 2016; and, 2) identifies and 
evaluates the nature of demand and competition in the SOT cluster as at 2016.  
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4. Research Findings, Stage 1: Industry Evolution and 
Demand and Competition in the SOT Cluster 
 
Research stage 1: objective 1, Industry evolution 1960-2016; 
objective 2, the nature of demand and competition in the SOT 
cluster in 2016 
 
4.1: Introduction 
This chapter of the research findings deals specifically with research objectives 1 & 2. The 
data gained in achieving these objectives sets the context for subsequent primary research 
stages. For example, when attempting to identify innovative and co-operative activity within 
the SOT cluster in 2016, it is essential to analyse and evaluate findings in light of current 
environmental conditions. Therefore, this chapter, and the subsequent chapter, utilise 
secondary data from multiple sources to identify: both the current situation of the SOT 
cluster; and, the key environmental factors and influences that have shaped the cluster over 
recent decades. 
 
Objective 1 is aimed at tracking the development of SOT tableware and giftware 
manufacturers, between 196034 and 2016 (inclusive), in order to identify the number of core 
manufacturing firms left in the industry by the end date, as well as to identify the pattern of 
mergers, acquisitions, firm closures and new entrants during the period. To date no previous 
studies have been carried out into the life-cycle development of the SOT cluster, i.e. this 
data does not exist in a joined-up, comprehensive format. As a result, the researcher has 
taken the following approaches to achieve objective 1. 
 
 
                                                 
34 The year 1960 was chosen as a starting point for the research as, due to the introduction of the Clean Air Act in 1956, new gas and 
electricity kiln technology was introduced. In 1958 there were 298 pottery factories in North Staffordshire using 438 bottle kilns and 654 
tunnel and other gas/electric kilns. By 1965 there were no longer any coal-fired bottle kilns in use. Source: visitstoke.co.uk. (2017), 
Ceramics in Stoke-on-Trent 20th Century, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.visitstoke.co.uk/ceramics-trail/history-20century.aspx. 
[Accessed 7 July 2017]. Compliance with the legislation imposed sudden and significant costs on the ceramics manufacturing process. In 
an attempt to offset those costs the industry embarked on a round of mergers and acquisitions, resulting in an over-concentrated ceramics 
sector. Source: www.parliament.co.uk. (2016), Ceramics Industry, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-
03-08/debates/16030869000001/CeramicsIndustry. [Accessed 7 July 2017]. 
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4.1.2: Objective 1a (Part 1 of this chapter), The Cluster as a Whole (1996-2016) 
Firstly, a basic overview of the more recent development of cluster firms between 1996 and 
2016 is presented (part 1). This initial stage covers the last twenty years of the cluster’s 
development and should provide a clear indication of the challenges and opportunities that 
the cluster has faced and where the industry stands today. The aim is twofold: firstly, to 
identify the number and size of firms remaining in the cluster in 2016; secondly, to determine 
the performance of SOT cluster firms with regard to growth/decline in turnover and market 
share over the twenty-year period. As no single-source, up-to-date, fully comprehensive 
report on the SOT ceramics industry could be found, the findings here are based on multiple 
secondary data sources, which have been, where possible, cross-referenced with each other 
(triangulated). The sources that will be utilised include both raw data and published 
summaries. This type of data is useful in both descriptive and explanatory research 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Moreover, the data will be a mix of quantitative and qualitative data 
which, again, is consistent with the critical realist, mixed-methods approach. Moreover, by 
using data from such well-established organisations and researchers the data can be 
considered reliable and trustworthy. 
 
 
The key secondary sources utilised for this initial stage of the research included the 
following:  
• ECOTEC Report (1999). In 1998, ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd. were 
commissioned by the City of Stoke-on-Trent Council, Staffordshire Training & 
Enterprise Council (TEC), the British Ceramics Confederation (BCC) and the 
Government Office for the West Midlands to review the performance and prospects 
of the ceramics sector in Staffordshire and to make recommendations for appropriate 
policy responses. The subsequent report, produced in 1999, provides an up-to-date 
account of the SOT ceramics industry up to 1998 and therefore has been adopted as 
a key secondary data source for this section of the findings;  
• FWC Sector Competitiveness Studies: Competitiveness of the Ceramics Sector EU 
(2008). In 2007, the European Commission commissioned a report into sector 
competitiveness of the European Ceramics Industry. Although not strictly focused on 
the SOT ceramics cluster, or on the tableware and giftware sector, this report 
provides the most recent data on the UK ceramics industry and, therefore, has been 
adopted as another key secondary data source for this section of the research; 
• Various MINTEL (market intelligence) Reports (2004–2014) on the UK China and 
Earthenware and Tableware ceramics sectors; 
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• Various KEYNOTE (market intelligence) Reports (2008–2011) on the UK China and 
Earthenware ceramics sector; 
• Findings from the researcher’s own investigation and consequent addition of recent 
primary data; 
• A variety of additional secondary data sources has also been used in an attempt to 
update, verify and fill-in any gaps in the analysis and these are referenced 
accordingly. 
 
 
4.1.3: Objective 1b (Part 2 of this chapter), The Firms Within the Cluster (1960-2016) 
Following this initial overview, and resulting from knowledge gaps, inconsistencies and 
limitations in the secondary data, the second section (part 2) presents findings from a 
comprehensive longitudinal study carried out by the researcher on the development of SOT 
cluster firms (1960 – 2016). The data was analysed and compiled by the researcher into a 
unique database which tracks the development of each individual firm in the SOT cluster 
from 1960 up to December 2016. The database also includes a small number of additional 
firms which were acquired before 1960 by other firms within the SOT cluster. The acquiring 
firms either become important players in the cluster, or are later acquired themselves by 
other firms who became important players in the cluster. Thus, these pre-1960 firms were 
included as they were considered an important contribution to identifying the pattern of 
mergers and acquisitions that took place in the cluster during the period 1960-2016, and to 
identifying the emergence of the SOT cluster’s dominant firms. The study also identifies new 
entrants, acquisitions and closures taking place within the cluster over the period in question. 
These data are presented as a series of tables and charts which are then analysed and 
discussed in light of theory. Key sources of data at this stage included: 
• Listings of ceramic firms in Godden (1964)35. The copy of Godden, which was loaned 
by the British Ceramics Confederation (BCC), had been annotated (updated) by a 
former employee of the BCC and thus provided some additional information on ‘new’ 
ceramics firms after 1964;  
• The second main source of data was ‘thepotteries.org’ website which contains 
listings and information on SOT ceramics manufacturers dating from the beginning of 
the SOT industry;36 
                                                 
35 Godden, G. (1964), Encyclopaedia of British Pottery and porcelain Marks, Herbert Jenkins 
36 The potteries.org website is home to the Potteries Heritage Society, which is an independent group of individuals who care about the 
towns and places that make up the City of Stoke-on-Trent, its history and its future. It is Stoke-on-Trent's Civic Society, one of a network 
of several hundred such societies in the UK registered with Civic Voice. Source: thepotteries.org. (2017), Our History, [ONLINE]. Available 
from: http://www.potteries.org.uk/our-history. [Accessed on 2 July 2017] 
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• In addition to these two main sources, a large number of additional sources were 
used to add to the listings and for cross-referencing purposes to ensure validity of the 
data (see Appendix 4a for a list of sources). 
 
 
4.1.4: Objective 2 (Part 3 of this chapter), Changing Demand Conditions (2007-2016) 
The third section of this chapter is concerned with examining the changing pattern of 
demand for the SOT cluster’s products between 200737 and 2016. It is also concerned with 
resultant effects on competition within the cluster. Secondary data sources at this stage 
include sources already listed from the previous sections of this chapter (e.g. MINTEL; FWC 
Report) and various other relevant sources, all referenced accordingly. In addition to existing 
secondary data sources, relevant findings from subsequent primary research stages (Stage 
3 questionnaire survey) are cross-referenced here to provide more accurate data on 
competitive activity, segmentation and demand. These empirical findings supplement the 
secondary data findings and are presented as a series of tables and charts with 
accompanying analysis and discussion. 
 
 
4.1.5: Chapter Conclusions 
The fourth and final section of this chapter presents interim conclusions for this stage of the 
research. Findings have been mapped-back to the Literature Review where possible and 
weaknesses in data highlighted. 
 
 
4.2: Objective 1, Part 1 - The Development of the SOT Cluster 199638 to 2016 
(Initial overview based on secondary data) 
 
4.2.1: The Number and Size of Firms in the SOT Cluster  
This section of the research begins in a way not conventional of previous studies of the SOT 
ceramics cluster, namely by drawing upon MINTEL, other market intelligence reports and 
company annual reports. Taken over time, these reports highlight some of the important 
industry trends. However, it should be noted that the many deficiencies of these sources 
were part of the motivation for the subsequent primary research study (objective 1b). 
                                                 
37 Note: 2007 was selected as the starting point of a ten-year period of analysis, i.e. 2007-2016. 
38 Note: 1996 was selected as the starting point for a twenty-year period of analysis. In addition, this is the year that the first (available) 
industry report was published, i.e. ECOTEC (1999), A Strategic Analysis of the Ceramics Industry in Staffordshire, ECOTEC Research 
and Consulting Ltd., Birmingham. 
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According to ECOTEC (1999), in 1996 the number of SOT tableware and ornamentalware 
manufacturers (SIC code 23410) was reported to be 164 (ECOTEC, p. 8 & 13). However, it 
should be noted that not all of these firms were independent businesses as often single 
companies occupied a number of sites, hence many of these 164 firms are assumed to be 
business units belonging to groups. This point was also raised in the FWC Report on the EU 
Ceramics sector (2008), where it was noted that “some large corporate groups now own, 
and are represented by, a portfolio of SMEs” (p. 35). According to an article by David 
Nicholls of The Telegraph, the number of ceramics firms still operating in the SOT cluster in 
2011 was “about 30” (26th January, 2011)39. Another article by The Independent (7th 
October, 2011), quoted Portmeirion Pottery’s Managing Director, Michael Haynes, as 
stating. "Of the 300 companies working in Stoke-on-Trent 20 years ago, perhaps only 15 
exist today”40. Such inconsistencies in the existing data make it difficult to ascertain an 
accurate number of firms operating in the SOT cluster in 2016 and this is where this 
research aims to fill the gap. For the purposes of this research study, SOT ceramics firms 
will be listed and measured by ownership, i.e. single ownership, and as individual 
businesses within a group. 
 
 
Despite an extensive search for this thesis, more accurate data on the actual number of SOT 
ceramics manufacturing firms in 2016 was not found, or simply not gathered in the first 
place. Moreover, a complete list of names of existing SOT ceramics manufacturing firms 
could not be found either. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, and subsequent to this initial 
stage of the research, the researcher carried out her own primary research and will present 
accurate listings of SOT ceramics manufacturers’ by name and ownership, as at 2016, in 
section 4.3 of this chapter. 
 
 
Of the 164 business units identified by ECOTEC in 1996, the majority were small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with 135 (82%) of the total number of firms having less 
than 250 employees41. Moreover, the vast majority of these SMEs employed less than 25 
                                                 
39 Nicholls, D. (2011), All Fired Up: The Future of Pottery, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/interiors/8281433/All-fired-up-the-future-of-pottery.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
40 Lorenz, T. (2011), Fired up for the future: Stoke-on-Trent's future depends on a new generation of collectors, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/property/house-and-home/fired-up-for-the-future-stoke-on-trents-future-depends-on-a-new-generation-o. 
[Accessed 7 July 2017] 
41 Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are non-subsidiary, independent firms which employ fewer than a given number of 
employees. This number varies across countries. The most frequent upper limit designating an SME is 250 employees, as in the 
European Union. Source: OECD, (2005), SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMES), [ONLINE]. Available at: 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3123. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
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people (ECOTEC, p. 12). In 1996 the tableware and giftware sector accounted for 84% of 
the total number of employees in the SOT ceramics industry, approximately 17,000 
employees. However, a disproportionate number of employees were employed by the 
sector’s largest firms, resulting in a high concentration ratio. For example, according to 
Staffordshire TEC (1998), the 4 largest tableware and giftware manufacturers employed in 
excess of 10,000 people, almost 60% of the 1996 total (Staffordshire TEC, 1998). Between 
1996 and 1998 there were a number of reported closures and job cuts across all firm size 
bands in the sector. For example: in December 1998 Royal Doulton announced 1,000 job 
cuts in its SOT workforce;42 also in 1998 Staffordshire Tableware shed 80 jobs43 and closed 
altogether in 1999 with a further loss of 670 jobs44. The industry continued to suffer from 
factory closures and job losses, so much so that by 2005 SOT City Council reported: 
“ceramics (in SOT) now provides for only 1 job in every 10, half the rate of a decade ago”45. 
Altogether, more than 20,000 job losses were recorded between 1998 and 200846. In 2009, 
Wedgwood, the SOT cluster’s largest firm, went into administration, 1,500 jobs were cut and 
much of the mass manufacturing was moved to Asia (previously only a limited amount was 
outsourced there)47. Further evidence of consolidation and factory closures is given below. 
 
 
4.2.2: Performance of the SOT Cluster’s Largest Firms 2000 - 2008 
In 2003, the 4 largest firms in the SOT cluster still accounted for the overwhelming majority 
of jobs and market share in the domestic market. Table 4.1 shows that in 2003 the four 
largest SOT tableware and giftware manufacturers (highlighted), accounted for just over a 
third of sales (34%) of china and earthenware to the domestic market, down from 41% in 
2001 (MINTEL, 2004). In 2008, the market share of the four largest firms had further 
reduced to 22% (MINTEL 2008). Of the ‘other UK companies’ in MINTEL’s 2003 report, 
representing 25% of domestic market share, it is acceptable to assume that the majority of 
these were SMEs located in the SOT cluster as the UK industry is predominantly 
geographically clustered in the SOT area. It is also assumed that the MINTEL definition of 
China and Earthenware also includes porcelain products as there is no evidence in the 
                                                 
42 Ridge, M. (2002). Gone to Pot, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/may/29/guardiansocietysupplement. 
[Accessed 7 July 2017] 
43 Birks, S. (2002), Staffordshire Tableware Ltd., [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.thepotteries.org/allpotters/950b.htm. [Accessed 7 July 
2017] 
44 Ridge, M. (2002), Gone to Pot, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/may/29/guardiansocietysupplement. 
[Accessed 7 July 2017] 
45 Stoke.gov.uk, (2005), The Plan to Rebuild North Staffordshire’s Industry, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stoke.gov.uk/ccm/navigation/news/city-life/city-life-autumn-2005/the-plan-to-rebuild-north-staffordshire-s-industry/ [accessed 
16/03/17] 
46 Nicholls, D. (2011), All Fired Up: The Future of Pottery, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/interiors/8281433/All-fired-up-the-future-of-pottery.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
47 Monocle. (2017), All Fired Up, [ONLINE.] Available at: https://monocle.com/magazine/issues/70/all-fired-up/. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
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reports to the contrary and it is well known that Villeroy and Boch (listed) produce mainly 
porcelain products48. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Manufacturers’ Share of Sales; China & Earthenware 2001, 2003, 2005 & 
2008 (see footnotes)49 
 2001  2003  2003  2005  2008 
(est.) 
 
 £m % £m % £m % £m % £m % 
Waterford Wedgwood 
Group+ 
89.0 19 92.5 19 80.0 16 102.0 20 102.0 18 
Royal Doulton 79.0 17 48.0 10 40.0 8 - - - - 
Denby Pottery 22.0 5 23.1 5 23.1 5 23.5 5 25.9 5 
Villeroy & Boch 13.6 3 15.5 3 15.5 3 19.3 4 22.5 4 
Portmeirion Potteries 12.5 3 12.9 3 12.9 3 11.2 2 11.4 2 
Royal 
Worcester/Spode++ 
10.5 2 11.1 2 11.1 2 11.6 2 13.3 2 
Churchill China 10.0 2 9.9 2 10.6 2 11.2 2 11.9 2 
           
           
Other UK companies 116.5 25 122.6 25       
Other imports 111.9 24 154.4 32       
           
Other Brands     131.4 27 143.8 28 153.5 28 
Own label/unbranded     165.4 34 189.4 37 214.5 39 
Total 465.0 100 490.0 100 490.0 100 512.0 100 555.0 100 
(Source: Mintel, 2004 and 2008) 
 
 
Although the MINTEL data is useful in ascertaining a broad picture of UK manufacturers’ 
sales for the period in question, there are many ambiguities and discrepancies in the data. 
Firstly, the data presented for the Waterford-Wedgwood Group includes sales of 
crystalwares as well as ceramic wares, consequently accurate sales figures for purely 
ceramics products cannot be ascertained. Secondly, the 2004 data lists Royal 
Worcester/Spode as one entry, when in reality the two companies did not merge until 
200650. Thus, it is not clear whether the figures listed refer to Royal Worcester or to Spode, 
or to the sales of both companies combined. Moreover, it is also worth noting that, until the 
merger in 2006, Royal Worcester’s manufacturing facilities were located in Worcester, which 
                                                 
48 Villeroy and Boch, (2017), About Villeroy & Boch: A Timeless Tradition, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.villeroy-
boch.com/shop/aboutus. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
49 Notes to table 4.1: 1) There is a discrepancy in the data for 2003 in the two Mintel Reports; 2) Shaded areas denote SOT Cluster firms; 
3) Denby Pottery is located near to Derby which is outside the SOT cluster; 4) Royal Worcester/Spode merged in 2006 and so are not 
included in the discussions below; 5) Waterford Wedgwood Group includes Doulton from 2005, figures also include Waterford Crystal 
sales. 
50 Davies, E. (2013), Rare pottery goes on display at Spode Works Visitor Centre, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/rare-pottery-goes-display-spode-works-visitor/story-18167740-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
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is outside the Stoke-on-Trent cluster. For this reason Royal Worcester/Spode has not been 
included in the discussion of the data presented in Table 4.1.  
 
 
The first thing to note from Table 4.1 is that the 2003 sales figures for many of the listed 
manufacturers do not match exactly with the data for 2003 presented in MINTEL’s 2008 
report. The biggest difference is in the data provided for Waterford-Wedgwood and Royal 
Doulton. However, exact figures on sales and market share are not considered to be of 
primary importance to the objectives of this research study at this stage, as the aim here is 
to provide evidence of growth or decline in SOT firms’ performance over the period in 
question. The important points to note are that, according to MINTEL, the combined sales for 
the two companies declined from £168m in 2001 to £102m in 2008. Also significant is the 
drop in market share from 36% in 2001 to 18% in 2008. This represents a decline in sales of 
£66m and a 50% decline in market share over the seven year period 2001-2008.The data for 
Portmeirion also shows a decline in sales from £12.9m in 2003 to £11.4m in 2008, and a 
drop in market share from 3% to 2%. However, according to the MINTEL data, not all SOT 
firms experienced a decline in sales during this period. For example, Churchill China 
experienced a steady growth from £10.6m in 2003 to £11.9m in 2008, but market share 
remained static throughout the period at 2%, so it cannot be assumed that companies like 
Churchill have been more profitable.  
 
 
So far, the data presented above indicates that although the market had grown overall, from 
£465m in 2001 to £555m in 2008, the sales and market shares of the largest SOT firms 
declined significantly during this period, with the exception of Churchill China who 
experienced a small growth in sales revenue. It should be noted that it is not clear whether 
the MINTEL sales data is stated in ‘nominal’ or ‘real’ terms. If the data is nominal, then 
deflation will have reduced the size of the apparent increase. The MINTEL data also does 
not include tableware and giftware manufacturers who operate in the hospitality sector, e.g. 
Steelite, Dudson and Churchill China. Another shortcoming of the MINTEL data is that the 
data is for UK retail sales only and does not include sales from exports. Furthermore, the 
MINTEL data does not provide details of profits for the companies listed above and this is 
another shortcoming of the data. Consequently, based on the available secondary data, it is 
difficult to ascertain an accurate picture of growth or decline in the fortunes of the SOT 
cluster’s firms. The only available collated data that provides details of specific firms is 
MINTEL data, and this source is ambiguous and inconsistent at best. However, the MINTEL 
data, for all its shortcomings, does reflect broad processes, albeit with not much precision or 
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detail. One further point to note is that the sales data provided by MINTEL is not necessarily 
an indicator of profitability of the companies listed51.  
 
 
4.2.3: Performance of the SOT Cluster’s Largest Firms 2010 - 2015 
In an attempt to overcome some of the shortcomings in the MINTEL approach, data has 
been accessed for the years 2010 and 2015 from company annual reports52 for the SOT 
cluster’s largest firms, including those firms operating in the hospitality sector, and has 
compiled the data into a table (see Table 4.2). In total, four new firms not mentioned in the 
MINTEL reports are included in the table. Employee numbers are also included as they give 
an indication of the size of the cluster’s largest firms. The following section provides a brief 
overview of each of the firms in Table 4.2, along with a discussion of sales turnover, profits 
and employee numbers for each firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 For example, the Waterford-Wedgwood Group went into administration in January 2009 and in March 2009 a U.S. private equity firm 
called KPS Capital bought the company . Waterford-Wedgwood was then called WWRD Holdings  and much of its production shifted 
outside the SOT Cluster to Indonesia . In 2015, WWRD was purchased by Finnish based home and garden group Fiskars for £280m. 
52 Companies House UK, (2017), Find Company Information, [ONLINE]. Available at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house. [Accessed on various dates April/May 2017] 
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Table 4.2: Revenue, Profit & Employees (2010 & 2015) for the SOT Cluster’s Largest 
Firms 
Company Revenue 
£m 
Operating 
(PBIT) £m 
Employees 
in SOT 
Revenue 
£m 
Profit 
(PBIT) £m 
Employees 
in SOT 
 2010 2010 2010 2015 2015 2015 
Steelite 60.5 6.0 800 102.0 8.8 1000+53 
Portmeirion 34.8 2.7 532 50.5 7.2 684 
Churchill 43.7 2.2 555 46.8 4.8 56154 
Dudson 14.3 (1.9) loss 500 19.4 (5.3) loss 50055 
WWRD (Wedgwood)56 N/K N/K 50057 N/K N/K 50058 
Emma Bridgewater 10.7 0.6 18059 14.1 1.2 26560 
Wade ceramics 10.2 0.4 15061 10.0 0.2 20062 
Denby63 20.6 0.9 35 26.8 1.2 50+64 
Note: Financial data for Wedgwood production in SOT could not be obtained. N/K = not known 
(Source: individual company accounts (Companies House UK) unless otherwise referenced) 
 
 
Steelite International 
According to the data presented in Table 4.2, Steelite International is the biggest single 
employer in the SOT cluster (approximately 1,000 employees in 2016)65. Steelite is a world-
leading manufacturer and supplier of tabletop ranges for the international hospitality industry 
(hotelware). The company’s core chinaware products are manufactured at its factory in the 
SOT cluster. Steelite International established in 1983, following a management buyout of 
                                                 
53Simpson, M. (20160, Steelite to create 112 new jobs and develop eyesore site in expansion, [ONLINE.] Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/steelite-to-create-112-new-jobs-and-develop-eyesore-site-in-expansion/story-29466805-detail/story.htm. 
[Accessed 7 July 2017] 
54 Citywire, (2017), Churchill China PLC., [ONLINE]. Available at: http://citywire.co.uk/money/share-prices-and-performance/share-
factsheet.aspx?InstrumentID=731. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
55 The Sentinel, (2014), Tunstall-based Dudson ceramics lands £3m from Business Growth Fund, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/tunstall-based-dudson-ceramics-lands-3m-business/story-21048427-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 
2017] 
56 WWRD figures include crystalwares and other non-ceramic products not produced in the UK 
57 The Sentinel, (2010), Wedgwood is back in profit two years after collapse, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/wedgwood-turning-profit/story-12572943-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
58 The Sentinel, (2012), Wade Ceramics plans expansion after doubling production rates, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/wade-ceramics-plans-expansion-doubling-production/story-15933809-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 
2017] 
59 BBC News Business, (2010), Emma Bridgewater, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10322646. [Accessed 7 July 
2017] 
60 Nicholls, D. (2011), All Fired Up: The Future of Pottery, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/interiors/8281433/All-fired-up-the-future-of-pottery.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
61 The Sentinel, (2010), Firm Wades into £7.5m state-of-the-art factory, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/firm-
wades-163-7-5m-state-art-factory/story-12573729-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
62 The Sentinel, (2012), Wade Ceramics plans expansion after doubling production rates, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/wade-ceramics-plans-expansion-doubling-production/story-15933809-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 
2017] 
63 Denby figures are for 2011 and are for group operations, including goods made outside SOT 
64 The Sentinel, (2013), Burleigh Pottery workers: 'Give us a pay rise or we'll strike again' [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/burleigh-pottery-workers-pay-rise-ll-strike-video/story-19623885-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
65 Simpson, M. (2016), Steelite to create 112 new jobs and develop 'eyesore' site in expansion, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/steelite-to-create-112-new-jobs-and-develop-eyesore-site-in-expansion/story-29466805-detail/story.htm. 
[Accessed 7 July 2017] 
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the hotelware division of Royal Doulton66. In December 2012 Steelite bought Royal Crown 
Derby, another SOT ceramics manufacturer established in 2000, as a spin-off from Royal 
Doulton. Royal Crown Derby had a turnover of approximately £6m and employed 200 staff at 
the time of acquisition67. In 2015, Steelite’s turnover was £102m, up from £60.5m in 2010 
(see Table 4.2). Also in 2015, Steelite reported an operating profit of £8.8m, up from £6.0m 
in 2010. Steelite’s main UK competitors in 2015 were Churchill China UK Ltd., and Dudson 
Ltd., both having significant presence in the hotelware segment. Steelite do not operate in 
the domesticware segment, and so may not be perceived as a direct competitor by some of 
the SOT cluster’s other large firms. However, based on the data presented above, Steelite 
currently has the largest turnover from SOT made goods and also the largest number of 
SOT based employees, more than any other firm in the SOT cluster, and therefore Steelite is 
classed as the cluster’s largest firm. 
 
 
Portmeirion 
Portmeirion was established in 1960 after the acquisition of Grays Pottery and Kirkhams Ltd, 
both were existing SOT based potteries at the time. In 2009, Portmeirion acquired the Royal 
Worcester and Spode brands. Portmeirion is currently the UK’s largest consumer ceramics 
manufacturer68. According to MINTEL data, Portmeirion was the second largest firm in the 
SOT cluster in 2010 with a 5% UK market share (MINTEL, 2010). Since 2010 Portmeirion 
has continued to grow and prosper, mostly due to growth in export markets69. Data 
presented in Table 4.2 shows that the group employed 684 people in SOT in 2015 and had 
sales turnover of £50.5m, up from £34.8m in 2010. Profit before tax also increased over the 
same period from £2.7m in 2010 to £7.2m in 2015. From the data presented in this chapter, 
and based on sales turnover, profit and employee numbers, it can be assumed that 
Portmeirion has emerged as the second largest firm in the SOT cluster. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 The Sentinel, (2016), Steelite International: A pottery history, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/steelite-
international-a-pottery-history/story-29451509-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
67 Derby Telegraph, (2012). Royal Crown Derby sold to ceramics firm Steelite International. [ONLINE] Available at: 
http://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/royal-crown-derby-sold-ceramics-firm-steelite/story-17628257-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
68 Financial Times, (2016), Spode-maker Portmeirion issues upbeat profit outlook, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/ee15b7b9-78b0-3392-97b4-18344e279bf4. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
69 The Sentinel, (2010), Pottery's sales soar after buying Spode and Royal Worcester brands, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/pottery-s-sales-soar-buying-brands/story-12513000-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
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Churchill China 
Churchill China is another large SOT ceramics manufacturer, established in 1795, and still 
40% owned by the Roper family. The company operates mainly in the hotelware segment, 
but unlike Steelite, Churchill also has a significant presence in the domesticware segment. 
According to MINTEL (2010), Churchill’s market share in 2010 was 4% of the UK market and 
sales turnover was £20m. However, the MINTEL data represents Churchill’s UK 
domesticware retail sales only. The data presented in Table 4.2 represents all sales turnover 
(domesticware and hotelware and domestic and international sales), thus the combined 
sales turnover for both hotelware and domesticware in 2015 was £46.8m, up from £43.7m in 
2010, and the combined operating profit for both hotelware and domesticware in 2015 was 
£1.2m, up from £0.9m in 2010. Employees in SOT in 2015 were 561. The data presented in 
Figure 4.2 shows that Churchill China is the third largest firm in the SOT cluster. 
 
 
Dudson Limited 
Dudson Pottery are a private, family-owned business, first established in 1800, and are 
another prominent supplier to the UK and international hotelware segments. In 2015, they 
had approximately 500 employees in SOT (see Table 4.2), and a sales turnover of £19.4m, 
up from £14.3m in 2010.  However, in 2015 the company recorded a loss of £5.3m. In 2010 
the company had also reported a loss of £1.9m.  As Dudson are a privately owned, family-
run business, very little information on their profitability is available in the public domain and 
so no accurate comments or explanations can be made regarding the losses. However, the 
situation for Dudson may not be as bad as it seems as, in 2014, the Stoke Sentinel reported 
that Dudson had secured £3m of funding from the UK Business Growth Fund, with the 
purpose of investing it in more efficient manufacturing equipment, streamlining production 
processes and enhancing sales and marketing capabilities70. Despite the loss-making 
situation of Dudson, and based on sales turnover and number of employees alone, the 
company is identified as the fourth largest firm in the SOT cluster in 2015. 
 
 
Wedgwood Group (WWRD) 
Prior to 2005, Wedgwood and Royal Doulton Groups were the two ‘dominant firms’71 in the 
SOT cluster, i.e. effectively a duopoly. Although both companies established in the 18th and 
                                                 
70 The Sentinel, (2014), Tunstall-based Dudson ceramics lands £3m from Business Growth Fund, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/tunstall-based-dudson-ceramics-lands-3m-business/story-21048427-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 
2017] 
71 Definition: A dominant firm is one which accounts for a significant share of a given market and has a significantly larger market share 
than its next largest rival (source: OECD, (2002), DOMINANT FIRM, [ONLINE]) 
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19th centuries respectively, their expansion through acquisition mainly happened in the 
1960s and 1970s by the amalgamation of many independent potteries companies72, each 
group continued to grow through acquisition throughout the 1980s and 1990s73. In 1986, the 
Irish company Waterford Glass Ltd., acquired Wedgwood. In 2005, the Waterford-
Wedgwood Group acquired Royal Doulton74 and effectively absorbed its main competitor75. 
Wedgwood’s UK market share in 2010 was 13% (MINTEL, 2010). However, as previously 
stated, Waterford-Wedgwood went into administration in 2009 and was purchased by U.S. 
firm KPS Capital. Accurate financial data on the SOT factory’s performance since then is not 
available. In 2014, however, WWRD’s whole group turnover was reported as £280m76 and 
the number of employees in Wedgwood’s SOT factory was estimated to be approximately 
50077. In July 2015, the Finnish company Fiskars Corporation, a leading global supplier of 
consumer products for the home, garden and outdoors, acquired the WWRD group of 
companies78.  With approximately 500 employees still working at Wedgwood’s SOT factory, 
Wedgwood is assumed to be the fifth largest firm in the SOT cluster in 2015. However, 
without any accurate data on sales turnover and profits, the true position of Wedgwood in 
the SOT cluster cannot be ascertained. 
 
 
Emma Bridgewater 
Emma Bridgewater was established in 1985 and, as a result, is relatively new to the SOT 
cluster. The company began by first designing pottery, then moved into manufacturing in 
199179. In 1996, having outgrown their first factory, the company moved to Eastwood Works 
(formerly Meakin Brothers Pottery)80.  Emma Bridgewater specialises in hand-decorated, 
cream coloured earthenwares that are manufactured entirely in SOT. In 2015, the 
                                                 
72  Birks, S. (2002), Josian Wedgwood and Sons, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.thepotteries.org/allpotters/1069.htm. [Accessed 7 
July 2017] 
73 PR NEWSWIRE, (1997), WATERFORD WEDGWOOD PLC ACQUISITION OF 51.58% STAKE IN ROSENTHAL AG, [ONLINE]. 
Available at: http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/waterford-wedgwood-plc-acquisition-of-5158-stake-in-rosenthal-ag-
156811265.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
74 Evening Standard, (2004), Wedgwood buys Doulton for £40m, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.standard.co.uk/news/wedgwood-
buys-doulton-for-40m-7200534.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
75 At the time of the acquisition, Waterford-Wedgwood's group chief executive, Redmond O'Donoghue, said the acquisition would   
"increase the volume through our factories without substantially increasing production costs". (source: Independent, (2009), The rise and 
fall of Wedgwood. [ONLINE]. 
76 Includes Waterford crystal and products made outside the SOT cluster 
77 King, A. (2015), Wedgwood bought by Finnish company, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/wedgwood-bought-
finnish-company/story-26479861-detail/story.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
78 Waterford Crystal, (2017), History of Waterford Crystal, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.waterfordvisitorcentre.com/content/history-
waterford-crystal. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
79 Emma Bridgewater, (2015), ABOUT THE FACTORY, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://emmabridgewaterfactory.co.uk/pages/about-the-
factory/. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
80 Breaking The Mould, (2009), Emma Bridgewater Pottery, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.breakingthemould.info/hanley/09-emma-
bridgewater/more.html. [Accessed 7 July 2017] 
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company’s sales revenue was £14.1m, up from £10.7m in 2010 and profits were £1.2m, up 
from £0.6m in 2010. Employees in SOT in 2015 were approximately 265 (see Table. 
4.2).Therefore, based on the data above, Emma Bridgewater appear to be the sixth largest 
firm in the SOT cluster. 
 
 
Wade Ceramics 
Wade Ceramics was originally founded in 1810 as a producer of ceramic items for industry81. 
Today Wade produces a range of porcelain and earthenware products for the domestic 
market, including animal figures for their Collectors Club, as well as a range of commercial 
products including whisky flagons and other industrial ceramics82. In 2015, the company’s 
sales revenue was £10.0m, slightly down from £10.2m in 2010 and profits were £0.2m, down 
from £0.4m in 2010. Employees in SOT in 2015 were approximately 200 (see Table. 4.2). 
Based on the employee data above, Wade Ceramics appear to be the seventh largest firm in 
the SOT cluster. 
 
 
Denby Pottery 
One other tableware and giftware manufacturer, who up until 2009 could not be considered 
to be part of the SOT cluster, is Denby Pottery. Although based in Derby since it was 
established in 185083, and thus outside of the SOT cluster, Denby acquired the SOT 
ceramics manufacturer Burleigh Pottery in 200984. The Denby Pottery parent company also 
owns Poole Pottery, now manufactured in SOT, and a number of other non-ceramic 
housewares brands. In 2009, investment group Hilco UK made significant investment into 
Denby Pottery Group. Hilco Capital is an international UK company that specialises in 
restructuring and refinancing other companies85. In 2015, Denby’s turnover was £26.8m, up 
from £20.6m in 2010. Operating profit was reported as £1.2m in 2015, up from £0.9m in 
2010 (see Table. 4.2). However, the sales turnover and profit data presented in Table 4.2 is 
for all of Denby Pottery Group activities, thus it is not clear what percentage of sales turnover 
and profits are for ceramics produced in SOT. Furthermore, although Denby Pottery Group 
                                                 
81 Wade ceramics, (2017), Wade ceramics Heritage, [Online]. Available at: http://www.wade.co.uk/history/ [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
82 Wikipedia, (2017), Wade Ceramics, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wade_Ceramics. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
83 Pottery Histories, (2011), History of the Denby Pottery, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.potteryhistories.com/Denbyhistory.html. 
[Accessed 10 July 2017] 
84 The Sentinel, (2015), Sale of Burleigh pottery brand put on hold, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/sale-burleigh-
pottery-brand-hold/story-25923993-detail/story.htm. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
85 Wikipedia, (2017), Hilco, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilco. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
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employ approximately 800 staff across the group86, only 50-60 employees are likely to be 
based in the SOT cluster. For these reasons, Denby cannot be classified as one of the SOT 
cluster’s largest firms. 
 
 
4.2.4: The Influence of Dominant Firms in the SOT Cluster  
From the data presented so far in this section, Steelite appears to be the current dominant 
firm in the SOT cluster in terms of employees, sales turnover and profit from its SOT 
manufacturing operations. The next three largest firms, based on employee numbers are 
Portmeirion, Churchill and Dudson, who, although similar in terms of employees, are less 
similar in terms of sales turnover and profit. Wedgwood, with 500 employees in SOT, can 
also be classed as one of the clusters largest firms. However, as stated previously, without 
financial data for Wedgwood’s SOT manufactured products, it is difficult to position the 
company against the other large SOT cluster firms. 
 
 
Interestingly, only three of the five dominant firms presented here were present in the SOT 
cluster before the 1960s. Wedgwood was established in 1759, Churchill China (formerly 
Sampson Bridgwood, then JAS Broadhurst) was established in 1795, and Dudson was 
established in 180087. Portmeirion and Steelite are relatively new to the SOT cluster. 
Portmeirion was established in 1960 and Steelite in 1983, although Steelite was a spin-off 
from Royal Doulton hotelware division, and thus not a true new entrant. Steelite, Churchill 
and Dudson differ from the other large firms in the SOT cluster in that they operate 
extensively in the hospitality sector, producing durable tableware for the global restaurant 
and hotel industry. Demand in this sector has grown as people have replaced eating in for 
eating out88. Growth in export markets, particularly in Asia, is considered to be another 
reason for the success of these companies. It is estimated that approximately 70% of UK 
manufactured ceramics products are exported around the globe89. 
                                                 
86 Derby Telegraph, (2013), £7m backing for Denby Pottery to break into new foreign markets, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/pound-7m-backing-denby-pottery-break-new-foreign/story-19360366-detail/story.html#axzz2b6DhEati. 
[Accessed 10 July 2017] 
87 Dudson, (2017), A Potted History, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.dudson.com/company/about-us/a-potted-history. [Accessed 10 
July 2017] 
88 Big Hospitality, (2016), UK Diners to Spend £54.7bn on Eating Out by 2017, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.bighospitality.co.uk/Trends-Reports/UK-diners-to-spend-54.7bn-on-eating-out-by-2017. [Accessed 10 July 2017]; 
Baer, D. (2016), Americans Spend More on Restaurants Than Groceries, Because of Huge Social Changes, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2016/06/americans-spend-more-on-restaurants-than-groceries.html. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
Neilsen, (2016), WHAT’S IN OUR FOOD AND ON OUR MIND, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/eu/docs/pdf/Global%20Ingredient%20and%20Out-of-
Home%20Dining%20Trends%20Report%20FINAL%20(1).pdf. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
89 Jack, I. (2010), Fire returns to the Potteries' heart, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2010/oct/16/stoke-
pottery-industry-china-ian-jack. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
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Wedgwood, and Doulton prior to acquisition by Wedgwood, were by far the largest ceramics 
manufacturers in the SOT cluster from the 1960s onwards. By 1975, Wedgwood had 
approximately 9,000 employees in 20 factories in SOT90. In 2000 Royal Doulton employed 
about 3,000 people in its Nile Street factory alone in SOT91. Moreover both Wedgwood and 
Doulton operated mainly in the domesticware segment, where most of the SOT cluster’s 
SMEs operate. Therefore, due to their previous size and long presence in the cluster, it may 
be assumed that these two companies have had a significant influence upon the fortunes of 
the SOT cluster over time. 
 
 
The past dominant positions of Wedgwood and Doulton, with combined market share of 36% 
in 2001 (MINTEL, 2004), indicate that the fortunes of these companies have been critical to 
the SOT cluster as a whole (see also Padley and Pugh, 2000). Figure 4.1 below presents a 
comparison of sales turnover for the two largest firms in the SOT cluster between 1982 and 
2007. Figure 4.2 compares the combined sales of Wedgwood and Doulton with the total 
sales of the UK tableware and giftware sector for the period 1996-2007. From Figure 4.1 it 
can be seen that Royal Doulton enjoyed rising sales until the late 1990s, while Wedgwood 
kept sales more or less constant for some years preceding the late 1990s. At their height, 
the combined annual sales of these two firms were only a little less than £400 million (£395 
million in both 1996 and 1997). From there the decline of both firms was uninterrupted, with 
Doulton eventually being taken over by Wedgwood in 2005, and then Wedgwood being 
placed into administration at the beginning of 200992. Figure 4.2 focuses on the years of 
decline since the late 1990s, it charts the combined sales of Wedgwood and Doulton from 
the years of their joint maximum (1996 and 1997) to 2007. To this is added the total sales of 
the tableware and giftware industry (ons.gov.uk, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Funding Universe, (2000), Waterford Wedgwood PLC History, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/waterford-wedgwood-plc-history/. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
91 The Economist, (2001), The China Syndrome, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/748802. [Accessed 10 July 
2017] 
92 Note: the data, which is from successive Annual Accounts of both firms, is not adjusted for inflation. This is not necessary given the 
main purpose is to compare the decline of Doulton and Wedgwood with the decline of total sales in the tableware and giftware industry 
(SIC 2621). 
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Figure 4.1: Wedgwood and Doulton Turnover (1982-2007) 
 
(Source: Limbrick and Pugh (2009). Based on Annual Reports and Accounts for Royal Doulton and Josiah Wedgwood (with 
gaps reflecting missing years)) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Wedgwood and Doulton turnover compared to total industry turnover 
(Tableware and Giftware: SIC 2621) (1996-2007) 
 
(Source: Limbrick and Pugh (2009). Based on Annual Reports and Accounts for Doulton and Wedgwood (with gaps 
reflecting missing years) and the ONS on-line database for the tableware and giftware industry) 
 
 
From the data presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 it is evident that the decline of the industry’s 
two dominant firms moves almost in-step with the decline of the industry overall; and, that 
most of the decline of the industry is accounted for by the decline of its two once dominant 
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firms. Over the decade, from 1998 to 2007, the combined turnover of Doulton and 
Wedgwood declined by £287 million, and that of the tableware and giftware industry as a 
whole by £357 million. Hence, over the period in question, 80% of the decline of the 
tableware and giftware industry is accounted for by the decline of its once two dominant 
firms. Moreover, the data on industry turnover is for the UK as a whole, therefore an even 
greater proportion of the decline of the tableware and giftware industry in the SOT cluster is 
accounted for by the decline of Doulton and Wedgwood.  
 
 
The data presented here shows that Doulton and Wedgwood were not typical of the industry 
they dominated. In addition to being much larger than the typical SOT cluster firm, it is 
thought that they substantially and systematically underperformed in relation to the industry 
as a whole. This is a view that has been previously analysed by industry experts (see Padley 
and Pugh, 2000). It would appear though, based on the data presented in previous sections 
of this chapter, that the end of the era of dominance by Doulton and Wedgwood has left the 
SOT cluster with an industry that appears to be much more sustainable. The SOT cluster is 
currently made up of large (albeit much smaller than Wedgwood and Doulton at their peak), 
medium and small firms. The success of the largest of these firms has been shown in 
previous sections of this chapter.  
 
 
4.2.5: The Number of New Firms Entering the SOT Cluster  
In the UK ceramics industry there have been only two ‘real’93 new entrants formed in the last 
50 years that have grown to any significant size, both companies belong to the SOT cluster. 
Portmeirion was founded in 1960 and, as mentioned previously, acquired Spode (including 
Royal Worcester and Pimpernel in 2009) and by 2015 had approximately 684 staff. The 
second firm, Emma Bridgewater, was founded in 1985. In 2015, Emma Bridgewater 
employed approximately 265 staff (see Table. 4.2). MINTEL’s 2004 report also lists 
successful new entrants into the SOT cluster as: Emma Bridgewater Ltd (1985); Repeat-
Repeat (1984); and, The Tabletop Company (1996). Repeat-Repeat was still operating as a 
small (less than 10 employees) but very successful craft potter in 201694. After a brief 
expansion in 2004 the Tabletop Company was dissolved in 200795. Emma Bridgewater Ltd. 
is the only new firm of any size listed in MINTEL’s 2004 report. MINTEL’s 2008 and 2010 
                                                 
93 Real new entrants are brand-new start-up firms, not spin-offs or existing firms from outside the cluster who have relocated to SOT. 
94 Repeat Repeat, (2017), About Us, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.repeatrepeat.co.uk/about-our-company.html. [Accessed 10 July 
2017] 
95 Wikipedia, (2014), The Tabletop Group, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tabletop_Group. [Accessed 10 July 
2017] 
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reports do not identify specific new entrants into the industry. The researcher could not find 
any other existing listings of significant new firms since 2004.   
 
 
As stated previously, there is no systematic data about new entrants into the SOT cluster in 
the published literature. From the limited numbers listed it can be assumed that there have 
been fewer new entrants into the SOT cluster than there have been closures and mergers 
(see 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). The evidence indicates that the overall number of firms in the industry 
has declined, resulting in a reduction in competition and possibly also in the innovative 
capacity of the cluster.  
 
 
From the findings presented so far, it is clear that there are several limitations in the existing 
published data. Firstly, there is no detailed periodic information available on the number of 
firms in the cluster before 1996, thus the rate of decline in the number of firms cannot be 
accurately determined up to 2016. Secondly, no published data is available on the exact 
number of firms existing in 2016. Consequently, an important aim of this thesis is to address 
the limitations of the existing data by undertaking a longitudinal study, that tracks the 
movement of SOT tableware and giftware manufacturers from 1960 up to 2016, in order to 
determine an accurate account of the evolution of the SOT cluster and of the number of 
firms left in the industry in 2016. Findings of the longitudinal study are presented next in this 
chapter and include: the number of firms, by ownership, existing in the SOT cluster between 
1960 and 2016; the number of new entrants into the SOT cluster between 1960 and 2016; 
the size and development of new entrants over the period in question; and, the pattern of 
acquisitions, mergers and closures over the period in question. 
 
 
4.3: Objective 1, Part 2 - The Development of the SOT Cluster 1960 to 2016 
(based on primary research) 
This section of the findings aims to determine more accurately whether domestic competition 
in the SOT cluster increased or decreased over the last 56 years, simply by tracking the 
movements of the competing firms in the cluster. Another important aim of this stage of the 
research is to identify the target population for the questionnaire and interview surveys on 
innovation, co-operation and competition, i.e. all core manufacturing firms remaining in the 
cluster in 2016. 
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4.3.1: Rationale for the Total Population Selection 
Large firms and SMEs only are considered in the primary research stages of this study, i.e. 
firms with approximately 10 employees or more. Micro-firms, i.e. firms with 10 employees or 
less, have been excluded. The rationale for excluding micro-firms is based on a previous 
study of the SOT cluster by Jackson and Tomlinson (2009), who note that standard 
measures of innovation are not deemed suitable for micro-firms producing studio pottery, as 
output is often bespoke and varies considerably among firms. Moreover, studio pottery often 
depends upon individual artistic interests (p. 696). In addition, micro ‘artisan’ companies can 
often be difficult to identify and track, e.g. they can be run from home and may not be VAT 
registered. It is assumed that these firms represent only a small percentage of the SOT 
cluster. 
 
 
Furthermore, only core product manufacturers who are active in all (most) stages of the 
value chain, including design, manufacturing and decorating of ceramics products, are 
included in this study (see methodology). This decision was based on the need to be able to 
compare like-for-like firms with each other and also over a period of time. The identified core 
manufacturers are listed by ownership, i.e. business units are not counted separately. This is 
an important distinction between this study and previous studies that have tended to list 
factory sites as separate businesses, e.g. ECOTEC, 1996. The number of firms still 
operating in 2016 will form the total population for stage 3 and stage 4 of the research.  
 
 
The longitudinal study presented here is based on information gained from multiple 
secondary sources (see list of references in Appendix 4a). Data was compiled by the 
researcher into a unique database (Appendix 4) which tracks the development of firms in the 
SOT cluster from 1960 up to December 2016. It also includes a small number of additional 
firms which were acquired before 1960 by other firms within the SOT cluster. The acquiring 
firms either went on to become important players in the cluster, or were later acquired 
themselves by firms who became important players in the cluster. Thus, these pre-1960 
firms were included as they were considered an important contribution to identifying: 1) the 
pattern of acquisitions that took place in the period 1960-2016; and, 2) the emergence of the 
SOT cluster’s dominant firms. The database (Appendix 4) is organised as follows: 
• Alphabetical listing of all known tableware and giftware manufacturers based in and 
around SOT; 
• Company history (if known and if relevant), including details of mergers, acquisitions, 
closures, name changes, etc; 
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• Year of establishment and year of closure/takeover/merger/name-change. 
• Current status, i.e. operating or not; 
• Location within the SOT area. 
 
 
From the main database, a number of derivative tables were compiled and these are 
included in the appendices. From the tables, the movement of firms in each decade can be 
tracked, e.g. new entrants, acquisitions, mergers, closures and firms remaining from the 
previous decade. The overall purpose, apart from the historical interest in identifying the 
evolution of the ceramics industry over the period, was to arrive at an accurate number of 
firms operating in the industry in 2016. These firms then formed the total research population 
for stages 3 and 4 of this research study. 
• Appendices 5a-5g show the actual number of firms in existence in the periods 1960-
1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009, 2010-2016 and 2016.  
• Appendix 6 shows the actual number of new entrants (broad definition)in each of the 
periods: 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009, 2010-2016 and 
2016.  
• Appendix 7 shows the origin of new entrants between 1960 and 2016. 
• Appendix 8 shows new entrants for each decade based on the narrow definition96 of 
new entrants. 
 
 
4.3.2: Analysis of Data 
Table 4.3 summarises findings related to the analysis of data in appendices 5a-5g and 6. 
Discussion for each decade is provided below (see 4.3.2.1 – 4.3.2.6). The figure for 2016 
denotes the number of firms carrying out all/most stages of production, with 10 or more 
employees, left in the SOT cluster in 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 The number of new firms shown in appendix 6 includes all new entrants regardless of their origin and so represents the broad definition 
of new entrants. However, some new entrants are not genuine new entrants, but were previously existing firms that had changed name or 
were new subsidiaries of existing firms. Some firms were also formed as spin-offs from existing or previously existing firms. Only 8 firms 
are known to be true new start-ups. Origins are not known for 15 firms. By including only known new entrants and spin-offs, we arrive at a 
narrow definition of new entrants (Appendix 8). 
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Table 4.3: Development of the SOT Tableware & Giftware Cluster 1960-2016 (see 
Appendices 5a-5g & 6) 
 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2009 2010-2016 2016 Totals 
Number of firms in 
operation  
107* 70 64 52*** 46**** 24 15  
New entrants over the 
period 
(8) (7) (9) (7) (7) (0) (0) 38 
Firms each period less new 
entrants 
99 63 55 45 39 24   
Firms still operating at the 
start of next period  
(63) (55) (45) (39) (24) (16)   
Number of firms no longer 
operating at end of period 
44 15 19 13 22 8  121 
Destination of firms no 
longer in operation 
        
Acquired 26 7 11 8 4 0  56 
Closed down** 16 7 7 4 18 8  60 
Merged 1 1 1 1 0 0  4 
Diversified 1 0 0 0 0 0  1 
Total 44 15 19 13 22 8  121 
(* Includes 1 new entrant who entered and exited during the period (Baifield Productions). **Includes 2 firms who closed down c1969/70. 
*** Includes 3 new entrants who entered and exited during the period (Lorna Bailey, Staffordshire China and Crownford China). **** 
Includes 1 new entrant who entered and exited the cluster during the period in question (Pyramid Pottery). 
 
 
1960 - 1969 
The overall number of firms operating during the period 1960-1969 including new entrants 
was 107. By the beginning of 1970, this number had reduced to 63. This represents an 
approximate reduction of 33% in the total number of firms over the decade. However, by 
subtracting new entrants (8) included in the table for 1960-69, we can see that of the original 
99 firms existing prior to 1960, only 55 remained in 1969. This shows a reduction of 46% in 
the number of firms operating at the beginning of 1960. Of the 44 firms no longer operating 
in 1970: 26 firms had been acquired; 16 had closed down; 1 had merged with another firm; 
and, 1 had diversified into industrial ceramics. 
 
 
1970 - 1979 
The overall number of firms operating during the period 1970-1979 including new entrants 
was 70. By the beginning of 1980, this number had reduced to 55. This represents an 
approximate reduction of 21% in the total number of firms over the decade. However, by 
subtracting new entrants (7) included on the table for 1970-79, we can see that of the 
original 63 firms existing prior to 1970, only 48 remained in 1979. This shows a reduction of 
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approximately 24% in the number of firms operating at the beginning of 1970. Of the original 
15 firms no longer operating in 1980: 7 firms had been acquired; 7 had closed down; and, 1 
had merged with another firm. Note: of the 55 firms still operating 1 firm had changed name 
from Washington Pottery to English Ironstone tableware97. 
 
 
1980 - 1989 
The overall number of firms operating during the period 1980-1989 including new entrants 
was 64. By the beginning of 1990, this number had reduced to 45. This represents an 
approximate reduction of 30% in the total number of firms over the decade. However, by 
subtracting new entrants (9) included on the table for 1980-89, we can see that of the 
original 55 firms existing prior to 1980, only 36 remained in 1989. This shows a reduction of 
approximately 35% in the number of firms operating at the beginning of 1980. Of the 19 firms 
no longer operating in 1990: 11 firms had been acquired; 7 firms had closed down; and, 1 
firm had merged with another firm. Note: of the 45 firms still operating, 1 firm had changed 
name from James Broadhurst & Sons to Churchill China98. 
 
 
1990 - 1999 
The overall number of firms operating during the period 1990-1999 including new entrants 
was 52. By the beginning of 2000, this number had reduced to 39. This represents an 
approximate reduction of 25% in the total number of firms over the decade. However, by 
subtracting new entrants (7) included on the table for 1990-99, we can see that of the 
original 45 firms existing prior to 1990, only 32 remained in 1999. This shows a reduction of 
approximately 29% in the number of firms operating at the beginning of 1990. Of the 13 firms 
no longer operating in 2000: 8 firms had been acquired; 4 firms had closed down; and, 1 firm 
had merged with another firm. 
 
 
2000 - 2009 
The overall number of firms operating during the period 2000-2009 including new entrants 
was 46. By the beginning of 2010, this number had reduced to 24. This represents a 
reduction of 48% in the total number of firms over the decade. However, by subtracting new 
entrants (7) included on the table for 2000-09, we can see that of the original 38 firms 
                                                 
97 Listed from 1980s onwards as English Ironstone Tableware 
98 Listed from 1990s onwards as Churchill China 
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existing prior to 2000, only 17 remained in 2009. This shows a reduction of approximately 
55% in the number of firms operating at the beginning of 2000. Of the 22 firms no longer 
operating in 2000: 4 firms had been acquired; and, 18 firms had closed down. 
 
 
2010 - 2016 
The overall number of firms operating during the period 2010-2016 was 24. By 2016 this 
number had reduced to 16. This represents a reduction of approximately 33% in the total 
number of firms over the decade. There were no new entrants during this period. Of the 
original 8 firms no longer operating in 2016, all 8 had closed down. 
 
 
In summary, by adding the total number of new entrants during the period (38) to the number 
of firms in operation in 1960 (107), minus new entrants over that decade (8), we get an 
overall number of 137 firms ((107 – 8) + 38 = 137). If we then deduct the total number of 
firms that ceased operating in the period 1960-2016 (121), 16 firms remain. These 16 firms 
are the total number of firms remaining in the industry in 2016 (see Appendix 5g). Of the 121 
firms no longer operating, 56 had been acquired, 60 had closed down, 4 had merged and 1 
firm had diversified into industrial ceramics. Figure 4.3 shows the total number of firms 
including new entrants for each decade. From the chart the pattern of decline, year-on-year, 
over the 56 year period is determined, with the most dramatic decline taking place between 
1960 and 1969, and a lesser but still significant decline during the period 2000-2009. At this 
stage of the research there are no explanations for the dramatic decline between 1960 and 
1969. Possible reasons are explored later in this chapter. It is thought that the most likely 
reason for the decline during the period 2000-2009, was on-going competitive pressures 
from overseas along with effects of the current financial crisis (2008- date). 
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Figure 4.3: Number of Firms in the SOT Cluster by Decade 1960- 2016 (Including New 
Entrants) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the total number of firms, excluding new entrants, for each decade. From 
the chart, the same pattern of decline can be identified. From the two charts it is possible to 
conclude that, despite a small but steady stream of new entrants each year, the number of 
firms exiting the industry was greater. Thus, overall numbers have declined year on year. 
According to industry life-cycle theory, this year on year decline in overall numbers indicates 
that the SOT cluster is in the decline phase of the industry life-cycle (Klepper, 1996; 
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). However, the steady but relatively small stream of new 
entrants would indicate that the industry is in the mature phase of the life-cycle. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Number of Firms in the SOT Cluster by Decade 1960-2016 (Excluding New 
Entrants) 
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4.3.3: New Entrants, Acquisitions, Mergers and Closures in the SOT Cluster 1960-2016 
Appendix 6 gives full listings of new entrants for each of the decades from 1960 – 2016. 
Figure 4.5 summarises the number of new entrants in each decade (including the firms that 
entered and exited the industry during the period 1960-2016). From the chart, it appears that 
a small but relatively steady stream of new entrants entered the SOT cluster each decade, 
with the exception of the 2010-2016 period when no firms entered. It is possible, however, 
that the 2016 figure is incorrect, as it is probable that source information is not fully up-to-
date, but as the definition of new entrants has not changed between 1961 and 2016, the 
comparison is still valid even if the numbers may not be wholly precise. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: New Entrants into the SOT Cluster by Decade 1960-2016, Broad Definition 
 
 
 
The number of new firms shown above includes all new entrants regardless of their origin, 
and so represents the broad definition of new entrants. However, by examining the origins of 
these new entrants (Appendix 7), it is evident that 9 firms are not ‘true’ new entrants, but 
were previously existing firms that had changed name or were new subsidiaries of existing 
firms. From the remaining 29 firms: 6 firms were formed as spin-offs from existing or 
previously existing firms; and, 8 firms are known to be true new start-ups (including one 
long-established Scottish pottery firm re-located to SOT). Origins are not known for the 
remaining 15 firms. By including only known new entrants and spin-offs, a narrow definition 
of new entrants is identified (Appendix 8). Table 4.4 summarises origins of all new entrants, 
Figure 4.6 shows true new entrants (narrow definition) for each decade.  
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Table 4.4: Origins of SOT New Entrants 1960 - 2016 
Origins Number of Firms 
Pre-existing firms that changed name 5 
Pre-existing firms that changed name after 
acquisition/merger/management buy-out 
4 
A spin-off from an existing or previously existing firm 6 
Pre-existing pottery re-located to Stoke-on-Trent (Dunoon) 1 
Known brand new entrants 7 
Origin not known99 15 
Total 38 
 
 
Figure 4.6: New Entrants into the SOT Cluster by Decade 1960-2016, Narrow definition 
 
 
 
From this data it is assumed that there were comparatively few new entrants (14) of any 
significant size entering the cluster in the period 1960-2016. Moreover, the motivations of all 
‘true’ new entrants (firms that were not in existence in some previous form) for starting-up 
business are not known. It is possible that many of the spin-offs started up because their 
previous employer was in difficulty, e.g. was about to go into liquidation or be acquired, and 
not because the industry was thriving and growing and therefore ‘attractive’. Without further 
                                                 
99 Despite extensive research effort, the origins of some firms could not be determined. 
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research it is difficult to determine the exact nature and impact of new entrant activity on the 
SOT cluster during the period being studied, however this is not the main focus of this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the number of acquisitions taking place in the SOT cluster between 1960 
and 2016. Overall, there were 60 acquisitions and mergers (56 acquisitions and 4 mergers). 
This is important evidence of industry consolidation and an indication that some of the firms 
in the cluster were growing through acquisition. Furthermore, the data derived from the 
source database shows that acquisitions were mostly made by the largest firms in the SOT 
cluster, with perhaps the largest acquisition made by Wedgwood in 2004, when they 
acquired Royal Doulton. The data also shows that there were 2 mergers of significant size in 
the 1960s, and 1980s (see Appendices 5a and 5c), and this is further evidence of 
consolidation.  
 
 
Figure 4.7:  Acquisitions and Mergers in the SOT Cluster by Decade 1960-2016  
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the number of firm closures taking place in the SOT cluster between 1960 
and 2016. Overall, there were 60 closures and this provides further compelling evidence of 
industry consolidation and decline in the overall number of firms in the cluster. From the 
table, it is possible to see that the greatest number of closures occurred in the periods 1960-
69 and 2000-2009. 
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Figure 4.8:  Firm Closures in the SOT Cluster by Decade 1960-2016  
 
 
 
4.3.4 The Emergence of Dominant Firms 
Figures 4.9- 4.17 show a series of flow charts derived from the source database (Appendix 
4) that trace the pattern of acquisitions and mergers from pre-1960 up to 2016. The charts 
demonstrate the emergence and size of some of the SOT cluster’s dominant firms: 
Wedgwood Group; Royal Doulton; Churchill; Steelite and others. 
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Figure 4.9: 
Development Path of Royal Doulton up to Acquisition by Wedgwood in 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Development Path of Wedgwood Group up to 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S. E. Pearson & Sons (origins unknown)  
Also known as The Lawley Group until 1964 
when renamed Allied English Potteries 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Ridgway Potteries Ltd. (date unknown – pre 
1955) 
Alcock Lindley & Bloor (date unknown) 
Swinnertons (1959) 
T. C. Wilde (1964) 
Royal Crown Derby (1964) 
Chapmans Longton Ltd (1966) 
Shelley Potteries (1966) 
Shore & Coggins (1966) 
 
Merged with Royal Doulton in 1972 
and the whole group operated as 
Royal Doulton PLC Until 1993 
when the group became a private 
company again 
Ridgway Potteries 
(origins date back to 1726) 
 
Ridgway family owned the 
following factories between 1726 
and 1955 
 
Adderleys Ltd 
Adderley Floral China 
Booths 
Clocloughs 
Paladin Works 
North Staffordshire Pottery 
Portland Pottery 
Bedford Works 
Gainsborough Works 
John Shaw and Sons Ltd 
Royal Doulton, est. 1862 - 2005 
 
Known Acquisitions pre-merger with S E 
Pearson; 
Minton & Co. (1968) 
Dunn, Bennett & Co. Ltd. (1968) 
John Beswick Ltd Longton (1969) 
Holland Studio Craft (1996) 
 
Royal Doulton acquired by Wedgwood in 
2004 
Steelite International, est. 1983  
(formerly D.E.D. Johnson) 
Known Acquisitions: Steelite purchased 
Royal Doulton Hotelware Division 
(1983) 
T. C. Wilde, est. 1894 
(re-named Royal Albert 1961) 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Paragon China Co. Ltd. (1960) 
Wedgwood, est. 1759 
(Josiah Wedgwood) 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
R. H. & S. L. Plant Ltd (Royal Tuscan), 
(1966) 
William Adams & Sons (1966) 
Susie Cooper China Ltd (1966) 
E. Brain & Co. Ltd (1967) 
Johnson Bros Ltd. (1968) 
J & G Meakin (1970) 
Masons Ironstone China (1973) 
Crown Staffordshire China Ltd (Coalport), 
(1973) 
A. G. Richardson & Co. Ltd (1974) 
Enoch Wedgwood (Tunstall) Ltd (1980) 
Royal Doulton (2005) 
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Figure 4.10: 
Development Path of Wedgwood Group up to 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crown Staffordshire China Ltd. 
Est. 1889 
 
Acquired by Semart Importing 
(America) in 1964. Then by 
Wedgwood in 1973 
 
E. Brain & Co. Ltd., est 1906 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Coalport Porcelain Works 
(1959) 
 
J & G Meakin Ltd., est. 1851 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
W. R. Midwinter Ltd (1968) 
Masons Ironstone China, est. 
1862 
Known Acquisitions: 
G. L. Ashworth & Bros. (1968) 
Wedgwood, est. 1759 – present  
(Josiah Wedgwood) 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
R. H. & S. L. Plant Ltd (Royal Tuscan), 
(1966) 
William Adams & Sons (1966) 
Susie Cooper China Ltd (1966) 
E. Brain & Co. Ltd (Coalport), (1967) 
Johnson Bros Ltd. (1968) 
J & G Meakin (1970) 
Masons Ironstone China (1973) 
Crown Staffordshire China Ltd (1973) 
A. G. Richardson & Co. Ltd (1974) 
Enoch Wedgwood (Tunstall) Ltd 
(1980) 
Royal Doulton (2005) 
 
W. R. Midwinter, est. 1910 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Shorter & Sons Ltd (1964) 
Newport Pottery Co. Ltd 
(1964) 
Arthur J. Wilkinson Ltd (1964) 
Royal Doulton, est. 1862 
For associated acquisitions see 
Figure 4.9 
R. H. & S. L. Plant Ltd., est. 1898 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
New Chelsea China Co. Ltd (1961) 
Wedgwood merged with 
Waterford Crystal in 1989 
 
Waterford had acquired 
Aynsley China Ltd in 1970 
and so already had a 
presence in the SOT cluster 
Wedgwood went into administration in 2009. 
They were bought by KPC private equity in 
2009 and operated as WWRD Holdings 
 
WWRD mostly manufactured in Indonesia. In 
2013 they had approximately 400 employees 
left in SOT, compared to approximately 2,400 
in 2003 (Waterford-Wedgwood Annual 
Report, 2004) 
 
In July 2015, WWRD was bought by the 
Finnish company FISKARS. Employee 
numbers in SOT are estimated at 
approximately 500 (The Sentinel, 11/05/15) 
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Figure 4.11: Development Path of Churchill China PLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Development Path of Staffordshire Tableware Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crownford China. Est. 1989 
 
(formed from an amalgamation 
of Elizabethan (est. 1875), and 
Taylor-Kent (including Rosina), 
est. 1867 
 
 
Taylor & Kent. Est. 1867 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Rosina China (19??) 
 
 
Churchill Fine Bone China 
Division, est. 1994 
 
(formed from acquisition of 
Crownford China) 
 
Elizabethan Bone China. Est. 
1875 
 
Myott-Meakin. Est. 1977 
(formerly Myott, Son & Co. Ltd 
est. 1898) 
 
 
Myott, Son & Co. Ltd., est. 1898 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Alfred Meakin Ltd (1976) 
Renamed Myott-Meakin in 1977 
 
 
Churchill Group. Est. 1985 - 
present 
(formerly James Broadhurst & 
Sons. est. 1962) 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Sampson Bridgwood & Sons 
(1964), acquired by Broadhurst & 
Sons 
Myott-Meakin (1991) 
Crownford China, Longton (1994)  
James Sadler (2000) 
 
 
Coloroll Group, est. 1986. 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Biltons Ltd. (1986) 
Staffordshire Potteries (1986) 
Clough’s Royal Art Pottery (Alfred Clough), 
(1986) 
 
Clough’s Royal Art Pottery, 
est. 1961 (Formerly Alfred 
Clough 1913-1961) 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Cartwright & Edwards (1955) 
Barker Bros. Ltd (1959) 
W. H. Grindley & Co. (1960) 
 
* Also known as Federated 
Potteries 
Woodlands Pottery. Est. 
19?? 
 
Known Acquisitions; 
W. H. Grindley (1991) 
 
Still operating in 1995 but 
assumed closed down late 
1990’s 
Staffordshire Potteries, est. 1950 
(Formerly Keele Street Pottery, 
1915-1950) 
 
Known Acquisitions 1947-1949: 
Paramount Pottery Ltd 
Winterton Pottery Ltd 
Thomas Cone Ltd 
Collingwood Bone China Ltd 
Conway Pottery Ltd 
Piccadilly Pottery Ltd 
Lawton Pottery 
 
After 1950: 
Taunton Vale Industries, inc. Royal 
Winton (Grimwades) (1979) 
 
 
W. H. Grindley. Re-opened 
1988 - 1991 
 
Re-purchased from Coloroll 
in 1988 
Staffordshire Tableware, 
est. 1990 - 2000 
Formed after a 
management buyout of  
Coloroll 
 
Closed down 2000 
 
Dubelle Foundation 
 
Acquired Biltons from 
Staffordshire Tableware in 
1995 and divided into: 
 
Stoke Potteries 
Ltd. 
 
Assume closed 
down 
 
Biltons 
tableware 1998 
Ltd (1998-1999) 
 
Closed down 
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Figure 4.13: Development Path of Steelite International 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Development Path of Portmeirion Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Development Path of Price & Kensington 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arthur Wood Group, est. 1928 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Carlton Ware (1967) 
Price Bros. (Burslem) Ltd (c1950) 
Kensington Pottery Ltd (19??) 
 
These two firms operated as Price 
and Kensington from 1962 
 
Price & Kensington (formerly 
part of Arthur Wood Group and 
originally Price Bros. and 
Kensington Pottery) 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Arthur Wood Group (1989) 
 
Price and Kensington bought out 
Arthur Wood 
 
 
Price & Kensington Acquired 
by the Raywear Group in 2006 
 
Raywear group, based in  
Liverpool, now produce all 
ceramics overseas. No longer 
part of SOT cluster 
 
Steelite International, est. 1983  - present 
 
In 1983 D.E.D. Johnson acquired Royal 
Doulton Hotelware and Steelite International 
was formed.) 
 
Known Acquisitions: Steelite purchased Royal 
Crown Derby in 2012 
Dunn, Bennet & Co. Ltd., est. 
1978 – 1968  
 
Acquired by Royal Doulton in 1968 
and disposed of 
Royal Crown Derby, est. 1750 – 1964  
 
Acquired by S. E. Pearson and Sons in 1964 (located 
in Derby) 
 
S E Pearson & Sons merged with Royal Doulton in 
1972 
 
Royal Crown Derby purchased from Royal Doulton 
(management buyout by Hugh Gibson) in 2000 
Portmeirion, est. 1961 – 
present 
 
Known Acquisitions: Portmeirion 
purchased Royal Worcester/Spode 
in 2009 
 
Acquired Pimpernel in 2006 – 
complimentary tableware (not 
ceramic) 
 
Acquired Wax Lyrical in 2016 – 
candles (not ceramic) 
A E Gray & Co. Ltd, est. 1912 - 
1960 
 
Susan Williams-Ellis (a designer) 
bought A E Gray in 1960 
Kirkhams Ltd, est. 1946 – 1961  
 
Susan Williams-Ellis (a designer) 
bought Kirkhams Ltd in 1961 and 
merged with A E Gray  to form 
Portmeirion. 
 
In 2016 Steelite was 
acquired by John 
Miles and PNC 
Riverarch Capital 
USA. 
 
Royal Crown Derby 
was sold 
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Figure 4.16: Development Path of Tams Group       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Development Path of Royal Stafford 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Objective 2, Part 3 (competition & demand in 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 John Tams & Son Ltd 1875-2000) 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
A. T. Finney (Duchess China), (1989) 
Nanrich Pottery (1991) 
Royal Grafton (1992) 
 
 
 
 
Barratt’s of Staffordshire. Est. 1843 
 
Known Acquisitions: 
Furnivals Ltd (1967) 
 
 
Royal Stafford China. Est. 1845 
 
 
 
Royal Stafford. Est. 
1992 - 2012 
(Formed from merger 
between Royal Stafford 
China and Barratt’s) 
 
 
Tams Group. Est. 2000 - 2006 
After management buy-in 
 
 
 
 Duchess China sold to Taylor 
Tunnicliffe in 2000 
 
 
 
 
Tams Group went into 
receivership in 2006 
 
Closed down 
 
 
 
 
Royal Stafford acquired by 
Denby Pottery in 2012 
 
Denby pottery also acquired 
Burleigh Pottery in 2009 
 
Denby acquired Poole pottery in 
2011 
 
Burleigh ware and Poole ware 
now produced in SOT 
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4.4: Objective 2, Part 3; Competition and Demand in 2016 
 
4.4.1: Demand for the SOT Cluster’s Products  
According to MINTEL (2004), the UK market for domestic sales of china and earthenware 
was worth £505 million in 2004, representing overall nominal growth of 13% since 1999 
(12% in constant terms). However, in real terms this means little or no growth at all. The 
2004 report also estimated that the market would grow by 6% in real terms between 2003 
and 2008. MINTEL’s subsequent 2008 report put the actual sales figure for 2004 at £500m.  
From the table we can see that, according to MINTEL, sales of china and earthenware grew 
year-on-year between 2005 and 2008. Unfortunately, separate sales data for china and 
earthenware between 2008 and 2010 is not available in MINTEL’s 2010 Tableware 
Report100, as the report combines the data for chinaware, glassware and cutlery. However, 
the 2010 report did put the value of sales of chinaware at £452m for 2007; £463m for 2008; 
and, £471m for 2010, thus showing year-on-year growth (MINTEL: Market Size and 
Forecast, p. 2). However, it is difficult to ascertain whether MINTEL’s chinaware category 
includes ceramic kitchenware, as not all ceramic kitchenware is oven-to-tableware. Also, it is 
not clear from the data what proportion of sales came from imported products and what 
proportion came from UK produced products. 
 
 
Table 4.5: UK Retail Sales of China and Earthenware, 1999-2008   
Year   £m Index £m at 
1999 
prices 
 Year £m Index £m at 
2008 
prices 
          
1999  445 100 445  2005 512 92 541 
2000  455 102 459  2006 525 95 548 
2001   465 104 465  2007 538 97 549 
2002  475 107 472  2008 555 100 555 
2003  490 110 485  2009 
(est.) 
570 103 564 
2004 
(est.) 
 505 113 497  2010 
(est.) 
581 105 571 
(Source: MINTEL, 2004) 
 
(Source: MINTEL, 2008) 
 
                                                 
100 Note: MINTEL’s 2010 Tableware Report is assumed to not include ceramic kitchenware and/or giftware. Both of these categories are 
assumed to be included in MINTEL’s previous reports on China and Earthenware 
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The problem of inconsistencies and ambiguities in the published MINTEL secondary data is 
further compounded when the data is compared to other sources of data on the UK China 
and Earthenware sector. For example, in 2010, a report by the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI)101 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the UK had experienced 
growth in consumption of ceramic kitchenware and tableware in the period 2005-2007. 
However, since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, with its negative effect on the 
housing market and disposable income, the market experienced a year-on-year decline up 
to 2010, although a slight recovery was predicted for 2011 (p. 1). It would appear that the 
data presented in the CBI report is fairly consistent with the data presented in KEYNOTE’s 
2011 report. Such inconsistencies and ambiguities in the various data are further evidence of 
the complexities involved in attempting to ascertain an accurate picture of demand for 
tableware and giftware in the UK market. However, the various reports (MINTEL and 
KEYNOTE), unlike the Office for National Statistics (ONS) data, do provide some data on 
some specific companies, e.g. market share and turnover, and so are of some (limited) use 
for that reason. 
 
 
In an attempt to overcome some of the shortcomings in the various secondary data, and also 
to ascertain a more accurate picture of demand for the SOT ceramics manufacturers 
products, a series of charts have been compiled as follows: 1) Office for National Statistics 
data  (ons.gov.uk), for sales of ceramic household and ornamental articles (SIC 2341); 2) 
HM Revenue and Customs import/export trade data (uktradeinfo.com), for ornamentalware 
(SITC 666.1) and tableware (666.2). The following charts present the data as follows: Figure 
4.18, UK manufacturers total sales (prodcom); Figure 4.19, total UK exports and total UK 
imports; 3) Figure 4.20, total UK manufacturers sales; and, Figure 4.21, UK manufacturers 
key export markets (see Figures 4.18, 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21). 
 
 
                                                 
101 CBI, (2010), Exporting dinnerware to Europe, [ONLINE]. Available at: https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/home-decoration-
textiles/dinnerware/europe/. [Accessed 5 May 2016] 
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Figure 4.18: UK Manufacturers’ Total Sales of Ceramic Household and Ornamental 
articles 2007-2016, (£millions) 
 
(Source: author, compiled from ONC data for SIC 26210 (2007) SIC2341 (2008-2016)) 
 
 
The data presented in Figure 4.18102 shows, that apart from 2009, and two slight declines in 
2012 and 2016, overall global demand for the SOT clusters products increased by 15.5% 
from £342.6m in 2008 to £395.7m in 2016 (current prices). However, it is not clear from the 
data, what percentage of sales were domestic sales, and what percentage were export 
sales. Figure 4.19 presents data on exports and imports for SITC codes 666.1 and 666.2 
(combined). By subtracting the export data from the sales data in Figure 4.18, the SOT 
cluster’s domestic (UK) sales have been identified. This data is presented in Figure 4.20 
below. 
                                                 
102 Please note that the data in Table 4.18 presents ‘nominal’ and not ‘real’ values. Nominal value is the value of a product or service 
quoting the money of the day, without taking into account any changes in prices, i.e. inflation. Nominal figures are misleading when we 
use them to compare values in different periods, because inflation diminishes the real value of something over time. 
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Figure 4.19: UK Exports and Imports of Ceramic Household and Ornamental articles 
2007-2016, (£millions) 
 
(Source: author, compiled from HM Revenue & Customs Trade Statistics, SITC codes 666.1 and 666.2) 
 
 
The data (latest available) presented in Figure 4.19 shows that throughout the ten-year 
period 2007-2016, imports of ceramic goods were greater than exports. In 2007, imports of 
ceramic goods were 58% higher than exports of UK produced ceramics. However, by 2016 
the gap between exports and imports had reduced to 40%. In 2016, imports were 8% higher 
than they had been in 2007 (£256.7m in 2007 to £278.3m in 2016). For the same years, 
exports of UK produced ceramics rose by 22%, from £162.1m in 2007, to £198.2m in 2016. 
This is a good situation for the SOT cluster overall as exports have risen by a greater 
percentage than imports. However, the situation for the SOT cluster does not appear so 
positive if domestic sales performance is considered (see Figure 4.20 below). From the table 
it is possible to see that, in 2016, UK sales of SOT produced ceramic tableware and 
ornamentalware were almost 11% lower than they had been in 2007 (£221.5m in 2007 and 
£197.4m in 2016). Overall, from the data presented above, it is clear that demand for the 
SOT cluster’s products increased more in global markets than in the domestic market. 
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Figure 4.20: UK Manufacturers’ Domestic Sales of Ceramic Household and 
Ornamental articles 2007-2016, (£millions) 
 
(Source: author, compiled from ONC data for SIC 26210 (2007), SIC 2341 (2008-2016) and, HM Revenue & Customs Trade Statistics, 
SITC codes 666.1 and 666.2) 
 
 
Figure 4.21 presents data on UK ceramic tableware and ornamentalware sales to specific 
export markets. There is some evidence that the nature of UK pottery exports has changed 
over the longer period of 1990-2016. In the early 1900s, around 60% of all UK pottery 
production was sold abroad (Ewins, 2017: 174). In 2008, UK pottery exports had reduced 
slightly to approximately 58% of total UK pottery manufacturers’ sales, with domestic sales 
at approximately 42% (based on ONS sales data Figure 4.18 and HMRC export data Figure 
4.19). However, by 2016, domestic sales represented approximately 50% of total sales and 
exports also approximately 50%. In 1991 the largest single export market for UK ceramic 
tableware was the United States (Ewins, 2017: 174). In 2007, sales of UK produced 
ceramics to the U.S. were £54.5m, but by 2016 that figure had reduced to £37.5m, a decline 
of approximately 32% (see Table 4.6 below). However, despite the decline, the U.S. are still 
the SOT cluster’s biggest single market. In 2016, the largest region for exports was the 
European Union, with exports in 2016 significantly up on 2007 figures (from £54.9m to 
£90.2m). Moreover, EU exports for 2016 show a 30% increase on 2015 figures, possibly due 
to a weak British pound post the BREXIT referendum in June 2016. Asia and Oceana were 
the second largest region for UK ceramic exports in 2016, representing approximately 22% 
of all UK ceramic tableware and ornamentalware exports that year (also up 22% overall from 
2007 figures, see Table 4.6). For details of all export markets 2007-2016, see Figure 4.21. 
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Table 4.6: UK Ceramic Tableware Export Markets 2007 and 2016  
2007 
£millions 
2016 
£millions 
Increase/ 
decrease 
+/- 
EU 54.9 90.2 65%  + 
Asia and Oceania 35.1 43.2 22%  + 
North America 54.5 37.5 31%  - 
Middle East and North Africa 5.3 10.2 100% + 
Western Europe exc EC 4.2 8.6 100%  + 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.5 1.9 45% - 
Eastern Europe 2.7 4.4 65% + 
Latin America and Caribbean 1.9 2.0 11% + 
(Source: author, compiled from HM Revenue & Customs – Trade Statistics, SITC codes 666.1 and 666.2) 
 
 
Figure 4.21: UK Ceramic Tableware Sales to Export Markets 2007-2016 
 
(Source: author, compiled from HM Revenue & Customs – Trade Statistics, SITC codes 666.1 and 666.2) 
 
 
4.4.2: Drivers of Demand for the SOT Cluster’s Products  
A number of trends for ceramic tableware and giftware products have been identified from 
the various reports presented above. These trends can be identified as key drivers of 
demand for the industry’s products. For example, some of the most commonly cited drivers 
include: cheaper, imported tableware sold as ‘own label’ products by retailers such as IKEA 
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and Tesco (MINTEL 2004, 2008, 2010, 2014; KEYNOTE 2011); Modern consumer 
preferences for contemporary china over traditional British fine china (MINTEL 2004, 2008, 
2014; KEYNOTE 2011; FWC 2008); increased interest in cooking and home entertaining, 
influenced by celebrity TV chefs (MINTEL 2008, 2010, 2014; KEYNOTE 2011); and, the 
positive influence of designers and celebrities on sales (MINTEL 2008, 2010, 2014; 
KEYNOTE 2011). More details of key UK drivers of demand for china and earthenware are 
presented in Appendix 17. Economic and Socio-cultural factors are identified as the key 
factors influencing demand for the industry’s products, e.g. increasing imports of ceramic 
products, an ageing UK population, an increase in the overall number of households, 
including single households, and further considerations of style and fashion.  
 
 
4.4.3: The Number of Product Variations and Segments in Domestic & International 
Markets  
The china and earthenware industry does not segment sales by type of ceramic used but 
rather according to use or styling and price (MINTEL, 2004). For example, tableware can be 
divided into ‘casual’ and ‘formal’ with ‘giftware’ being another segment. The casual segment 
is experiencing healthy growth and in the formal segment demand is diminishing slowly (see 
Appendix 17). Within each of the main segments the market can be further subdivided into 
hotelware and domesticware with some overlap between these groups (e.g. Steelite and 
Churchill, see section 4.2.3). Table 4.7 presents data on the market segments of some of the 
SOT cluster’s largest firms and is based predominantly on MINTEL data. In stage 2 of the 
research (questionnaire survey), these findings will be updated where possible to give a 
more accurate picture of segmentation in the SOT cluster. 
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Table 4.7: Segmentation in the SOT Ceramics Cluster 2008-2010 
Company Segment 
(MINTEL, 2008) 
Segment 
(MINTEL, 2010) 
Comments 
Steelite 
(including Royal Crown Derby) 
Premium + 
Hotelware 
Premium Royal Crown Derby produces premium 
porcelain gift and tableware for the retail 
market. 
Wedgwood 
(including: Royal Doulton, Johnson 
Brothers, Coalport, Mason, 
Rosenthal) 
Premium/Luxury Premium/Luxury
/Upper-mid 
The various brands in the group’s portfolio 
have broadened reach across the market. 
However, focus is still on the premium/luxury 
sectors. In recent years focus has been on 
developing casual rather than formal ranges. 
Portmeirion 
(including Royal Worcester and 
Spode since 2009) 
Mid-Premium Mid Provides a range of traditional and casual 
porcelain and china wares. The brands are 
very distinctive. In recent years focus has 
been on developing more giftware rages as 
well as new designs in dining. 
Churchill China Mid-premium + 
Hotelware 
Upper in the 
Hotelware 
sector. Mid-
market and 
volume in the 
retail sector. 
Produces own-label and branded products in 
the retail sector. 
Emma Bridgwater Upper-Mid Mid Strictly casual earthenwares. Personalised 
tableware is also a strong selling point. 
Denby 
(part of the SOT cluster through 
their acquisition of Burleigh Pottery 
in 2009 and Royal Stafford in 2011) 
Mid-Premium Mid/Upper-Mid Focus is on quality casual dining. 
Raywear 
(including: Arthur Wood, Price & 
Kensington, Mason Cash) 
Lower /middle- 
Mid 
Mid Casual diningware, giftware and kitchenware. 
No longer produce in the SOT cluster 
Aynsley Pottery Premium Premium Bone china tableware and giftware, mainly 
formal. 
Dunoon Mid Mid Produces mugs, teacups and saucers. 
Just Mugs Mid Mid Produces only mugs. 
Repeat Repeat Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Tableware and mugs. 
Roy Kirkham Mid Mid Tableware and giftware. 
    
Royal Winton 
(part of Taylor Tunnicliffe Group. 
Listed under Duchess China) 
Premium Premium Specialises in chintz bone china. 
Susie Watson Mid Upper-Mid Country style table and kitchenware. 
(Source: Author, compiled from MINTEL (2008, 2010)) 
 
 
The data presented in Table 4.7 is only for the SOT cluster’s largest firms. According to 
MINTEL (2008), ‘other’ companies and own-label or unbranded products accounts for well 
over half the market value (Companies and Products, p. 5). This degree of fragmentation 
within the UK industry makes is extremely difficult to analyse segmentation for all SOT 
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cluster firms. However, with many SOT cluster’s smallest firms operating in low-mid 
segments we can assume, at this stage of the research, that there may exist price-based 
forms of competitive activity in these segments or, as Porter (1990) describes, ‘unhealthy 
forms of competition’ in the SOT cluster. Moreover, in the middle and upper segments of the 
market, where design, quality and brand image are crucial, consumer demand for greater 
variety appears to be driving increasing imports, and thus increasing competition in these 
segments too.  
 
 
The existing secondary data evidence indicates that the majority of SMEs in the SOT cluster 
operate in niche segments (O’Keefe, 2000; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011). According to O’Keefe 
(2000), many SMEs (low-mid segments) niche strategies are no longer defensible as these 
segments are over-supplied. It is in these segments that price based competition is thought 
to be particularly intense. Many other SOT SMEs operate as focused differentiators who 
compete on factors other than price alone, such as design, variety, quality and brand. 
Hence, there are many market segments and a fragmented industry structure, with relatively 
low production economies to be gained, although opportunities do exist for economies of 
scale in marketing and distribution. The largest firms in the industry tend to be broad 
differentiators, as evidenced by Table 4.7, operating across a broad range of premium 
product segments. 
 
 
Industry experts have predicted that the future of the SOT industry will depend on its ability 
to increase exports by seeking out new markets and by selling more products in growing 
segments, e.g. porcelain (Padley and Pugh, 2000). Overall, the findings clearly indicate a 
reduction in domestic demand for the SOT cluster’s products, especially in the lower-mid 
priced segments. Further research is required to ascertain whether cluster firms operating in 
these segments have survived. Further research is also required to find out whether 
surviving firms have ‘switched’ focus to mid-upper segments of the market. Thus, one of the 
aims of research stage 3 (questionnaire survey) is to discover answers to these questions. 
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4.5: Chapter Conclusions 
 
4.5.1: Conclusions on the Number and Size of Firms 1960-2016 
The findings for this first stage of the research have fully achieved the aim of objective 1, 
which was to determine an accurate picture of the development of the SOT cluster over the 
study period, i.e. between 1960 and 2016.  
The initial stage of the research found that the reported number of separate tableware and 
giftware manufacturers in the SOT cluster was thought to be 164 in 1996 (ECOTEC, 1996). 
However, the real number, by single ownership rather than separate SBUs, was assumed to 
have been much smaller than this. No accurate data was available on the actual number of 
firms left in 2016. Moreover, the researcher could find no comprehensive published material 
about the pattern of shrinkage in the SOT cluster over time. Subsequently, an in-depth 
longitudinal study was carried out that identified and tracked all SOT core manufacturers 
from 1960 to 2016. Findings from this primary research study show that the overall number 
of firms significantly reduced over time, from 107 in 1960, to 16 in 2016. The research also 
found that the number of firms operating at the end of the 1990s was only 38, thus proving 
that the number of business units (164) reported by ECOTEC in 1996 did not represent the 
true number of firms in the industry at that time. Therefore, the primary research findings 
presented here cast doubt on the validity of previous work on the industry. If there is such a 
margin of error on such a basic matter as the number of firms in the industry, or such 
imprecision in definition that such a huge overestimate is not challenged, it suggests that 
nothing in the conventional wisdom should be taken for granted.  Furthermore, stage one of 
the research found other inconsistencies in the data on firm performance (turnover and 
market share), which also suggests that the conventional wisdom might be flawed. Overall, 
the findings clearly show a significant degree of shrinkage in the SOT cluster over the period 
in question. 
 
 
According to Porter (1990), if there are fewer firms overall there will be less competitive 
rivalry103. This is simply because there are fewer competing firms and less intense enmity. 
The reduction in competitors may also result in a reduction in innovation for the same 
reasons, i.e. there are fewer firms to carry out innovation. From the literature review a 
number of characteristics of ‘declining’ or ‘failing’ clusters were identified. Most important 
was a significant reduction in competitive rivalry within the cluster which leads to a decline in 
innovative activity (Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Dei Ottati, 1994, 1996). The evidence indicates 
                                                 
103 See Literature Review, chapter 2.5 
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that competitive rivalry within the SOT cluster has reduced significantly as the industry has 
consolidated. Moreover, competitive activity between existing firms is thought to be weak, as 
firms appear to operate in separate niche segments (see later in this chapter). 
 
 
4.5.2: Conclusions on the Dominant Firm effect 
Both secondary research findings and primary research evidence clearly show that many of 
the SOT cluster’s largest firms embarked upon strategies of growth through acquisition (e.g. 
Wedgwood, Portmeirion and Steelite, also Doulton prior to 2005). The primary data shows 
that there were two main periods of acquisition activity: the 1960s (27 acquisitions and 
mergers); and, to a lesser extent, the 1980s (12 acquisitions and mergers). The first wave of 
acquisitions in the 1960s is thought to be mainly due to the 1957 Clean Air Act, which 
resulted in making the industry’s coal-fired bottle kilns obsolete (Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011). 
The new tunnel kilns, which ran on gas and electricity, replaced the coal-fired bottle kilns. 
However, the costs of the new technology were high and larger firms in the SOT cluster 
embarked upon a period of rationalisation and growth to obtain the critical mass required to 
justify the running of the kilns (Gay and Smyth, 1974). Possible reasons for the second wave 
of mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s are thought to be mainly connected to the global 
recession of the 1980s (see Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011). The number of acquisitions and 
mergers that have taken place, when considered alongside the data in Figures 4.7- 4.17, 
clearly show consolidation in the SOT cluster and the emergence of the cluster’s dominant 
firms. 
 
 
From the literature review, a number of possible ‘dominant firm effects’ were identified that 
may have had an influence on the SOT cluster. For example, dominant firms can embark 
upon predatory practices such as eliminating competitors, possibly through forcing small 
firms out of business or by acquiring them to shut down the manufacturing facility (Porter, 
1990; Dei Ottati, 1994; Rosenfeld, 1997), and there is some anecdotal evidence that this 
may have happened in the SOT cluster (Padley and Pugh, 2000). Moreover, according to 
Sacchetti and Tomlinson (2009), when a cluster has evolved towards a more hierarchical 
mode of economic governance, lead firms can have a major impact on the shape and 
direction of the cluster, in particular to new investment capacity and the skills base (p. 1843).  
Other negative effects relate to the cluster becoming ‘locked in’ to the objectives and 
strategic decision-making processes of a few firms, or even a single firm (see literature 
review 2.8.4). In such circumstances the cluster’s outlook can become monodirectional. This 
can pose two related dangers for the cluster’s development. First, the cluster can become 
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vulnerable to economic factors affecting the core firm. Secondly, the cluster’s development 
path can become entwined with the ramifications of the core firm’s strategic decisions. For 
instance, a strategic decision (or even a threat) by a core firm to shift production overseas 
and/or pursue a global outsourcing strategy will have significant repercussions for the 
cluster’s smaller firms, workers and the skills base, which can alter the cluster’s development 
trajectory (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009: 1845). As seen from discussions in previous 
sections of this chapter, both Wedgwood and Doulton shifted the bulk of their ceramics 
production overseas between 1990 and 2009. According to Hervas-Oliver et al., (2011): 
“The district’s (SOT) current trajectory has largely been determined by the strategic 
decisions of its leading (mainly publicly owned) firms and, for most commentators, 
the picture is now (2007/8) one of slow entrenched decline exacerbated by 
globalisation” (p. 383). 
 
 
The literature also states, though, that dominant firms can also have positive effects on an 
industry cluster, e.g. leading firms can act as technological gatekeepers whose responsibility 
it is to share ‘external’ knowledge (know-how) with other cluster firms (Giuliani and Bell, 
2005; Giuliani, 2009, 2011). 
 
 
The roles that Wedgwood, Doulton and other large firms in the SOT cluster have taken with 
respect to other SOT cluster firms are not evident from the published data. Some reasons 
why the SOT cluster’s largest firms embarked on strategies of growth through acquisition are 
given above. In addition, less systematic evidence suggests that a motive behind some of 
the acquisitions was possibly the elimination of local competitors (Padley and Pugh, 2000). 
According to Sacchetti and Sugden (2003), when knowledge and production become overly 
concentrated it may well be detrimental to the long-term development of the district (cluster). 
However, there may be yet other reasons for the acquisitions. For example, according to the 
FWC Report (2008: 46), as a response to global competition many firms have attempted to 
cover various segments in many markets. Large ceramic firms have tried to do this by 
creating divisions of firms that specialise in niche markets, or by buying SMEs that supply 
products to select markets (See also Tomlinson and Branston, 2017: 10). Therefore, the 
relationship between SMEs and large firms can be symbiotic, i.e. co-operative, rather than 
confrontational or competitive (FWC Report, 2008). According to Gemser et al., (1996), large 
core firms can act as ‘lighthouses’, sourcing small firms with information of foreign markets 
and new technologies, while the small firms should function as a production base for the 
large core firms (p. 445). The research findings have identified a possible ‘shift’ in the 
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balance of power between firms in the SOT cluster, from the Wedgwood and Doulton 
duopoly, to a post-duopoly phase involving several smaller dominant firms.  Further research 
is needed to determine more accurately the motivations behind SOT dominant firms’ 
acquisition strategies, and also to determine whether current dominant firm effects upon the 
SOT cluster are positive or negative.  Thus, these are objectives of the third and fourth 
stages of the research.  
 
 
Whatever the reasons for acquisitions by the SOT cluster’s dominant firms, the outcome has 
been a steady reduction in the overall number of firms in the cluster. This could be a 
contributory factor to the decline in competitive rivalry in the SOT cluster and, possibly a 
corresponding decline in the potential for innovation (fewer firms leads to fewer competitors, 
which leads to less intense rivalry, which can result in less innovation). The relationship 
between the number of firms and innovation was examined in the literature review chapter of 
this thesis (e.g. Porter, 1990, 1998, 2000; Dei Ottati, 1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). It 
was also identified in the literature that ‘small firms often get a better return than large firms 
on investment in knowledge generating inputs such as R&D’ (Acs and Audtretsch, 1990; Acs 
et al.,1994; Klepper, 1996). In a study carried out by the Tableware Strategy Group (1995), 
of 19 tableware firms studied in the SOT cluster, it was found that many of the small firms 
(approximately 50%) achieved a significantly better return on investment (ROI between 7% 
and 24%), than the two largest firms whose ROI was approximately 6% (cited in Padley and 
Pugh, 2000). However, there are no details of whether these investments were made in 
R&D. According to the FWC Report (2008), ‘conventional thought and evidence highlights 
the importance of SMEs in being creative and innovating, and driving the sector forward’ (p. 
45). Moreover, it is thought that the internal organisation of SMEs tends to be simpler and 
that this can imbue them with greater flexibility, allowing them to respond and adapt more 
quickly than larger firms (Aragon-Sanchez et al., 2005). Further research is needed to find 
out details about the innovations in the SOT cluster and their relationship with firm size, thus 
this is a further objective of the third stage of this research project. 
 
 
4.5.3: Conclusions on New Entrants 
Although, under the broad definition of entrants, the evidence shows a constant stream of 
new entrants into the SOT cluster (38 in total), the total number of entrants is much less than 
the number of firm closures (60 in total), and also much less than the number of acquisitions 
and mergers (61). This means that the overall number of firms in the industry has 
significantly declined, although a decline in the number of firms does not necessarily mean a 
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decline in output, due to gains in productivity and firm size. Moreover, there is nothing in the 
academic literature to define exactly what is meant by “a constant stream of new entrants” 
(Porter, 1990), relative to the overall number of firms.  
 
 
It was also found that at least half of the listed new entrants were not proper new entrants in 
the purest sense, but were the result of name changes or were new subsidiaries of existing 
firms. If these firms are excluded from the total, then there have been a total of only 14 new 
entrants, under the narrow definition (see Appendix 8). Overall, the conclusion on new 
entrants is that there have been few new entrants into the SOT cluster in the last 56 years. 
Cluster life-cycle theory posits that regional life-cycles can be extended if regions can 
successfully align old and new technologies, which in turn stimulate the entry of new firms 
and dynamism in the region (Swann et al., 1998; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011). However, from 
the available evidence, the number of new entrants into the SOT cluster has been relatively 
small, suggesting that the cluster has not been particularly successful at adapting to change. 
According to Klepper (1996), if there are fewer new entrants then eventually competitive 
rivalry will diminish. Moreover, a continual stream of new entrants is essential to create new 
competitors and to feed the process of innovation (Porter, 1990).  
 
 
A number of potential barriers to entry into the UK ceramics industry have been identified 
from published data. For example, according to the FWC Report (2008), the most significant 
sunk costs for ceramics manufacturers are kilns, which are costly and have a long average 
life, and production technologies, which have high initial setup costs. The fact that such 
costs could not easily be recouped in the event of failure, can act as a significant deterrent to 
entry (p. 47-48). Other barriers cited in the literature include, the inability of SMEs to easily 
achieve economies of scale, and the prohibitive first-mover advantages of incumbent firms. 
However, it is not clear from the research just what the reasons were for the lack of new 
entrants into the SOT cluster. Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this research study to 
attempt to determine the reasons, i.e. this research is concerned with identifying the current 
strategic position of the SOT industry cluster only at this stage (see objectives). 
 
 
4.5.4: Conclusions on Demand for the SOT Cluster’s Products 
From the research findings, it is clear that the competitive environment for the UK ceramic 
industry’s products is becoming fiercer with the main competitive drivers being EXTERNAL 
to the SOT cluster (see section 4.4), i.e. 
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• Increasing foreign imports (a threat but also a driver of innovation) 
• Decreasing sales in the domestic market (opportunity for innovation) 
• Decline in traditional export markets (a threat) 
• Growth in new export markets (an opportunity) 
• Lifestyle changes are driving demand for more product variations (a threat but 
also an opportunity for innovation) 
 
 
Demand in the UK market has grown overall and key drivers indicate that growth will 
continue. However, the combination of worldwide overcapacity in production, BREXIT 
concerns and competition from countries with lower production costs are all said to be 
contributors to the price pressures that the UK industry is experiencing. According to 
Newlands (2003), intensified global competition poses significant problems for the survival of 
local clusters. One response to these challenges is that clusters have attempted to avoid 
competing at the bottom end of the market (Porter, 1990; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992). It 
is obvious from the research findings that an increase in innovative activity is required to 
provide the product variations demanded by UK consumers. As a result, we should expect to 
see more innovative activity happening in the SOT cluster not less. However, increased 
competition in output markets, resulting in lower profit margins, often reduces the amount of 
resources devoted to R&D (Beaudri and Breschi, 2003), making it even more difficult for 
cluster firms to focus on the higher end of the market. Although there is some evidence 
(below) that SOT cluster firms have been shifting focus upwards towards the upper 
segments of the market, it is not clear how successful they have been. Stage 3 of this 
research project, i.e. the innovation questionnaire survey, will attempt to address this issue. 
 
 
4.5.5: Conclusions on Product Variations and Segments in the Domestic & 
International Markets 
There are many segments and product variations existing in both domestic and international 
markets. The UK market exhibits particularly sophisticated and demanding consumers who 
are becoming more influenced by fashion and design. This is driving demand for more 
product variations. The SOT cluster’s five largest firms (Steelite, Portmeirion, Churchill, 
Dudson and Wedgwood) operate across a broad range of premium segments. The 
remainder of firms in the cluster are mostly focused differentiators (Porter, 1985), operating 
in one/few niche segments. Firms operating in low-mid price niche segments are 
experiencing price-based competition, mainly from foreign imports. The literature suggests 
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that intense price competition may have an adverse effect on innovation (Porter, 1990). 
Potentially the relationship between competition and innovation is an ambiguous one. On the 
one hand, competition increases incentives to innovate but on the other hand, it may well 
decrease the means, e.g. cost/price pressures may reduce finance available for R&D. 
According to research carried out by Hervas-Oliver et al., (2011), SOT cluster firms, in 
response to global/economic pressures, have begun to establish and foster niche markets. 
The strategy of establishing niche markets was triggered by import penetration from the Far 
East. This is further evidence of how SOT firms chose not to compete head-on with each 
other, but rather focus on separate segments. From the findings, we can assume that these 
firms have no/few local competitors and hence the local stimulus for constant product 
innovation may be missing. In the literature a ‘failure to constantly innovate’ was given as 
one of the typical features of a failing cluster (Porter, 1990; Klepper, 1996; Audretsch & 
Feldman, 1996).  
 
 
It would appear that although SMEs do compete specifically with each other, albeit indirectly, 
there are ambiguities concerning the nature of competition itself. On the one hand, even 
though firms are in niches, they compete with each other to persuade buyers to buy their 
ceramics collectible and not their competitor’s. This is competition, but the evidence 
indicates that, due to the reduction in firms, there are less competing versions of the product 
on the market, hence competition is less intense. On the other hand, ceramics firms also 
need to persuade buyers to buy a ceramics collectible rather than another lifestyle or hobby 
product/service. This is not direct competition in the true sense and it cannot be said to be 
‘fierce’ competition. There is some evidence to support the view that SMEs need to move 
beyond their immediate niches to address changes in the competitive environment. 
According to the literature, competitive rivalry should be good for innovation, but the 
evidence on innovative output in the SOT cluster is unclear. Moreover, the fierce protection 
of market niches may be a contributor towards a general ‘mistrust’ of other firms. As 
Saxenian (1994) found, the ‘culture’ of a region may be partly responsible for a lack of 
interdependence. Similarly, Rosenfeld (1997) cites ‘weak social fabric’ as symbolic of a 
latent or under achieving cluster. Conversely, positive forms of co-operation and 
interdependence are cited in the literature as features of successful clusters (Porter, 1990; 
Dei Ottati, 1994; Rosenfeld, 1997; Tassey, 1991; Midgley et al., 1992).  
 
 
173 
 
Moreover, according to a recent study on the SOT ceramics cluster (Hervas-Oliver et al., 
2011), which examined the district’s ability to withstand or survive a disturbance or series of 
shocks over time: 
“There is a degree of ambivalence among district firms towards wider networking 
opportunities, particularly horizontal ties which may aid knowledge transfer and 
innovation…” (p. 389).  
 
However, it is not clear from the secondary data, the extent to which cluster firms do/do not 
partake in positive forms of co-operation and interdependence. It is also not clear from the 
research, so far, what effect niche strategies have had on competition and innovative output. 
Stages three and four of the research are designed to answer these questions, in particular 
the questions on competition and innovation in the innovation survey (see Appendix 9). 
Findings from stages three and four are presented in chapter six of this thesis.  
 
 
4.5.6: Chapter Findings Mapped to the Objectives and the Theoretical Framework 
Overall, the research presented in this chapter fully achieves research objective 1 (i – vii), 
and partially achieves research objective 2 (i and iv). The remainder of objective 2 (ii – iii) will 
be addressed in stage three of the research. Table 4.8 below maps relevant sections of this 
chapter to specific objectives and Figure 4.22 below maps relevant sections of this chapter 
to specific sections of the theoretical framework (see chapter 1, Figure 2.4). The next 
chapter presents the findings for stage 3 of the research, i.e. identifying the ‘need’ for co-
operation in the SOT cluster over time (objectives 3-6).
174 
 
Table 4.8: Chapter Sections Mapped to Objectives 1 & 2  
 
Stage 1 Research Objectives – Industry life-cycle, demand and competition 
 
Link to 
Propositions 
Link between this 
chapter and 
objectives 
 
12. To track the development of SOT tableware & giftware manufacturers from 1960 – 2016: 
viii. Establish the total number of firms operating in each decade from 1960 – 2016 
ix. Establish the total number of new entrants in each decade from 1960–2016  
x. Establish the number of firm closures in each decade from 1960-2016  
xi. Establish the number of acquisitions & mergers in each decade from 1960-2016  
xii. Determine the degree of consolidation in the cluster as at 2016 
xiii. Establish the life-cycle stage of the cluster as at 2016 
xiv. Establish the emergence of dominant firms in the industry and their history of 
mergers and acquisitions 1960-2016 
 
 
P6, P6a 
P7, P7a 
P10, P11 
 
4.3 – 4.3.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. To examine the nature of demand for the SOT cluster’s products and its effect on competition 
between 2000 and 2016. 
v. Establish whether demand is increasing or declining 
vi. Establish the level and sophistication of demand as evidenced by increasing 
segmentation and product variations 
vii. Establish the pattern of local competitive activity (cluster) between 2000 and 
2016 
viii. Establish the extent of competition from abroad, including competitors from low-
cost countries 
 
 
P6, P6a 
P7, P7a 
 
 
 
4.4 – 4.4.2 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Chapter 4 Findings Mapped to Relevant Sections of the Theoretical 
Framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               (Source: Author, adapted from Arikan (2009). See chapter 2, Figure 2.2) 
1) Life-cycle stage of the 
industry cluster 
 
Sections 4.2 – 4.3.8 
2) Degree of 
consolidation in the 
industry cluster  
Sections 4.2 – 4.3.8 
4) Presence of dominant 
firms and their role in 
facilitating knowledge 
transfer 
Section 4.3 – 4.3.8 
3) Number of new firms 
entering the cluster 
 
Section 4.3 – 4.3.8 
6) Level of stability in the 
cluster’s environment 
 
Section 4.4 – 4.4.2 
8) Number of firms in the 
cluster that follow 
differentiation or 
cost/price based 
strategies 
Section 4.4 – 4.4.2 
Also stage 3 of the 
research 
9) Number of firms in the 
cluster who compete in 
the same segments of 
the market 
Section 4.4 
Also stage 3 of the 
research 
7) Degree of change in 
demand conditions for 
the clusters products 
Section 4.4 – 4.4.2 
5) Balance of power and 
control within the cluster 
Section 4.3 – 4.3.8 
Also stage 3 of the 
research 
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5. Research Findings Stage 2: Historic Overview of Co-
operation and Knowledge Exchanges within the SOT 
Cluster up to 2016 
 
Research stage 2: Objective 3, the breadth of knowledge in the 
cluster; objective 4, modularity in product technologies; and, 
objective 5, the level of technological dynamism in the cluster 
 
5.1: Introduction 
This chapter of the research findings deals specifically with research objectives 3, 4, & 5 
(stage 2 and part of stage 3). One of the key aims of this research project is to identify 
innovation in the SOT cluster. Considering the importance of co-operation to innovative 
activity and output, it is also necessary to identify and analyse the current situation regarding 
co-operation within the cluster (stage 3, objectives 6, 7 and 8). From this analysis, current 
‘opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges’ (Arikan, 2009), and the relationship with 
innovative output can be better understood (see chapter 2, Figure 2.3).  
 
 
However, prior to the primary research stage and, to provide context for the findings, it is first 
necessary to: examine the nature and types of co-operation that have characterised the SOT 
cluster since its beginnings; and, determine whether the nature of co-operative relationships 
has changed over time. Another related aim of this chapter is to identify the possible reasons 
for any consequential changes, as this would aid in understanding the position of the 
industry regarding the need, desire and ability to co-operate, both in the past and present. 
This outcome is important as preliminary investigations (based on Whipp, 1990) would 
indicate that there was little need, or desire, for strong co-operative links within the SOT 
cluster prior to the late 1970s. More recently this situation appears to have changed (see 
5.5.2 in this chapter), and there is some evidence (Tomlinson and Branston, 2017) of 
increasing co-operative activity within the SOT cluster today.  
 
 
To date no previous time-series data exists that specifically examines co-operative linkages 
in the SOT cluster over time. However, there are a number of existing studies, books and 
reports that give limited or restrictive insights into co-operative activity within the SOT cluster 
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at various time periods. Unfortunately, the data from these sources regarding co-operation 
tends to be rather limited, generally comprising of only small parts of much broader industry 
studies. This thesis has extracted relevant data from the various secondary sources and 
constructed a comprehensive account of co-operative activity within the SOT cluster at 
various points in time. Chapter findings are mapped to the objectives and to key themes 
emerging from the literature review as explained further below. 
 
 
The Literature Review identified positive forms of co-operation as one phenomena of 
successful industry clusters (see chapter 2.4). Co-operation in clusters involves linkages 
between similar firms within the industry, and with different agents located nearby, such as 
clients, suppliers and other related firms and industries. Interchanges between these agents 
are seen as ‘cluster externalities’. Moreover, such linkages are seen as the main knowledge 
transmission mechanisms in clusters, i.e. external localisation economies are drivers of 
innovation in industry clusters (see chapter 2.6). The relevant academic literature also draws 
important distinctions between ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ and also between different 
types of knowledge. This chapter will utilise Matusik and Hill’s (1998) two types of 
organisational knowledge, ‘component’ and ‘architectural’ when analysing the type of 
knowledge required to produce the SOT cluster’s products (see chapter 2.6.2). 
 
 
As stated previously, there is a need to discover opportunities for inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges in the SOT cluster and to link this to co-operative activity past and present. The 
existing academic literature indicates that such opportunities depend upon issues such as: 
1) the breadth of knowledge required to offer the products that characterise the cluster; 2) 
the degree of separability (modularity) of product technologies; 3) the degree of 
technological dynamism surrounding products and processes; and, 4) the degree of vertical 
integration apparent in cluster firms (see chapter 2.6.6). These four themes arising from the 
literature are explored in relation to the SOT ceramics cluster (5.1.2 – 5.1.4). In addition, 
section 5.1.5 considers ‘other influences’ on co-operation and knowledge transfer within the 
cluster. Findings in this section provide some possible explanations for attitudes towards co-
operation and knowledge transfer over time.  
 
 
 
 
177 
 
5.1.2: Objective 3, The Breadth of Knowledge Required to Produce the Cluster’s 
Products   
A number of secondary sources (see 5.1.7) have been examined in order to identify 
knowledge requirements within the cluster’s core manufacturing firms. Identified knowledge 
is classified as either ‘component’ or ‘architectural’ (Matusik and Hill, 1998). Component 
knowledge ranges in nature from straightforward technical (simple, tangible, explicit) know-
how through to highly systemic (complex, intangible, tacit) scientific knowledge. Highly 
technical knowledge includes blueprints, product patents, step-by-step instructions for an 
operation, and so forth, in other words ‘information’. Whereas, systemic component 
knowledge includes scientific theory, complex process patents, activities that require 
learning-by-doing, and organisational routines. The more technical, as opposed to systemic, 
a piece of component knowledge is, the faster and more coherently it will be disseminated 
within a regional cluster (Tallman et al., 2004). Architectural knowledge relates to an 
organisation as an entire system and to the structures and routines for co-ordinating and 
integrating its component knowledge for productive use, and for developing new 
architectural and component knowledge (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Matusik and Hill, 
1998; McGaughey, 2002; Tallman et al., 2004). Architectural knowledge evolves 
endogenously as an inseparable part of the firm, rather than existing independently and, as 
no two firms are exactly the same, is highly individual, and therefore extremely difficult to 
diffuse outside of the organisation. Findings in this section are mapped back to the literature 
and conclusions drawn regarding how the SOT cluster’s knowledge requirements changed 
over time and how knowledge requirements during different periods affected opportunities 
for knowledge exchanges. 
 
 
5.1.3: Objective 4 (and partially objective 6), Identifying Modularity in Product 
Technologies, and Vertical Integration in the SOT Cluster 
Both these objectives are connected as they are concerned with the separability of 
production processes and the potential for increasing inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
According to the literature, when a cluster’s product technologies are highly modular, it is 
possible for different firms in the cluster to specialise in different bodies of knowledge 
associated with different components. Under perfect modularity, each firm would be able to 
integrate its component into the overall product architecture, without exchanging any 
knowledge associated with the design and manufacture of its component, thanks to the 
presence of standardised component interfaces (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Arikan, 2009). 
High modularity increases the number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
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Conversely, low modularity in product technology reduces the number of opportunities for 
inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the cluster.  
 
 
5.1.4: Objective 5, Technological Dynamism Surrounding the Cluster’s Products  
Technological dynamism refers to the process of technological change. In the field of 
technology dynamics, the process of technological change is explained by taking into 
account influences from ‘internal factors’ as well as from ‘external factors’. Internal factors 
relate technological change to unsolved technical problems and to established modes of 
solving technological problems. External factors relate to various (changing) characteristics 
of the social environment in which a particular technology is embedded (Bell and Albu, 
1999). According to Arikan (2009), the degree of technological dynamism surrounding the 
cluster’s products influences whether a cluster firm chooses to exploit a particular body of 
knowledge or not. The higher the level of technological dynamism surrounding the products 
that characterise the cluster, the more opportunities arise for inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges within the cluster (Arikan, 2009). In this section, technological developments over 
time within the SOT cluster are identified, along with the resultant effects on opportunities for 
co-operation and knowledge exchange.  
 
 
5.1.5: Other Influences on Knowledge Transfer within the SOT Cluster 
From a systematic assessment of the various secondary data sources, several other 
influences on co-operation and knowledge exchange within the SOT cluster are identified. 
The thesis considers these additional influences as significantly important in providing 
possible explanations for some of the findings on co-operation and knowledge exchange 
opportunities within the SOT cluster (5.2 – 5.5). These ‘other’ influences have been 
categorised by the author as: 1) Custom, Practice and Social relations in the Workplace; 
and, 2) The Nature and Role of Supporting Institutions in the SOT cluster. Findings have 
been mapped back to the academic literature and conclusions drawn regarding the effects 
these influences have had on co-operation and knowledge transfer opportunities within the 
SOT cluster. 
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5.1.6: Chapter Conclusions 
The final section of this chapter will draw together interim conclusions from the previous 
sections. Findings will be mapped back to the Literature Review  (theoretical framework) and 
weaknesses in the data highlighted. 
 
 
5.2: Breadth of Knowledge Required and Knowledge-transfer Mechanisms 
 
5.2.1: 1700s – 1960 
In this section, findings are presented up to 1960, as it was around then that major 
technological changes began to take place in the SOT (UK) ceramics industry with resultant 
effects on skills and knowledge requirements in the SOT cluster. The SOT ceramics cluster 
started as a small community of farmer-potters in the mid-seventeenth century (Birks, 2017). 
Although there were other potteries in England, e.g. in London, Bristol, Worcester and 
Liverpool (Barker, 1991; Ewins, 2008), by 1740 SOT was the main production centre for 
England, and by 1800 it was the most important ceramic production centre in the world 
(Weatherill, 1971; Barker, 1991; Birks, 2017). Not only was there a greater concentration of 
potteries and potters in North Staffordshire than in any other part of the world, with the 
exception of China, most of the innovations in stoneware and earthenware manufacture 
appear to have taken place there (Barker, 1991:13). Throughout this period, knowledge 
within the cluster is identified as being highly skilled and often unique to the firm with the 
majority of workers employed to perform specific and skilled tasks (Nixon, 1976; Imrie, 1987; 
Whipp, 1990). For example, the skill and precision expected of a turner demanded a 
separate craft education to that of the thrower, resulting in separate apprenticeships for the 
two crafts (Nixon, 1976). According to Day et al., (2000): 
“the craft and artisan skills involved in some of the ceramic manufacturing process 
tasks is highly specialised, with a range of tasks taking many years to learn” (p. 12). 
 
 
Moreover, many skilled workers were often trained to produce a single carefully chosen 
product, rather than a series of articles (Nixon, 1976). In this way, very high quality could be 
achieved. After working for many years on specific tasks, workers would develop latent 
knowledge, skills and practices that were often passed down over generations (Lambert, 
2010). Product specific knowledge was usually concentrated within a single pottery and thus 
skills were often firm specific (Nixon, 1976; Imrie, 1987; Whipp, 1990; Lambert, 2009). 
Moreover, the product range of even one manufacturer was often so extensive that each firm 
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had to carry a number of alternative manufacturing processes or sub-processes which could 
accommodate that variety (Whipp, 1990). The evidence clearly indicates that a wide range of 
specialised skills was a characteristic of the potteries’ divisions of labour.  
 
 
Skilled operatives were vital to every one of the seven main stages105 in the production 
process (see Figure 5.1, Whipp p. 46). Most potters had to be acutely aware of the special 
properties of clay, e.g. plasticity, and it was the knowledge of the features of the raw material 
and an awareness of how clay behaved in differing compositions and under varying 
conditions, allied with extreme dexterity, which constituted the potter’s main skills (Whipp, 
1990). This importance of the need to understand clay was also reported by Smyth (1971): 
“Clay is a natural and somewhat perverse raw material, it must be humoured and not 
abused and one must not underestimate the difficulties involved in translating the 
traditional skill of potters to machines” (p. 85). 
 
 
Given the specified nature of pottery production, the potter’s self-image was usually one of a 
skilled worker and, indeed, of a craftsman. According to Whipp (1990), Staffordshire’s 
dominance of the pottery industry relied partly on inherited advantages (see section 5.5) but 
predominantly on the accumulated knowledge base which its potters possessed (p. 196). 
From the evidence so far, it can be assumed that knowledge requirements during the period 
up to the mid-1900s were highly complex, specific to individual tasks and often unique to the 
pottery firm (Nixon, 1976). This situation is said to have continued until the mid-twentieth 
century when major organisational change occurred in the decorative and ancillary crafts. 
 
 
Applying Matusik and Hill’s (1998) typologies of organisational knowledge (see chapter 2, 
2.6.2) to the SOT cluster during this period, the cluster’s knowledge can be identified as 
highly systemic ‘architectural’ knowledge as opposed to mere systemic ‘component’ 
knowledge. Architectural knowledge includes scientific theory, complex process patents, 
activities that require learning-by-doing, organisational routines and so on. Complex, 
architectural systemic knowledge is thought to be difficult to transfer outside the firm, as 
opposed to simpler, codified, less tacit, and less path dependent knowledge which is more 
likely to be mobile (Tallman et al., 2004). Architectural knowledge relates to an organisation 
as an entire system and to the structures and routines for co-ordinating and integrating its 
                                                 
105 1) Clay Department, 2) Potting, 3) Firing, 4) Printing, 5) Decorating, 6) Warehouse, 7) Packing (Whipp, 1990: 46). 
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component knowledge for productive use and for developing new architectural and 
component knowledge (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Matusik and Hill, 1998; 
McGaughey, 2002; Tallman et al., 2004). In such situations, architectural knowledge evolves 
endogenously as an inseparable part of the firm, rather than existing independently and, as 
no two firms are exactly the same, is highly individual. From the evidence above, it appears 
that this was the case for SOT firms, as knowledge was often highly tacit in nature and also 
firm specific. 
 
 
According to the literature, bodies of architectural knowledge are not easy to coherently 
assemble (Tallman, 2004), and this is almost certainly likely to be the case for bodies of 
knowledge within SOT pottery firms as knowledge was specific to each of the many stages 
of production in the ceramic manufacturing process (discussed further in section 5.3). 
Although not readily transferable, elements of architectural knowledge may leak-out through 
constant interaction with other firms in the cluster. The literature claims that firms, who 
possess most or all of the knowledge and capabilities needed in production, may have little 
need for inter-firm co-ordination, and this would seem to be the case for the SOT cluster 
based on the evidence above. Systemic architectural knowledge is linked to the concept of 
‘core competencies’ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), and ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece, et al., 
1997), and is widely viewed as the key to sustained competitive advantage for individual 
firms providing it remains private to the firm for a sustained period (Porter, 1990; Sanches et 
al., 1996).  
 
 
As a result, it can be assumed from the evidence on the SOT cluster that, despite identifying 
high knowledge intensity and a wide breadth of knowledge requirements, which should lead 
to opportunities for knowledge exchange (Arikan, 2009), the type of knowledge existing in 
the SOT cluster during this period appears to have been so specialised and unique to 
individual firms that it hindered co-operation within the cluster and thereby reduced the 
number of opportunities for knowledge creation. Also, it appears that cluster firms may have 
wanted to keep their knowledge private, uncodified or unpublished for competitive reasons, 
and this too may have reduced the number of knowledge creation opportunities in the SOT 
cluster during this period.  
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5.2.2: 1960 – 2016 
Throughout the twentieth century, the SOT ceramics industry witnessed an extended period 
of consolidation, with many mergers, acquisitions and closures (see chapter 4 of this thesis 
for evidence). The number of core firms reduced significantly from approximately 230 firms 
in 1935, to 85 in 1970, and to 16 in 2016 (Gay and Smyth, 1974; Limbrick, 2017106). Despite 
the significant consolidation in the industry, methods of manufacturing ceramics goods 
hardly changed from the methods employed over the previous 100 years (Whipp, 1990; 
Warren et al., 2000). However, starting at the beginning of the 1980s, many changes were 
made to the skill base in the SOT cluster, including restructuring of work processes and a re-
composition of skills. In contrast to the old-style system (discussed in 5.2.1 and detailed in 
Whipp 1990, p. 46), where workers were employed on single tasks, workers were now 
trained to undertake a range of jobs, thus enabling workers to be used interchangeably 
according to pressures within the system. Moreover, the mechanisation of some tasks (see 
5.4) led to the acquisition of new skills alongside the more traditional ones (Smyth, 1971; 
Imrie, 1987; SQW Report, 2009). Consequently, fewer employees were required, as a single 
employee was expected to be competent across a wider range of tasks improved by 
machinery (Imrie, 1987; SQW Report, 2009). This resulted in higher productivity in output 
per employee and the emergence of a technical elite, comprising both semi-skilled and 
skilled workers, with potters having to learn to work closely with machinery engineers.  
 
 
These changes led to the formation of two distinct groups in the industry: a ‘higher order’ 
skills group (Imrie, 1987); and, a ‘lower order’ skills group (Day et al., 2000). The key 
strategy in the industry at this time was to use semi-skilled operatives to perform a set of 
simplified tasks, reducing as many highly paid skilled workers as possible, i.e. a move away 
from the ‘Master’ potter. Consequently, after the 1970s, the industry had a greater 
requirement for individuals with multiple skills than previously (Smyth, 1971; Imrie, 1987; 
Day et al., 2000; SQW Report, 2009). Moreover, the nature of skills in the SOT cluster 
changed to address technological advances aimed at providing more flexibility and 
responsiveness (FWC Report, 2008). However, it is not clear from the evidence that this was 
the case for all cluster firms. Section 5.4 of this chapter examines technology development 
and adoption. Findings in that section indicate that it was mostly the larger cluster firms that 
embarked upon automation of some processes. 
 
 
                                                 
106 See primary research findings in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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It can be assumed from the evidence that, during this later period, knowledge in the SOT 
cluster had become somewhat less complex in nature, i.e. more straightforward technical 
know-how (simple, tangible, explicit), resulting from some de-skilling and partial automation. 
For example, technical knowledge in the cluster may well have included more tangible step-
by-step instructions for an operation, and so forth, in other words ‘information’. According to 
Tallman et al., (2004), the more technical, as opposed to systemic, a piece of component 
knowledge is, the faster and more coherently it will be disseminated within a regional cluster 
(Tallman et al., 2004). Nevertheless, component knowledge will only provide short-term 
competitive advantage to firms within a cluster while it remains private, and component 
knowledge that is public only within the cluster provides short-term competitive advantage to 
the cluster as a whole (Tallman et al., 2004). This is because simpler processes may provide 
conditions where different firms in the cluster can provide specialised knowledge associated 
with different components. Hence, increasing the number of knowledge-exchange 
opportunities. This is not to imply that knowledge within the SOT cluster during this later 
period can be identified purely as ‘component’ knowledge, as many of the cluster’s 
technological processes have remained extremely difficult to automate (see sections 5.3 and 
5.4). From the evidence above, and from subsequent sections of this thesis, knowledge 
within the SOT cluster during this period can be classified as lying somewhere between 
component and architectural.  Overall, from the available evidence, it appears that 
opportunities for knowledge exchange and co-operation increased slightly in SOT cluster 
from the 1980s onward. However, the degree of knowledge transfer, and the degree of the 
cluster’s propensity to co-operate, also depends on other factors such as separability of 
processes, technological dynamism and mechanisms for co-operation and these are 
discussed in sections 5.3-5.5. 
 
 
5.3: Modularity in Product Technologies and Vertical Integration in the SOT 
Cluster 
 
5.3.1: 1700s – 1960 
According to Arikan (2009), when a cluster’s product technologies are highly modular, it is 
possible for different firms in the cluster to specialise in different bodies of knowledge 
associated with different components, hence providing opportunities for co-operation. In 
clusters where product systems are characterised by inseparability, joint production within a 
single firm might be the most effective form of governance, due to the difficulty of separating 
production activities in a way that allows multiple firms to act in parallel (Arikan and Schilling, 
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2011). According to Arikan and Schilling (2011), the primary factor that leads to a high need 
for co-ordination is a combination of ‘complexity’ and ‘imperfect separability’ (p. 774). 
Complexity of knowledge has been discussed in the previous section (5.2). In this section 
complexity and separability of SOT cluster firms’ production technologies are examined fully. 
 
 
During the period 1700s-1960, the evidence indicates that most SOT cluster firms carried 
out most phases of the production process, including the preparation of materials (Gay and 
Smyth, 1974; Imrie, 1987; Whipp, 1990). This was assumed to be the case for all core 
manufacturers regardless of size. However, there is also evidence that it was fairly common 
practice for firms to produce ceramic wares for other pottery manufacturers. For example, 
the pottery Cork and Edge of Burslem, was well known for supplying other manufacturers 
and merchants in the Staffordshire region (Ewins, 2008:112). In terms of firm size, the 
pottery industry exhibited a wide range. At one extreme there was a group of exceptionally 
large firms, e.g. by 1920 Cauldons had fourteen factories and employed 3,000 workers 
(Whipp, 1990). However, the vast majority of firms in the industry were SMEs. Even in the 
larger factories, e.g. Wedgwood and Doulton, plant size was conventionally small, and 
production predominantly based on craft skill, hence there was no requirement or significant 
advantage in large unit size (Whipp, 1990).  
 
 
The work itself within the cluster firms was organised around a number of distinct processes 
with separate places allocated for each (Nixon, 1976; Whipp, 1990). The characteristic 
fragmentation and separation of production processes within the cluster restricted the size of 
organisational departments (Lambert, 2009). Attempts to codify the diversity of activities of 
pottery work largely failed, due to the many complexities apparent in the way that work was 
structured, organised and controlled (Whipp, 1990), and also in the way that worker families 
‘hoarded’ knowledge (see section 5.5). During this period, production processes were highly 
complex. The production sequence itself composed of many interdependent phases. The 
largest pottery manufacturers contained between 100 and 150 departments, while even the 
smaller banks used over thirty separate phases (Imrie, 1987; Whipp, 1990). This situation 
had not changed much by the 1950s. According to Imrie (1987): 
“in the early post-war (World War Two) period it was still not uncommon for there to 
be at least 100 separate tasks carried out in the pottery industry” (p. 12). 
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Moreover, the level of mechanisation was generally low, which meant that there were few 
machines that could combine or simplify tasks, and no machines could encompass the work 
of a whole department (Whipp, 1990). In addition, it is thought that the poor special layout of 
potteries inhibited the efficient transfer of the product between constituent processes (Gay 
and Smyth, 1974).  
 
 
The evidence presented here clearly indicates high complexity but low separability of 
production processes in ceramics production. The cluster’s products are not made of 
separate individual components that can be combined into the final piece. Each stage of the 
production process is distinct, however each of the activities in the production system are 
highly interdependent, and as such are not easily capable of being performed by different 
firms in the cluster. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, knowledge was also 
highly specialised in parts, e.g. mould making, and firm-specific to each phase of the 
production processes and, again, not easily transferable outside of the firm. Hence, the need 
for co-ordination between SOT cluster firms is assumed to be low during this period. 
Consequently, the opportunities for co-operation and knowledge transfer are also assumed 
to be low. According to Arikan (2009), the structure of the industry plays an important role in 
cluster firms’ willingness to engage in inter-firm knowledge exchanges (Arikan, 2009). The 
findings in this section provide one possible explanation for why SOT cluster firms have 
reputedly been unwilling to engage in co-operative activities (discussed further in section 
5.5). 
 
 
5.3.2: 1960 - 2016 
According to Arikan and Schilling (2011), high technological complexity may require firms to 
break down product systems into more manageable components, leading to specialisation, 
and hence the need for co-ordination (p. 774). This section provides evidence of SOT cluster 
firms’ attempts to simplify production processes. 
 
 
In the SOT cluster, over 100 separate named work groups were still in evidence in 1977, 
related to fifteen different categories of product within the industry (Whipp, 1990). 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in order to overcome work organisation and production 
discontinuities, there is some evidence that largest firms in the SOT cluster increasingly 
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adopted Fordist107 methods of production in some processes (Imrie, 1987). This involved 
increasingly restructuring work around a series of automatic and semi-automatic machines 
which encouraged high volume flow-line production. In turn, model ranges were reduced to a 
handful of popular models (rationalisation), in contrast to the hundreds of different styles that 
had been produced under the previous system (Imrie, 1987). However, the evidence 
indicates that cluster firms never really achieved high levels of standardisation, due to the 
complexities of the production process that were so intricate that they rendered automation 
of some processes infeasible, this was even true for large firms like Wedgwood (Wedgwood, 
1982, cited in Imrie, 1987; Day et al., 2000).  
 
 
During this period, in addition to streamlining production processes, cluster firms began to 
look outside the firm to specialist firms who could supply many pre-prepared materials, such 
as clays, flints, colours, glazes, etc. that had previously been prepared in-house, thereby 
reducing vertical integration (Smyth, 1971). However, vertical disintegration appears to have 
only taken place in the early preparation processes rather than in the key manufacturing 
processes (Imrie, 1987; Whipp, 1990; Day et al., 2000). The majority of large firms still 
organised production starting with raw materials mixing through to selling the decorated 
product, whilst many smaller firms bought-in prepared raw materials and manufactured from 
clay through to the finished piece (Day et al., 2000). The outsourcing of some basic 
preparation processes could be said to have aided knowledge transfer within the cluster, 
leading to more profitable opportunities for knowledge transfer within small firms. 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, complexity can provide the motivation for firms to pool 
their efforts to break down that complexity into more manageable pieces, but it is the 
separability of activities that determines the ease or effectiveness of doing so (Baldwin and 
Clark, 1997; Schilling, 2000; Arikan and Schilling, 2011). The findings on the SOT cluster 
clearly indicate that SOT cluster firms have only been partially successful in reducing 
technological complexity in production processes. Moreover, the processes themselves are 
still highly interdependent, i.e. ‘inseparable’. Whilst these conditions have led to some forms 
of co-operation with suppliers of raw materials, for some firms, the evidence indicates that 
specialisation of the more complex processes has not been possible. The evidence also 
                                                 
107 An industrial paradigm involving mass production of standardized goods on a moving assembly line using dedicated machinery and 
semiskilled labour. Source: Britannica.com. (2017), Fordism, [ONLINE]. Available from: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fordism. 
[Accessed 28 Feb 2017] 
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indicates that strong task divisions throughout the industry have gradually been broken 
down, and this has aided the flexible use of labour (Day et al., 2000), providing more 
opportunities for knowledge exchange. Hence, the conclusions are that opportunities for co-
operation and knowledge exchange between firms engaged in the various production 
processes in the SOT cluster, may have increased marginally from the position pre-1960. 
 
 
5.4: Technological Dynamism Surrounding the Cluster’s Products  
 
5.4.1: 1700s – 1960 
According to Arikan (2009), a cluster may originate as a specific knowledge-based area but 
the number of opportunities for knowledge exchanges may change over time. For example, 
environments surrounding the cluster's products may become more stable over time (low 
technological dynamism), making self-sufficiency in terms of knowledge requirements a 
more valued goal to pursue than flexibility. Conversely, if the environment surrounding the 
cluster becomes dynamic, leading to increasing technological change over time, then this 
may create a greater need for inter-firm co-operation, and hence create more opportunities 
for knowledge exchange. The idea that knowledge requirements change over time is linked 
to the concept of the industry life-cycle (see chapter 2.7). The academic literature suggests 
that firm-level innovation, and how much innovative activity is undertaken, is also closely 
linked phases of the industry life-cycle (Klepper, 1996, 2007; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; 
Breziz and Krugman, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 2007; Potter and Watts, 2011). The 
following section identifies the key technological changes that have taken place within the 
SOT cluster and links them to corresponding life-cycle changes, and to opportunities for co-
operation.  
 
 
As discussed in the previous section, production methods employed by many firms in the UK 
ceramics industry up to the late 1880s, had hardly changed over the previous 100 years 
(Gay and Smyth, 1974). Any technological advancements that did take place tended to be 
small and incremental (Imrie, 1987; Whipp, 1990). For example, in the mixing and clay 
preparation departments, mechanical grinders, blungers and mixers gradually replaced older 
hand techniques, and in decorating improved transfer machines were developed. By the 
mid-1920s, external ceramic transfer companies were also established and they were able 
to supply manufacturers with ready-made transfers (Whipp, 1990). Overall, from the 
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evidence, technological dynamism in the SOT cluster could be described as low during this 
period. 
 
However, during the period 1890-1960 there were several significant changes in the use of 
ceramic technology, with the two main changes taking place in the pressing and firing 
departments. The greatest technological change with regard to pressing was the introduction 
of casting. Casting involved working with a simple, liquid clay and mould that enabled 
complex shapes to be made in a single operation, where previously the hollow ware presser 
had needed several stages to make such articles (Whipp, 1990). The second type of change 
concerned oven design and firing techniques. A handful of firms pioneered gas firing in 
tunnel ovens (largely as a result of the Clean Air Act (1956), and the introduction of natural 
gas in 1960). However, only a few of the largest firms experimented with firing technologies 
during this period (Whipp, 1990).  
 
 
As mentioned previously, throughout the 1900s, the SOT cluster also experienced an 
extended period of consolidation. However, despite the decline in the number of firms, 
output increased substantially over the same period (Gay and Smyth, 1974). On this 
evidence the industry can be placed as in the slow-growth phase of the industry life-cycle up 
to the end of the 1970s, when the effects of recession and globalisation sent the industry into 
long-term decline (Tomlinson and Branston, 2017: 5). 
 
 
The evidence presented so far indicates that, apart from advances in kiln technology, there 
was a low level of technological dynamism in the industry during 1900s, only gaining 
momentum towards the end of the twentieth century. According to Gemser (1996), during 
the slow-growth phase of the industry life-cycle the need for horizontal linkages between 
competing firms is low, due to firm specialisation. At this stage of the life-cycle the focus of 
innovation is on the product. Within this environment, firms continue to compete by pursuing 
product differentiation strategies and the number of segments in the market increases. 
(Brenner, 2005; Belussi and Sedita, 2009). The evidence presented above on technological 
dynamism in the SOT cluster for this period does not indicate conclusively that cluster firms 
focused on product innovations. Moreover, the evidence presented in section 5.2, shows 
that during this time the product ranges of pottery firms were widely varied with long 
established production methods, thus it can be concluded that no radical product innovations 
took place during this period. This fact, coupled with the lack of significant advances in 
process technologies during the same period, leads to the conclusion that during this period 
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the industry’s environment was stable with low technological dynamism. According to the 
academic literature (Arikan, 2009), low technological dynamism results in few opportunities 
for knowledge exchanges. Thus, the findings in this section support the results from the 
previous section that indicate low knowledge exchange opportunities within the SOT cluster 
during this period. 
 
 
5.4.2: 1960 - 2016 
Despite the introduction of some new technologies in the 1960s and 1970s, as detailed in 
section 5.3, the pace of industrial and economic change appears to have continued slowly 
up to the late 1970s (Smyth, 1971; Imrie, 1987; Warren et al., 2000; Day et al., 2000). 
Moreover, technological change was modest; a series of piecemeal alterations rather than 
radical innovations (Whipp, 1990). Oven technology is one example of this. The Clean Air 
Act (1956) raised the need to replace the old, coal-fired bottle kilns, yet their replacement by 
electric and gas ovens was slow and fitful given the constraints of small scale potteries and 
the continued existence of the smaller potter firm (Gay and Smyth, 1974; Whipp, 1990).  
 
 
During this period (1960s – 1970s) there is further evidence of the adoption of ‘Fordism’ 
principles, including attempts to standardise the product to achieve economies of scale, and 
the use of integrated assembly line production in an attempt to equalise conveyance times 
between work processes (Nixon, 1976; Imrie, 1987). However, as mentioned previously, 
mechanisation had only been introduced into certain pottery processes but not in all. For 
example, according to Imrie (1987), by the early 1980s little mechanisation had been applied 
to preliminary processes such as casting and moulding (p.15). There is also evidence of 
forced rationalisation of product lines during this period, i.e. fewer profiles for shapes and the 
standardisation of mass-market tableware, but still with a wide variety of designs and 
decorations (Nixon, 1976; Imrie, 1987; Warren et al., 2000; Day et al., 2000). The evidence 
can be linked to both Fordism and Flexible Specialisation108 production models, i.e., 
evidence of attempts to standardise some products, whilst maintaining a wide variety of 
designs and decorations for others. This notion of a ‘dualist’ structure, i.e. some mass 
production elements and some product differentiation elements, existing in the UK ceramics 
                                                 
108 Flexible Specialisation: When a firm has multi use equipment and multi-tasking employees to adapt to market changes. The changes 
are fast and the company must change to continue to function and profit. Source: The Law Dictionary, (2017), Flexible Specialisation, 
[ONLINE]. Available at:  http://thelawdictionary.org/search2/?cx=partner-pub-
4620319056007131%3A7293005414&cof=FORID%3A11&ie=UTF-8&q=Flexible%20specialisation. [Accessed 21 July 2016] 
190 
 
cluster is not new and has been widely reported in various previous studies of the industry 
(Imrie, 1987; Rowley, 1994, 1998; Day et al., 2000). 
 
 
From the evidence above, the SOT cluster can be regarded as having entered the mature 
phase of the industry life-cycle. According to life-cycle theory, during this period a number of 
evolutionary changes occur that cause the industry to mature. First, because of the 
knowledge codification process, knowledge within the industry becomes codified and 
transferable across geographical space with lower transaction costs109 (Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996; Bathelt et al., 2004. see earlier references too). There is some evidence of 
this happening within the SOT ceramics cluster with the simplification of some manufacturing 
processes, job de-skilling and intra-firm knowledge transfer (between departments as 
workers become multi-skilled), plus knowledge transfer through mergers and acquisitions 
(consolidation effects). A second feature of an industry in the mature phase of the life-cycle 
is that, due to rapidly increasing demand (Brenner, 2005), a dominant design emerges within 
the industry that enables products to become standardised and produced using capital 
intensive, high-volume mass production processes rather than craft production processes 
(Klepper, 1996). Once more, there is some evidence of this happening in the SOT cluster 
through standardisation of some products. A third feature of the mature phase of the industry 
life-cycle is that firms begin to shift their R&D emphasis away from a product differentiation 
strategy that focuses on product innovation, towards a cost-saving strategy that emphasises 
production innovation (Klepper, 1996; Brenner, 2005). The evidence in this respect indicates 
that SOT firms began to re-focus on process innovations during this period.  
 
 
Gemser (1996) also acknowledges a focus on cost-cutting process innovations during the 
maturity phase of the life-cycle, along with a decrease in the need for both horizontal and 
vertical linkages, mostly as a result of mergers, takeovers and vertical integration. There is 
evidence that although there appears to have been some increased opportunities for 
knowledge transfer in the SOT cluster through merger, acquisitions and codification of some 
knowledge, knowledge transfer seems to have mostly taken place between firms belonging 
to the same company, or group of companies. This leads to the assumption that it was 
mostly inside the large firms where knowledge transfer opportunities increased. However, 
what was happening with SME firms during this period cannot be clearly ascertained, as the 
                                                 
109 A central premise of transaction cost theory is that transaction costs increase as transactors make greater asset-specific investments. 
The standard reasoning is that as asset specificity increases, more complex governance structures are required (Dyer, 1997).  
 
191 
 
data from previous accounts of the industry tends to focus mostly on the larger firms in the 
SOT cluster. The findings do, however, lend convincing support to Gemser’s view that 
consolidation in the industry can lead to a decrease in the need for inter-firm linkages, as in 
reality there are fewer firms to co-operate with. Overall then, during the 1960s and 1970s, it 
appears that the number of opportunities for knowledge exchange declined in the SOT 
cluster. 
 
 
It is evident that from the late 1970s technological dynamism appears to speed-up 
considerably in the UK ceramics industry. Pottery firms began to respond slowly to a series 
of external shocks that started in the late 1960s and adversely affected many traditional 
industries across the globe. These crises were caused, in part, by the saturation in world 
markets that rendered the mass production of standardised goods untenable (Gay and 
Smyth, 1976; Imrie, 1987; Warren et al., 2000; Day et al., 2000). According to Imrie (1987), 
the UK ceramics industry continued to grow in terms of output until 1978 when sales 
(tableware) peaked at £348m, declining to £213m by 1982 (p. 45). By the early 1980s, the 
UK pottery industry was in crisis, due to increasing international competition, especially from 
the East Asian region, and changes in consumer demand and spending. This resulted in the 
break-up of traditional mass markets and an increased focus on market niches (Gay and 
Smyth, 1976; Nixon, 1976; Whipp, 1990; Warren et al., 2000; Day et al., 2000; Carroll, et al., 
2001; Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). The evidence here clearly indicates that the SOT 
cluster had entered the decline110 phase of the industry life-cycle. 
 
 
By the 1980s, in response to the changing external environment, many of the larger pottery 
companies had, in addition to continuing to invest in automating some processes, developed 
a series of small production innovations aimed at servicing market niches and sensitising 
production to switches in patterns of consumption (Imrie, 1987). Another of the responses of 
the UK pottery industry was that some of the larger firms began to adopt certain elements of 
Japanese production methods into their operations, e.g. hybrid versions of just-in-time 
(Imrie, 1987, p. 19). These firms were able to produce goods when required, to exact 
numbers and specifications, and with a much higher onus on quality control than previously 
(further evidence of flexible specialisation). As well as being a response to international 
                                                 
110 For the purposes of strategic analysis the industry which is in decline can be recognised by an absolute decrease in sales over a 
longer period of time. It is characterised by falling profit margins, reductions in production lines, lower investments in research and 
development and marketing and fewer competitors (Porter, 1980, cited in Sabol, et al., 2013).  
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competition, the development of mechanised production also reflected the need of the SOT 
cluster to respond to rapidly changing fashions in the consumer market (Nixon, 1976; SQW 
Report, 2008). Warren et al., (2000) also acknowledge this ‘second technological revolution’ 
as taking place in industry in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (p. 91).  
The evidence indicates that, by the end of the 1970s, it was the larger pottery companies in 
the SOT cluster who were investing most in more significant new technologies. For example, 
both Staffordshire Potteries and Wedgwood made significant investments, over £4 million 
combined, in new plant and mass production technologies (Imrie, 1987). The evidence for 
SMEs, who were not part of a larger group, would indicate that there was little large-scale 
investment taking place during the same period. Aside from not having the necessary 
resources to fund major expenditure programmes, for many SMEs large scale expenditures 
were not wholly appropriate for their scale of operations (Imrie, 1987). Although the switch to 
high quality, low volume production targeted at market niches, was largely undertaken by 
small firms, they were either owned by the larger firms, or did subcontract work for them. 
Moreover, many of these smaller firms had been acquired by larger firms in order to acquire 
skills in specialised areas (Smyth, 1971; Niblett, 1987). This situation led to closer 
relationships between the larger and smaller firms within the same group, with the former 
relying more and more on the latter’s production technologies and expertise. In turn, the 
larger firms focused more on introducing and expanding technologies and forms of work 
organisation orientated to volume production (Imrie, 1987). Moreover, technological 
improvements were not uniform throughout the industry, with developments occurring fastest 
in the cheaper end of the industry, e.g. earthenware, and slower in the more expensive end 
of the market, e.g. bone china (Warren et al., 2000). This supports views stated elsewhere in 
this chapter, i.e. that not all firms adopted new technologies, and this view is well 
documented in the literature (Imrie, 1987; Warren et al., 2000).  Another response by the 
largest firms to the industry’s problems was to re-locate much of their production overseas 
(Imrie, 1987; Carroll et al., 2002). For example, both Wedgwood and Doulton located 
production overseas in the 1990s (see also chapter 2, section 2.2 of this thesis). By the mid-
1990s, the SOT cluster had evolved into a very dynamic sector with rapidly changing 
techniques and technologies (Rowley, 1996).  
 
 
From the evidence above, between the late 1970s and mid-2000s, the SOT cluster is clearly 
placed in the decline phase of the industry life-cycle. This final stage of the industry life-cycle 
is characterised by a period of decline that affects the whole industry and has implications 
for the survival of the cluster. A number of different factors can trigger the decline stage, 
including a large shake out of firms, intensive price competition, market overcapacity, 
193 
 
disruptive innovations, product substitution, exogenous shocks, or unpredictable changes in 
supplier or customer markets (Porter, 1990; Klepper, 1996; Potter and Watts, 2011). It is 
evident that most of these factors were experienced by SOT cluster firms during the period 
in question. According to life-cycle theory, firms that remain within the industry during the 
decline phase attempt to adapt their routines and place greater emphasis on a variety of new 
management routines and strategies. These new routines may include geographic 
relocation, industry diversification, increasing plant size, business mergers and acquisitions 
(Swann et al., 1998). Again, the evidence on the SOT industry indicates that many new 
routines and strategies were adopted in a response to the problems that it was facing during 
this period, and these fit with what the theory says about the decline phase of the life-cycle. 
According to Gemser (1996), firms’ abilities to appropriate the profits of innovations are 
especially difficult at the beginning and end of the industry life-cycle because of the high 
costs of R&D and marketing and the high capital needs of production. Therefore, horizontal 
inter-firm linkages should be particularly dense at these stages. However, in the decline 
stage of the life-cycle they may be weak, due to negative competition or dominant firm 
effects that may be a feature of the cluster (Gemser, 1996; Molina-Moralez et al., 2015).  
 
 
The evidence on the SOT cluster does not give a definitively clear picture of inter-firm co-
operation during the period in question, although the evidence does indicate that there was 
some intra-firm co-operation taking place within large firm groupings. In addition, the 
overseas outsourcing of production by the largest firms should have created opportunities for 
knowledge exchange with firms outside the SOT cluster. The academic literature defines the 
transfer of knowledge from local to a global scale as ‘non-cluster economies’ (Yeung et al., 
2006), ‘extra-cluster linkages’ (Giuliani and Bell, 2005), or ‘global pipelines’ (Andersen and 
Lorenzen, 2007). According to Hervas-Oliver et al., (2008), in a global economy the majority 
of clusters are connected in global value chains, and clusters should be open to ‘newcomers’ 
that act as knowledge diffusers and create both inflows and outflows of knowledge (p. 508). 
However, whether a firm chooses to make its knowledge available to other firms in the 
cluster is dependent on whether external exploitation of knowledge endangers the firm’s 
competitive standing inside the cluster (Arikan, 2009; Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009).  
 
 
Historical reasons and path dependency (discussed in 5.5 of this chapter) are another 
reason given in the academic literature for dominant firms’ lack of co-operation (Arikan and 
Schilling, 2011). Dominant firms can also control the rate at which technology is upgraded or 
refined (Arikan, 2000), with the firm that possesses control dictating much of the behaviour in 
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a cluster due to their large bargaining power (Arikan and Schilling, 2011). It is not obvious 
from the evidence on the SOT cluster, whether the ‘new knowledge’ gained from new 
overseas linkages outside the cluster created knowledge exchange opportunities for all firms 
within the SOT cluster, i.e. there is no evidence of this in existing industry studies. Hence, 
one of the aims of stage 3 of the research (questionnaire and interview surveys) is to identify 
the extent of current internal and external cluster linkages. Overall, from the evidence 
presented in this chapter, it can be assumed with some certainty, that although new 
knowledge was developed in some of the cluster’s largest firms, opportunities for knowledge 
exchange remained relatively low for cluster firms as a whole during this period. 
 
 
As demonstrated, by the start of the twentieth century the need for new technology had 
become increasingly imperative to ceramics manufacturers in order to combat increasing 
competition in markets and from other materials such as glass and plastic. Thus, the focus of 
more recent innovative activity has been on making ceramic goods quicker, cheaper, more 
reliable and longer lasting (Warren et al., 2000, p. 91). Although the recent evidence, up to 
the early 2000s, has indicated that it was mostly the largest firms in the SOT cluster who 
adopted the more radical technologies, there is evidence from recent research into the 
industry to show that this situation might be changing. Both the FWC Report (2008, p. 52) 
and the SQW Report (2009, p. 23), state that the use of automation technology had become 
widespread in UK ceramics manufacturing, with the majority of companies in the sector, 
including SMEs, having invested heavily in new technologies including new automated 
casting and decoration equipment. Unfortunately, no detailed evidence of innovations was 
provided in these reports, and so without further research (stage 3 of this research project) it 
is difficult to come to an overall conclusion regarding current technology adoption in the SOT 
cluster. It is evident though that both the level of technological dynamism and the need for 
innovation have grown rapidly from the 1970s onwards, particularly from the late 1980s to 
the present time, and this should have provided increased opportunities for knowledge 
transfer.  
 
 
Further evidence of positive change in the SOT cluster is provided by Tomlinson (2015111), 
who reported the SOT ceramic cluster as “looking much healthier than it did a decade ago, 
when it appeared in danger of collapsing altogether”. Most of the revival has been in table 
                                                 
111 Tomlinson, P. (2015), The revival of the UK’s ceramic industry, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
https://www.positive.news/2015/lifestyle/arts/18593/revival-uks-ceramic-industry/. [Accessed 10 July 2017] 
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and giftware, where exports rose 36 percent between 2009 and 2014 (see chapter 4.4.1). 
Another strong performance was also recorded in 2015. Tomlinson also reports that the SOT 
cluster has benefited in recent years from substantial new investment in both technology and 
factories, e.g. WWRD (Wedgwood), Wade and Steelite. This recent evidence on the SOT 
cluster indicates that the industry is coming out of the decline phase of the industry life-cycle 
and is experiencing a period of re-growth. The academic literature also suggests firms can 
rejuvenate an industry’s pattern of development by adapting their co-operative and 
competitive behaviour with rivals and/or suppliers up and down the value chain (Gemser, 
1996). There is also recent evidence to support the view that co-operation, and hence 
opportunities for knowledge exchange, has been increasing in the SOT cluster. For example, 
according to Tomlinson (2015): 
“Local firms and institutions such as the British Ceramic Confederation, industry 
testing centre Lucideon and the local chamber of commerce have also made greater 
efforts to encourage networking and collaboration. We’re seeing producers 
benchmarking their products and manufacturing processes and visiting one another’s 
factories. Not only have they been sharing knowledge and ideas, some leading firms 
have been informally advising and supporting smaller ones. For instance, Steelite’s 
new factory has incubator units for start-ups. There has also been greater 
collaboration among firms on industry-wide issues such as improving energy 
efficiency and local skills development” [ONLINE]. 
 
 
Initial conclusions, for the period 2010 to date, are that the evidence clearly indicates a 
significant growth in inter-firm co-operative activity, and consequently in the number of 
knowledge exchange opportunities for the SOT cluster. However, more detailed evidence on 
co-operative activity and knowledge exchanges is required in order to meet the objectives of 
this research study. In stage 3 of the research (objectives 6-10), primary research is 
conducted in order to ascertain a more accurate account of knowledge exchange and 
innovative activity within the SOT cluster. 
 
 
5.5: Other Influences on Co-operation in the SOT Cluster 
This section examines other influences on co-operation and knowledge exchange within the 
SOT cluster. There are two main themes to be examined: firstly, the nature of employment in 
the SOT cluster over time, and how the way work was structured, organised and governed, 
influenced opportunities for co-operation and knowledge exchange; secondly, an overview 
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and discussion of related and supporting institutions and their role in creating and facilitating 
opportunities for knowledge exchange will be provided. 
 
 
5.5.1: Custom, Practice and Social Relations in the Workplace 
This section of the findings examines some key aspects of the nature of employment in the 
SOT ceramics cluster. Findings here are important as they indicate that, up to the early 
1980s, work organisation and worker relationships were quite unique to the SOT cluster and 
provided significant opportunities for, and inhibitors to, co-operation and knowledge transfer, 
both within single firms and between firms in the cluster. It is a key characteristic of the SOT 
cluster that, from the early years of the industry up to the late 1970s, workers tended not to 
drift between jobs or factories but generally progressed in the same firm through accepted 
career sequences. All the departments of a pottery firm had well known patterns of career 
progression. Many potters, especially the more skilled, remained in one occupation for most, 
if not all, of their career, e.g. mould makers. Variations in production technique, coupled with 
the prevalence of traditional job progressions, made movement between pottery firms or 
trades difficult. Hence, workers would often remain with the same firms their entire careers 
(Whipp, 1990; Lambert, 2009).  
 
 
Given the high degrees of permanence of employment in a company, many workgroups 
developed customs and continuities which augmented their social cohesion and provided an 
informal disciplining process (Whipp, 1990; Lambert, 2009). Each occupation generated its 
own commonly accepted working methods and rules, i.e. the pottery firms were regarded as 
bespoke places by themselves, with hardly any supervision. Moreover, family connections, 
i.e. inter-generations, gave many workgroups their strength. In many cases husband and 
wife or child worked together in the same factory. Individual families ‘followed the trade’ both 
between generations and across the family and kin network (Whipp, 1990; Lambert, 2009). 
Some firms employed various ‘attachment devices’, e.g. issue of shares, to tie the most 
skilled workers to the firm to prevent loss of company recipes and methods (Whipp, 1990). 
Another way of tying workers to the firm and protecting knowledge was to provide 
accommodation for the more skilled type of worker (Nixon, 1976). Religion was another 
method used by employers as a way of tying workers to firms. The Methodist revival of the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century had had a profound effect upon pottery workers and 
their employers. Some Pottery owners even built their own chapels and expected their 
workers to regularly attend church. One example of this is provided by Josiah Wedgwood 
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(1913) who, when referring to pottery owner Job Ridgway (Ridgway potteries), wrote “if you 
worked for Job Ridgway, you had to attend his chapel also” (p. 143). 
 
 
According to the academic literature, one of the ways in which innovations are diffused is 
through inter-firm mobility of workers (Porter, 1990; Rosenkopf and Almedia, 2003; Arikan, 
2009). The evidence on the SOT cluster’s family-oriented work structure indicates a lack of 
inter-firm mobility, and hence a reduction in the number of opportunities for knowledge 
exchange. 
 
 
It was through family and kin connections that the worlds of work and home intersected in 
the SOT cluster. One manifestation of the family’s role was in transmitting skills and securing 
job inheritance. In 1924, 74% of daughters and 63% of sons worked in the same department 
as their parents (CATU Coll: Burslem Lodge Membership Register, 1920, cited in Whipp, 
1990). The extent of family relations in the early twentieth century are examined in studies of 
the industry from the 1970s onwards. For example, Nixon (1976) mentions the family as a 
unit of manufacture with its own natural discipline (p. 32), and Lambert (2009) states: 
“A traditional product associated with internal recruitment policies in the industry was 
the establishment of long-standing associations of worker families with particular 
firms. This remained a feature of the 1960s ceramic tableware cluster. Some workers 
could even trace successive generations of their families working within particular 
organisational units” (p. 11). 
 
 
During this period, knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, tended to remain in the hands of 
the workers and was not readily shared with management. In many instances, workers 
would acquire more knowledge and expertise regarding products, production processes and 
types of equipment and machinery, than management or specialist technologists (Lambert, 
2009). This eventually led to management trying to increase control of the industrial process 
by attempting to reform shop-floor custom. Such changes led to worker opposition, with 
some workers never accepting that management had the ‘right’ to change them (Whipp, 
1990).  
 
 
From the available evidence it can be assumed that families protected knowledge of working 
practices, keeping it within the family and not readily sharing it outside the family group, 
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possibly with the aim of securing positions for future generations of successive family 
members. This situation is not suitable for knowledge transfer within the firm. As discussed 
in section 5.2, ‘architectural knowledge’ (Arikan, 2011), in individual SOT firms was not 
coherently assembled, i.e. tasks were distinct from each other and so not readily 
transferable. If knowledge is also kept exclusive to family groups this too reduces co-
operation, and consequently the number of opportunities for knowledge transfer. Moreover, 
according to the academic literature (Becattini, 1991; Bellandi, 1992; Asheim, 1994; Boix 
and Trullen, 2010), the main way of diffusing innovation in a cluster is through social 
processes, also called ‘local buzz’ (Bathelt et al., 2004), where there are formal exchanges 
of information in public spaces or in domestic life between the workforce. It would appear 
that in the SOT cluster, knowledge-exchange took place within family units, but not 
necessarily between workers in social spaces such as pubs and local community 
organisations, again possibly for reasons involving protecting the family. Arikan (2009) cites 
‘a lack of an appropriate institutional environment in the cluster for co-operative relationships’ 
as one reason for failure in local knowledge markets (p. 15). 
 
 
Another key characteristic of social relations among pottery workers was a separatism 
between departments that arose from the nature of pottery manufacture (Whipp, 1990). 
Internal workgroup independence was strong, which made factory-wide organisations 
unstable (Whipp, 1990). In fact, according to Whipp (1990): 
“while the relations within the workgroup were generally cohesive, the relationship 
between the hierarchically ordered workgroups was competitive and often deeply 
antagonistic” (p. 82).  
 
 
This situation was not necessarily conducive to co-operation and knowledge transfer. 
According to Marshall (1890, 1920) in his work on industrial districts, the ‘industrial 
atmosphere’, inside as well as between firms, enables the transmittance of tacit knowledge 
with the district (see chapter 2.3). If these ‘uncooperative’ relationships within SOT firms 
were competitive, and even in some cases antagonistic, then it can be assumed that this 
situation reduced the number of opportunities for knowledge transfer within the firm itself. 
The findings here can also be linked to the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ (Zahra and 
George, 2002; Lorentzen, 2008), which relates to the firm’s ability to acquire, assimilate, 
adapt and apply new and improved knowledge (see 2.4.3). Industry conditions can create 
incentives or disincentives to invest in developing absorptive capacity. From the evidence, 
workplace relations in SOT cluster firms appear to be based on dominance and 
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independence, thus providing barriers to co-operation, and hence reducing the number of 
opportunities for knowledge exchange. 
 
 
It was from the late 1970s that worker family units began to break-up in SOT cluster firms 
and this can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, because of increasing automation and 
streamlining of processes in the largest firms, fewer workers were needed. Moreover, many 
of the traditional highly specialised skills were lost through automation. Secondly, 
consolidation in the industry, including plant and firm closures (see chapter 4 of this thesis), 
resulted in a significant reduction in the number of firms, and this led to high unemployment 
in Stoke-on-Trent. In the 19th century the SOT ceramics industry employed more than 
100,000 people, this number had reduced to 52,700 by 1979 and, by 2008, there were only 
around 10,000 people employed in the industry (Tomlinson, 2015). Finally, as 
unemployment increased, so too did worker mobility between firms, but not necessarily 
between towns in North Staffordshire. The implications of these changes on knowledge 
transfer opportunities are twofold. On the one hand, fewer firms in the SOT cluster reduces 
opportunities for co-operation and knowledge transfer as there are fewer firms who can take 
part in co-operative activity. On the other hand, increased worker mobility between firms 
should, according to the academic literature, have resulted in the creation of new knowledge 
transfer opportunities. However, overall during this period, simply due to the scale of decline 
in employment in the SOT cluster, it is assumed that opportunities for knowledge transfer 
also significantly reduced in the cluster. 
 
 
Just as pottery workers organised their working lives with strong reference to family and kin, 
so did the pottery owners, i.e. there are many examples where 3-4 generations of family 
management are apparent within the industry, e.g. Allerton of Longton and Bakewell Bros. 
As well as ensuring a steady supply of managerial competence, there were other reasons to 
confine management to immediate family, e.g. to minimise loss of recipes and technical 
knowledge and to ensure the transmission of in-house trade secrets that made the ware 
distinctive (Whipp, 1990). As stated in section 5.2, protection of specialised systemic 
architectural knowledge (core competencies) can bestow competitive advantages on firms, 
providing that knowledge remains private to the firm. Therefore, it is assumed that this 
situation had a profoundly negative effect on opportunities for knowledge transfer for the 
SOT cluster as a whole. 
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Although the SOT cluster remained highly concentrated spatially up to the 1980s, it 
continued to exhibit a high level of fragmented ownership up until the 1960s, i.e. family-
owned and not PLC. By the 1980s, however, due to consolidation and changes in the 
industry’s external environment (see 5.4), some cluster firms transferred ownership to multi-
product corporations from outside the region (Imrie, 1987; Day et al., 2000; Sacchetti and 
Tomlinson, 2009), and by 1990 there were few family owned businesses left (Niblett, 1990). 
Despite the breakdown of family ownership in the industry there is still evidence of some 
knowledge transfer occurring between managers and directors in the industry. Many of the 
cluster’s managers had developed through the ranks since joining the industry after leaving 
school and that led to the formation of an ‘old boys network’, where everybody knew 
everybody else (Warren et al., p. 94). Carroll et al., (2002) also found an ‘esprit de corps’ 
existing between owners and managers in the SOT cluster (p.12).  
 
 
One of the places where pottery owners and managers used to meet on a social basis was 
the Potteries club112, which was established in 1951. Most co-operation that did take place 
within the industry was thought to be through these types of informal inter-firm relationships 
and networks (Gay and Smyth, 1974; Lambert, 2009). However, the SOT managerial 
network did not necessarily lead to positive forms of co-operation, and this is reflected in 
conflicting accounts from studies of the industry. Examples include Gay and Smyth (1974), 
who state: 
“It is a feature of the industry that the managers of firms which give every indication 
of being deadly rivals are willing and pleased to assist each other with advice or the 
loan of equipment or materials in an emergency” (p. 51). 
 
Carroll et al., (2002), also quote one interview respondent113 as saying: 
“I don’t know what it is but I’ve always found in this particular industry a great deal of 
co-operation at one level but they’ll be scratching each other eyes out in another” (p. 
12).  
 
 
The idea that SOT cluster firms view each other as ‘deadly rivals’ is despite the fact that in 
the tableware sector many firms do not actually compete directly with each other (see 
                                                 
112 The British Pottery Manufacturer's Federation Club, or Potters' Club as it's usually referred to, was founded in 1951 to provide facilities 
for the directors of local pottery companies to entertain their visitors and guests, many from around the world, including royalty and VIP's. 
Source: The Potters Club, 2017, History of The Potters' Club, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.thepottersclub.co.uk/about//. [Accessed 
10 July 2017]) 
113 A prominent figure in the British Ceramics Confederation – The UK ceramic industry’s main Trade Association. 
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chapter 4.4 and chapter 6.5). Further evidence that SOT cluster firms do not compete 
directly with each other is offered by Smyth (1971), who states: 
“Manufacturers of mass-produced cheap earthenware were not in direct competition 
with Doulton, Wedgwood, Spode or Royal Worcester (outside SOT cluster). Firms 
which produce middle range earthenware compete only indirectly with manufacturers 
of hotel ware and not at all with manufacturers of posies, vases or brown teapots” (p. 
93). 
According to Porter (1990) and Dei Ottati (1994), constructive competition in the industry can 
lead to co-operation based on local customs, reciprocity and trust. If all firms agree 
(informally) to adhere (behave) to local norms, an environment that facilitates knowledge 
transfer can develop (see chapter 2, section 2.5.3). Conversely, if firms do not compete 
directly because of a high degree of product differentiation, knowledge transfer mechanisms 
will not operate effectively (Smyth, 1971). By applying these concepts to findings on the SOT 
cluster, it would appear that the indirect nature of competition between cluster firms 
(operating in separate market niches) had a negative effect on the number of potential 
opportunities for knowledge transfer in the SOT cluster.  
 
 
Networks of the type identified between owners and managers in the SOT cluster are 
thought to have potentially positive and negative effects on the facilitation of innovation (see 
chapter 2, section 2.4.5-2.4.7). For example, networking is deemed essential for the 
development of a region’s knowledge infrastructure (Tassey, 1991). However, it is network 
cohesiveness that is positively correlated to the degree of innovative success (Ebadi and 
Utterback, 1984; Roberts et al., 1992). Close geographic proximity, or economies of location, 
should lead to the development of a community of collective knowledge which can be easily 
diffused throughout the cluster, and where collaborative activities can be easily established 
and organised (Porter, 1990). The idea of network cohesiveness is linked to the concept of 
‘social trust’. Firms within networks of trust should benefit from the reciprocal exchange of 
information, particularly information that cannot be codified (Brusco, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 
1984). From the evidence on the SOT cluster, it would appear that, possibly due to viewing 
each other as deadly rivals, there was a lack of trust between owners of firms and an 
absence of cohesiveness in the SOT network. However, it is not clear from the available 
evidence on the SOT cluster whether the identified cluster network was comprised of owners 
and managers from all/most cluster firms, including SMEs. For example, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that it was mainly the largest firms in the cluster that were members of the Potters 
Club.  
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The academic literature claims that lead firms in a cluster are the dominant mechanism for 
inter-firm knowledge exchanges (Arikan, 2009, 2011). However, lead firms in clusters do not 
always share their knowledge with other cluster members (Marshall, 1890). Moreover, the 
SOT type of ‘old boys’ network can also lead to a collective, stagnant attitude towards 
innovative thinking, an attitude that the industry is reputed to have. For example, according 
to Warren et al., (2000), “the UK ceramics industry is often perceived as being unable or 
unwilling to germinate, develop and transfer technological innovation ideas” (p. 86). Overall, 
based on the evidence here, it can be assumed that the managerial network existing in the 
SOT cluster up to 2000, was not based on strong co-operative linkages and thus did not 
provide many opportunities for knowledge transfer. 
 
 
However, recent evidence on the SOT cluster indicates a ‘shake up’ in the cluster’s 
managerial network. For example, Tomlinson (2015), reports a big change of attitude in the 
SOT cluster. Recent managerial appointments have tended to draw from across 
manufacturing and other sectors. As well as a shift away from the mass market, this has led 
to wider engagement with consumers and more emphasis on marketing and technology. 
Local firms and institutions such as the British Ceramic Confederation, industry-testing 
centre Lucideon (formerly CERAM Research) and the local chamber of commerce are also 
making greater efforts to encourage networking and collaboration. Moreover, there is 
evidence that cluster firms have been visiting one another’s factories. Not only have they 
been sharing knowledge and ideas, some leading firms have been informally advising and 
supporting smaller ones. For instance, Steelite’s new factory has incubator units for start-
ups, although it’s not clear whether these start-up firms are ceramics manufacturers. There 
has also been greater collaboration among firms on industry-wide issues such as improving 
energy efficiency and local skills development (p. 1). The evidence indicates that co-
operative activity is not only taking place between cluster firms but also with related and 
supporting institutions (RSIs) located within the region. Related and supporting institutions 
are deemed extremely important in aiding and facilitating the knowledge transfer process 
(Porter, 1990). The next section of this chapter will identify the main SOT cluster RSIs and 
will examine their influence on knowledge creation opportunities within the cluster over time. 
Final conclusions for this section are that, using the most recent evidence, knowledge 
transfer opportunities have increased in the SOT cluster in recent years. However, without 
further evidence, clear conclusions cannot be drawn regarding current co-operative activity 
leading to innovative output. Therefore, a key aim of the next stage of the research is to 
conduct a primary research study into the current situation regarding co-operation and 
innovation in the SOT cluster (see objectives 6-11). 
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5.5.2: Related and Supporting Institutions in the SOT cluster 
According to the literature review (see chapter 2.4.2), the main knowledge transmission 
mechanisms in clusters, apart from firm-to-firm co-operations, include linkages between the 
different agents located nearby, such as clients, suppliers and other related industries, 
through informal and formal collaboration and relationships (Becattini, 1990; Porter, 1990; 
Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009). Certain transactions in labour markets, e.g. inter-
firm relations, innovation and knowledge development, require appropriate co-ordinating 
institutions (Storper, 1995). Linkages of this particular type can be classified as second-order 
embeddedness (relationships with social and economic institutions) and third-order 
embeddedness (firms indirectly related through social and economic institutions) 
(Johannisson et al., 2002). Moreover, it is believed that it is the social capital and mutual 
trust within such networks that makes firms, associations and public agencies engage in 
processes of self-organised, interactive learning (Simmie, 1997; Storper, 1997; Braczyk et 
al., 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Lorentzen, 2008). Therefore, it can be assumed that, 
the more information channels and knowledge brokers there are present in a cluster to 
establish connectivity between cluster firms, the greater the number of opportunities there 
will be for inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
 
 
In previous sections of this chapter some examples of co-operative activity between core 
firms and suppliers has been discussed. This section of the findings deals specifically with 
institutions located within the SOT cluster, whose key role has been to try to support the 
cluster with regard to co-operative activity and knowledge transfer. Firstly, Table 5.1 
presents a timeline of key supporting institutions along with their role in knowledge creation 
and knowledge transfer (for a list of references used to compile the table see Appendix 16). 
The table also includes linkages to industry life-cycle stages where appropriate. Findings 
from the table are evaluated using relevant academic theory. The final section presents the 
latest findings regarding the current role of related and supporting institutions in the SOT 
cluster. The evidence clearly indicates increased co-operative activity, with regard to 
knowledge creation and knowledge transfer, taking place within the SOT cluster from the 
1990s up to 2016.  
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Table 5.1 Related and Supporting Institutions in the SOT Cluster up to 2016 
Institution Date 
Established 
Link to Life-Cycle Comments & Implications for Knowledge Creation 
Stoke-on Trent Chamber 
of Commerce - Local 
Government 
1813 Growth Phase. Working with industries in the region on a variety of initiatives. Not 
strictly focused on the ceramics industry. 
St. James House 1867 Growth Phase. Once a Victorian factory school that supported the ceramics 
industry. Now houses the Hothouse Centre for ceramic design (est. 
1995). 
The Sutherland Institute  1897 Growth Phase. Once a technical college, intended to promote and support the 
industries of its day: coal, steel and ceramics. No longer operating. 
British Ceramics 
Confederation (BCC) 
Circa early 
1900s (exact 
date 
unknown) 
Growth Phase. The SOT cluster’s main Trade Association. However, not all SOT 
firms were members. Mainly the largest manufacturers are 
members. 
Staffordshire University  1901 Growth Phase First site was on College Road in 1901 delivering mining classes. 
Developed in 1907 to deliver pottery classes. Developed further in 
1914 with the introduction of Cadman Building. 
Established as a centre to support the ceramics industry. After 
several stages of expansion and development became North 
Staffordshire Technical College in 1924. Achieved university status 
in 1992. Provides design, business and technological expertise to 
SOT cluster. 
UNITY (formerly CATU –
the Ceramic and Allied 
Trades Union) 
1906 Slowing Growth 
Phase 
Originally NASMFPW in 1906. Then NSPW in 1917. CATU from 
1970. Now UNITY since 2006. 
LUCIDEON (Formerly 
CERAM Research) 
1920 Slowing Growth 
Phase 
Research institution since 1920. Amalgamation of BRRA (1920) and 
BPRA (1937). The SOT cluster’s main research institution. Lucideon 
since 2014. 
Keele University 
 
1949 Slowing Growth 
Phase 
Formerly University College of North Staffordshire. Keele since 
1962. Provides technological expertise to SOT cluster. 
British Ceramic Plant and 
Machinery Manufacturers 
Association (BCPMMA) 
Unknown but 
incorporated 
in 1989 
Growth Phase Manufacturers Association – suppliers of raw materials, equipment, 
etc., to the ceramics industry. 
International Clay 
Technology Association 
(ICTA) 
1927 Growth Phase up to 
late 1970s. Decline 
phase from 1979 to 
circa 2008. Re-
generation phase 
from circa 2008. 
Specialising in clay management and production. Merged with IOM3 
(Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining) in 2006. New ‘external’ 
knowledge entering the SOT cluster from other industries. 
The HOTHOUSE Ceramic 
Design Centre 
1995 Decline Phase. The SOT cluster’s main centre for design. Government initiative. 
The Ceramic Industry 
Forum 
2000 Decline Phase The Ceramic Industry Forum (CIF) was set up in light of 
competitiveness issues facing the UK ceramic industry. The CIF is 
supported by Government funding and the work of a wide range of 
partner organisations with the common objective of promoting and 
encouraging innovation in the design, marketing, manufacturing and 
development of training and skills. The services of the CIF are 
available to all UK ceramic companies no matter what size. 
The British Ceramics 
Biennial 
2009 Re-generation 
Phase. 
The British Ceramics Biennial (BCB) launched in 2009 with a 
festival celebrating and showcasing contemporary ceramics from 
across the world. The Clay Foundation is a registered charity set up 
to deliver the British Ceramics Biennial. Comprising a year round 
programme of community and education work and in contemporary 
ceramics in Stoke-on-Trent. Organisers come from a wide range of 
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backgrounds, industries and disciplines. New ‘external’ knowledge 
entering the SOT cluster. 
Ceramic Skills Academy 2014 Re-generation 
phase. 
Ceramic Skills Academy – an information hub and educational and 
training resource for those working in and aspiring to work within the 
ceramic industry.  Owned and led by leading ceramics businesses, 
the programme has been part-funded by the UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills through the Growth and Innovation Fund. 
CSA mission is to ensure that those skills that set UK ceramics 
apart from the rest of the world do not become lost. Specialist 
knowledge and resources are maintained and passed to future 
generations. 
DTI - Department for 
Business, Innovation & 
Skills (BIS) 
N/A Various Involved in various initiatives from post 1950 onwards. 
European Commission N/A Various Involved in various initiatives from 1970s onwards, e.g. Ceramic 
Kilns Academy funding. 
(Source: Author, compiled from various sources – see Appendix 16) 
 
The findings from Table 5.1 can be clearly linked to industry life-cycle theory and to 
knowledge creation opportunities as follows. Findings show that the establishment of many 
of the SOT cluster’s key supporting institutions took place during two distinct phases of the 
industry life-cycle. Firstly, industry specific institutions, including the BCC (est. circa 1900) 
were established during the rapid growth phase of the industry life-cycle, i.e. towards the end 
of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth century. Secondly, several 
new research and development institutions, e.g. the Hothouse (est. 1995), The Ceramic 
Industry Forum (est. 2000 but ended circa 2014) and the Ceramics Skills Academy (est. 
2014), were established during the late decline phase of the industry life-cycle, i.e. from the 
mid-1990s up to circa 2008. These findings appear to fit with the academic literature on the 
industry life-cycle. For example, according to Boschma and Frenken (2006), it is during the 
early growth stage of the industry life-cycle that institutional investors, trade associations, 
supportive institutions, universities, and professional gatherings become involved with the 
industry, often choosing to collocate in close proximity to the firms within the cluster to 
ensure network centrality and connectivity (p. 6). The evidence on the SOT cluster shows 
that many supporting establishments were established during the growth phase of the 
industry life-cycle, and this clearly supports Boschma and Frenken’s theory. Moreover, 
Gemser et al., (1996) also take the view that firms’ abilities to appropriate the profits of 
innovations are especially difficult at the beginning and end of the industry life-cycle because 
of the high costs of R&D and marketing and the high capital needs of production and, 
therefore, horizontal inter-firm linkages should be particularly dense at these stages. 
However, in the decline stage of the life-cycle such linkages may be weak, or undermined, 
due to negative competition or dominant firm effects that may be a feature of the cluster.  
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Gemser et al., (1996) also suggest that firms can rejuvenate an industry’s pattern of 
development by adapting their co-operative and competitive behaviour with rivals and/or 
suppliers up and down the value chain. The evidence from Table 5.1 indicates that this is 
happening in the SOT cluster, as new supporting institutions, such as the Ceramics Skills 
Academy, have established in recent years. Moreover, the evidence on the SOT cluster also 
indicates that new ‘external’ knowledge has entered the SOT cluster through the British 
Ceramics Biennial and from the amalgamation of traditional ceramics institutions with 
institutions from other non-ceramic industries, e.g. ICTA merging with IOM3 (see Table 5.1). 
New external knowledge is deemed extremely important in the academic literature in 
avoiding ‘technological lock-in’ (Bell et al., 2009; Lorentzen, 2008; Hervas-Oliver et al., 
2011). As Lorentzen (2008) purports, "close networks must be supplemented by loose 
networks, with odd partners, if knowledge leading to innovation is to be sourced" (p. 542). 
Furthermore, according to Hervas-Oliver et al. (2008), “newcomers’ can act as knowledge 
diffusers and create both inflows and outflows of knowledge” (p. 508).  
 
 
In this final section, some examples of recent co-operative activity within the SOT cluster are 
covered in detail. As mentioned earlier in this chapter (5.3 and 5.4), many of the current SOT 
cluster’s SMEs did not tend to have the resources to innovate beyond incremental 
improvements in products and processes. Consequently, some SMEs sought help from 
supporting institutions in the form of funding, project management and technology 
development. External organisations that have helped the UK ceramics industry in recent 
years include the government, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
European Commission. These external funding bodies tend to work closely with industry 
specific supporting institutions, such as the British Ceramics Confederation (BCC), UNITY 
Trade Union (formerly CATU) and LUCIDEON (formerly CERAM Research), as well as 
working with the innovating organisations. One example of such a joint project is 
development of ‘Airless Drying’ and ‘solid oxide fuel cells’ (Warren et al., 2000, p. 93). There 
is also evidence of increasing co-operation from the 1990s onwards between engineers, 
potters and specialist companies financed by industry (Niblett, 1990; Warren et al., 2000; 
Day et al., 2000). LUCIDEON is identified as a key player in aiding and facilitating innovation 
amongst members of the industry and in managing collaborative research, development and 
technology transfer projects.  
 
 
Some examples of technological innovations led by LUCIDEON are in the development of 
firing techniques and granular pressing. However, the adoption of these new technologies 
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and innovations are mostly thought to have taken place outside the UK industry, e.g. by 
firms in Germany and Italy, rather than by firms in the SOT cluster (Warren et al., 2000). 
Therefore, evidence of the adoption of innovative products and processes appears to be low 
in the SOT cluster, with mainly the largest firms adopting new innovations (Warren et al., 
2000). Moreover, there is evidence from the literature that the more complex or innovative 
the technology is, the more reluctant firms are to adopt. These firms appear to be risk 
averse114, often interested in the new technology but not wanting to be first movers in 
adopting the technologies (Warren et al., 2000). However, as mentioned earlier, many SMEs 
were not financially, or logistically, big enough to warrant the adoption of such large-scale 
technologies. Moreover, they did not have the resources to complete this task.  
 
 
An example of co-operative activity is given by Day et al., (2000), who report a ‘mixed’ 
relationship existing between the UK ceramics industry and local government. For example, 
the City Council has helped with setting up some projects, such as the HOTHOUSE, but at 
other times there have been conflicts with ceramics firms on other issues, such as 
environmental and health and safety issues (p. 14). Another example of recent co-operative 
activity is the Ceramic Development Group, which was established in 2010. This is a 
collective body of stakeholders from the local institutions (the BCC, the North Staffordshire 
Chamber of Commerce and Lucideon (CERAM Research), and district ceramic 
manufacturers (both large and small), which meets regularly and acts as the focal point for 
discussing district issues and co-ordinating responses to industry challenges (including EU 
and government policy directives). It has also become a forum for co-ordinating and 
managing collaborative bids for district wide funding relating to skills development, energy 
efficiency and marketing (Tomlinson and Branston, 2014, 2017). However, Tomlinson and 
Branston (2017), also found that, although some firms in the ceramics cluster exhibited a 
degree of apathy in relation to policy issues, ‘active’ members of industry associations were 
often able to exert influence over cluster wide policy initiatives (pp. 9-10). Moreover, as 
identified earlier, the evidence indicates that it was mostly the larger firms in the cluster who 
were active members of these associations. 
 
 
                                                 
114 Investor attitude according to which the value (utility) of a sure chance (certain prospect) with a lower yield is considered higher than 
the utility of an unsure chance (uncertain prospect) with a higher yield. Source: Business Dictionary, 2017, Risk Aversion, [ONLINE]. 
Available at: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/risk-aversion.html. [Accessed 11 July 2017] 
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From the evidence presented above, it is not clear as to how many of the SOT cluster’s firms 
actually took part in co-operative activities. Moreover, despite there being some evidence of 
recent SME co-operation with supporting institutions and external organisations, the 
evidence (see 5.4) indicates that it was mostly the largest firms in the SOT cluster who took 
part in large-scale technology developments. Certainly up to the late 1990s, and despite the 
presence of many supporting institutions, the UK ceramics industry was still often regarded 
as being unable or reluctant to successfully embrace innovation and transfer technology 
(Warren et al., 2000). Evidence from a more recent report indicates that SOT cluster firms 
were still facing issues around technology and knowledge transfer in 2009 (Lambert, 2009, 
p. 3). Moreover, the evidence on co-operation in the industry is often conflicting. For 
example, Day et al. (2000), state that “companies (in the cluster) feed off each other in terms 
of goodwill, co-operation and innovation” (p. 13). However, Day et al. also acknowledge that: 
“inter-firm relations both between competitors and the firms that supply them, on the 
whole, are characterised by an adversarial approach. There are strong links between 
manufacturers and suppliers in the area of technical support, but more integrative 
activities such as joint R&D are not a feature of these relationships” (p. 13). 
 
 
Although the evidence on co-operation between SOT cluster firms and supporting 
institutions clearly indicates that it was the largest firms who mainly took part in collaborative 
projects, the evidence on whether the knowledge gained from resulting technology 
developments was shared with other cluster firms is not clear. Chapter four of this thesis 
clearly identified the emergence of dominant firms in the SOT cluster (see 4.2.2). The SOT 
cluster’s dominant firms can be classed as ‘old’, e.g. Wedgwood and Doulton and ‘new’, e.g. 
Steelite, Portmeirion and Churchill115. Wedgwood and Doulton were dominant firms in the 
SOT cluster up to 2009, and after their decline (see 4.2.2) Steelite and Portmeirion became 
the Cluster’s dominant firms. The academic literature indicates that lead firms in an industry 
may have little interest in sharing new knowledge, preferring to keep such knowledge hidden 
so as to strengthen its hold over its strategic options and capabilities, particularly in relation 
to technological change (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). This concept can be linked to the 
Networks of Direction theory (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003), where the governance system in 
a cluster has evolved into a hierarchical form led by one or few dominant firms. In networks 
of direction, core firms independently pursue their own strategic objectives, often with little 
consultation with their trading partners and/or other stakeholders in the locality (p. 684).  
                                                 
115 Churchill China is still classed as a ‘new’ dominant firm as, although the company established in 1795, they were not one of the 
cluster’s largest firms during the reign of Wedgwood and Doulton. They are now one of the largest firms in the cluster, hence considered 
as a new dominant firm. 
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Networks of direction have both positive and negative implications for clusters. On the 
positive side, the presence of dominant firms can lead to new investments in technology on 
a scale which might not be undertaken by smaller firms (Lazonick, 1993; Belso, 2010). 
However, as stated earlier, this does not necessarily lead to knowledge sharing with other 
cluster firms, i.e. there are new opportunities for knowledge creation but they do not benefit 
the whole cluster. Hence, networks of direction may result in the cluster becoming ‘locked-in’ 
to the objectives and strategic direction of a few or even a single firm. From the findings in 
this chapter, and in chapter two of this thesis, it can be assumed that this was the situation 
during the time period when Wedgwood and Doulton were the SOT cluster’s dominant firms. 
This view that dominant firms can undermine the value and sustainability of clusters is quite 
common across the academic literature (Porter, 1990; Bianchi, 1993; Rosenfeld, 1997; 
Audretsch, 1997; Schilling, 2000; Brusoni et al., 2001; Sacchietti and Sugden, 2003; 
Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009; Bell et al., 2009; Arikan, 2009; Belso, 2010; Arikan and 
Schilling, 2011). Furthermore, according to Gemser (1996), dominant firms can also change 
the dynamics of a cluster’s competitive environment in a positive way, with large core firms 
acting as ‘lighthouses’ by sourcing small firms with information of foreign markets and new 
technologies. However, there is no certain evidence that this is happening in the SOT 
cluster. Hence, one of the aims of the primary research stage (see chapter six) is to 
investigate the role of the cluster’s new dominant firms. 
 
 
The most recent evidence on co-operation with supporting institutions is given by Tomlinson 
(2015), who reports local firms and institutions in the SOT cluster, such as the British 
Ceramic Confederation, LUCIDEON and the local chamber of commerce are making greater 
efforts to encourage networking and collaboration, with cluster firms, even visiting one 
another’s factories. Not only have firms been sharing knowledge and ideas, some leading 
firms have been informally advising and supporting smaller ones. For instance, Steelite’s 
new factory has incubator units for start-ups. There has also been greater collaboration 
among firms on industry-wide issues such as improving energy efficiency and local skills 
development (p1). Another recent (2014) development that benefits the cluster is the new 
Ceramic Skills Academy, which has Steelite, Portmeirion and Churchill on its Board of 
Directors (ceramicskillsacademy.co.uk). Overall, from this evidence, it would appear that in 
recent years knowledge creation opportunities have increased in the SOT cluster, i.e. many 
more firms are now taking part in co-operative activities, both with each other and with 
supporting institutions in the cluster. However, the evidence on the role of dominant firms 
within the SOT cluster is limited, and so without further research an accurate picture cannot 
be ascertained. Therefore, two objectives (objectives 9 & 10) of stage 4 of this research 
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study are to: 1) carry out primary research to establish the balance of power and control in 
the SOT cluster in 2016; and, 2) to determine whether dominant firms are having a positive 
effect on competition and co-operation in the SOT cluster in 2016. 
 
 
5.6: Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter of the research findings has dealt specifically with research objectives 3, 4, & 5 
(stage 2 and part of stage 3). The key aim at this stage was to provide context for 
subsequent primary research findings by identifying opportunities for knowledge exchange 
within the SOT cluster at different periods of the cluster’s evolution, and then by linking the 
opportunities to co-operative activity within the SOT cluster. Detailed conclusions have 
already been drawn at various sections throughout this chapter. This next section 
summarises the key findings in Appendix 15, and presents a related discussion below. 
Findings are then mapped the theoretical framework identified in chapter two (Figure 5.1), 
and finally to the objectives (Table 5.3).  
 
 
5.6.1: Opportunities for Knowledge Exchange in the SOT Cluster 1700s – 1960 
The evidence presented in this chapter, and summarised in Appendix 15, indicates that, 
during this period, opportunities for knowledge exchange, both inside the firm and externally, 
were low. Knowledge within the SOT cluster during this time was highly systemic, 
architectural knowledge that was often firm specific. This type of knowledge cannot be easily 
transferred, thus there was little need for inter-firm co-operation. The family ownership 
structure of many pottery firms is another possible reason for lack of inter-firm co-operation, 
there is some evidence that the family protected knowledge to prevent the loss of recipes 
and other technical knowledge. Knowledge at this stage was also difficult to transfer inside 
the firm due to the task specific nature of knowledge and possibly also due to localised 
protectionism by worker families. As well as families protecting knowledge, power and 
knowledge were also kept within distinct workgroups, i.e. in separate departments or 
workshops. There was also little mobility of labour during this period and this also reduces 
the number of opportunities for knowledge exchange. The evidence also indicates that most 
of the SOT cluster’s firms tended to carry out all/most phases of  production processes and, 
although highly complex and distinct, those phases were inseparable. Although there were 
some attempts by owners to codify the diversity of production activities, these attempts 
mostly failed. Codified knowledge can be more easily transferred, and this should lead to 
more opportunities for knowledge exchange but, as most attempts failed, it is thought that 
opportunities for knowledge exchange remained low.  
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Technological dynamism was also relatively low at this stage of the cluster’s development, 
as the evidence indicates that there were only small and incremental advances taking place. 
Low technological dynamism reduces the need for inter-firm co-operation and consequently 
reduces the number of opportunities for knowledge exchange. There is limited evidence that 
there were many supporting institutions during this phase, and this should mean 
opportunities for knowledge exchange, however it remains unclear how many of the SOT 
cluster’s firms were using their services. The evidence also indicates that at this stage the 
SOT cluster was in the ‘rapid growth’ phase of the industry life-cycle, where the focus of 
innovation should be on the product. There is evidence to support that this was happening in 
the SOT cluster as there were many product variations and there were many market niches.  
 
 
5.6.2: Opportunities for Knowledge Exchange in the SOT Cluster 1960s 2008 
During this period the evidence indicates that although there were some new opportunities 
for internal knowledge exchange, overall the number of opportunities for intra-firm 
knowledge exchange were fairly low at the start of the period, but increased towards the 
end. One reason for low intra-firm knowledge exchange could possibly be the existence of 
family protectionism. The idea of protecting knowledge can be linked to the theory of 
‘knowledge hiding’, which is defined as “an intentional attempt by an individual to withhold or 
conceal knowledge that has been requested by another person” (Connelly et al., 2012: 65). 
Moreover, according to Černe et al., (2014), knowledge hiding prevents colleagues from 
generating creative ideas, it can also trigger a reciprocal distrust loop in which co-workers 
are unwilling to share knowledge with them (p. 173). According to Connelly et al., (2012), 
distrust is a key predictor of knowledge hiding in organisations (p. 65). Knowledge hiding 
theory is also connected to ‘psychological ownership theory’ (Pierce et al., 2001, 2003), 
which purports that individuals can easily form an ownership feeling over a target if they 
have constant control over it, invest much time or energy on it, or are familiar with it (Peng, 
2013: 399). In addition, individuals may be unwilling to share the target of ownership with 
others because they fear they will experience loss of control and negative emotions if they 
share with others (Pierce et al., 2003; Peng, 2013; Huo et al., 2016). Since knowledge is 
acquired, controlled or created by ‘them’, individuals may easily feel that knowledge is their 
personal psychological property, and subsequently want to withhold it. From the evidence 
presented in this chapter, it would appear that SOT workers have had a long history of 
protecting knowledge, mistrust and a lack of co-operation. However, the current situation 
regarding these issues is not clear at all and, therefore, the current situation regarding trust 
and co-operation will be explored further in stages 3 and 4 of this research study. 
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The evidence indicates that the number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchange 
also remained fairly low during the start of period, despite several significant technological 
advances, but increased towards the end. The increased number of intra-firm opportunities 
are due to the attempts by some SOT cluster firms to reduce the number of tasks and 
increase automation. Simplification of tasks and automation resulted in some knowledge 
being codified, and thus capable of being more easily transferred. In addition, there is 
evidence of some vertical disintegration taking place at this time, e.g. some outsourcing of 
early production processes. However, only a few processes were automated and/or 
outsourced in the early part of this stage, mostly in the larger firms, and so although there 
were new opportunities for knowledge exchange, they are considered to be fairly limited 
overall. There is evidence too at this stage of the multi-skilling of some employees, along 
with evidence of some job losses due to automation. Consequently, worker mobility 
increased as workers who had lost their jobs sought work in other pottery firms. This 
increase in worker mobility led to an increase in opportunities for knowledge exchange 
between firms. Moreover, it is in the early part of this period too that the worker family 
structure began to break down (late 1970s), resulting in knowledge no longer being 
protected within the family, as members of one family could now be employed at several 
firms within the SOT cluster. Family ownership of firms also began to break down during this 
period too, with some firms transferring ownership to multi-product organisations from 
outside the region. Consequently, the breakdown of worker-family and family-owner 
structure is likely to have led to an increase in the number of opportunities for knowledge 
exchange. 
 
 
It is from circa 1980 that the SOT cluster begins to suffer several ‘external’ shocks,116 i.e. the 
external environment becomes more unstable due to globalisation and recession effects, the 
industry is also adversely affected by changes in consumer spending and demand. The 
evidence shows that there were many acquisitions and mergers during this period, as well 
as many firm closures. Consolidation effects reduced the overall number of opportunities for 
knowledge exchange between cluster firms as there were fewer firms in the cluster overall. It 
is assumed that the overall consolidation effects outweighed the small increase in 
opportunities for knowledge exchange, e.g. through increased worker mobility, resulting in 
an overall reduction in inter-firm opportunities.  
 
                                                 
116 See chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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Two big influences on technology in the SOT cluster during this period were the introduction 
of the Clean Air Act (1956), and the introduction of natural gas in 1960, which was 
subsequently used to fire kilns. These factors led to significant changes in firing and pressing 
technologies, resulting in the first technological revolution in the SOT cluster. Thus, 
technological dynamism increased, which in turn increased the number of opportunities for 
knowledge exchange, albeit mostly with suppliers. The evidence indicates though, that it was 
only the cluster’s largest firms who adopted the new technologies during this phase, and 
thus whilst the number of opportunities for knowledge exchange increased, they remain fairly 
limited. The evidence also indicates that during this period the SOT cluster was in the 
‘slowing growth/mature/decline117’ phases of the industry life-cycle, where the focus of 
innovation should be on process technologies (slow growth and mature phases) and then 
the product (decline phase). There is evidence to support that this was happening in the 
SOT cluster as process innovations focused on increasing automation, including the 
introduction of flexible specialisation methods, and product innovations focused on 
developing products to serve market niches. 
 
 
5.6.3: Opportunities for Knowledge Exchange in the SOT Cluster 2008- 2016 
During this period, the evidence indicates that the number of opportunities for internal and 
external knowledge exchanges increased, but it remains unclear as to the extent. Intra-firm 
opportunities increased further due to the continued streamlining and automation of more 
production processes, this resulted in more knowledge becoming codified and capable of 
being easily transferred, e.g. knowledge becomes more technical (mechanised) and tangible 
(through routines and instructions). However, the majority of pottery production processes 
remain interdependent and highly inseparable, and thus the increase in opportunities for 
internal knowledge exchange are constrained. Consolidation effects for some firms (largest) 
also increased opportunities for knowledge exchange during this period, e.g. increased firm 
size (groups of firms), resulting from acquisitions, increased internal knowledge exchange 
opportunities between firms in the same group. However, the evidence indicates that most of 
the changes discussed in this section refer mainly to the SOT cluster’s largest firms, and so 
it is not certain whether knowledge exchange opportunities increased also for the SOT 
cluster’s SMEs.  
 
 
                                                 
117 SOT Cluster’s sales peaked in 1978 then declined (Imrie, 1987). 
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There is also some evidence of increasing investment in technology, factories and marketing 
during this period, as well as evidence of some new firm start-ups. New firms in the SOT 
cluster should provide new opportunities for knowledge exchange. However, chapter four of 
this thesis (4.2.3) identified only a few new firms during this period, and so the number of 
new opportunities for knowledge exchange arising from new firms is deemed low. It is also 
unclear as to which firms are making investments in new technologies and other forms of 
innovation.  
 
 
The evidence indicates that the SOT cluster has entered a ‘re-generation’ phase of the 
industry life-cycle, where the focus should be mainly on product innovation. Further research 
is needed, however, to gain a more accurate picture of innovation in the SOT cluster, and 
thus a key aim of stage 3 of this research is to identify, analyse and evaluate the level and 
types of innovative activity taking place in the SOT cluster between 2010 and 2015. Other 
evidence that opportunities for knowledge exchange in the SOT cluster may be increasing is: 
1) greater efforts are being made by cluster firms to encourage networking and collaboration; 
2) there has been a shift in management recruitment from inside the cluster to outside (from 
across other manufacturing and other sectors); and, 3) there are new supporting institutions 
who are working with SOT cluster firms. Overall, the evidence indicates that the number of 
opportunities for knowledge exchange have increased and that conditions in the SOT cluster 
now appear to be more conducive to co-operation. Again, further research is needed to 
establish whether SOT cluster firms are actually co-operating more with each other and with 
supporting institutions and other non-cluster firms. Therefore, another key aim of stages 3 
and 4 of this research is to identify, analyse and evaluate the levels and types of co-
operative activity taking place in the SOT cluster between the period 2010 and 2015. 
 
 
5.6.4: Chapter Findings Mapped to the Objectives and the Theoretical Framework 
This chapter set out to establish the ‘need’ for co-operation in the SOT cluster (objectives 3-
5) and all objectives have been fully achieved in that a context has been provided for the 
subsequent primary research stages (stages 3 and 4). Some findings from the primary 
research will also be used to update the final period examined in this chapter (2016), they 
will be presented and discussed in chapter six of this thesis.  Figure 5.1 below maps the 
findings from this chapter to relevant sections of the theoretical framework. Table 5.3 maps 
findings to the research objectives. Chapter six presents the primary research findings 
(questionnaire and Interviews) regarding recent innovative and co-operative activity and the 
past/present influences of the cluster’s dominant firms. 
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Figure 5.1: Chapter Findings Mapped to the Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author, adapted from Arikan (2009)) 
 
= Determined in this chapter (research stage 2) 
= Determined in chapters 6 (research stage 3) and 7 Conclusions 
Degree of modularity in product 
technologies underlying the products 
that characterise the cluster 
 
1700s-1960s: Processes are highly 
inseparable. Complex systems, unique to 
firms. Low opportunities for KE. 1960s 
onwards, some simplification of processes 
but still highly interdependent. A slight 
increase in opportunities for knowledge 
transfer but still low. 
Breadth of knowledge required to offer 
the products that characterise the 
cluster 
 
Wide breadth of knowledge. Architectural 
knowledge not easily transferrable. Low 
opportunities for knowledge exchange 
(KE) increasing from 2005 onwards. 
 
 
Level of technological dynamism 
surrounding the products that 
characterise the cluster 
 
From 1700s to 1960, fairly low level of 
technological dynamism. 1960-present, two 
technological revolutions increased 
opportunities for KE, but mostly for the 
largest firms.  
Number of cluster firms that follow 
exploration based strategies 
(stage 3 research) 
Number of industries in the cluster that 
leverage the same general purpose 
technology 
 
1700s-1960, all firms have similar basic 
processes but they are made unique to the 
firm. Knowledge is protected. 1960s 
onward, some standardisation of processes 
takes place in the industry. KE opportunities 
increase but mostly for the largest firms. 
Enablers of inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the cluster: 
- Lead firm’s level of co-operative orientation. 1700s- 2005, no 
evidence of lead firms cooperating with the rest of the cluster. Since 
2005 there’s some evidence of the industry’s ‘new’ lead firms 
cooperating. Stage 3 of the research will explore further. 
- Tacitness of the knowledge to be exchanged. 1700s-1960, highly 
tacit, architectural knowledge but mostly unique to the firm. 1960s- 
present time, knowledge becoming more mechanised, ‘component’ 
knowledge. 
- Connectivity among cluster firms. Little evidence of connectivity 
among cluster firms. Stage 3 of the research will explore further. 
Number of opportunities for 
inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges within the 
cluster 
 
Historically LOW, 
increasing slowly since 
1960 
Number of realised 
inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges within the 
cluster 
Knowledge 
creation 
capability 
Effectiveness of inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the cluster: 
- Knowledge overlap among cluster firms 
- Number of cluster firms that engage in knowledge 
exchanges with outside entities 
- Number of cluster firms that identify and dissolve 
knowledge exchange relationships that no longer 
provide knowledge-related benefits Work organisation, structure and local 
culture  
 
1700s-1960s Unique structure of worker 
families and family owners protects 
knowledge and reduces internal and 
external KE opportunities. 1960s onwards, 
family structure (workers & owners) breaks 
down and worker mobility increases. 
Increases KE opportunities. However, 
consolidation effects (vast reduction in the 
number of firms) negate any increases. 
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Table 5.2: Chapter Findings Mapped to Objectives 1 & 2  
 
 
Stage 2 Research Objectives – Establishing the ‘Need for Co-
operation’ 
 
Link to 
Propositions 
Data Requirements Link between this 
chapter and 
objectives 
 
3. To determine the breadth of knowledge required to 
offer the products that characterise the cluster 
iii. Is a wide breadth of knowledge required? 
iv. Is a narrow breadth of knowledge required? 
 
 
P4, P4aa 
P9, P9a 
 
 
Secondary Data (examples) 
 
Rowley (1994, 1996, 1998), 
Manufacturing and Flexible 
Specialisation in the British ceramics 
Manufacturing Industry (academic 
papers). 
 
Gay & Smyth (1974), The British 
Pottery Industry (Book). 
 
Imrie (1989), Industrial Restructuring in 
the British Pottery Industry (book). 
 
5.2 
 
4. To determine the degree of modularity in the product 
technologies underlying the products that 
characterise the cluster 
iv. Are product technologies separable? 
v. Are product technologies inseparable? 
vi. Is knowledge within the cluster mostly 
‘component’ knowledge or ‘architectural’? 
 
 
P4, P4a 
P9, P9a 
 
Niblett (1990), The British Pottery 
Industry 1940-1990 (Book). 
 
Day et al. (2000), A case study of 
British ceramics Production (Academic 
paper). 
 
Warren et al. (2000), Technological 
Innovation in the UK Ceramics Industry 
(Book). 
5.3 
 
5. To determine the level of technological dynamism 
surrounding the products that characterise the 
cluster 
iii. Is the industry’s technology highly dynamic? 
iv. Is the industry’s technology slow changing? 
 
 
P4, P4a 
P9, P9a 
 
Caroll et al. (2001), Outsourcing in the 
UK Ceramics Industry (Academic 
paper). 
 
Whipp (1990), Patterns of Labour, 
Work and Social Change in the Pottery 
Industry (Book). 
 
5.4 
Additional – To determine other influences on Co-operation 
in the SOT cluster 
  5.5 
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6. Research Findings Stages 3 & 4: Innovation, Co-
operation and Dominant Firm Effects in the SOT Cluster 
 
Research stages 3 & 4: objectives 6–8, innovation and co-operation 
2010-2015; objectives 9-10, the role of dominant firms past and 
present 
 
6.1: Introduction 
The key aim of this research study is to determine the current strategic position of the SOT 
cluster. Chapters four and five of this thesis contributed towards achieving this aim by: 1) 
partially identifying the development and performance of the largest SOT tableware and 
giftware manufacturers, from 1960 up to the present time; 2) providing an initial analysis of 
the role and effects of the cluster’s dominant firms, past and present; and, 3) providing an 
historical overview of past co-operative behaviours and opportunities for knowledge transfer 
in the SOT cluster over time. However, an accurate assessment of the current strategic 
position of the SOT cluster could not be determined due to gaps and inconsistencies in the 
secondary data (see chapters 4 and 5). Hence, primary research is required in order to 
answer fully the research question.  
 
 
This chapter of the research findings deals specifically with research objectives 6-10 (stages 
3 and 4), and presents the findings of the primary research study. The main aim of the 
primary research stage was to determine recent (2010–2015) innovation and co-operation 
activities of firms in the SOT cluster (objectives 6, 7 and 8). A further aim was to develop the 
discussion and analysis of the role of the cluster’s dominant firms past and present and to 
determine their part in the current competitive position of the SOT cluster (objectives 9 and 
10). The primary research involved a questionnaire survey (see Appendix 9) and semi-
structured, in-depth interviews (see Appendix 12 for the schedule of questions). The 
questionnaire and interviews were conducted between October 2016 and April 2017 on six 
of the SOT cluster’s core manufacturing firms. The original plan was to administer the 
questionnaire survey to the total population, i.e. all sixteen of the SOT cluster’s core 
manufacturing firms (see chapter 4.3.2 for population identification) then, based on 
questionnaire responses, to select seven or eight of those firms for semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews. However, despite exhaustive efforts made in contacting the sixteen firms (see 
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Appendix 20), only six firms agreed to take part in the survey, and this may be further 
evidence, in itself, of a reluctance on the part of cluster firms to co-operate, either with each 
other, or with external organisations. Subsequently, the questionnaire survey and interviews 
were conducted on all six of the firms that responded. The six firms are considered to be 
truly representative of the whole industry (i.e. the total population of sixteen firms) because 
they: 1) represent 38% of the total population of 16 firms; 2) include the two biggest firms in 
the SOT cluster in terms of employees, sales turnover and profit; 3) include both 
domesticware and hotelware manufacturers; 4) include small, medium and large firms; and, 
5) represent approximately 60% of the total number of employees in the total population. A 
full description, rationale and justification for the questionnaire and interview methodology is 
provided in the methodology chapter of this thesis (see chapter 3.7.15). 
 
 
As discussed extensively in the Methodology chapter (see chapter 3.7.14), the innovation 
questionnaire for this study was adapted from a questionnaire previously used by the 
European Union GPrix project118. The results of the GPrix survey are available in a variety of 
reports119 and relevant findings from the reports are utilised in this chapter as a comparator 
for the SOT cluster survey results. The researcher acknowledges that any comparisons 
made between the GPrix survey data and the SOT survey data cannot be strictly reliable, 
given the differences between the two samples in terms of size and the range of industries 
involved.  However, the GPrix data is considered useful in this research as it provides a 
benchmark against which to measure the performance of the SOT respondent firms. 
 
 
6.1.1: The Respondents: Company profiles 
In order to convince companies to participate in the survey a covering letter was provided 
ensuring anonymity of the company data. All firms agreed to take part providing they were 
not identified (also the case for the interview stage of the research). The researcher 
consequently provided a confidentially agreement and agreed to make the research findings 
available to participants. Table 6.1 presents company profile data for all six respondents 
(see Appendix 13 for more details) and is compiled from general company information 
provided in section 1 of the innovation questionnaire survey. The data clearly shows the 
representativeness of firms taking part in the survey in terms of size, sales turnover, main 
                                                 
118 GPrix, (2012), GPrix innovation policy support survey, [ONLINE]. Available at: http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/en/survey.htm. 
[Accessed 30 June 2017] 
119) GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
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activity, employee numbers, etc. For example, the respondents consist of two very large 
firms (A and B), two medium sized firms (C and D) and two small firms (E and F). Firm ‘A’ 
operates in the hotelwares sector, firms ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘F’ in domesticwares, firm ‘E’ operates in 
both domesticwares and hotelwares, and firm ‘D’ operates in domestic and commercial 
wares.  
 
By analysing the data in table 6.1, it can be evidenced that only one company (F) increased 
sales turnover (Q1.2) over the five years, from less than £500,000 in 2010 to between £0.5m 
and £1.0m in 2015. One other company (C) increased employees (Q1.3) from between 50 
and 249 in 2010, to over 249 in 2015. Two companies (D and E) entered new markets 
(Q1.6) between 2010 and 2015 (mostly in Europe). All other firms and categories remained 
the same between 2010 and 2015. Although the questionnaire provides some useful 
information about turnover and employees for SOT respondents, the data is quite vague in 
some sections due to the size of the category bands. For example, the highest band for 
turnover is over £20m, which is very low considering that there are firms in the SOT cluster 
who have turnover of over £100m. In addition, the highest band for employees in the 
questionnaire is over 249, when there are firms in the SOT cluster who have over 1,000 
employees (see chapter 4.2.3 for more accurate data on SOT firms). Hence, large band 
sizes are considered a partial limitation of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Questionnaire & Interview Company Profiles (Q1 – Q1.9) 
  Company ‘A’ Company ‘B’ Company ‘C’ Company ‘D’ Company ‘E’ Company ‘F’ 
Q Company ownership Private Publicly quoted Private Private Private Private 
1 Part of a group YES YES NO NO YES NO 
1.1 Head office location UK (Stoke) UK (Stoke) UK (Stoke) UK (Stoke) UK UK (Stoke) 
1.2 Turnover 2010 £20,000,000 + £20,000,000 + £10,000,000 - 
£20,000,000 
£20,000,000 + £500,000 - 
£1,000,000 
Less than 
£500,000 
1.2 Turnover 2015 £20,000,000 + £20,000,000 + £10,000,000 - 
£20,000,000 
£20,000,000 + £500,000 - 
£1,000,000 
£500,000 - 
£1,000,000 
1.3 Employees 2010 249 + 249 + Between 50 - 
249 
Between 50 - 249 Between 10 - 
49 
Between 1 - 9 
1.3 Employees 2015 249 + 249 + 249 + Between 50 - 249 Between 10 - 
49 
Between 1 - 9 
1.4 Does your firm undertake 
all phases of production? 
YES YES YES – except 
slips 
YES – except 
slips & glazes 
YES YES 
1.5 Which geographic 
markets do you operate 
in? 
ALL - 
Regional/nation
al/Europe and 
other 
ALL - 
Regional/nation
al/Europe and 
other 
ALL - 
Regional/nation
al/Europe and 
other 
ALL - 
Regional/national/
Europe and other 
ALL - 
Regional/nation
al/Europe and 
other 
National 
1.6 Where any of these new 
markets between 2010-
2015? 
NO NO NO YES – Germany, 
France, Australia, 
Japan 
YES – EU and 
other countries 
NO 
1.7 Your main activity? Hotelwares Domesticwares Domesticwares Domesticwares & 
commercial 
Domesticwares 
& hotelwares 
Domesticwares 
1.8 Your market positioning? ALL – 
low/medium/pr
emium 
Medium Premium ALL – 
low/medium/prem
ium 
Premium Premium 
1.9 Change in market 
positioning 2010-2015 
NO NO NO NO NO NO 
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6.1.2: How Objectives 6–10 Will be Achieved 
Objectives 6 and 7 are aimed at identifying the current situation in the SOT cluster regarding 
innovation across a range of activities. Firstly, objective 6 determines the number of core 
firms in the SOT cluster in 2015 that leverage the same general purpose technology. Q1.4 
(section 1) in the questionnaire is specifically aimed at fulfilling this objective. The reason 
why it is important to discover whether firms in 2015 are all utilising the same general 
purpose technologies is because this outcome affects opportunities for collaboration, which 
in turn may lead to an increase in innovative output. This question is also linked to the 
concept of ‘modularity’ and ‘opportunities for knowledge exchange’ (Arikan, 2009) as 
previously examined in chapter five of this thesis (see chapter 5.3). Objective 7 is aimed at 
determining the output of innovative activity in the SOT cluster between 2010 and 2015. 
Mostly quantitative data (questionnaire data) will be utilised to achieve this objective 
(sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7). Section 2 examines product innovation, section 3 examines 
process innovation, section 4 examines other organisational innovations, section 5 examines 
the effects of innovation on the organisation, and section 7 (Q7.2) of the questionnaire is 
aimed at identifying factors hampering innovation activities. In addition to the quantitative 
findings on innovation, the qualitative interview data also provides further findings on 
innovation activities in the SOT cluster, and these are integrated into the questionnaire 
analysis and evaluation where appropriate.   
 
 
Objective 8 is aimed at determining the number of inter-firm knowledge exchanges, i.e. co-
operative activities taking place within the SOT cluster between 2010 and 2015. Co-
operation and knowledge exchanges are identified in the academic literature as a key 
characteristic of successful industry clusters (e.g. Porter, 1990; Arikan, 2009; Hervas-Oliver 
and Albors-Garrigos, 2009). Hence, an important aim of this research is to ascertain an 
accurate picture of co-operative activity in the SOT cluster. A further related aim is to 
determine whether the presence or absence of co-operative activity is a factor in the 
cluster’s current competitive position. Answers to section 6 of the questionnaire provide 
quantitative data on the quantity and type of collaborative relationships existing in the SOT 
cluster between 2010 and 2015. They also provides data on knowledge exchanges, over the 
five years, between firms and with institutions and other entities from outside the SOT 
cluster. In addition, the qualitative interview data provides further details of whether firms and 
other entities co-operate with each other and, if they do, what it is they co-operate on. The 
qualitative data also provides valuable insights into respondents’ perceptions of competition, 
co-operation and trust in the SOT cluster. The findings on competition in the SOT cluster are 
linked to earlier findings in chapter four of this thesis. The findings on co-operation also build 
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on the secondary data findings in chapter five of this thesis, i.e. on opportunities for co-
operation and knowledge exchanges throughout the development of the SOT cluster.  
 
 
Objective 9 is aimed at determining the level of power and control in the SOT cluster in 
2015. According to the academic literature (Sacchietti and Tomlinson, 2009; Bell et al., 2009; 
Belso, 2010; Arikan and Schilling, 2011), if there is an imbalance between power and 
control, e.g. where one or more parties have disproportionate authority or influence on a 
cluster, there may be negative effects on other firms within the cluster and on the cluster’s 
overall strategic position. Chapter four of this thesis presented findings based on secondary 
data regarding the SOT cluster’s dominant firms past and present (see chapter 4.2.4). In this 
chapter, balance and control are explored further and findings are linked to chapter four 
findings where appropriate. 
 
 
Objective 10 is aimed at determining the role of dominant firms in the SOT cluster past and 
present. Chapter four of this thesis provided some evidence that the cluster’s previous 
dominant firms, Wedgwood and Doulton, had not been beneficial for the SOT cluster overall 
(see 4.2.4). However, no up-to-date published evidence could be found on the role of the 
cluster’s new dominant firms120. Hence, another important aim of the primary research is to 
ascertain a more accurate picture of balance and control in the SOT cluster in 2015, and the 
role of the cluster’s dominant firms past and present. The role of the cluster’s dominant firms 
is considered an important factor in determining the current strategic position of the SOT 
cluster, i.e. do they help or hinder other firms in the cluster? Hence, qualitative data from the 
interviews will be utilised to achieve this objective and findings are analysed and evaluated 
in light of chapter four findings on dominant firms.  
 
 
6.2: The Primary Research Findings 
The rest of this chapter is presented in five main sections: 6.3) analysis and evaluation of 
innovation in the SOT cluster (questionnaire data, objectives 6 and 7); 6.4) analysis and 
evaluation of co-operation in the SOT cluster (questionnaire and interview data, objective 8); 
6.5) analysis of other factors influencing innovation and co-operation in the SOT cluster 
(interview data); 6.6) analysis and evaluation of power, control and the role of dominant firms 
                                                 
120 A search of Staffordshire University’s library resources, plus extensive internet searches, did not identify any previous studies on the 
SOT cluster’s new dominant firms. 
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in the SOT cluster (interview data, objectives 9 and 10). Chapter conclusions are presented 
at the end of the chapter (6.7). 
 
 
6.2.1: How the Questionnaires and Interview Transcripts Were Analysed 
Full details and justification for how the completed questionnaires and interview transcripts 
were analysed is presented in the methodology chapter of this thesis (chapter 3) and, 
subsequently, a brief summary only is presented here. Due to the small size of the 
population (16 firms in total) and the small number of questionnaires completed (i.e. 6), it 
was not possible to conduct a full statistical analysis of the data as there were not enough 
data points. Consequently, a series of simple, one-way frequency tables were utilised to 
present the data question by question. Companies are identified in the tables as either A, B, 
C, D, E or F (see table 6.1) and are allocated to one of the answer options according to their 
response. Some of the tables are further analysed by identifying clear groupings or clusters 
of respondents and then by drawing a circle around them. Findings are evaluated in light of 
theory and in light of findings from previous chapters if relevant. The chapter conclusions 
identify and evaluate patterns, connections and relationships in the responses to various 
questions. The interview responses were audio recorded and professionally transcribed. 
Various elements of answers were then ‘pattern-matched’ (Campbell, 1966; Yin, 1984; Hak 
and Dul, 2009) to themes identified from the academic literature. A full set of pattern 
matched interview responses is available in appendix 19. In this chapter, the interview 
responses are further broken down, analysed and integrated with questionnaire findings 
where appropriate, and with findings from previous chapters. Findings are also mapped to 
relevant academic literature. 
 
 
6.3: Innovation in the SOT Cluster between 2010 and 2015 
 
6.3.1: Product Innovations 
Table 6.2 presents the answers to Q2.1 - Q2.3, which ask whether firms had introduced new 
or significantly improved product innovations between 2010 and 2015. All six firms answered 
‘yes’ to this question. Five out of the six firms answered that all of the product innovations 
during this period were developed in-house, only one firm (D) had co-operated with other 
enterprises or institutions on their product developments. When asked whether their product 
innovations were new to their market and/or firm, five firms (A, B, C, D and F) answered that 
they had introduced product innovations that were new to their market, and four firms (B, C, 
D and E) answered that they had introduced product innovations that were new to their firm 
223 
 
only. This evidence indicates a high degree of product innovation taking place in 38% of all 
SOT core cluster firms (6 out of 16 firms in the population). This is compelling evidence of 
differentiation, and in addition supports the positioning of respondents, i.e. all firms are 
positioned in mid-premium segments (see table 6.1, Q1.8). According to Porter (1990), 
Innovation is a function of the strength of a cluster, thus the evidence here indicates that 
strong product innovation is a strength for the SOT cluster, especially through the significant 
number of firms who introduce new-to-market products. However, the evidence here also 
indicates that the majority of SOT respondents tend not to co-operate with other ceramic 
manufacturing firms in the cluster on product innovations. Moreover, evidence from the 
interview responses on co-operation in the SOT cluster (see 6.4) also shows that there is 
very little co-operation between SOT ceramics manufacturers on product innovations and 
this is possibly a weakness of the cluster. 
 
 
Table 6.2: Q2.1–Q2.3 Product Innovations Taking Place  in the SOT Cluster 2010 - 2015 
Section 2, Q 2.1 – Q 2.3 Product Innovation 
 
  YES NO 
Q 2.1 During the five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise 
introduce new or significantly improved goods? 
 A  B  C  D  E  F  
    
Q 2.2 Who developed these product innovations?    
Mainly your enterprise or enterprise group A  B  C  D  E  F   
Your enterprise together with other enterprises or institutions D   
Mainly other enterprises or institutions    
    
Q 2.3 Were any of your product innovations during the five 
years 2010 to 2015? 
   
New to your market?  A  B  C  D  F E 
New to your firm?  B  C  D  E A  F 
 
 
Table 6.3 presents answers about the percentage of turnover that SOT respondent firms 
attributed to product innovations between 2010 and 2015 (Q2.4). Note: only five out of the 
six firms answered this question. Responses to this answer were varied with no apparent 
correlation between firm size and percentage of turnover. For example, firms ‘B’ and ‘D’ (one 
large firm and one medium sized) claimed that between 1% and 10% of sales turnover had 
come from new product innovations over the five years, whilst firms ‘C’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ (one 
medium and two small) claimed that between 16% and 50% of sales turnover came from 
their product innovations over the period. It is not clear from the responses, however, 
whether the percentages of sales turnover for firms ‘D’ and ‘B’ apply to each category, i.e. 
‘market’ and ‘firm’, or whether the new product innovations were the same products that 
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were both new to their markets and new to their firms. Four of the five respondents said that 
the majority of their sales turnover (76-100%) came from existing products that were 
unchanged or marginally modified over the period. The results on product innovation for 
SOT respondent firms can be compared to the results of the GPrix innovation survey (2005 
– 2009) for the same question, where 70% of the GPrix sample said that they had introduced 
product innovations in goods over the five-year period121, compared to all of SOT respondent 
firms. The results show that a higher percentage of SOT respondent firms carried out 
product innovations than GPrix firms122. 
 
 
Table 6.3: Q2.4 Percentage of Turnover from Product Innovation Taking Place in the 
SOT Cluster 2010 - 2015 
Q 2.4  Using the definitions above, please give the percentage 
of your total turnover in 2015 from: 
   
 0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% 
Product innovations 
introduced during 2010 to 2015 
that were new to your market 
 D B  F C   
Product innovations 
introduced during 2010 to 2015 
that were only new to your firm 
 D B  E    
Products that were unchanged 
or only marginally modified 
during 2010 to 2015  
     C  B  D  E  F 
Note: Company A did not answer this question 
 
 
6.3.2: Process Innovations 
Table 6.4 presents the answers on whether SOT firms introduced new or significantly 
improved process innovations between 2010 and 2015 (Q3.1-Q3.2). Five out of six 
respondents (A, B, C, D and F) said that they had introduced new manufacturing processes. 
Three firms (A, B and C) had also introduced new logistics processes, and four firms (A, B, 
C and E) had introduced new supporting activities for processes. The three largest firms (A, 
B and C), including the two largest firms in the SOT cluster, had introduced new innovations 
in all three categories, i.e. manufacturing, logistics and support for processes. The three 
smallest firms (D, E and F) had carried out fewer process innovations, especially in logistics. 
When asked who had developed their process innovations (Q3.2), three firms (B, C and E) 
responded that they had been developed in-house, and three firms (A, D and F) answered 
                                                 
121 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
122 Unfortunately, no other GPrix results data is provided for other questions on product or process innovations or for questions on 
organisational innovations (Q2.2-Q2.3, Q3.1-Q3.2 and Q4.1), and therefore no comparisons could be made between results for these 
specific questions. 
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that they had developed their process innovations with other enterprises or institutions. The 
evidence indicates that a significant number of SOT cluster firms carry out manufacturing 
process innovations and innovations to support manufacturing, and this is seen as another 
strength for the cluster. The evidence also indicates that cluster firms may be more willing to 
co-operate with external firms and institutions on process innovations than they are on 
product innovations, e.g. three out of six firms said they had co-operated on process 
innovations, compared to only one firm who said they had co-operated on product 
innovations. The evidence here is supported by evidence from the interview survey, which 
also shows that some SOT respondent firms do co-operate with suppliers and supporting 
institutions on some of their process innovations (see 6.4.4). 
 
 
Table 6.4: Q3.1–Q3.2 Process Innovation Taking Place in the SOT Cluster 2010 - 2015 
Section 3, Q 3.1 – Q 3.2 Process Innovation 
 
Q 3.1 During the five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise 
introduce? 
 YES NO 
new or significantly improved processes for manufacturing your 
goods 
 A  B  C  D  F E 
New or significantly improved logistics, delivery or distribution 
processes 
 A  B  C D  E  F 
New or significantly improved supporting activities for your 
processes, such as maintenance systems or operations for 
purchasing, accounting, computing and marketing planning 
 A  B  C  E D  F 
    
Q 3.2 Who developed these process innovations?    
Mainly your enterprise or enterprise group B  C  E   
Your enterprise together with other enterprises or institutions A  D  F   
Mainly other enterprises or institutions    
 
 
6.3.3: Other Innovation Activities 
Table 6.5 presents the answers to whether firms introduced new organisational and/or 
marketing innovations between 2010 and 2015 (Q4.1-Q4.2). The circles on the table indicate 
the activities where the majority of respondent firms did/did not innovate. The activities in 
which firms innovated the most were in marketing (Q4.2), where all six firms had introduced 
new media techniques and/or product promotions over the period, and in organisational 
activities, where five out of six firms had introduced new practices for organising procedures. 
Only firm ‘F’, the smallest respondent firm, had not introduced any new organisational or 
marketing innovations during the period in question. The area where the least amount of 
innovative activity had taken place was in introducing new methods of organising external 
relations with other firms and institutions, where five out of the six firms responded that they 
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had not taken part in that activity over the five years. This is further evidence of a possible 
lack of co-operation between manufacturers and other firms/institutions in the SOT cluster.  
 
Table 6.5: Q4.1–Q4.2 Other Innovation Activities Taking Place in the SOT Cluster 2010 
- 2015 
Section 4, Q 4.1 – Q 4.2 Other Innovation Activities & Expenditures 
 
Q 4.1 During the Five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise engage in the 
following ORGANISATIONAL innovation activities? 
YES NO 
New business practices for organising procedures (e.g. supply chain 
management, business re-engineering, knowledge management, lean 
production, quality management, etc.) 
A  B  C  D  E F 
New methods of organising work responsibilities and decision making (e.g. 
first use of a new system of employee responsibilities, team-work, 
decentralisation, integration or de-integration of departments, 
education/training systems, etc.) 
A  B  C  E D  F 
New methods of organising external relations with other firms or public 
institutions (e.g. first use of alliances, partnerships, outsourcing or sub-
contracting, etc.) 
B A  C  D  E  F 
   
Q 4.2 During the Five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise engage in the 
following MARKETING innovation activities? 
YES NO 
Significant changes to the aesthetic design or packaging of a good or service A  B  C  E D  F 
New media or techniques for product promotion (e.g. first use of a new 
advertising medium, introduction of loyalty cards, etc.) 
A  B  C  D  E  F  
New methods of pricing goods or services (i.e. first time use of variable pricing 
by demand, discount systems, etc.) 
B A  C  D  E  F 
New methods for sales channels (i.e. first time use of franchising or 
distribution licenses, direct selling, exclusive retailing, new concepts for 
product presentation, e-commerce facilities, etc.) 
B  E A  C  D  F 
                                                                = main areas of innovation 
                                                                = evidence of a lack of co-operation 
  
 
 
Comparisons between the GPrix survey results123 and the SOT survey results for marketing 
innovations show that: 41% of GPrix firms had introduced design or packaging innovations, 
compared to 66.6% of SOT firms; 40% of GPrix firms had introduced promotion innovations, 
compared to 100% of SOT firms; 32% of GPrix firms had introduced sales innovations, 
compared to 33.3% of SOT firms; and, 26% of GPrix firms had introduced pricing 
innovations, compared to 16.6% of SOT firms. The comparisons show that a significantly 
higher percentage of SOT survey firms had introduced design, packaging and promotion 
innovations over the five-year period than had GPrix survey firms.  
 
 
 
                                                 
123 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, Page 30, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
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6.3.4: The Effects of Innovation on the Organisation 
This next section presents a series of tables that give responses to questions asked about 
the effects of innovation on SOT survey firms over the five-year period (Q4.3, Q4.4 and 
Q5.5). Table 6.6 presents responses about the amount of turnover and resources dedicated 
to innovation activities in 2015, and about the percentage of sales value from product and 
process innovations. Table 6.7 presents responses about the innovation capabilities of firms 
in 2010 and 2015 (Q5.4). Table 6.8 presents responses about the importance of innovation 
to cluster firms (Q5.1). Table 6.9 presents responses about: abandoned or delayed 
innovation activities over the five years and factors influencing them (Q7.1-Q7.2); and, 
whether SOT firms had received public support for any of their innovation activities (Q5.6). 
 
 
The evidence in table 6.6 shows that four out of five respondents (A, B, C, and D) spent 
between 1% and 5% of turnover on innovation activities in 2015. The two smallest firms in  
(E and F) spent between 6% and 10% of their turnover on innovation activities in 2015. This 
is interesting, as there is evidence in the academic literature that small firms tend to spend 
more on R&D activities than their larger counterparts (e.g. Acs et al., 1994; Audretsch, 2002; 
Hall et al., 2009). Comparing the results for SOT survey firms (for 2015) with the results of 
the GPrix innovation survey (for 2009), 66.6% of SOT firms spent between 1% and 5% of 
turnover on innovation, compared to 37% of GPrix firms, and 33.3% of SOT firms spent 
between 6% and 10% of turnover on innovation compared to 25% of GPrix firms124. 
Moreover, none of the SOT survey firms spent more than 10% of turnover on innovation, 
whilst 23% of GPrix firms said they spent between 11% and 50% of turnover on innovation. 
From the results, it appears that SOT cluster firms spend less overall on innovation than 
GPrix firms. However, the GPrix data is not broken down into high-tech and low-tech 
industries and therefore it is not certain that the comparisons are reliable here. 
 
 
With regard to resources devoted to innovation, three firms (A, D and E) responded that they 
had devoted more resources to innovation in 2015 than they had five years earlier, and three 
firms (B, C and F) said that they had devoted about the same amount of resources to 
innovation in 2015 as they had done five years earlier. When asked about the proportion of 
current sales by value, that came from both product and process innovations since 2010, 
three firms (B, E and F) said that between 16% and 25% of their current sales came from 
                                                 
124 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, [ONLINE.] Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. Page 31. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
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new product and process innovations, and two firms (A and C) said it was over 50%. This is 
further supporting evidence that the innovations taking place in the industry contribute to the 
competitive advantage of the cluster as, by comparing the amount of expenditure on 
innovation with the percentage of sales by value, it appears that all cluster firms are 
receiving a high return on their investment, with firms ‘A’ and ‘C’ receiving the highest return. 
However, these findings may not be strictly accurate as the questionnaire did not ask for 
average expenditure on innovation over the five-year period, therefore it is not clear whether 
expenditure was higher in any of the years between 2010 and 2014.  
 
 
Comparing the results for SOT survey firms (2015) to results of the GPrix Innovation Survey 
(2009) for the percentage of sales (by value) that GPrix firms stated came from product and 
process innovations:125 12% of GPrix firms and 16.6% of SOT firms stated between 11% 
and 15%; 18% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT firms stated between 16% and 25%; and, 
17% of GPrix firms and 33.3% of SOT firms stated over 50%. The results show that SOT 
firms were getting a higher percentage of sales by value from their new product and process 
innovations than the GPrix firms. Another positive point for the SOT cluster is that in 2015, 
none of the six firms had devoted fewer resources to innovation than they had in 2010 (see 
Table 6.6). This result also compares favourably with the GPrix findings.126 52% of GPrix 
firms and 50% of SOT firms had devoted the same amount of resources to innovation at the 
end of the five years as they had done five years earlier. 9% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT 
firms had devoted more resources to innovation at the end of the five years than they had 
done five years earlier. The evidence shows that many of the SOT survey firms had 
significantly improved the resourcing of innovations over the five-year period and this is 
another potentially important strength for the SOT cluster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, Page 35 [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
126 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, Page 32 [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
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Table 6.6: Q4.3, Q4.4 & Q5.5 Turnover and Resources Devoted to Innovation Activities 
and Percentage of Sales by Value from Innovation in the SOT Cluster 2010 – 2015 
Q 4.3 Please estimate (approximately) the total amount of expenditure on all of your innovation 
activities as a share of turnover in 2015: 
0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-25% 26-50% >50% 
 A  B  C  D E  F     
Q 4.4 Five years ago did you devote....? 
Fewer Resources to Innovation About the same resources to innovation More resources to innovation 
A  D  E B  C  F  
Q 5.5 What proportion of your current sales by value comes from new or substantially 
improved products or processes introduced since 2010? 
0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-25% 26-50% >50% 
   D B  E  F  A  C 
 
 
Table 6.7 shows that all six respondents made improvements to their innovation capabilities 
over the five-year period. The biggest improvements were made by the two smallest firms (E 
and F), who moved from ‘lagging’ to ‘above average’ positions in product innovations, and 
from ‘lagging’ to ‘average’ in process and marketing innovations. The three largest SOT 
firms (A, B and C) claimed to be the industry leaders in product innovations in 2015, and 
company ‘D’ claimed to be the industry leader in process innovations in 2015. Again, the 
results for SOT survey firms (2015) compare favourably with the results of the GPrix survey 
(2009) for product and process innovation capabilities127.  
 
 
For product capabilities at the start of their respective five-year periods: 72% of GPrix firms 
and 33.3% of SOT classed themselves  as ‘lagging’ or’ average’; and, 28% of GPrix firms 
and 66.6% of SOT classed themselves  as ‘above average’ or ‘leading’. Five years later the 
results were: 52% of GPrix firms and 0% of SOT firms classed themselves  as ‘lagging’ or 
‘average’; and, 48% of GPrix firms and 100% of SOT firms classed themselves  as ‘above 
average’ or ‘leading’. For process innovation capability at the start of their respective five-
year periods: 78% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT firms classed themselves  as ‘lagging’ or 
‘average’; and, 22% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT firms classed themselves  as ‘above 
average’ or ‘leading’. Five years later the results were: 54% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT 
firms classed themselves  as ‘lagging’ or ‘average’; and, 46% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT 
firms classed themselves as ‘above average’ or ‘leading’ (although one SOT firm did move 
from lagging to average over the period).  
 
                                                 
127 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, Page 36 [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
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From the comparison, it is apparent that SOT firms outperformed GPrix firms in terms of 
enhancing their product innovation capabilities over their respective five-year periods but did 
not progress as much as GPrix firms in enhancing their process innovation capabilities. 
However, firms in the SOT survey were already starting from a significantly higher capability 
level at the start of the five-year period than firms in the GPrix sample. Improvements made 
in product and process innovation capabilities are seen as a strength of the SOT cluster. 
 
 
For marketing innovation capability at the start of their respective five-year periods: 86% of 
GPrix128 firms and 50% of SOT firms classified themselves as ‘lagging’ or ‘average’; and, 
14% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT firms classified themselves as ‘above average’ or 
‘leading’. Five years later the results were: 72% of GPrix firms and 33.3% of SOT firms 
classified themselves as ‘lagging’ or ‘average’; and, 28% of GPrix firms and 66.6% of SOT 
firms classified themselves as ‘above average’ or ‘leading’. The comparisons indicate a 
higher percentage of GPrix firms (50%) moved into ‘above average’ and ‘leading’ categories 
over the five years than did SOT firms. However, the SOT cluster firms were positioned at a 
much higher capability level than GPrix firms at the start of their five-year period. Overall, the 
results show that marketing innovation capabilities are much higher in the six SOT firms than 
in GPrix firms and this is another potential strength for the SOT cluster. 
 
 
For organisational innovation capability at the start of their respective five-year periods: 83% 
of GPrix firms129 and 83.3% of SOT firms classified themselves as ‘lagging’ or ‘average’; 
and, 17% of GPrix firms and 16.6% of SOT firms classified themselves as ‘above average’ 
or ‘leading’. Five years later the results were: 70% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT firms 
classified themselves as ‘lagging’ or ‘average’; and, 30% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT 
firms classified themselves as ‘above average’ or ‘leading’. The comparison here shows that 
although both GPrix and SOT firms started at similar capability levels at the beginning of 
their respective five-year periods, a much higher percentage of the SOT sample firms 
progressed into the ‘above average’ and ‘leading’ categories over the five years (from 16.6% 
of firms to 50%). Overall, the results show that SOT firms improved organisational innovation 
capabilities more than any other innovation capabilities over the five-year period and this is 
another strength for the SOT cluster.  
                                                 
128 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, Page 37 [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017] 
129 GPrix, (2011), D1.7 Impact Assessment of Measures on SMEs, Page 37 [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/docs/Del_1_7_Impact_Assessment.pdf. [Accessed 30 June 2017]. 
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Table 6.7: Q5.4 Innovation Capabilities of SOT Firms in 2010 and 2015 
Q 5.4    How would you judge your firm’s innovation capabilities within your industry in the past and 
now, regarding? 
 Lagging Average Above average Leading 
In the past (2010)     
Product innovation E  F  B  D A  C 
Process innovation E C  F A  B D 
Marketing innovation D  E  F  C A  B 
Organisational innovation D  E B  C  F A  
     
Now (2015)     
Product innovation   D  E  F A  B  C 
Process innovation  C  E  F A  B D 
Marketing innovation  D  F C  E A  B 
Organisational innovation  C  D  E A  B  F  
 
 
Table 6.8 presents the results of the importance of innovation to SOT cluster firms (Q5.1). 
Responses show that most of the SOT survey firms consider innovation to be ‘essential’ or 
‘highly important’ across a range of activities. The activity that appears to be least important 
to respondents (D, C and E) is reducing materials and energy per unit costs. An interesting 
response was given to the question about the ‘importance of developing knowledge sharing 
capabilities inside and outside the firm’. Four firms responded that this was either ‘essential’ 
(A, C and F) or ‘highly important’ (B), yet earlier answers have shown little evidence of 
cluster firms co-operating with each other, or with other firms and institutions (see tables 6.2, 
6.4 and 6.5). Furthermore, the interview findings (see 6.4.2-6.4.6.) also strongly indicate that 
cluster firms do not co-operate that much with each other. 
 
 
Comparisons between the GPrix survey results130 and the SOT survey results on the 
importance of innovation show that at the end of their respective five-year periods: 32% of 
GPrix firms and 33.3% of SOT firms thought that product innovation was ‘highly important’; 
and, 32% of GPrix firms and 66.6% of SOT firms thought that product innovation was 
‘essential’. For process innovation at the end of their respective five-year periods: 32% of 
GPrix firms and 40% (approximately) of SOT firms thought that process innovation was 
‘highly important’; and, 14% of GPrix firms and 50% of SOT firms thought process innovation 
‘essential’. These comparisons indicate that SOT survey firms think that both product and 
                                                 
130 Gprix, (2012), Deliverable 1.7 - Impact assessment of measures on SMEs (30th November 2011) [Online]. Available from: 
http://business.staffs.ac.uk/gprix/reports/impact.htm [Accessed 2 July 2017] 
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process innovations are more essential than GPrix firms and this is considered to be a 
further likely strength of the SOT cluster. 
 
 
Table 6.8: Q5.1 Importance of Innovation to SOT Cluster Firms 2010 - 2015 
Q 5.1 How important were each of the following effects on your product, process, organisational and 
marketing innovations introduced during the five years 2010 to 2015? 
 Essential 
 
Highly 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Not 
Important 
Product Oriented Effects     
Increased range of products A  B  C  F D  E   
Entered new markets or increased market 
share 
A  B  F D  C  E   
Improved quality of products A  B  C  F  D  E  
Process Oriented Effects     
Improved flexibility of production A  C  F D  B  E   
Increased capacity of production A  B  C  F D  E   
Reduced labour costs per unit output A  F D  B E C 
Reduced materials and energy per unit 
output 
A  B  F  D  C  E  
Other Effects     
Reduced environmental impacts or 
improved health and safety 
A  B  C  F D E  
Met regulatory requirements A  B  C  F D E  
Speeded up decision making A  F B  C  E D  
Developed knowledge sharing capabilities 
(inside and outside your enterprise) 
A  C  F B D  E  
 
 
Table 6.9 presents answers about abandoned or delayed innovation activities (Q7.1) and 
factors influencing them (Q7.2), and about public financial support for innovations (Q5.6). 
The responses show that it was mainly the two largest firms (A and B) in the SOT cluster 
who experienced the most problems with abandoned or delayed innovation activities. 
Company ‘D’ had abandoned projects at the concept stage and company ‘E’ had 
experienced serious delays with projects. When asked about the importance of factors 
hampering innovation the majority of firms stated that they had not experienced any of them. 
However, it is the two smallest firms (E and F) who appear to have had the most problems, 
e.g. lack of qualified personnel, lack of information on technology/markets and financing/cost 
issues. Only one respondent (B) identified market factors as being an important factor in 
hampering their innovations. When asked whether they had received any financial support 
from local/national/European government, the majority of respondents stated that they had 
not. The only firm that had received financial support from all three levels of government was 
firm ‘A’. Whilst this information is useful, it would have been even more insightful to discover 
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whether the other five respondents had applied to any level of government for financial help 
and, if they had, whether their applications had been rejected, or not. Overall, from the 
evidence available, it appears that relatively few firms in the SOT survey experience factors 
that hamper their innovation activities, and this can be seen as another strength for the SOT 
cluster. 
 
 
Table 6.9: Q7.1-Q7.2 and Q5.6 Abandoned or Delayed Innovation Activities: 
Influencing Factors 
Q 7.1 During the five years 2010 – 2015, were any of your innovation activities or projects? 
 YES NO 
Abandoned in the concept stage A  B  D C  E 
Abandoned after the activity or project was begun A  B C  D  E 
Seriously delayed A  E B  C  D 
Q 7.2 During the five years 2010 – 2015, how important were the following factors for hampering your 
innovation activities or projects or influencing a decision not to innovate? 
 High 
 
Medium Low Factor not 
experienced 
Cost factors     
Lack of funds within your enterprise or 
group 
 E  A  B  C  D  F 
Lack of finance from sources outside your 
organisation 
  E  F A  B  C  D 
Innovation costs too high  E F A  B  C  D 
Knowledge factors     
Lack of qualified personnel E   A  B  C  D  F 
Lack of information on technology E  F A  B  C  D 
Lack of information on markets  B  E  A  C  D  F 
Difficulty in finding co-operation partners 
for innovation 
 B A C  D  E  F 
Market factors     
Market dominated by established 
enterprises 
 B  A  C  D  E  F 
Uncertain demand for innovative goods or 
services 
 B  A  C  D  E  F 
Reasons not to innovate     
No need due to prior innovations   E A  B  C  D  F 
No need because of no demand for 
innovations 
  E A  B  C  D  F 
Q 5.6 During the five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise receive any public financial support for 
innovation activities from the following levels of government?  
 YES NO 
Local or regional authorities A  E B  C  D  F 
Central government (including central government agencies or ministries) A  D B  C  E  F 
The European Union (EU) A B  C  D  E  F 
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6.4: Co-operation in the SOT Cluster between 2010 and 2015 
This next section presents questionnaire and interview responses to questions about co-
operation in the SOT cluster as follows: 1) the questionnaire responses about co-operation 
on innovation in the SOT cluster131 (Q6.2-Q6.4); and, 2) the interview responses about co-
operation on innovation in the SOT cluster (Q1-Q5). The questionnaire responses are 
presented as a series of tables with accompanying discussion and evaluation. The interview 
responses are presented as synthesised and summarised responses discussed under 
various themes on co-operation, along with examples of supporting quotes from the 
interview transcripts. The full set of pattern-matched responses is available in Appendix 19. 
 
 
6.4.1: Questionnaire Responses on Co-operation on Innovation Activities in the SOT 
Cluster 
 Table 6.10 presents the answers to section six of the questionnaire survey, i.e. co-operation 
on innovation activities in the SOT cluster between 2010 and 2015. The table combines the 
answers about co-operation on activities at regional, other UK and overseas locations. The 
circles on the diagram identify groupings of responses that indicate areas where there are 
high degrees of co-operation and areas where there is little or no co-operation. 
 
                                                 
131 Note: GPrix data on co-operation was not included in the GPrix reports. 
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Table 6.10: Q 6.2 – Q 6.4 Level of Co-operation on Innovation Activities in the SOT Cluster 2010 - 2015 
Q 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 - From 2010 to 2015 did your enterprise co-operate on any of your innovation 
activities with other enterprises or institutions? 
                                                                               Degree of co-operation in you region Degree of co-operation other UK locations Degree of co-operation overseas 
 High 
 
Medium Low Not used High  Medium Low Not used High Medium Low Not used 
Internal             
Within your enterprise or enterprise 
group 
A  B  C  E  F   D    C  E  F A  B   C  D  E  F 
Market Sources             
Suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components, or software 
A  B  C  F D  E   B   D A   C  E  F A  B  D   C  E  F 
Clients or customers A  B  C  E D  F   A  B D  C  E A  B  D   C   
Competitors or other enterprises in 
your sector 
  D   A  B  C  E  F    A  B  C  D  E  F    A  B  C  D  E  F 
Consultants, commercial labs, or 
private R&D institutes 
B  A C  D  E  F B  A C  D  E  F B    A C  D  E  F 
Institutional Sources             
Universities or other higher 
education institutions 
 D  F A  C  E B    A  B  C  D  E  F   A B  C  D  E  F 
Government or public research 
institutes 
 A  F  B  C  D  E      A  B  C  D  E  F    A  B  C  D  E  F 
Other Sources             
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions  A  F D    B  C  E A D  B  C  E  F A D  B  C  E  F 
Scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications 
A  D   B  C  E  F A   B  C  D  E  F A   B  C  D  E 
Professional and industry 
associations 
  D  A  F B  C  E   A B  C  D  E  F A   B  C  D  E  F 
                                                    = High co-operation 
                                                    = No co-operation 
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Responses to the question with respect to the degree of co-operation on innovation activities 
between 2010 and 2015 regionally (Q6.2) show that the area where respondents replied 
they co-operated the most (high degree for A, B, C, E and F) was within their own enterprise 
or group. Other areas where respondents replied they co-operated to a high degree were 
with suppliers (A, B, C and F) and with customers (A, B, C and E).Two respondents replied 
that they co-operated to a medium degree with suppliers (D and E) and with customers (D 
and F). The areas where firms co-operated the least were with competitors and/or other 
enterprises in their sector, (no co-operation for 5 firms, low for firm D). The results here 
support the findings in earlier sections of this chapter (see 6.3), where firms had replied that 
they innovated mostly ‘within their own enterprise or group’, or possibly with suppliers on 
some process innovations, and are further evidence of a lack of co-operation in the SOT 
cluster. Other areas where the majority of respondents (A, B, C, E and F) replied that they 
did not co-operate at all, or only to a low degree, were with consultants, private and public 
research and development institutes, scientific journals, trade publications and 
professional/industry associations. 
 
 
Responses to the question about the degree of co-operation with firms and enterprises in 
other UK locations (Q6.3) show that the majority of firms in the SOT survey do not co-
operate with other enterprises and institutions in other UK locations. The exceptions are 
firms ‘A’ and ‘B’, the two largest firms in the SOT cluster, and firm ‘D’ who all appear to co-
operate, to a greater or lesser extent, with suppliers, customers, trade fairs and conferences 
in other UK locations. Similar to responses for regional co-operation, all firms stated that 
they did not co-operate with competitors or other firms in their sector in other UK locations. 
However, this last response is not entirely unexpected as the majority of UK ceramics 
production, i.e. approximately 80%, takes place in the SOT area.  
 
 
When questioned about the degree of co-operation with firms and enterprises in overseas 
locations (Q6.4), only three respondents (A, B and D), including the two largest firms again, 
answered that they co-operated with firms and enterprises in overseas locations. The main 
areas of co-operation were within their own enterprise or group, and with suppliers and 
customers. These areas of co-operation support other findings in this chapter, where some 
SOT survey firms said that they did develop some process innovations with their suppliers 
(see tables 6.4 and 6.12) and with customers (see section 6.4.3). From the results in this 
section, firm ‘A’ stands out from the other cluster firms in that they appear to co-operate 
more with firms and enterprises in overseas locations, and across a wider range of 
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innovation activities, than any of the other respondents. The following two tables (6.11 and 
6.12) present the responses to questions about specific areas where firms have collaborated 
(Q6.5), and on the nature of current collaborative relationships in the SOT cluster (Q6.6). 
The nature of relationships is important in the academic literature and relates to the concept 
of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ ties (Julien et al., 2004; Tallman et al., 2004; Lorentzen, 2008). Strong 
ties are intense relations between agents of great similarity and offer a great depth of 
knowledge but little diversity. Weak ties are seen as more beneficial to knowledge creation 
as they call into question existing knowledge (Julien, et al., 2004: 266-267). The academic 
literature purports that successful clusters have extensive networks involving both strong 
and weak ties (Julien et al., 2004; Tallman et al., 2004; Lorentzen, 2008) and, therefore, an 
important assessment of the SOT cluster’s competitive advantage would be evidence of 
extensive strong and weak ties.  
 
 
Table 6.11: Q 6.5 Areas Where SOT Cluster Firms Have Collaborated 
Q 6.5 Please indicate the areas where you have collaborated 
                                                                                                  Type of co-operation 
 Information 
only 
 
Product design 
and materials 
Process 
developments 
Internal    
Within your enterprise or enterprise group E A  B A 
Market Sources    
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components, or 
software 
 A  B  D  E  F A  B  C  D 
Clients or customers B A  B  C  D  E  
Competitors or other enterprises in your sector   A  B 
Consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes B B A  B 
Institutional Sources    
Universities or other higher education institutions A  C  E   
Government or public research institutes E  A 
Other Sources    
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions  E  F A  E  
Scientific journals and trade/technical publications E A  
Professional and industry associations  A  
 
 
Table 6.11 shows that respondents co-operate most with suppliers and with customers (5 
out of 6 firms). The areas where they tend to co-operate the most with suppliers (A, B, D, E 
and F) and customers (A, B, C, D and E) are on product design and materials. Another area 
where respondents stated that they co-operated was with suppliers on process 
developments (A, B, C and D). Interestingly, the two smallest firms (E and F) appear not to 
co-operate with suppliers on process developments. However, this could be due to their size 
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and, thus, the fairly low-tech nature of their processes (for evidence see chapter 5.4.2). The 
two largest firms in the cluster (A and B) also answered that they co-operated with 
competitors and/or other enterprises in their sector on process developments. This result 
supports the findings from the innovation responses presented earlier (see Table 6.4). Three 
respondents (A, C and E) stated that that they co-operated with universities and other higher 
education institutes, but only for information purposes. From the evidence, it appears that 
the largest firm in the SOT cluster (A) co-operates across a wider range of activities, more 
than any other firm in the SOT survey. Furthermore, from the evidence presented so far, co-
operation appears to be non-existent between the ceramics manufacturers themselves in 
terms of product development. Overall, the evidence presented here indicates that co-
operation is low in the SOT cluster.  
 
 
Table 6.12 shows that many respondents have a range of formal and informal relationships 
with their suppliers and customers (weak ties), and the majority of these relationships are 
long term in nature. Relationships with universities and other research institutes tend to be 
informal and mostly short-term in nature (weak ties). Whilst relationships at conferences, 
trade fairs, scientific and trade journals tend to be both formal and informal, and a mix of 
long and short term in nature (weak ties). Only firm ‘A’ answered that they had a range of 
relationships with professional and industry associations (both weak and strong ties). 
Interestingly, the interview results presented later in this chapter (see 6.4.2 - 6.4.4) conflict 
somewhat with the findings presented here. Several interviewees stated no co-operation 
was taking place between ceramics manufacturing firms in the SOT cluster, whilst several 
other interviewees gave good examples of how firms did co-operate with each other, e.g. 
through membership of the BCC (British Ceramics Confederation) and other professional 
associations (strong ties), and also by visiting each other’s factories (strong ties). It appears 
that SOT cluster firms may co-operate more than they think they do, but so far, the evidence 
is not clear. The implications for competitive advantage, based on the evidence here, are 
that co-operation with the BCC and other supporting institutions could be an influencing 
factor in the innovative activity apparent in the SOT cluster and, as a result, this is a potential 
strength for the cluster. 
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Table 6.12: Q 6.6 The Nature of Collaborative Relationships in the SOT Cluster 
Q 6.6 Please indicate the nature of the collaborative relationship 
                                                                                       Type of relationship 
 Formal 
contractual 
relationship 
 
Informal 
relationship 
Long-term 
relationship 
(more than 1 
year) 
Short-term 
relationship 
(less than 1 
year) 
Internal     
Within your enterprise or enterprise 
group 
A B A  E  
Market Sources     
Suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components, or software 
A  B  D  E A  C  E  F A  C  D  E  F A 
Clients or customers A  B  C  D  E A  E  F A  C  E  F A  E 
Competitors or other enterprises in your 
sector 
  D    
Consultants, commercial labs, or private 
R&D institutes 
A  B A A A 
Institutional Sources     
Universities or other higher education 
institutions 
 A  C  D  E  F  A  D  E 
Government or public research 
institutes 
 A  E  A  E 
Other Sources     
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions  A  D A  E  F A  D  E  F A 
Scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications 
A A  E A A  E 
Professional and industry associations A A A A 
 
 
Table 6.13: Q 6.8 Participation in Collaborative Projects 
Q 6.8 Five years ago did your enterprise engage in....? 
Fewer collaborative projects About the same collaborative projects More collaborative projects 
A B  C  D  E  F  
 
 
6.4.2: Interview Findings on Co-operation on Product Innovations (see Appendices 12 
(Q1) and 19) 
When asked whether SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate with each other on product 
innovations, four respondents (A, C, E, and F) replied that they did not think that firms co-
operated, or that co-operation was very limited. Two respondents (B and D) stated that firms 
did work together, but not as well as they could. Another respondent (F) gave a conflicting 
response, he said that firms did co-operate but also said there wasn’t a lot of collaboration or 
co-operation. Respondent (E) said that he had not seen much co-operation in the industry 
over the 32 years he had been in it: 
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“My experience is no, very, very limited. They always talk. They kind of talk but then 
I’ve never seen it in my 32 years I’ve been in the ceramic industry. No, I’ve never 
seen it (E). 
 
 
Interviewees were asked to give reasons why they thought ceramics manufacturers did not 
co-operate on product innovations. Four firms said that it was because ceramics firms are 
very protective of their intellectual property and they don’t want to share their ideas or 
innovations with other ceramics firms (A, D, E and F). Two firms said it was because of a 
fear of other firms ‘stealing’ their ideas. Examples include: 
“We will innovate something new and it becomes massively successful and 
everybody obviously wants a piece of that success and they just do very poor knock-
offs of the same thing” (A). 
 
“Because potters have been stealing off each other for 250 years” (B). 
 
 
The second reason for firms not co-operating on product innovations was because firms 
wanted to maintain their own sense of identity and independence. For example: 
“I think that’s actually healthy not to [co-operate] because ways that companies 
actually maintain their own sense of identity purposes is to keep everything kind of 
very tight and secret” (A). 
 
“I think the nature of being an entrepreneur and setting up a business is probably 
you’re quite independent” (C). 
 
 
The findings here have implications for the competitive advantage of the SOT cluster. For 
example, protection of intellectual property is a key factor in innovation and differentiation. If 
firms in the SOT cluster view each other as rivals, then this is in line with the academic 
literature that purports vigorous domestic rivalry is a key motivator for innovation (e.g. Porter, 
1990; Dei Ottati, 1996). Moreover, the findings here could also partially explain why SOT 
cluster firms appear to innovate so much. 
 
 
Interviewees were also asked to identify ways that they thought ceramics manufacturers co-
operated on product innovations. It appears that one of the main ways that firms co-operate 
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is by manufacturing ceramic items for each other. Firms ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘F’ all replied that 
other ceramics manufacturers made products for them. The main reasons for outsourcing to 
other firms in the cluster were because of capacity issues and, for some of the larger firms, 
flexibility issues, e.g. small one-off orders of something unusual for existing customers. 
Although, strictly speaking, these examples are not co-operation on product innovations, i.e. 
working together to create a new product, they are evidence of knowledge exchanges and of 
knowledge-creating opportunities (Arikan, 2009). Other ways that ceramic manufacturers co-
operate with each other are by visiting each other’s factories, and by visiting each other’s 
stands at trade fairs (B, D and F). Although this type of co-operation is ‘informal’ and again 
not focused on product innovation, it is further evidence of potential knowledge exchanges 
between cluster firms. However, there is also some evidence that, in recent years, some 
firms (e.g. F) may have become less inclined to show other ceramics manufacturers around 
their factories, possibly due to contraction of the local industry, overseas competitors or 
possibly due to perceptions about who competitors are. Examples of responses include: 
“We do co-operate with (anonymous company), now I think about it. So, we make 
some of our pottery at (anonymous company). I think there is a little bit of co-
operation there because they make for us, and I think we have had some decorations 
as well” (C). 
 
“We’ve all been around each other’s factories. I’ve been around every pottery in 
Stoke except (anonymous company). So there is co-operation there, or at least it’s 
not hidden” (B). 
 
“They [Mfs.] would arrange for instance, factory tours so you would have gone and 
visited (anonymous company and anonymous company).You wouldn’t show anybody 
around the factory now from within the industry. Simply due to what you think is 
competition” (F). 
 
 
As in the previous section, this is evidence of co-operation, albeit informal. This kind of 
informal co-operation is another example of a ‘strong tie’, i.e. ties between agents of great 
similarity, such ties can lead to an increase in opportunities for knowledge exchange (Arikan, 
2009). It is also evidence of knowledge-creating opportunities, which may lead to innovation. 
However, according to the academic literature, strong ties offer a great depth of knowledge 
but little diversity (Lorentzen, 2008). It is weak ties that are thought to be more valuable, i.e. 
they call existing knowledge into question and add new elements leading to innovation 
(Julien et al., 2004). Consequently, based on the academic literature, relationships that can 
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be classed as strong ties in the SOT cluster are assumed to provide only low-medium 
benefits with regard to innovation. 
 
 
6.4.3: Interview Findings on Co-operation on Process Innovations (see Appendices 12 
(Q2) and 19) 
When asked about co-operation on process innovations (Q2) the responses varied. Three 
interviewees (D, F and B) stated that firms did co-operate on process innovations, and two 
interviewees (A and C) stated that firms didn’t co-operate on process innovations. 
Interviewees were asked to give reasons why they thought ceramics manufacturers did not 
co-operate on process innovations. The main reason given was that ceramics firms prefer to 
‘do their own thing’, because what they do is different to what everybody else does. These 
findings support the results of the innovation questionnaire (see Table 6.4), where three 
respondents stated that they did work with other firms on their process innovations and three 
respondents stated that they developed their process innovations alone. Examples of 
interview responses include: 
“There’s a mad scramble at the moment for entry into digital direct printing. I was at 
Ambiente132 in February and we [ceramics mfs.] were all on the same stand looking 
at the same kind of products. But, we are not talking to anybody, you know, any of 
our competitors about it, we are doing our own thing with it and suspect that they do 
the same thing as well” (A). 
 
“We are more inclined to do our thing ourselves. It’s not through a kind of isolationist 
approach, it’s just because what we do is so different from what everybody else 
does” (C). 
 
 
The available evidence here supports the earlier findings (see 6.4.3) that SOT ceramics 
manufacturers possibly view themselves as close competitors and, whilst this may be 
beneficial for innovation, it may not be that beneficial for co-operation in the SOT cluster. 
 
 
                                                 
132 Ambiente is an annual leading international trade fair for consumer goods, held in Frankfurt, Germany. Source: Ambiente. (2017), 
Ambiente The Show, [Online]. Available from: http://ambiente.messefrankfurt.com/frankfurt/en/besucher/messeprofil.html [Accessed 2 
July 2017] 
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When asked to identify ways that they thought ceramics manufacturers co-operated with 
other firms on process innovations, several interviewees replied that the main way firms co-
operate is with suppliers (B and F). Individual firms work with suppliers and technology and 
knowledge transfer takes place indirectly from natural diffusion within the cluster, i.e. through 
contact with those same suppliers over time. The evidence indicates that, although SOT 
ceramic manufacturers do not work with each other on process technologies, they may 
benefit over time from each other’s technology investments. Examples of responses include: 
“Because we are a cluster, most of the pieces of machinery are from local firms, e.g. 
kilns. For example, last year we put in a new kiln, the new technology put into that 
will get transmitted elsewhere, and you know it will” (B). 
 
“This company I’m working with now on producing this new body. It’s a stronger body 
so the benefit for this guy working with me is that as a small company I might not be 
going to be buying big volumes of it, but if that system works, he’s then got a 
fantastic opportunity to market that to loads of people. So, the benefits are there, it’s 
a win-win for both of us, that’s why it works” (F). 
 
 
These examples are possible evidence of ‘weak ties’ (Lorentzen, 2008) that, according to 
the strategic management literature, may lead to knowledge creation. Moreover, the 
evidence also indicates possible knowledge exchange opportunities (Arikan, 2009) and 
cluster/agglomeration benefits (Porter, 1990; Dei Ottati, 1994; Camagni, 2002). Hence, co-
operation with suppliers is seen as another possible strength of the SOT cluster. 
 
 
6.4.4: Interview Findings on Co-operation With Other Non-ceramic Manufacturers and 
Other Institutions (see Appendices 12 (Q3) and 19) 
When asked about co-operation in general with other non-ceramic firms and other 
institutions, five out of six interviewees replied that co-operation was taking place between 
ceramics manufacturers and other firms and institutions. It appears that the main way firms 
co-operate is through membership of various trade associations, e.g. the BCC (formerly 
called BCMF), and with industry specific local research companies, e.g. Lucideon (formerly 
CERAM). These types of ties can be classed as ‘strong’, e.g. the BCC is an agent of great 
similarity as their sole purpose is to support the ceramics industry. However, it is not 
disclosed how many SOT cluster firms are members of these various trade/research 
associations. The evidence from the secondary data, presented in chapter five of this thesis 
(see chapter 5.5.2), indicates that it is mostly the largest firms in the SOT cluster who are 
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members of these associations. Overall, the evidence indicates that many of the SOT 
cluster’s ceramic manufacturers take part in knowledge exchange activities with non-ceramic 
firms and institutions that benefit at least the largest firms in the cluster. However, the 
evidence here also conflicts somewhat with evidence from the questionnaire responses (see 
table 6.12), where only one respondent (A) answered that their company engaged in formal 
and informal relationships with trade and other professional associations. Interestingly, this 
may be because other respondents may not perceive such relationships as co-operation. 
Examples of responses include: 
“Well, we’re all part of the BCMF (BCC) which is a good talking shop and where it 
benefits us we will co-operate” (B). 
 
“Yes, at the confederation BCMF (BCC). This again, you know, these people who sit 
on the board at BCMF, I’m not one of them but they are from different 
companies….there was a meeting last Friday…..and (anonymous company and 
anonymous company) also had people walk in for the actual meeting, so they’re all 
there together in a common room, talking about common interests. They [ceramics 
mfs.] all sit on various committees, I just think they have never really understood 
what they’re doing is co-operating. The same goes for Lucideon, which used to be 
called Ceram, and Ceram was basically kept going by the industry. We paid the 
membership fee, you got 70 days of their time and ideas, that were shared, and so I 
just think the industry is always as they used to be. I myself used to be a director at 
ACTD [Association for Ceramic Training Development] as it was called, the ceramic 
training center” (D). 
 
 
The second example of how cluster firms co-operate with other firms and institutions is co-
operation with suppliers. This is not the same co-operation with suppliers on process 
innovations as mentioned previously (see 6.3.2 and 6.4.2), here co-operation is mainly on 
developing inputs, such as glazes and decorations, and on purchasing. Some cluster firms 
buy inputs together, e.g. clay, there are even some cluster firms who own a clay/milling 
company between them. Co-operation of this type is identified in the academic literature as 
beneficial to cluster firms, i.e. they can gain early access to inputs, and this is an important 
cluster benefit (Porter, 1990), or agglomeration benefit (Glaeser, 2010). The third example of 
co-operation between cluster firms and other firms and institutions is co-operation with 
universities, e.g. on digital printing technologies (company A), albeit mostly for information 
purposes (see also tables 6.10 and 6.11). This is another example of a ‘weak’ tie (Lorentzen, 
2008). These three examples provide good evidence of knowledge creating opportunities 
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and potential knowledge exchanges within the SOT cluster. Moreover, this type of 
knowledge is what Porter (1990) calls ‘advanced factor conditions’ and can contribute 
significantly to competitive advantage, providing firms continue to invest in and upgrade their 
advantages. The final example is co-operation with overseas manufacturers of ceramics 
products, mainly resulting from some SOT cluster firms outsourcing production overseas. 
This is evidence of external (outside the cluster) knowledge exchange and possibly ‘new’ 
knowledge entering the cluster, which is viewed as important to the survival of a cluster in 
the academic literature (see chapter 2.4.8). However, whilst this should bring about more 
opportunities for knowledge exchange, it appears that more knowledge may have left the 
SOT cluster than entered it, as evidenced by the significant loss of jobs in the industry due to 
some of the largest firms relocating production (see chapter 4.2.1). Examples of interview 
responses include: 
“You know, I’ve been here for 20 something years and when the market changes you 
might need some input in that area, you go and seek it out and those relationships 
are formed and I think that’s happened fairly recent with digital printing. You know, 
because it’s a new exciting innovative area. So, we’ve kind of engaged with 
universities that are actually doing research projects in that area, just so we 
understand what’s going on” (A). 
 
“I know people who buy together. There are some people [ceramics mfs.] who own 
one of the clay companies together. We are neither of those… but there are, I know, 
people doing both of those things” (C). 
 
“I think, you know, in the last 20 years, there has been enormous co-operation with 
overseas manufacturers. Because people like Doulton, and Wedgwood in particular, 
who were seen as the kind of policy, you know. So they co-operated with lots of 
manufacturers and basically exported that expertise and where has it got them” (F). 
 
 
As previously identified, the evidence indicates both strong and weak ties, including possible 
new ‘external’ knowledge which is said to be beneficial to innovation and knowledge creation 
in clusters (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009; Lorenzen and 
Mudambi, 2013). However, the evidence also indicates that knowledge is leaving the SOT 
cluster, and this is possibly detrimental to the cluster as it reduces cluster/agglomeration 
benefits. 
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Interviewees were asked to give examples of ways or reasons how/why firms might not co-
operate with other firms and institutions. One interviewee (D) stated that “the industry won’t 
get together for more training”. Apparently, the need for co-operation on training arises 
because most firms do not have enough trainees to run their own training course. Most local 
universities, and further and higher education colleges, require an approximate number of 15 
students per cohort to make delivering a course viable. Thus, the evidence indicates that this 
is an area where cluster firms could co-operate with each other and, collectively, with local 
educational institutions. The implications are that there is potential demand for training in the 
SOT cluster, and perhaps too for a coordinator (possibly from a university or college) to work 
with cluster firms in this respect. As mentioned in the academic literature (chapter 2, Table 
2.1), training and education are considered as ‘higher order’ skills (Porter, 1990) and can 
contribute towards a cluster’s competitive advantage and, therefore, this is seen as an 
opportunity for the SOT cluster. Another example given by interviewees for not co-operating 
is firm size, i.e. small firms tend to do most things in-house. One small firm (F) said that they 
had used a research company in the past, but the technology hadn’t worked for them and 
that it had cost too much. Examples of responses include: 
“I’m frustrated at it, as a matter of fact, that the industry won’t get together for more 
training. Because we’ve all got similar issues……..we’ve all got our own personal 
recipes, we’re all using slightly different bodies and different mixtures and different 
whatevers, but the bottom line is, clay is clay. The techniques are almost exactly the 
same. There’s nobody big enough in the city, I believe, that could put 15 people on a 
course like that. So we should co-operate” (D). 
 
“You know, we’ve not used outside resources because when I have used it in the 
past, I found that the actual technology and processes didn’t work for us. At one time 
I used Ceram, good people, you know, the expert of ceramic industry, we used them 
to develop an angle and it was useless. Yes, it didn’t work, they didn’t do the job. 
They never came back and never followed it through. For them, they’d be getting 
paid so much for doing it” (F). 
 
 
The evidence indicates that, although there is some evidence of co-operation and thus 
cluster benefits, there are further opportunities for cluster firms to co-operate, e.g. in 
organising collective training that would provide additional cluster benefits (Porter, 1990). In 
addition, such collective initiatives could also possibly help to build trust between firms in the 
cluster, as well as potentially lowering transaction costs (Glaser, 1992; Rosenfeld, 1997; 
Bianchi, 1993). 
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6.4.5: Interview Findings on Whether SOT Manufacturers Co-operate More or Less 
Now than they did 10 Years Ago (see Appendices 12 (Q4) and 19) 
When asked whether SOT manufacturers co-operate more or less now than they did 10 
years ago, five out of six interview respondents replied less and only one firm (B) replied 
more. Firm ‘B’ stated that the reason why firms co-operated more now was “because 
Wedgwood has gone and now the BCC pulls us together more tightly” and that helps co-
operation. Apparently, the main reason why firms co-operate less now is because of 
increased competition, globally and locally (A and E). Local competition is considered to be 
intense, mainly due to the difficult times the industry has been through over recent years, 
and because cluster firms may now perceive each other as competitors (E). Other reasons 
given for not co-operating are a general lack of trust between cluster firms (A) and to protect 
ideas and innovations (A, E and F). One respondent implied that it was the family ownership 
structure of some firms, which may have led to mistrust (E), although the evidence 
presented in chapter five of this thesis indicates that family ownership in the SOT cluster is 
much lower now than it was in the 1960s and 1970s (see chapter 5.5). Examples of 
responses include: 
“Less local competitors but you know on the global stage, there’s many more people 
entered the industry. You know, from lots of different countries that weren’t even on 
the radar before. You know, these countries are making quality products. So I think 
competition’s actually increased and I think that’s forced people into being much 
more protective about letting their competitors see what their activities are and what 
their…” (A). 
 
“I think nobody trusts anybody basically. I think there’s just been a long history of, 
you know, general mistrust of anybody else’s activity and you know and a rise to kind 
of steal” (A). 
 
“I think it was as if the shrinking of the industry almost made you just kind of close 
your ranks in effect because, you know, it was just your business that wanted to 
survive and it was very much - if we are surviving, it’s only about surviving” (E). 
 
“It’s always described as a peculiar industry and I don’t know whether it might be the 
fact as well, that it was very much owned by families. So, you know, it was the 
Dudson’s, the Ropers at Churchill…and it was almost like, you know, it’s the case of 
‘I know I’m better than you’….and, you know, they were almost like kids at times” (E).   
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The evidence presented here links to a previous section in this chapter, where competitive 
rivalry is discussed (see 6.4.2), and further supports the view that SOT ceramics 
manufacturers see themselves as competitors. Whilst this may be good for product 
innovation, the evidence also indicates that ceramics firms do not trust each other, and this 
is not thought to be beneficial to the competitive advantage of the cluster as a whole. 
According to the strategic management literature, trust is important in creating and 
sustaining collaboration between economic actors within clusters (Maskell, 2001; Newlands, 
2003). Moreover, social trust is more likely to be sustained in geographically concentrated 
networks than more dispersed ones (Belussi, 1996; Lorenzen, 2002; Newlands, 2003). 
However, as identified, the evidence gathered from the interviews clearly indicates that SOT 
firms do not trust each other and, therefore, a lack of trust is identified as a possible 
weakness of the cluster.  
 
 
6.4.6: Interview Findings on Areas Where SOT manufacturers could Co-operate (See 
Appendix 19) 
Interviewees were asked to identify areas where they thought they could work more closely 
together. Interestingly, only one interviewee (E) answered this question. This is possibly a 
further indicator of a lack of co-operation in the cluster. In addition to co-operating on training 
(see 6.4.3), the respondent said that he  thought they could work more closely together in 
the supply chain, e.g. to possibly backward integrate elements of the supply chain by 
manufacturing some equipment together, and by getting together to promote ‘made in Stoke-
on-Trent’ (E). Examples of responses include: 
“Yeah, definitely, it’s the supply chain, so that’s the glaze manufacturers, refractory 
manufacturing, colour supply, colour technology, because all of that supply chain’s 
just disappeared. Things like ceramic and kiln furniture, what used to be five or six 
manufacturers in Stoke-on-Trent, there are none now, it’s all imported by one firm. 
I’m sure there’s an opportunity, if we did get together, to set up manufacturing in 
Stoke-on-Trent of ceramic and kiln furniture, by all of us putting some money in. We 
could see benefits from that ship by being in control over what they sell rather than 
the third party being in control only to put their margin on” (E).  
 
“But you see, I think, I do believe that the industry would be stronger if we all got 
together and did a big thing about making in Stoke-on-Trent. But, you know, there’s 
got to be strength in made in Stoke-on-Trent. Stoke-on-Trent likes to sell itself as a 
city as the world capital of ceramics. If that’s the situation shouldn’t we all be singing 
from the rooftops that we’re in Stoke-on-Trent?” (E). 
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The implications here are that SOT cluster firms and related/supporting firms have an 
opportunity to co-operate more on the issues identified above. For example, greater co-
operation in supply chain initiatives, and in promoting the ‘made in Stoke-on-Trent’ brand, 
would not only increase opportunities for knowledge exchange (Arikan, 2009), it would also 
increase cluster benefits (Porter, 1990). Opportunities for the SOT cluster are discussed 
further in the conclusions section of this chapter, and also in the main research conclusions 
chapter of this thesis where they are linked to recommendations (see chapter 7.4-7.5). 
 
 
6.4.7: Interview Findings on Whether SOT Manufacturers see Themselves as a Cluster 
(see Appendices 12 (Q5) and 19) 
The final question on co-operation asked whether interviewees thought that SOT ceramics 
manufacturers saw themselves as a whole industry cluster. Only three interviewees 
answered this question. Two respondents (A and D) thought that firms did see themselves 
as belonging to one industry cluster, and one firm (E) said no, “definitely not”. When asked 
for reasons why some firms may not see themselves as part of a cluster, two interviewees 
replied: 
“It’s like there’s not enough companies to achieve critical mass….I think companies 
tend to work much more in isolation now than they have in the past” (A). 
 
“You see, they see themselves certainly as individuals and ‘we are going to do better 
than (anonymous company)’ or ‘better than (anonymous company)’ or ‘better than 
(anonymous company)’, they definitely see themselves as that” (E). 
 
 
The evidence indicates that some SOT cluster firms do not see themselves as part of an 
industry cluster, possibly because the industry is below critical mass. Identity as part of an 
industry cluster is similar to the concept of ‘shared vision’ (Exposito-Langa et al., 2015; 
Tomlinson and Branston, 2017), whereby cluster members who share a vision are more 
likely to influence local industry issues and initiatives, and are possibly more likely to co-
operate. The lack of shared vision in the SOT cluster is seen as a potential weakness of the 
cluster and a possible threat to the cluster’s future survival. Later in this chapter, some 
possible reasons, linked to dominant firm effects, are given for why SOT firms may not see 
themselves as part of a cluster (see 6.6.1-6.6.3). 
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6.5: Interview Findings on Views on Innovation Opportunities and other 
Success Factors for SOT Firms (See Appendices 12 (section 3) and 19) 
From the interview responses to various questions, several areas were identified as future 
knowledge creating opportunities for SOT cluster firms. The first area is product innovation, 
as materials that are required to make ceramics are capable of being combined in many 
different (new) ways to produce new product ideas. Innovation is viewed in the strategic 
management literature as a key contributor to sustained competitive advantage (e.g. Porter, 
1990; Sanches et al., 1996). One interviewee said: 
“The great thing about ceramics is just how much you can push the material. You 
know, it’s a fantastic medium for constant innovations, there are always new ways of 
doing things, different combinations of things that can come together. There’s always 
a chance you’ll steal a march on your competitors by coming up with some magic 
formula, not just in terms of chemistry but in terms of you know, shape and design 
innovation” (A).   
 
 
Another area where SOT firms contribute towards knowledge creation is by having a strong 
individual identity and by focusing on a specific niche in the market. As previously stated in 
chapter 4 (see 4.4.3) SOT cluster firms tend to operate in separate market niches and they 
innovate within those niches. Further evidence that SOT cluster firms follow niche strategies 
was found in interview responses. For example: 
“I think that is indicative of the people that survived because they found a niche. They 
stuck to it and they fine-tuned it, they’ve honed it and they’ve innovated within that 
niche. They’ve got a strong identity and it’s the thing that people buy into. I think the 
companies that survive are the ones that have had a very strong sense of self and 
purpose and that’s something, people don’t buy pots, they buy a dream or they buy, 
you know, the romance of the product, they buy the sizzle not the sausage” (A). 
 
“We’re still here today, particularly in niche companies like the table work, the hotel 
work, companies who still choose particular countries that really have a huge market 
to go at. It is a growing market, you know. They get fantastic margin off the product. 
They are not dealing directly with retail because that’s hard, you’ve got to make sure 
that retail has a good margin. So, that is the difference between their business and 
ours and that’s why they have enormous success, when that’s finally done really well, 
you know” (F). 
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Niche strategies are further evidence of differentiation for cluster firms. According to the 
strategic management literature, differentiation strategies enlarge local capabilities and pave 
the way for new development and growth trajectories (Brenner, 2005; Belussi and Sedita, 
2009). Overall, innovation, differentiation and niche strategies are identified as strengths for 
the SOT cluster. 
 
 
6.5.1: Competition in the SOT Cluster 
Niche strategies are evidence that cluster firms do not necessarily compete directly with 
each other. This is an important point as strong local competition is seen as a driver of 
innovation in the academic literature. For example, according to Porter (1990), strong 
domestic rivalry (competition) promotes upgrading of the entire cluster through new entrants 
and innovation. Not only does the increased number of firms provide greater competition for 
new ideas, greater competition across firms can facilitate the entry of new firms specialising 
in particular product niches (Jacobs, 1969; Dei Ottati, 1996). However, in addition to 
providing evidence of cluster firms niche strategies, chapter four of this thesis also found that 
there had been very few new entrants into the SOT cluster since 1960 (see 4.3.5), and this 
is not seen as beneficial for the long-term survival of the cluster. 
 
 
Further supporting evidence that SOT cluster firms do not compete directly with each other 
is provided by the interview responses. Only one interviewee (A) stated that their key 
competitors were local, but they also stated that they had many overseas competitors too. 
The majority of interviewees stated that they were mainly competing with overseas 
competitors (A, B, D, E), and also with firms in other industries for consumer disposable 
income, e.g. holiday companies or electronics companies (A). Examples from interview 
responses include: 
“Less local competitors but you know on the global stage, there’s many more people 
entered the industry. You know, from lots of different countries that weren’t even on 
the radar before. You know, these countries are making quality products, so I think 
competition has actually increased, and I think that has forced people into being 
much more protective about letting their competitors see what their activities are. A 
lot of pottery manufacturers are actually competing with holiday companies or 
electronics companies, their biggest competitor problem is Apple or Samsung. You 
know, that is the reality of it” (A). 
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“No, we don’t really compete with any them (other SOT ceramics firms) much. 
They’re bigger and more mechanised than us. So, we’re both kind of non-competitive 
or committed that easily to each other” (C). 
 
“We don’t have any competitors in the UK, we’ve got one in Germany, one in France. 
You know, we don’t really compete with anybody in Stoke” (D). 
 
“We haven’t got a lot of competition because we are kind of in a niche with our supply 
really, but we’ve got (anonymous company) which I think is another small business. 
They import product from China and they decorate in the UK” (E). 
 
 
The evidence indicates that SOT cluster firms do not directly compete with each other and, 
according to the academic literature (Porter, 1990), this is not good for innovation. However, 
the evidence from the interviews also indicates that, whilst SOT cluster firms clearly state 
that their main competitors are not local, they do appear to view each other as competitors. 
This is evident from responses made in earlier sections of this chapter regarding cluster 
firms general mistrust of each other and reluctance to co-operate (see 6.4.2, 6.4.5 and 
6.4.6). It is also evident from the responses that cluster firms fiercely protect their intellectual 
property from each other to avoid having their ideas stolen or copied. According to the 
academic literature, “rivals located close to each other often tend to be jealous and 
emotional competitors” (Porter, 1990: 157). Consequently, from the evidence, whilst cluster 
firms acknowledge that they are not competing directly with each other, they do behave as if 
they are in fierce competition with each other. This factor could be a key driver of product 
innovation in the SOT cluster, and an explanation for the high levels of product innovations 
made by cluster firms (see 6.3.1). Further examples from interviewee responses include: 
“I think nobody trusts anybody basically. I think there’s just been a long history of, 
you know, general mistrust of anybody else’s activity and you know a rise to kind of 
steal” (A). 
 
“That culture is there, that by sharing, you almost say well, I don’t want them to have 
my ideas because my ideas made me survive, I don’t want to pass them on or show 
people” (E). 
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6.6: Interview Findings on Power, Control and the Role of Dominant Firms in 
the SOT Cluster 
The next section is presented in two parts: first, the interview responses to questions about 
the role of the SOT cluster’s past dominant firms, specifically Wedgwood and Doulton, are 
presented133 (Q6 and Q7); second, the interview responses to questions about the role of 
the SOT cluster’s current dominant firms are presented (Q9). Accompanying examples of 
responses are integrated throughout. 
 
 
6.6.1: Interview Findings on the Effects of the Cluster’s Past Dominant Firms 
(Wedgwood and Doulton) on the rest of the SOT Cluster (Q6) 
Interviewee responses to this question were expressed as advantages or disadvantages that 
Wedgwood and Doulton brought to the rest of the SOT cluster. Two interviewees responded 
that by having such large companies in the locale everybody benefited, i.e. because it was 
good for service industries, e.g. clay suppliers, glaze suppliers, colour suppliers and 
machinery suppliers (A and D). Similarly, another interviewee replied that having such a 
heavy ballast to the cluster made it a cluster because of the gravitational pull, and other firms 
(potters and suppliers) would come and set up there (B). Wedgwood and Doulton were also 
thought to be very good for employment and skills in the industry (A and D), e.g. Doulton 
employed approximately 3,000 people in its Nile Street factory at its peak. Training is stated 
as another advantage that Wedgwood and Doulton brought to the cluster, e.g. because they 
had large training budgets they could afford to put on training courses and other pottery firms 
could send some of their employees to join those courses (C). According to one interviewee 
(E): “they trained a lot of people and we have all benefited. They probably kept the college 
courses going”. This view was supported by another respondent (C) who commented “Well, 
at least they trained brilliant craftsmen. So, yes, they were very, very useful”.  
 
 
Another advantage that Wedgwood and Doulton brought to the SOT cluster is that they set 
industry standards, e.g. levels of productivity and quality that gave the rest of the industry 
something to aspire to (E). Wedgwood and Doulton are also said to have been innovators in 
the industry and that their innovations brought benefits to other cluster firms (E). For 
example, they would work with institutions like CERAM (now Lucideon), or with machinery 
manufacturers, on innovations such as printing processes and pressure casting, eventually 
                                                 
133 Note: although, in a sense, the role of the SOT cluster’s past dominant firms no longer matters to the assessment of the cluster’s 
current competitive position. However, it may help in explaining the previous situation and in charting a way forward. 
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the new innovations would be available to other cluster firms (E). A final advantage that 
interviewees stated was ‘reputation’, both for the industry and for Stoke-on-Trent (B and E). 
Examples of responses include: 
“Well, I suppose a heavy ballast to the cluster makes it a cluster because of the 
gravitational pull. It’s like, I’m here, I’m big, I’m important, I can employ these people, 
come in and set up then. You can steal employees off that, or maybe processes or 
ideas, or the same supply chain. So, it’s important to have the heavyweight ones in 
the middle. They bring that benefit, they bring the reputational benefit, but really, they 
bring the supply chain and the skill base benefit more than anything” (B). 
 
“They used to do a lot of training in the old days, we used to get everyone really 
trained by them. Because they had huge training budgets…..you know, Nile Street 
had 3,000 people working there” (C). 
 
“They are a brand.  If somebody says Royal Doulton, or Wedgwood, people know 
that straight away don’t they. Whether people would know straight away they’re from 
Stoke-on-Trent, I don’t know. If it was in the internet, if you put Wedgwood in Google 
say, it would say Stoke-on-Trent wouldn’t it” (E). 
 
 
The advantages stated above all appear to have happened prior to the period of 
consolidation that happened in the industry and can be linked to cluster/agglomeration 
benefits (Porter, 1990). Although Wedgwood was established circa 1770s and Doulton circa 
1880s, both firms would have contributed to the stock of cluster benefits that would have 
built up in the cluster over time. The strategic management literature also provides evidence 
that the emergence of large dominant firms within a cluster can lead to new investment in 
technology on a scale which might not have been undertaken by smaller firms (Lazonick, 
1993; Belso, 2010), and this is what appears to have happened in the SOT cluster.  
 
 
In addition to the advantages stated above, all interviewees stated a number of 
disadvantages that they thought Wedgwood and Doulton brought to the SOT cluster. The 
biggest disadvantage is that Wedgwood and Doulton are thought to have done significant 
damage to the industry (cluster) by eliminating all of their own major competitors, i.e. by 
acquiring them or shutting them down (B, C, D, F). According to one interviewee (D), “after 
acquisition ‘they’ sold the land, then liquidised assets and they moved the production to 
Wedgwood [or Doulton] or to overseas”. Similarly, interviewee (B) stated “Wedgwood 
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swallowed up 54 brand names. So that was a disadvantage”. Another interviewee could see 
no benefits to ceramic firms who were not part of the two big groups (D). One of the 
outcomes of Wedgwood and Doulton’s huge size was that they became too big and too 
inflexible and “they didn’t spot the changes in habits and tastes because they were too big to 
notice” (C). With reference to outsourcing of production, one interviewee (A) stated 
Wedgwood and Doulton had “taken the manufacturing heart out of the UK and put it 
somewhere else”. Moreover, it is when the industry started to struggle, that Wedgwood and 
Doulton are thought to have been particularly detrimental to the industry because they were 
“too long waking up to the fact that the industry had changed” (D). It is also thought that the 
management made many wrong decisions that ended up costing the industry a lot of jobs 
(D). Further examples of responses include134: 
“There were no advantages, they had a negative effect. Because what you got is two 
big players, and they were both vying with each other for dominance. What they did 
was, any small independent company that came up for sale or they wanted to buy, 
they would buy them. As a consequence, the whole of Stoke-on-Trent was either 
owned by Doulton or Wedgwood. All these great little companies became part of the 
overall Wedgwood brand, or the overall Doulton brand. Often they just destroyed 
them really and of course, you know, they [acquired firms] were not independent 
anymore. They were not making their own decisions so, as a consequence, you get a 
pretty bland environment, and non-competitive, and it just wasn’t healthy for Stoke. 
Not innovative enough you know, because often those factories had their very own 
fashion as well” (F). 
 
“And then you know, taking the manufacturing heart out of the UK and putting it 
somewhere else. People buy the history and the romance around the product rather 
than the product itself, and if you have not got that anymore, you haven’t really got a 
product and I think that was something that got lost in that era” (A). 
 
 
The evidence above clearly indicates that Wedgwood and Doulton were responsible for a 
significant reduction in the number of firms in the SOT cluster. According to Porter (1990), a 
reduction in the number of firms in a cluster results in a reduction in competition, and thus 
reduces the overall innovative capacity of a cluster (Porter, 1990). Consequently, 
                                                 
134 Note: the responses in these two quotes could indicate potential interviewee bias. However, the two firms ‘A’ and ‘F’ are the largest 
and the smallest in the survey and, although they are not examples of deliberate ‘extreme’ or ‘deviant case’ sampling (Patton, 1990), as 
originally intended (see chapter 3.6.4), they are examples of extremes and thus potential interviewee bias should be minimal.  
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consolidation and firm closures in the SOT cluster are viewed as a reduction in knowledge 
creating opportunities and therefore are considered as a weakness of the cluster. 
 
 
6.6.2: Interview Findings on Reasons Why Wedgwood and Doulton Acquired so many 
Pottery Companies between 1960 and 1990. 
This section explores further possible reasons why Wedgwood and Doulton acquired so 
many local companies between 1960 and 1990 (Q7). The main reason given by 
interviewees for the many acquisitions during the period in question is ‘elimination of their 
competitors’ (C, D, F), i.e. Wedgwood and Doulton bought firms to shut them down (C and 
F). Another reason was that motives for the acquisitions could have been profit led, i.e. a 
way of investing surplus funds with the aim of making cost savings (E). In addition, by 
picking well-known brands, Wedgwood and Doulton could extend their range and increase 
their sales without having to invest a lot of money in new product development (B, D and E). 
Furthermore, because Wedgwood and Doulton were competing against each other, each 
vying for dominance, making acquisitions was a way of getting more market share. 
Consequently, much of the SOT ceramics cluster was owned, eventually, by either Doulton 
or Wedgwood (F). Examples of responses include: 
“It was a campaign to get rid of competition and simultaneously they then put in the 
hands of too few players some decision making, like outsourcing manufacturing to 
Indonesia and Malaysia, all those places that basically completely trashed the jobs 
here” (C). 
 
“Because they could. I think it was driven by cost efficiency, which is to feed the big 
factory. Also, taking the brand names, because they didn’t want other people to do it 
and because they wanted to put the volume production through. Nowadays the same 
reasons would apply but I think the profit motive would be stronger” (B).  
 
 
As mentioned previously, the strategic management literature identifies positive and 
negative implications of dominant firms within a cluster (e.g. Porter, 1990; Sacchetti and 
Sugden, 2003; Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). For example, the networks of direction 
model (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009) raises particular concerns for clusters, primarily 
relating to a cluster becoming locked-in to the objectives and strategic direction of a few or 
even a single firm and, from the evidence, this appears to be the case with Wedgwood and 
Doulton. Moreover, the findings here can possibly be linked to earlier evidence of mistrust 
between firms in the SOT cluster, as Wedgwood and Doulton’s dominance over the industry 
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may possibly have been a contributing factor, given the damage they appear to have caused 
the SOT cluster. Overall, the net effect was to leave the cluster in a much weakened state. 
 
 
6.6.3: Interview Findings on the Effects of Wedgwood and Doulton’s Acquisitions on 
Acquired Firms and on the rest of the SOT Cluster. 
This section examines the effects of Wedgwood and Doulton’s acquisition strategies on the 
acquired firms, and on the rest of the SOT cluster (Q7). Although there is some overlap 
between the effects of acquisitions and the disadvantages that Wedgwood and Doulton 
brought to the SOT cluster (discussed in the previous section), the intention here is not to 
repeat material but rather to build upon the argument that the two firms, in later years, were 
not good for the SOT ceramics cluster. 
 
 
The common view from the interviewees is that Wedgwood and Doulton’s acquisition 
strategies did a significant amount of damage to the industry overall. One of the biggest 
effects was the elimination of competition in the SOT cluster (C, E and F). A consequence of 
less competition locally is a “bland environment that is not innovative enough” (F). In addition 
to damaging the SOT cluster overall, two respondents (A and F) also thought that 
Wedgwood and Doulton had damaged the firms that they acquired by diluting their brands, 
e.g. the acquired firms could no longer make their own decisions, they lost their own 
identities and became weaker for it. Moreover, Wedgwood and Doulton shut down many of 
the companies that they acquired, e.g. Masons and Enoch Wedgwood, thus further reducing 
competition in the cluster. A further significant negative effect on the cluster was identified as 
the loss of many jobs and specialised skills within the SOT cluster when Wedgwood, who 
had acquired Doulton in 2005, went into receivership in 2009. It also appears that any 
knowledge that Wedgwood and Doulton obtained from the firms that they acquired, was not 
shared with the rest of the SOT cluster. For example: 
“I will say no, they didn’t share knowledge. They were incredibly protective, you 
know. It was like a closed shop really” (F).  
 
 
From the evidence, it appears that Wedgwood and Doulton, who were once two strengths of 
the SOT cluster had, in later years, become a weakness of the cluster through negatively 
affecting competition, innovation, skills (knowledge) and the supply base. The overall result 
was a reduction in knowledge creating opportunities in the cluster. Thus, the findings 
presented here support the findings in chapter five of this thesis (see chapter 5.6.2). 
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In addition to the negative effects of Wedgwood and Doulton’s acquisition strategies, 
interviewees did identify some positive effects for acquired firms. Firstly, by being part of a 
group, acquired firms who performed badly in any given year, e.g. they didn’t make a profit, 
were supported by Wedgwood or Doulton (D). However, this advantage is considered to 
have been only a short-term benefit, given the demise of Wedgwood and Doulton and the 
loss of thousands of jobs in the two companies. Another benefit was the investment that 
Wedgwood and Doulton made into their factories and into new technologies (D) which, as 
mentioned previously, may have resulted in knowledge eventually spilling out to other firms 
in the SOT cluster. Finally, when asked whether they thought Wedgwood and Doulton had 
been good for the SOT ceramics cluster overall, the majority of interviewees said that they 
didn’t think that they had been good for the cluster (A, C and F). One firm (D) said “in some 
ways, yes. In some ways, no”. Only one firm (E) thought that Wedgwood and Doulton had 
definitely been good for the SOT cluster. Further examples of responses include: 
“We know that both did huge damage to the industry. Wedgwood and Doulton got rid 
of all of the major competitors and did massive damage of shutting down companies 
like Mason’s or like that. So I think, you know, very bad” (C). 
 
“Wedgwood did invest a lot of money into the factories that probably wouldn’t have 
happened without them. You know, new technology back then, I mean, it wasn’t a 
very technological industry back then and it still isn’t now, really. But where there 
were opportunities, Wedgwood invested in all the factories, not just in Barlaston” (D). 
 
“There’s less competition. Competition can be a good thing and a bad thing, can’t it? 
It would’ve been less competition but certainly they should’ve taken advantage of that 
being a big manufacturer. They should’ve been able to really drive efficiency” (E).  
 
 
The evidence presented above is strongly linked to earlier sections in this chapter, i.e. to the 
findings on positive and negative aspects of dominant firms in clusters. For example, 
Wedgwood and Doulton’s contribution to cluster/agglomeration benefits has been discussed 
in section 6.6.1 and some effects on competition, innovation and knowledge creating 
opportunities are discussed in 6.6.1 and 6.6.2. The conclusions section of this chapter 
provides a more detailed discussion, in light of theory, of the positive and negative aspects 
of Wedgwood and Doulton’s reign over the SOT cluster. The overall conclusion in this 
section though is that Wedgwood and Doulton provided many cluster benefits to the SOT 
cluster in the early part of their reign, but also were responsible for a significant reduction in 
cluster benefits in their latter years up to 2009. 
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6.6.4 The SOT Cluster’s New Dominant Firms 
Interviewees were asked for their views on the role of the SOT clusters ‘new’ dominant firms 
(e.g. Steelite, Portmeirion, Churchill and Dudson. See chapter 4.2.3). From the responses, 
the main role identified for the cluster’s largest firms is to bring strength and stability to the 
cluster (A, B, C and D), which can be achieved by firms being successful and, as a result, 
confidence in the industry will rise, along with the reputation of Stoke-on-Trent and its 
ceramic brands (A and E). Confidence in the industry would also ensure that suppliers would 
remain in business and their products and services would then be available to everyone in 
the cluster (A). One interviewee said “we’ve tried to be good neighbours” (A). Another (B), 
said that they take a “paternal” role as an employer and also an “ambassadorial” role in that 
they spend a great deal of time talking to the City about various industry issues, the 
outcomes of which may benefit the whole cluster. Firm ‘B’ also said that they saw their role 
in the industry as more of a “lighthouse and a gatekeeper” but that didn’t mean “keeping 
others [ceramics firms] out”. It would also appear from the responses that the current large 
ceramics firms in the SOT cluster have less control over the rest of the industry than 
Wedgwood and Doulton had in the past (B). Further examples of responses include: 
“The biggest thing we can bring to the industry is again stability. You know, the more 
successful we are the more successful everybody around us will be which just brings 
more confidence and stability and if everybody kind of grows along with us, that 
brings other people into the periphery as well” (A). 
 
“Of course, if they’ve kept the industry going in Stoke-on-Trent they’ve done 
something right, and they’re hopefully now becoming more profitable. If then they can 
invest their profits into the business and, whether that be training, marketing their 
businesses, marketing the made in Stoke-on-Trent ceramic brands, that’s going to be 
good, isn’t it? It’s going to be good” (E). 
 
 
From the evidence, it now appears that power and control are much more balanced in the 
SOT cluster, with no one/few firms having control. This can be viewed as a potential strength 
of the current SOT cluster. Moreover, SOT cluster firms also have the opportunity to move 
towards a ‘network of mutual dependence’ structure (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009), 
whereby cluster firms can engage in a series of ongoing economic relationships with each 
other that support and re-enforce co-operation, reciprocity and mutually supportive actions 
across the cluster. 
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6.7: Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter of the research findings has dealt specifically with objectives 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
The key aim of this primary research stage was to determine recent innovation and co-
operation activities of firms in the SOT cluster. Another aim of this stage of the research was 
to determine the role of the SOT cluster’s dominant firms past and present. The primary 
research findings have been presented and interim evaluations and conclusions drawn at 
various sections throughout this chapter. The next section provides more detailed 
conclusions and a summary of strengths, weaknesses opportunities and threats, based on 
the primary research findings. Finally, findings are mapped to relevant sections of the 
theoretical framework (Figure 6.1) and to the objectives (Table 6.14). 
 
 
6.7.1: Conclusions on innovation in the SOT Cluster 2010-2015 
The questionnaire findings, and the evidence from comparisons with the GPrix survey, 
clearly show that SOT survey firms are carrying out high levels of product, process, 
marketing and organisational innovations. The results also show that some SOT firms are 
investing more resources into innovation today than they did in the past, and that they have 
significantly improved their innovation capabilities in recent years. Moreover, the 
questionnaire results on co-operation support the earlier questionnaire findings on product 
and process innovations, where firms replied that they innovated mostly within their own 
enterprise or group on product innovations and only co-operated with suppliers on process 
innovations. 
 
 
From the interview responses it appears that, although SOT cluster firms do not compete 
directly with each other and, as this potentially reduces the intensity of rivalry this may not be 
good for innovation, they actually do see each other as competitors and they fiercely protect 
their innovations and ideas from each other. Thus, the evidence shows that SOT cluster 
firms ‘act’ like close competitors and, providing that their product innovations remain “private 
to the firm for a sustained period” (Porter, 1990; Sanches et al., 1996), this has the potential 
to ensure the long-term success of the cluster. Consequently, strong innovation capabilities 
and output are a key strength of the cluster.  
 
 
Whilst the results of the questionnaire survey show that the largest of the SOT firms spent 
between 1% and 5% of turnover on innovation activities over the period in question, the 
smallest firms spent more, typically 6% to 10% of turnover. The findings here give some 
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weight to the argument that smaller firms often carry out more product innovations than 
larger firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Acs et al., 1994; Klepper, 1997; OECD, 2000; 
Audtretsch, 2002; Hall et al., 2009). Another strength for the SOT cluster is that SOT cluster 
firms appear to be receiving a higher return on their investments, in comparison to GPrix 
survey firms. 
 
 
One relevant finding that emerged from the questionnaire results for innovation is that the 
smaller firms appear to carry out less process innovation than the larger firms, this is 
potentially a weakness for the cluster. However, as discussed in chapter five of this thesis 
(see chapter 5.4.2), smaller firms may not need to carry out significant process innovations 
due to their small size and the low-level technologies that they employ. For example, even 
Emma Bridgewater, who is a relatively large ceramics manufacturer, differentiates on the 
‘hand-made, hand-finished’ nature of their products135. 
 
 
The evidence from the research shows that the majority of SOT survey firms did not 
experience many factors to hamper their innovation activities, and this is viewed as a 
strength of the cluster. However, the evidence also shows that the two smallest firms in the 
survey experienced the most problems with factors delaying innovation. The main factors 
were lack of qualified personnel, lack of information on technology/markets, and 
financing/cost issues. Linked to factors delaying innovation is access to financial support for 
innovation activities. The questionnaire evidence shows that half of the SOT survey firms 
had not received any financial support from government for their innovation activities. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether these firms had applied for financial support. Lack of 
financial support for innovation could be a potential weakness for the SOT cluster. However, 
it is also an opportunity for cluster firms, government and other interested parties to co-
operate on identifying potential sources of financial support and in helping with applications. 
 
 
6.7.2: Conclusions on Co-operation in the SOT Cluster 2010-2015 
Overall, from the questionnaire responses on co-operation, it can be assumed that the level 
of co-operation between SOT survey firms and other enterprises and institutions, be it 
regional, other UK or overseas, is relatively low. The main areas where firms co-operate 
locally are within their own enterprise or group, and with suppliers and customers. Only the 
                                                 
135 Source: interview with Emma Bridgewater representative. January 2017. 
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largest two firms (A and B) and firm ‘D’ appear to co-operate in other UK locations and 
overseas. Moreover, there appears to be more co-operation happening overseas than in 
other UK locations. The main areas of co-operation, regionally and overseas, appear to be 
with suppliers and customers. From the questionnaire responses, the main areas where 
firms do not co-operate are with competitors and other enterprises in their sector, this 
applies to regional, other UK and overseas. However, the interview responses have shown 
that, whilst ceramic firms do co-operate with each other on product innovations, they 
frequently manufacture products for each other when needed, and this is co-operation and 
opportunity for knowledge exchange. Another way that SOT firms appear to co-operate is by 
visiting each other’s factories, although there appears to be less inclination to do this 
currently. Whilst this type of co-operation is informal and ad-hoc, it does provide some 
opportunities for knowledge exchange.  
 
 
Another area where co-operation appears to be fairly low is co-operation with research 
institutes, trade associations and other professional bodies. However, the interview findings 
apparently contradict this result as many interviewees said that they did co-operate with 
trade associations. From the interview evidence, though, it appears to be the biggest firms 
who co-operate more with trade associations. Hence, this is another opportunity for SOT 
cluster firms and trade/professional associations to get together to identify ways to support 
and encourage the cluster’s smaller firms to co-operate more. From the questionnaire 
findings it is also possible to interpret that cluster firms had not increased co-operation over 
the five-year period. For example, when asked if they had engaged in more, the same 
amount, or fewer collaborative projects in 2015 than they had in 2010, five out of six 
respondents said that they had engaged in about the same number. Only firm ‘A’ said that 
they had engaged in more collaborative projects in 2015 than they had done in 2010 (see 
table 6.13).  
 
 
From the questionnaire and the interview findings, it is clear that SOT survey firms are 
involved in a range of formal and informal relationships, that are both long-term and short-
term in nature, and that the majority of those relationships are with suppliers and customers 
(product and process innovations) and, to a much lesser extent, with trade associations, 
research institutions and others (mostly for information). These types of relationships can be 
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classed as ‘strong ties’, e.g. with trade associations136, and ‘weak ties’, e.g. with suppliers, 
customers and research institutions. According to the strategic management literature on 
networks, weak ties trigger technological innovation, whereas strong ties offer great depth 
but little diversity of knowledge (Julien et al., 2004; Tallman et al., 2004). Hence, based on 
the academic literature, the SOT cluster has a further opportunity to: strengthen their existing 
weak ties, e.g. for other than information seeking purposes; and, to establish new weak ties 
with the aim of creating new knowledge exchange opportunities for the SOT cluster. 
From the interview responses, it was also apparent that a lack of trust exists between firms 
in the SOT cluster. Although interviewees were not asked specific questions about trust, 
several of them brought up trust as an issue. According to the strategic management 
literature on networks, it is the social capital and mutual trust within networks (clusters) that 
makes firms, associations and public agencies engage in processes of self-organised, 
interactive learning (Simmie, 1997; Storper, 1997; Braczyk et al., 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 
1998; Lorentzen, 2008). On the one hand, the lack of trust between cluster firms, evidenced 
by the way they keep their product innovations secret, can be viewed as a strength of the 
cluster as it is a driver of innovation (discussed earlier, see 6.7.1). On the other hand, it can 
also be viewed as a weakness of the cluster as firms are reluctant to co-operate in other 
ways that may benefit the whole cluster, e.g. supply chain and process innovations.  
 
 
One area where interview respondents said that they would like to see more co-operation is 
employee training, i.e. because no one firm is big enough to provide enough employees to 
make their own training course viable. Lack of sufficient training in the industry is a 
weakness of the SOT cluster. However, it is also an opportunity for cluster firms to co-
operate with each other and with local colleges and universities, possibly through a co-
ordinator, e.g. from the BCC, to establish training needs and to organise training 
programmes that will benefit the whole cluster. Other areas where firms said they would be 
willing to co-operate are in the supply chain, e.g. purchasing and producing inputs, and in 
promoting the ‘made in Stoke-on-Trent’ brand. These are further opportunities for the SOT 
cluster to co-operate, possibly again through third-party organisations such as the BCC and 
the local Chamber of Commerce. Third party organisations such as the BCC also have an 
opportunity to ‘pull’ SOT cluster firms more closely together to share a common vision, as 
the interview evidence shows that SOT cluster firms do not see themselves as part of a 
cluster and, therefore, this is a weakness of the SOT cluster. According to Lorenzen (2002), 
                                                 
136 Strong ties are intense relations between agents of great similarity. In the case of the SOT cluster, strong ties would include industry 
trade associations, such as the BCC, and other ceramics manufacturers. 
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when firms refrain from networking, it is often because of misaligned expectations about 
each other, and this, it seems, is the current situation regarding SOT cluster firms. 
 
 
6.7.3: Conclusions on the Effects of the Cluster’s Past Dominant Firms 
The evidence from the interviews indicates that, whilst Wedgwood and Doulton brought 
many benefits to the SOT cluster during their existence, they also brought many 
disadvantages in the latter years of their reign over the industry that left the SOT cluster in a 
weakened position. The benefits to the cluster are thought to have been in attracting and 
developing the supply base and in innovating in both product and process technologies. 
They also brought ‘reputation’ to the industry, and that, in turn, attracted new firms to come 
and set up in SOT. Wedgwood and Doulton also set industry standards that other cluster 
firms aspired to, as well as providing excellent training opportunities for other ceramic firms 
in the SOT cluster. They were also good for employment in the region with thousands of 
employees between them. It is clear from the evidence that during their heyday both firms 
brought many ‘cluster benefits’ (Porter, 1990), or ‘agglomeration benefits’ (Audretsch, 1998; 
Feldman, 1994) to the SOT cluster and they provided many ‘knowledge creating 
opportunities’ (Arikan, 2009). 
 
 
In summary, the general opinion of interviewees was that Wedgwood and Doulton were not 
good for the SOT cluster overall, for the following reasons. Firstly, they were not good for 
competition as their acquisition strategies significantly reduced the number of local 
competitors in the SOT cluster, thus negatively affecting the clusters innovation capacity. 
The common view from interviewees was that Wedgwood and Doulton acquired firms to 
deliberately eliminate their competitors. Secondly, towards the end of their dominance, they 
were not good for employment in the cluster as, aside from closing down many of the 
acquired firms, their own eventual decline resulted in thousands of job losses in the SOT 
cluster. Thirdly, the significant number of job losses in the industry resulted in the loss of 
specialised skills in the cluster, i.e. many employees looked for work in other industries and 
other places outside the cluster (see also chapter 5.5.1). This is evidence of a loss of 
‘architectural’ knowledge (Matusik and Hill, 1998) from the cluster (see chapter 5.2.1). The 
loss of such knowledge that takes many decades to accumulate, no doubt left the SOT 
cluster in a very weakened state. Finally, consolidation in the industry, along with the 
eventual disappearance of Doulton (acquired by Wedgwood in 2005) and then the decline of 
Wedgwood (in receivership in 2009), affected both competition and the supply base in the 
SOT cluster as many suppliers closed down or moved out of the region.  
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The effect on competition was to significantly reduce the number of competing firms in the 
cluster and this was not good for the innovative capacity of the cluster overall (see also 
chapter 4.5.1). Thus, consolidation in the industry is seen as another weakness of the SOT 
cluster from the 1960s137 up to the end of the 2000s. Moreover, the loss of much of the 
supply base in the SOT cluster is further evidence of a loss of knowledge and knowledge 
creating opportunities in the cluster. The loss of ceramics firms and suppliers are seen as a 
loss of cluster benefits, therefore this is another weakness of the cluster during the latter part 
of the 2000s. According to Porter (1990) national competitive advantage in an industry is lost 
when conditions in the national diamond no longer support and stimulate investment and 
innovation to match the industry’s evolving structure, i.e. loss of cluster benefits. Moreover, 
Rosenfeld (1997) identifies a ‘latent or underachieving cluster’ as one where scale and 
geographic concentration exist but the potential is not fully realised, generally because the 
economic and social fabric is weak. Interaction among workers and employees is weak and 
the businesses involved neither share a vision of the future nor think of themselves as a 
cluster. According to Rosenfeld, one reason for this may be because the cluster is 
dominated by branch plants and large corporations (p. 9), and the evidence indicates that 
this may have been the case in the SOT cluster prior to 2009. Dominant firm effects on the 
SOT cluster are discussed further in the conclusions chapter of this thesis. 
 
 
6.7.4: Conclusions on the Role of the Cluster’s New Dominant Firms 
From the interview evidence, it appears that the SOT cluster’s new dominant firms are taking 
very different, more inclusive, roles in the cluster than the previous two dominant firms. For 
example, power and control appear to be more balanced in the cluster today as the four 
largest SOT cluster firms are of a similar size, although they are nowhere near as big as 
Wedgwood and Doulton were. According to the academic literature (Lorentzen, 2008; Bell, 
2009; Belso, 2010), the balance among actors depends on the governance structure of the 
network (cluster). In the past, the SOT cluster was governed by Wedgwood and Doulton, 
who may have had disproportionate authority or influence over which interactions took place 
and how they were carried out (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). Thus, based on the 
evidence from the interviews, control in the SOT cluster appears to be less hierarchical 
today than it was pre-2009, when Wedgwood was still the dominant firm in the industry, and 
this is identified as a strength of the cluster. 
 
 
                                                 
137 When Wedgwood and Doulton started their acquisition strategies (see also chapter 4.3.6). 
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 However, the new large firms in the cluster have only been in a dominant position, in terms 
of size, for a relatively short period of time. Thus, their impact on the current competitive 
advantage of the whole SOT cluster can only be based on their performance over recent 
years, which is quite impressive (see chapter 4, Table 4.2), and on what the interviewees 
said their role is or should be in the SOT cluster. For example, ‘paternalistic’, 
‘ambassadorial’, ‘gatekeeper’ (Giuliani, 2002) and ‘lighthouse’ (Gemser, 1996) are all terms 
that the interviewees used to describe their roles in the cluster. Nevertheless, there is no 
further evidence to support these claims. Consequently, the role of current dominant firms in 
the SOT cluster is identified as a topic for further research in the future, e.g. in 5-10 years 
time. However, based on the evidence from interviews, and also from chapter 4 (see 4.2.3), 
the cluster’s new dominant firms can be identified as a strength of the SOT cluster. These 
new dominant firms also have an opportunity to work together more with other cluster firms, 
i.e. to co-operate for the benefit of the whole cluster.  
 
 
6.7.5: Chapter Findings Mapped to the Objectives and the Theoretical Framework 
This chapter set out to determine the situation regarding innovation and co-operation in the 
SOT cluster in 2015 (objectives 6-8) and all three of the objectives have been fully achieved. 
This chapter also set out to determine the role of the SOT cluster’s dominant firms past and 
present (objectives 9-10) and these two objectives have also been fully achieved. Table 6.14 
maps chapter six findings to the research objectives. Figure 6.1 below maps chapter six 
findings to relevant sections of the theoretical framework.  
 
 
The next chapter, chapter seven, provides detailed conclusions on all three chapters of the 
empirical findings, drawing together the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
and linking the findings to the research propositions. It also makes recommendations to 
interested parties, as well as providing a discussion of the research contribution to 
knowledge and a reflection on the methodologies used in the research study. 
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Table 6.14: Chapter Findings Mapped to Objectives 6 – 10 
 
Stage 3 Research Objectives – Continuing to Establish the ‘Need for 
Co-operation’ and Establishing Levels of Innovative and Co-
operative Activity  
 
Link to 
Propositions 
Data Requirements Link between this 
chapter and 
objectives 
 
6. To determine the number of core firms in the cluster in 2015 that 
leverage the same general purpose technology 
vi. Are all core firms fully vertically-integrated? 
vii. Is there any evidence of specialisation? 
 
P4, P4a 
Primary Research 
 
Questionnaire on Innovation: 
1. Q1.5 
2. Q1.5 
 
Section 6.1 
 
7. To determine the output of innovative activity in the cluster between 
2010 and 2015. 
i. Establish whether product innovation has increased/decreased 
ii. Establish whether process innovation has increased/decreased 
viii. Establish whether other forms of innovative activity have 
increased/decreased, e.g. markets and marketing 
ix. Identify the main reasons why some firms innovate and others 
don’t. 
x. To determine the success of the cluster’s innovative activities 
 
P8, P8a 
 
 
Questionnaire on Innovation: 
1. Q 2.1 – 2.4 
2. Q 3.1 – 3.2 
3. Q4.1 – 4.4 
4. Q7.1 – 7.2 + Interview 
question 
5. Q5.4 – 5.5  
 
Section 6.2 – 6.3 
 
8. To establish the degree of inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the 
cluster between 2010 and 2015. 
i. Establish the existence and nature of horizontal co-operation & 
collaboration  
ii. Establish the existence and nature of vertical co-operation and 
collaboration  
iii. Establish the presence of formal and informal institutions that 
support the SOT industry cluster 
iv. Establish lead firm’s level of co-operative orientation 
v. Identify the number of  knowledge exchanges within the cluster 
vi. Identify the type and depth of knowledge exchange 
relationships within the cluster 
vii. Identify the main reasons why some firms co-operate and 
others don’t. 
viii. Identify the number of firms who exchange knowledge with 
outside (the cluster) entities 
 
P1, P1a 
P2, P2a 
P3, P3a 
P10, P11 
 
 
Questionnaire on Innovation and other 
sources: 
1. Q 6.1 – 6.4 
2. Q 6.1 – 6.4 
3. Secondary research (data 
exists) 
4. Primary research 
interviews 
5. Q 6.1 – 6.4 plus interviews 
6. Interview question 
7. Interview question 
8. Interview question 
 
Section 6.4 – 6.5 
 
Stage 4 Research Objectives – Power & Control and The role of 
Dominant Firms 
 
Link to 
Propositions 
Data Requirements Link between this 
chapter and 
objectives 
 
9. To establish the  balance of power and control within the SOT cluster in 
2016 
iii. Is power and control balanced across firms? 
iv. Is balance and control hierarchical, i.e. do dominant firms have 
more control? 
 
 
P3, P3a 
 
 
Primary Research 
 
1. Interviews 
2. Interviews 
3. Builds on findings from 
Chapter 4 of this thesis 
(objective 1 (vii)) 
 
Section 6.6 
 
10. To determine whether dominant firms have had a positive or negative 
effect upon competition and co-operation in the SOT cluster between 
1980 and 2016. 
i. Ascertain the motivations behind dominant firm strategies and 
their effects upon competition and co-operation in the cluster 
ii. Establish whether dominant firms have taken a prominent role 
in facilitating knowledge exchange within the cluster 
iii. Establish whether dominant firms have established linkages 
outside the cluster 
 
 
P10, p11 
 
Primary Research 
 
1. Interviews 
2. Interviews 
3. Interviews and 
questionnaire  
Q 6.2 
 
Section 6.6  
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Figure 6.1 Chapter Findings Mapped to the Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19) Effectiveness of inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the 
cluster: 
- Absorptive capacity of cluster firms 
High absorptive capacity within firms, low-medium 
between firms. 
- Knowledge overlap among cluster firms 
High knowledge overlap as firms use the same 
technologies and inputs. However, there is low-medium 
co-operation between firms in the cluster. 
- Number of cluster firms that engage in knowledge 
exchanges with outside entities 
Only the largest firms tend to engage with knowledge 
exchanges outside of the cluster, e.g. customers and 
suppliers. Overall, external exchanges have increased 
but are still low. 
- Number of cluster firms that identify and dissolve 
knowledge exchange relationships that no longer 
provide knowledge-related benefits 
Not identified from survey research responses. 
17) Enablers of inter-firm knowledge exchanges within the cluster: 
 
Lead firm’s level of co-operative orientation 
The SOT cluster’s past dominant firms (W&D) did not share knowledge with 
other cluster firms – co-operation was low. The cluster’s new dominant firms 
do not co-operate with other cluster firms on product innovations but there is 
some evidence of co-operation on process innovations. Overall though, co-
operation between cluster firms is low-medium. 
Tacitness of the knowledge to be exchanged 
In the past knowledge was more ‘architectural’ and complex than it is today 
but it is still tacit in the main. Currently knowledge is still  protected by 
individual firms 
Connectivity among cluster firms 
There is not a great deal of connectivity among cluster firms. Processes are 
highly interdependent and firms carry out all/most phases of production. 
Number of supporting institutions that facilitate knowledge transfer 
within the cluster 
There are many supporting institutions to facilitate the cluster. However, not 
all firms are members. It appears that, for members, this is the main way that 
firms co-operate. 
16) Number of 
opportunities for inter-
firm knowledge 
exchanges within the 
cluster 
There are more 
opportunities for 
knowledge exchange than 
in the past. However, 
many opportunities are not 
realised. There are also 
many further opportunities 
for knowledge exchange 
(see conclusions to 
chapter 6) 
18) Number of realised 
inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges within the 
cluster 
The number of realised 
knowledge exchanges within 
the cluster appears to be 
low. There is some co-
operation between SOT 
firms and suppliers, 
customers and trade 
associations but mostly for 
the largest cluster firms. 
20) Knowledge creation 
capability 
Despite overall low co-
operation in the industry and 
thus a low number of inter-
firm knowledge exchanges 
(mostly with suppliers and 
customers), knowledge 
creation capability is high in 
the SOT cluster (see findings 
on innovation in chapter 6). 
Component knowledge and 
Architectural knowledge 
Knowledge in the cluster is still 
‘architectural’ and tacit, but not 
as much as it was in the past as 
a result of automation of some 
processes. 
21) Innovative output 
of the cluster: new 
products; new 
processes; new 
markets. Conclusions 
to the research: 
Chapter 7 
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7. Overall Research Conclusions, Contribution to Theory 
and Reflection on Methodologies 
 
7.1: Introduction 
The main aim of this research study was to determine the strategic health, i.e. competitive 
advantage, of the SOT ceramics cluster, tableware and giftware sector. According to Porter 
(1998), competitive advantage depends on making more productive use of inputs, which 
requires continual innovation (p.78). The competitive advantage situation of the SOT cluster 
is determined in this chapter by further analysing and evaluating the research findings on the 
impact that co-operation, competition, path-dependence and dominant firms’ decisions have 
had on evolutionary processes and innovative output in the SOT industry cluster. Chapter 
four of this thesis presented and evaluated findings on the evolution of the SOT cluster from 
1960 to up to 2016, it also identified demand conditions, competitive factors and the cluster’s 
dominant firms past and present. Chapter five of this thesis presented and evaluated 
findings on opportunities for knowledge creation, throughout the cluster’s evolution and 
development. Chapter six of this thesis presented and evaluated primary research findings 
on more recent innovative activity and co-operation, as well as new findings on the roles of 
the cluster’s dominant firms past and present. Throughout each of these three chapters 
detailed conclusions were drawn in light of the academic literature and findings were clearly 
mapped to the research objectives (see tables 4.8, 5.3 and 6.14). The findings provide 
evidence that all of the research objectives have been achieved. 
 
 
In this chapter conclusions from all three empirical chapters are gathered together and are 
presented as follows: first, a SWOT138 analysis is performed to determine the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing the SOT cluster (7.2); second, the research 
findings are mapped to each of the propositions identified in the literature review and further 
conclusions are drawn (7.3); third, an overall conclusion is made on the current strategic 
position of the SOT cluster (7.4); finally, recommendations are made to SOT cluster firms, 
policy makers and other interested parties (7.5). 
                                                 
138 SWOT is an acronym for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. By definition, Strengths (S) and Weaknesses (W) are 
considered to be internal factors over which you have some measure of control. Also, by definition, Opportunities (O) and Threats (T) are 
considered to be external factors over which you have essentially no control. SWOT Analysis is the most renowned tool for audit and 
analysis of the overall strategic position of the business and its environment. Source: Management Study Guide, [ONLINE]. Available 
from:  http://www.managementstudyguide.com/swot-analysis.htm. [Accessed 14 June 2017] 
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In addition to the main conclusions this chapter also presents, a discussion of the 
researcher’s contribution to knowledge (7.6), a reflection on the primary research 
methodologies employed (7.7), and identification of areas for future research (7.8). 
 
 
7.2: SWOT Analysis of the SOT Cluster 
This section presents a SWOT analysis of the SOT ceramics cluster based on the collated 
research findings from all three empirical chapters. SWOT analysis is an appropriate tool to 
analyse the cluster findings as it is a popular strategic  framework that has been used many 
times before to assess local economies. For example, Ivano Frankivska in the Ukraine 
(citiesalliance.org) and the CLUSTERS3 Project in Europe (tci-network.org). Other reasons 
for using SWOT are that it requires limited quantitative/statistical data input, and it is 
relatively easy to understand and deploy. Appendix 18 presents the full SWOT analysis for 
the SOT cluster and content is referenced to relevant sections in each of the three empirical 
chapters. In this section, the SWOT findings are summarised. 
 
 
7.2.1: Summary of SWOT analysis 
From the SWOT analysis many strengths have been identified for the SOT cluster. A key 
strength is that the cluster has a very long history of success and a good reputation that is 
recognised globally. Despite experiencing a severe and prolonged decline in the industry 
(circa 1979-2010139), the industry has survived and is currently undergoing a period of 
rejuvenation. The majority of the SOT cluster’s firms appear to be performing well and have 
increased sales, profits and employees steadily over the last seven years. Another key 
strength is that cluster firms are highly innovative, they follow niche strategies in mid-
premium segments and they compete on the basis of differentiation. Moreover, the findings 
indicate that the largest cluster firms innovate across a wide range of product, process, 
marketing and organisational activities. Despite the fact that the cluster was dominated in the 
past by Wedgwood and Doulton, who may have not always acted in the best interests of the 
cluster, power and control appear to be more evenly balanced across the cluster’s five 
current largest firms, and this is possibly another strength. There are also many suppliers 
still located in the SOT cluster, albeit not as many as in the past, and these firms provide 
cluster benefits such as rapid and easy access to inputs and new technologies. Whilst the 
presence of local suppliers is a strength for the SOT cluster, this is an area that could be 
strengthened further. There are also many related and supporting institutions in the cluster, 
                                                 
139 The industry’s sales peaked in 1978 and then declined (Imrie, 1987). 
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and their number appears to have increased over recent years. These supporting institutions 
provide cluster benefits to firms who are members, e.g. knowledge creation and knowledge 
exchange opportunities, and thus they are another strength of the cluster. 
 
 
In addition to strengths the SOT cluster also has several weaknesses. Consolidation and 
decline in the cluster, between 1960 and 2008140 (see chapter 4.3.2), led to the demise of 
many firms and well known pottery brands. In addition, as a result of the decline in the 
industry (see above) coupled with the demise of the cluster’s two largest firms, many supply 
firms left the cluster. Moreover, firm closures in the cluster resulted in the loss of many jobs 
and the loss of tacit knowledge from the cluster. Overall, the effects of consolidation and 
decline led to a significant decrease in cluster benefits that left the cluster in a much weaker 
state. Furthermore, there have been very few new entrants into the cluster since 1960 and 
this is a significant weakness for the cluster and a threat to its long-term survival. Another 
key weakness for the cluster is that cluster firms (ceramics manufacturers) appear not to co-
operate that much with each other, or with external firms and /or supporting institutions, this 
is especially true for smaller firms. There also appears to be no differences in co-operative 
behaviour across segments, i.e. firms across all sectors (domesticware, hotelware, giftware, 
etc.) appear not to co-operate with each other. The findings indicate that it is the smallest 
firms in the cluster who appear not to take advantage of cluster benefits that are available to 
them, e.g. membership of trade and professional institutions and financial support that may 
be available to them. The findings also indicate that SOT cluster firms do not trust each other 
and this is not good for co-operation and knowledge creating opportunities and, therefore, 
this is another weakness of the SOT cluster.  
 
 
Several opportunities have been identified for the SOT cluster and these are presented in 
more detail in the recommendations section of this chapter (see 7.5). In this section the key 
opportunities are briefly summarised. Moreover, the key opportunities presented here are 
closely linked to some of the weaknesses discussed in the previous section, i.e. they are all 
connected to the apparent lack of co-operation that appears to be deeply embedded in the 
culture of the cluster. In summary, SOT cluster firms have many opportunities to co-operate 
more with each other, and with supporting firms and institutions, across a wide range of 
issues and areas. The outcomes of increased co-operative activity could significantly 
                                                 
140 According to Tomlinson and Branston (2017), “During the late 20th century, the district (i.e. SOT cluster) entered a ‘long decline’ 
(1979–2008) as firms struggled to adapt to the challenges posed by globalization and other exogenous shocks…..Since 2008, there have 
been signs of a potential renaissance in the fortunes of the district” (p. 5). 
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strengthen whole SOT cluster, i.e. there would be a significant increase in cluster benefits, 
such as shared training, skills development, shared purchasing and other supply chain 
initiatives. An increase in cluster benefits could benefit all firms in the SOT cluster, especially 
the smaller firms who appear to co-operate the least. For example, an increase in cluster 
benefits could provide small firms with access to information, new technologies and finance. 
Improved benefits for smaller firms may also stimulate new firm entrants into the cluster. 
 
 
In addition to opportunities, a number of threats were identified which, if unaddressed, could 
significantly weaken the SOT cluster. Firstly, it has already been established that the SOT 
cluster is under constant threat from global competition. If global competition increases, 
cluster firms could choose to embark upon price-based competitive strategies. Not only 
might this not be good for cluster firms’ profits, in the long term it may not be good for 
innovation in the SOT cluster, as firms will have fewer financial resources to invest in new 
products, processes and other innovations. Secondly, the general mistrust that cluster firms 
appear to have in each other is another threat as, at a time when the industry is facing 
growing global competition, cluster firms appear not to be working collectively to promote the 
‘made in Stoke-on-Trent’ brand, or to develop new technologies that could benefit the whole 
cluster. Finally, as stated in the previous section, the lack of new firm entrants in the SOT 
cluster is seen as a significant threat to the long-term survival of the cluster. New firms are 
needed to replace firms who inevitably exit the industry over time. Without new entrants, the 
SOT cluster is likely to shrink further and eventually die altogether. 
 
 
7.3: The Empirical Findings Mapped to the Research Propositions 
This section maps the research findings from various chapters to the research propositions. 
Conclusions are drawn throughout and are made in light of academic theory. 
 
 
7.3.1: Propositions 1 and 1a 
Proposition 1. Successful industry clusters will exhibit a strong network of cluster 
interrelationships involving both strong and weak ties. 
Proposition 1a. Failing industry clusters will exhibit a weak network of cluster 
interrelationships. 
 
The findings from chapters five and six provide evidence of a limited number of both strong 
and weak ties existing in the SOT cluster. Strong ties are more formal relationships, such as 
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alliances and some contractual agreements, weak ties offer access to diverse information 
and are thought to be of higher value than strong ties (Julien et al., 2004; Tallman et al., 
2004). In the SOT cluster there is evidence of strong ties between cluster firms and the 
industry’s trade association, the BCC, and with other supporting institutions, e.g. Lucideon, 
and the Ceramic Skills Academy. However, it appears to be mostly the largest firms in the 
SOT cluster who partake and work with these organisations. Another strong tie is between 
ceramics manufacturers themselves who often manufacture ceramics products for each 
other, this is assumed to be a contractual arrangement. In addition to strong ties, there is 
also evidence of weak ties existing in the cluster, e.g. between ceramics firms and suppliers, 
customers, other trade associations and research institutes. From the evidence though, it 
appears that SOT cluster firms, in the main, mostly co-operate with their suppliers and 
customers. Moreover, it appears to be mostly the largest cluster firms who co-operate with 
the BCC and other supporting institutions. Linked to network strength is the concept of ‘trust’, 
which is considered important in creating and sustaining collaboration between economic 
actors in clusters (Maskell, 2001; Newlands, 2003). The evidence in chapter six of this thesis 
indicates that SOT cluster firms do not trust each other. Based the evidence, the conclusion 
is that, although SOT cluster firms do have a network consisting of strong and weak ties, that 
network of cluster relationships is not as strong as it could be. However, the SOT cluster 
cannot be classed as a failing cluster either as, based on conclusions drawn earlier (SWOT), 
the SOT industry is much stronger now than it was pre-2009, and is experiencing a period of 
rejuvenation. Consequently, neither proposition 1, nor 1a, are acceptable to explain the SOT 
cluster’s current situation regarding the strength of its network ties as the cluster appears to 
lie somewhere in-between the two propositions, i.e. the SOT cluster appears to be a 
successful cluster, but it has a weak relationship network comprising of a limited number of 
strong and weak ties. 
 
 
7.3.2: Propositions 2 and 2a 
Proposition 2. Firms in successful industry clusters will demonstrate strong absorptive 
capacity as evidenced by a significant number of inter-firm linkages.   
Proposition 2a. Firms in failing industry clusters will demonstrate weak absorptive capacity 
as evidenced by few (no) inter-firm linkages. 
 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of the firm to acquire, assimilate, adapt and apply new 
knowledge, that is ‘to learn’ (Zahra and George, 2002; Lorentzen, 2008; Grandinetti, 2016). 
Absorptive capacity depends on a firms internal resources, i.e. capabilities to exploit external 
resources. Investing in developing internal resources can lead to greater success in 
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exploiting external resources and the effects can positively influence a firm’s innovative 
performance in clusters. From the evidence presented in chapter six, it is clear that 
absorptive capacity in SOT cluster firms is high, i.e. SOT survey firms are all highly 
innovative in product, process, marketing and organisational activities. However, as 
discussed in the previous section (7.3.1), whilst absorptive capacity might be high, there is 
little evidence of a significant number of inter-firm linkages existing in the SOT cluster. 
According to the academic literature, participation in a cluster network may provide access to 
external resources, but it can also involve relations of dominance and dependence that may 
prevent firms from co-operating (Lorentzen, 2008; Bell, 2009; Belso, 2010). From the 
findings in chapters four, five and six of this thesis, it appears that this was the case for the 
SOT cluster during the era when Wedgwood and Doulton were the two dominant firms in the 
cluster. Since 2009, and the demise of these two dominant firms, the cluster has evolved 
into a less hierarchical structure, comprising five large firms of roughly similar size. 
Consequently, there should currently be more opportunities for cluster firms to build network 
relationships, i.e. to increase their absorptive capacity. However, based on the questionnaire 
and interview findings, there is little evidence of extensive co-operation taking place in the 
SOT cluster. Consequently, neither proposition 2, nor 2a, are acceptable to explain the SOT 
cluster’s current situation regarding absorptive capacity evidenced by strong inter-firm 
linkages as the SOT cluster appears to lie somewhere between the two propositions, i.e. the 
SOT cluster has strong absorptive capacity but weak inter-firm linkages. 
 
 
7.3.3: Propositions 3 and 3a 
Proposition 3. In successful industry clusters, control will be equally balanced across firms, if 
there are dominant firms they do not abuse their powerful positions. 
Proposition 3a. In failing industry clusters, control will be concentrated into the hands of a 
few dominant firms who use their power to exert control over other cluster firms. 
 
Arikan and Schilling (2011), in their work on governance structures in industrial districts, 
contend that different governance types in clusters can lead to radically different types of 
interactions inside clusters (p. 774). In some clusters, one or more large firms can have 
disproportionate authority or influence over which interactions take place and how they are 
carried out (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). From the findings in chapters four, five and six 
of this thesis, it is clear that this was the case up to 2008, when Wedgwood and Doulton (up 
to 2005) were the two dominant firms in the SOT cluster. In the latter years of their 
dominance it appears that Wedgwood and Doulton were disadvantageous for the SOT 
cluster, e.g. they did not share knowledge with the rest of the cluster and they were 
275 
 
responsible for the loss of many firms, brands, suppliers and employees in the industry. 
These findings support the findings of Sacchetti and Tomlinson (2009) who also carried out 
research in the SOT cluster and found: 
“the larger ceramics firms have neglected the cluster’s longer-term development, in 
particular in relation to new investment capacity and the skills base” (p. 1854).  
 
 
Furthermore, it appears that balance and control were concentrated into the hands of 
Wedgwood and Doulton, and that they may have used their power to exert indirect control 
over other cluster firms, e.g. they could dictate much of the behaviour in the cluster due to 
their large bargaining power (Belso, 2010; Arikan and Schilling, 2011). Governance in the 
cluster during this era can also be likened to a ‘network of direction’ (Sacchetti and Sugden, 
2003), as the evidence indicates that Wedgwood and Doulton may have pursued their own 
strategic objectives, often with little consultation with their trading partners and/or other 
stakeholders in the cluster.  
 
 
Since 2009, i.e. since the decline of Wedgwood, the situation in the SOT cluster has 
changed and, as found in chapters four and six of this thesis, the SOT cluster now has 
several new dominant firms who, although much smaller than Wedgwood and Doulton, are 
of similar size to each other. Therefore, it now appears that power and control are much 
more balanced in the SOT cluster, with no one/few firms having control. Consequently, SOT 
cluster firms now have the opportunity to move towards a ‘network of mutual dependence’ 
structure (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009), whereby cluster firms can engage in a series of 
ongoing economic relationships with each other that support and re-enforce co-operation, 
reciprocity and mutually supportive actions across the cluster. Based on these findings 
proposition 3a is accepted, i.e. the SOT cluster appears to be a successful industry cluster, 
where power and control are equally balanced across firms, and where the largest firms do 
not abuse their powerful positions. 
 
 
7.3.4: Propositions 4 and 4a 
Proposition 4. Firms in successful industry clusters are more likely to have a higher need for 
co-ordination as evidenced by high technological complexity and highly separable 
processes. 
Proposition 4a. Firms in failing industry clusters are more likely to have a little need for co-
ordination as evidenced by low technological complexity and inseparable processes. 
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From the literature review it was established that the ‘need’ for co-ordination is an important 
factor to be taken into consideration when examining co-operation within a cluster. Factors 
influencing the need for co-ordination are the technological complexity of the cluster’s 
production processes and the separability of those processes (Arikan and Schilling, 2011). 
According to Arikan and Schilling, the primary factor that leads to a high need for co-
ordination is a combination of complexity and imperfect separability (p. 3). Conversely, a low 
need for co-ordination would be evidenced by low technological complexity and 
inseparability of processes. Chapter five of this thesis provided definite evidence that, up 
until 1960, the SOT cluster’s technological complexity, e.g. equipment and the processes 
themselves, was low, but knowledge complexity was high, e.g. tacit knowledge that was 
‘owned’ by individuals and groups and was highly protected (invisible to others) and often 
unique to the firm. Moreover, the findings also show that production processes were 
inseparable due to the interdependent nature of the processes and the difficulty in 
separating cluster firms’ production activities. Since 1960 technological complexity increased 
slightly, e.g. there was some automation of processes but mainly by the larger firms.  
However, the industry is still considered to be a fairly low-technology industry today. Also, 
since 1960 the findings show that, despite some automation of processes and some 
codification of knowledge, SOT cluster firms’ processes remain highly interdependent, i.e. 
inseparable.  
 
 
Furthermore, the findings presented in chapter six also show that cluster firms still carry out 
all/most phases of the production process. Therefore, based on the findings, there are two 
conclusions that can be drawn: 1) pre-1960 the SOT cluster had little need for co-ordination 
(co-operation) due to high complexity and inseparable processes; 2) post-1960, despite the 
automation of some processes and the codification of some knowledge, the SOT cluster’s 
knowledge remains highly complex and processes remain mostly inseparable. 
Consequently, the overall conclusion that can be drawn is that, although the need for co-
operation may have increased slightly, it still remains low in the cluster. These findings may 
also partially explain the cluster’s historical reluctance to co-operate with each other. Based 
on these findings, neither proposition 4, nor 4a, are acceptable to explain the situation 
regarding the need for co-ordination in the SOT cluster, i.e. the SOT cluster appears to be a 
successful industry cluster that has little need for co-ordination due to high technological 
complexity and inseparable processes. 
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7.3.5: Propositions 5 and 5a 
Proposition 5. Successful clusters facing the challenges of globalisation will have adopted 
global/local strategies, characterised by a strong global network of agents from the core 
industry, plus related and supporting industries. 
Proposition 5a. Failing clusters, facing the challenge of globalisation, will not have made new 
linkages with firms and institutions outside the cluster. Moreover, the number of inter-cluster 
linkages will have reduced. 
 
An emerging theme in the literature on clusters and networks is one that acknowledges the 
need, in response to changing technological and global economic conditions, for non-local 
knowledge relations in order to maintain and vitalise the local characteristics of clusters 
(Belussi and Asheim, 2003; Bathelt et al., 2004; Cooke, 2005; Giuliani and Bell, 2005; 
Anderson and Lorenzen, 2007; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013; Boschma, 2015). 
For example, according to Hervas-Oliver et al., (2011), one way of overcoming negative 
lock-in effects is to develop a cluster’s external ties, i.e. to develop relationships with agents 
outside the cluster or with foreign firms. From the findings presented in chapter six of this 
thesis it is evident that some SOT cluster firms have developed co-operative relationships 
with agents overseas. However, it is mainly the larger firms in the SOT cluster who have 
formed relationships outside the cluster, and these relationships are mainly with suppliers 
and customers. Several of the cluster’s firms also outsource some of their production 
overseas. There is also evidence in chapter five that new knowledge has entered the cluster 
from elsewhere in the UK in the form of management appointments from other industries in 
other UK locations. However, many of the cluster’s smaller firms have not formed 
relationships with other firms and institutions from outside the cluster. Moreover, there is little 
compelling evidence of SOT cluster firms forming new relationships with supporting 
institutions from outside the SOT cluster.  
 
 
Consequently, whilst the findings provide some evidence of ‘new’ knowledge entering the 
SOT cluster, the number of new relationships with external firms and institutions is deemed 
relatively low. The SOT cluster has an opportunity to strengthen their external ties and to 
possibly become a ‘node of a global network’, keeping their historical and social identity but 
absorbing knowledge and technologies developed somewhere else (Belussi and Pilotti, 
2002; Simmie, 2002; Belussi and Sedita, 2009; Boschma, 2015). Based on the findings, 
neither proposition 5, nor 5a, are acceptable to fully determine the situation in the SOT 
cluster regarding the adoption of global/local strategies, i.e. the SOT cluster appears to be a 
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successful cluster that has faced the challenges of globalisation by adopting some 
global/local strategies, however their global network of agents is weak. 
 
 
7.3.6: Propositions 6 and 6a 
Proposition 6. Successful industry clusters will demonstrate vigorous competition between 
cluster firms as evidenced by a large number of firms in the industry and a constant stream 
of new entrants. 
Proposition 6a. Failing industry clusters will demonstrate vigorous competition between 
cluster firms as evidenced by a declining number of firms in the industry and few (no) new 
entrants. 
 
According to Porter (1990), one of the main elements of the National Diamond system is 
domestic rivalry, as it promotes the upgrading of the entire diamond system through new 
entrants and innovation. The relationship between competition and new entrants can be 
viewed as a virtuous circle, i.e. new entrants increase the number of firms in an industry and 
thus provide greater competition for new ideas, and greater competition across firms can 
facilitate the entry of new firms specialising in new product niches (Jacobs, 1969; Dei Ottati, 
1996). Diminished competition, on the other hand, perhaps as a result of industry 
consolidation, is cited as one of the most common and most fatal reasons for loss of cluster 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1990). Consolidation leading to a reduction in the number of 
firms in a cluster can stifle innovation, as rivals are no longer aggressive due to a lack of 
pressure and challenge (Porter, 1990; Dei Ottati, 1994).  
 
 
From the findings in chapters four, five and six of this thesis, it is clear that competition has 
reduced in the SOT cluster due to severe consolidation since 1960, i.e. there are 
significantly fewer firms in the cluster now than in 1960. Consequently, there is significantly 
less local competition. Moreover, the findings indicate that there have only been three new 
entrants in the SOT cluster since 1960 that have grown to any significant size. The first is 
Emma Bridgewater, a ‘true’ new entrant, i.e. brand new start up firm and now the sixth 
largest firm in the cluster (see chapter 4, Table 4.2). The second is Steelite, the cluster’s 
current largest firm, who was a spin-off from Doulton and so not a ‘true’ new entrant. The 
third is Portmeirion, another ‘true’ new entrant and currently the second largest firm in the 
SOT cluster. Nevertheless, the findings from chapter six clearly indicate, that despite 
operating in different market niches, and so not directly competing with each other, vigorous 
domestic rivalry is taking place between cluster firms, evidenced by high levels of product, 
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process, marketing and organisational innovations. The findings also indicate that SOT 
cluster firms view each other as close competitors and they fiercely protect their innovations 
and new product ideas from each other. Moreover, intense global competition in all key 
markets has been shown to be another driver of competition between SOT cluster firms (see 
chapter 4.4.1 and SWOT). Based on the findings, neither proposition 6, nor 6a, are 
acceptable to fully determine the situation in the SOT cluster regarding vigorous competition, 
evidenced by a large number of firms and a constant stream of new entrants, i.e. the SOT 
cluster appears to be a successful cluster, demonstrating vigorous competition between 
cluster firms, evidenced by strong innovative output, despite a significant decrease in the 
overall number of firms and very few new entrants.  
 
 
7.3.7: Propositions 7 and 7a 
Proposition 7. In successful industry clusters firms compete mostly on the basis of 
differentiation. 
Proposition 7a. In failing industry clusters firms compete mostly on the basis of low-
cost/price. 
 
According to Sacchetti and Tomlinson (2009), in many European regions the growth in 
international competition, mainly from low-cost operators in the Far East, along with the 
increased use of global outsourcing by cluster firms, “has often had a painful impact upon 
local industry and employment levels, raising serious concerns of industrial hollowing-out” 
(p.1837). The findings in chapters four and six of this thesis have shown that growth in 
international competition, mainly from low-cost operators in the Far-East, has had a negative 
impact on the SOT cluster. Moreover, the problems are thought to have been compounded 
by the increased use of global outsourcing by some of the SOT cluster’s firms. The findings 
indicate that SOT cluster firms have reacted to these challenges by focusing on niche 
strategies at the premium end of the market, and by adopting differentiation and higher value 
added activities (see chapter six, Table 6.1). The strategic management literature also cites 
focusing on the higher end of the market as a strategy for dealing with low-cost competition 
from abroad (Porter, 1990; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992; Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). 
Thus, based on the findings, proposition 7 is accepted as the situation existing in the SOT 
cluster, i.e. the SOT cluster is a successful cluster where firms compete mostly on the basis 
of differentiation. 
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7.3.8: Propositions 8 and 8a 
Proposition 8. In successful industry clusters there will be evidence of strong innovative 
output as measured by the adoption of new technologies, new markets and new product 
developments. 
Proposition 8a. In failing industry clusters there will be evidence of weak innovative output as 
measured by the lack of adoption of new technologies, new markets and new product 
developments. 
 
As discussed previously, from the literature review and from chapter six of this thesis, 
innovation is widely viewed as a driver of competition and vice versa. Innovation can be 
linked to the ability to come up with new and better ways of organising the production and 
marketing of new and better products (Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Malmberg and Power, 
2005). Linked to innovative activity is industry life-cycle theory, which suggests that the focus 
of innovative activity can vary across different life-cycle stages. For example, Product 
innovation should be stronger at the beginning and end of an industry’s life-cycle, whilst 
process innovation is  often the focus during the rapid growth stage (Gemser, 1996; Giuliani, 
2013; Sabol et al., 2013). In chapter five of this thesis, it was identified that the SOT cluster 
had progressed away from a period of maturity and decline into a period of rejuvenation (see 
chapter five, 5.5.2 and 5.6.3) where, according to the literature, innovative activity should be 
focused on product innovations. The findings in chapter six of this thesis (also see SWOT 
analysis) clearly indicate that SOT survey firms exhibit strong innovative output in all 
categories of innovative activity, i.e. product, process, marketing and organisational 
activities. SOT survey firms were particularly strong in product and organisational 
innovations over the five-year period of investigation.  
 
 
In addition, they also significantly improved their innovation capabilities over the same 
period. Furthermore, when compared to the GPrix survey results, the findings indicate that a 
higher percentage of SOT survey firms carry out innovation activities. The findings also 
indicate that SOT firms improved their innovation capabilities more than GPrix firms over 
similar five-year periods. However, the evidence for SOT cluster firms entering new markets 
is less convincing (see chapter six, Table 6.1), as only two of the six questionnaire 
respondents indicated that they had entered new markets over the five-year period. 
Nevertheless, based on the findings for all other innovative activity, proposition 8 is accepted 
as the situation existing in the SOT cluster, i.e. the SOT cluster is a successful industry 
cluster with evidence of strong innovative output as measured by the adoption of new 
technologies, new markets (by some firms) and new product developments. 
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7.3.9: Propositions 9 and 9a 
Proposition 9. In clusters where there is high modularity in product technology, there will be 
a high number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
Proposition 9a. In clusters where there is low modularity in product technology, there will be 
a low number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges. 
 
Propositions 9 and 9a are linked to propositions 4 and 4a and the evaluation of complexity 
and imperfect separability. The conclusions for proposition 4 and 4a are that production 
processes are still mostly interdependent and inseparable in the SOT cluster, thus there is 
low modularity in product technology. Chapter five findings clearly indicate that, although the 
SOT cluster had historically had little need for co-operation in the past, the situation had 
changed a little over recent years due to consolidation effects (job losses), automation of 
some processes (some codification of knowledge) and global competition. Consequently, 
opportunities for inter-firm knowledge exchanges have increased slowly over recent years. 
However, the findings from chapter six of this thesis also clearly indicate that SOT cluster 
firms engage in a low number of inter-firm knowledge exchanges. Thus, it appears that, 
whilst more knowledge exchange opportunities exist in the cluster today, SOT firms do not 
take full advantage of those opportunities, possibly due to path-dependency and historical 
antecedents (see chapter 5.5.1).  
 
 
According to the literature on clusters and governance systems (Bell et al., 2009; Belussi, 
and Sedita, 2009), initial governance choices made by transacting firms within clusters can 
enable and constrain the design of future transactions between these firms owing to path 
dependencies that reside in the governance devices themselves. Such path dependencies 
influence firms’ ability to adapt to new circumstances. From the findings it appears that 
historically, SOT cluster firms have had little need to co-operate with each other, and that 
might partially explain their behaviour regarding co-operation. Competition is another factor 
that can influence the likelihood of firms engaging in co-operative activities (knowledge 
exchanges). According to Newlands (2003), when a cluster experiences mounting pressures 
of competition it may have a negative effect on the creation and maintenance of trust within 
the cluster, as firms may choose to trade-off between the benefits of mutual collaboration 
and the potential loss of competitive advantage. The interview findings in chapter six strongly 
indicate that cluster firms do not trust each other, and one of the reasons for this may be 
because they view each other as competitors. Therefore, based on the findings neither 
proposition 9, nor 9a, are accepted to explain the current situation in the SOT cluster 
regarding inter-firm knowledge exchanges, i.e. in the SOT cluster, although there is mostly 
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low modularity in product technology, the number of opportunities for inter-firm knowledge 
exchanges are increasing slowly. However, many SOT cluster firms do not take full 
advantage of these opportunities. 
 
 
7.3.10: Proposition 10 
Proposition 10. Failing industry clusters will have undertaken a significant process of 
consolidation resulting in a reduction in the number of firms and, in the emergence of 
one/few dominant firms who do not act in the best interests of the cluster as a whole. 
 
The findings from chapter five of this thesis clearly identified that the SOT cluster 
experienced a severe process of consolidation and firm closures between 1960 and circa 
2010 (see chapter 4.3). The number of SMEs (tableware and giftware ceramics 
manufacturers) in 1960 was 107, by 2010 this number had reduced to 24, and by 2016 it had 
reduced further to 16. The findings from chapter five also established the emergence and 
growth, mostly through acquisition, of the SOT cluster’s two former dominant firms, 
Wedgwood and Doulton. Chapter five and chapter six also found that Wedgwood and 
Doulton, whilst providing many benefits to the cluster (agglomeration benefits) in the earlier 
part of their development paths, had not always acted in the best interests of the SOT 
cluster. The effects on the industry were particularly damaging to the cluster in the latter 
years of their dominance over the industry (see chapter 6.7.3). Moreover, the findings also 
indicate that Wedgwood and Doulton were mainly responsible for much of the consolidation 
that took place in the SOT cluster. The strategic management literature on networks of 
direction (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003; Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009) identifies positive 
and negative implications of dominant firms within a cluster. On the positive side, the 
emergence of large dominant firms within a cluster can lead to new investment in technology 
on a scale which might not have been undertaken by smaller firms (Lazonick, 1993; Belso, 
2010), and this appears to have been the case with Wedgwood and Doulton. On the other 
hand, the networks of direction model raises particular concerns for clusters, primarily 
relating to a cluster becoming locked-in to the objectives and strategic direction of a few or 
even a single firm (Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009). Based on the findings, this also appears 
to be the case with Wedgwood and Doulton (see chapter 6.6.1).  
 
 
However, chapters five and six also identified that, since the decline of Wedgwood and 
Doulton (mid-late 2000s), the cluster has seen the emergence of five new dominant firms 
(currently the largest firms in the cluster) of approximately similar size. Moreover, the 
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evidence, whilst limited, indicates that the cluster’s new dominant firms are taking more 
positive roles within the cluster (see chapter 6.6.4). Power and control also appear to be 
more balanced across the cluster with no one/few firms having disproportionate control. 
Therefore, based on the findings, proposition 10 is not accepted to explain the current 
situation in the SOT cluster regarding dominant firms, i.e. the SOT cluster appears to be a 
successful cluster that has undergone a significant process of consolidation and now has a 
more balanced industry structure led by five large firms of roughly equal size. Moreover, 
early indications are that these firms are acting in the best interests of the cluster as a whole. 
 
 
7.3.11: Proposition 11 
Proposition 11. Failing industry clusters are dominated by a few large firms who engage in 
competitive strategies resulting in a reduction in co-operation and innovation. 
 
The findings from chapter six indicate that the cluster’s past dominant firms appear to have 
engaged in competitive strategies that resulted in a reduction in co-operation and innovation 
in the SOT cluster (see chapter 6.6.1-6.6.3). As noted previously, Wedgwood and Doulton 
are thought to be responsible for much of the consolidation that significantly reduced the 
number of firms in the cluster which, in-turn, also reduced competition in the cluster. A 
reduction in competition, simply because there are fewer firms, reduces the overall 
innovative capacity of the SOT cluster (Porter, 1990). Moreover, the findings indicate that a 
major motive for Wedgwood and Doulton’s acquisition strategies was deliberate elimination 
of competition. The findings also indicate that Wedgwood and Doulton did not share their 
knowledge with the rest of the SOT cluster, and this would have affected opportunities for 
knowledge exchange (co-operation) within the cluster. According to Sacchetti and Tomlinson 
(2009), lead firms might prefer their knowledge to remain hidden since it strengthens its hold 
over its strategic options and capabilities, particularly in relation to technological change (p. 
1843), and this appears to be the case with Wedgwood and Doulton.  
 
 
According to life-cycle theory (Gemser,1996), horizontal inter-firm linkages should be 
particularly dense at the beginning and end of the industry life-cycle (p.445). However, in the 
decline stage they may be weak due to negative competition or dominant firm effects that 
may be a feature of the cluster. It has been established in chapter five of this thesis that the 
SOT cluster was in the decline phase of the industry life-cycle from circa 1980 until circa 
2005, thus horizontal linkages should have been strong during this period. However, the 
findings in chapters five and six indicate that there were few linkages between cluster firms 
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during this period and, that Wedgwood and Doulton may have been partially responsible for 
that. The view that dominant firms can have negative effects on co-operation and innovation 
in clusters is also noted in the strategic management literature. For example, according to 
Rosenfeld (1997), it is not uncommon for a regional cluster to be dominated by a small 
number of very large companies and they can wield considerable power over smaller 
subordinate suppliers (p.16).  Such a situation can undermine reciprocity and trust and may 
partially explain why SOT survey firms appear to exhibit a general mistrust of each other. 
Based on the research findings, proposition 11 is not accepted to explain the current 
situation in the SOT cluster regarding dominant firm effects on co-operation and innovation, 
i.e. the SOT cluster appears to be a successful cluster that was once dominated by two large 
firms who engaged in competitive strategies that resulted in a reduction in co-operation and 
innovation in the cluster. 
 
 
7.4: The Research Conclusions – the Current Strategic Position of the SOT 
Cluster 
The conclusions drawn from earlier sections of this chapter clearly indicate that the SOT 
cluster exhibits many of the characteristics of a successful industry cluster. However, the 
findings have also identified several areas of weakness that need addressing to ensure the 
continuing success and long-term survival of the cluster.  
 
Firstly, the SOT cluster has many key strengths that contribute towards its competitive 
advantage. One key strength for the cluster is its strong locational benefits that have 
developed over the several hundred years of its existence, despite the recent period of 
consolidation and decline. Locational benefits include access to suppliers and other related 
and supporting industry, such as the BCC, Lucideon and CATU. These benefits can be 
linked to the ‘related and supporting industry determinant’ in Porter’s Diamond (1990). 
Another locational benefit for the cluster is that all core ceramic manufacturers are co-
located near to each other and, whilst the evidence shows that SOT cluster firms do not 
compete directly with each other, they behave as if they are close competitors and this has 
resulted in strong innovation in the SOT cluster, this is evident across all innovative activities 
for the larger firms, and mainly in product innovation activities for smaller firms. Strong 
domestic rivalry is part of the ‘firm strategy, structure and rivalry’ determinant of Porter’s 
Diamond (1990). Innovation is seen a key strength of the SOT cluster and an indicator of the 
cluster’s competitive advantage. Another key strength for the SOT cluster is that the skills 
base in the cluster is still strong, despite many traditional skills having left the cluster after 
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the decline of the industry. Moreover, knowledge in the cluster is still highly systemic, 
architectural knowledge (Arikan and Schilling, 2011) that bestows higher-order factor 
advantages on the cluster (Porter, 1990 – factor conditions).  
 
 
A further key strength for the SOT cluster is that the cluster has evolved into a less 
hierarchical mode of governance with power and control appearing to be more balanced 
between the cluster’s largest firms (linked to ‘firm strategy and structure’ in Porter’s Diamond 
(1990)). This was not the case in the past as, up until 2009, power and control were 
concentrated into the hands of Wedgwood and Doulton who may not have always acted in 
the best interests of the cluster. The cluster’s new dominant firms are performing well, their 
success is seen as a strength of the cluster as they raise the profile of the whole industry. 
Potentially, their success may attract new suppliers, customers and, hopefully, new firm 
entrants. Another key strength for the SOT cluster is that demand for the cluster’s products 
has grown, both at home and abroad and cluster firms are experiencing strong growth in 
domestic sales and exports. This can be linked to ‘demand conditions’ in Porter’s Diamond 
(1990). Moreover, new export markets have been targeted by many of the cluster’s largest 
firms. Overall, from the evidence, it appears that the SOT ceramics ‘local diamond’ has been 
significantly strengthened over recent years. 
 
 
As identified in the strategic management literature (Porter, 1990; Dei Ottati, 1994; 
Newlands, 2003; Belussi and Sedita, 2009), the two key elements of successful industry 
clusters are competition and co-operation, and these two elements need to be balanced in 
order to ensure the long-term stability of the cluster. From the findings, it is reasonably clear 
that whilst overall competition appears to have declined in the SOT cluster due to 
consolidation, innovation is a key feature of the cluster and as such is responsible for much 
of the cluster’s competitive advantage. However, in addition to the strengths identified in the 
cluster, several weaknesses were also identified, the most significant of which appears to be 
the low level of co-operative activity taking place in the cluster. In other words, co-operation 
appears to be out of balance with competition in the SOT cluster, despite their being many 
opportunities for knowledge creation and knowledge sharing. From the findings, it also 
appears to be the largest firms in the cluster who co-operate the most, but co-operation is 
mostly with suppliers and customers and with the BCC and a few other supporting 
institutions, e.g. Lucideon. It is the cluster’s smallest firms who appear to co-operate the 
least and, although there is some evidence of co-operation with suppliers and customers, 
there is little evidence of small firms co-operating with supporting institutions. There is also 
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little evidence of cluster firms co-operating with each other on projects that may benefit the 
whole industry, e.g. on promoting the ‘made in Stoke-on-Trent’ brand and on joint supply 
chain initiatives such as purchasing groups. A further weakness that was identified for the 
cluster was the general atmosphere of mistrust that appears to exist between cluster firms, 
and this may partially explain cluster firms’ unwillingness to co-operate with each other. 
There is some evidence in the literature that differences in the cultures of regions may 
contribute to differences in attitudes towards co-operation (Saxenian, 1994). From the 
evidence it would appear that the SOT cluster has historically had a low ‘need for co-
operation’ (Arikan, 2011) and a long history of not co-operating, and this is deeply embedded 
in the culture of the cluster. A final weakness of the SOT cluster is that there have been very 
few new entrants into the cluster since 1960 and this is seen as a key threat to the long-term 
existence of the cluster. 
 
 
Overall, based on all of the research findings, the final conclusion for the SOT cluster is that 
it is a relatively successful industry cluster, with strong competitive advantages based on 
innovation, niche strategies and differentiation. However, there are also weaknesses 
regarding cluster firms’ propensity to trust each other, and to co-operate for the overall 
benefit of the cluster. Several opportunities were identified from the findings and are 
presented as recommendations in the following section. 
 
 
7.5: Recommendations  
1. The findings indicate that it is the smallest SOT cluster firms who appear to conduct 
low levels of co-operation on their process innovations. It is recommended that 
smaller cluster firms identify ways to co-operate more with suppliers on their process 
innovations, possibly through working with third party co-ordinators, e.g. the BCC and 
the local Chamber of Commerce in North Staffordshire.  
 
2. The findings indicate that SOT cluster firms appear to be weak at developing external 
networks/linkages. It is recommended that all cluster firms investigate new methods 
for organising external relations, this applies to local/national/overseas partners. 
Again, possibly through working with third party co-ordinators, e.g. Lucideon. 
 
3. The findings indicate that it is the smallest firms in the SOT cluster who appear to 
experience the most factors hampering their innovations, e.g. lack of qualified 
personnel, lack of information on technologies and financing/cost issues. It is 
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recommended that small firms investigate ways of working with organisations, such 
as the local Chamber of Commerce, the BCC and other supporting institutions, to 
identify ways of overcoming factors hampering innovations, e.g. Staffordshire 
University. 
 
4. The findings indicate that SOT cluster firms may be willing to co-operate on 
promoting the ‘made in Stoke-on-Trent’ brand. It is recommended that SOT cluster 
firms investigate ways of collaborating to promote ‘made in Stoke-on-Trent’. Again, 
possibly through third party co-ordinators, e.g. The City of Stoke-on-Trent Council. 
 
5. The findings indicate that many SOT cluster firms appear not to take advantage of 
financial support that may be available to them. It is recommended that SOT cluster 
firms investigate ways of co-operating with policy makers and supporting institutions 
to take advantage of any government financial support that may be available to them. 
 
6. The findings indicate that many of the smallest SOT firms do not take advantage of 
the available support from the BCC and other supporting organisations. It is 
recommended that smaller SOT cluster firms negotiate membership terms with the 
BCC and other supporting institutions, possibly at reduced membership rates based 
on firm size. 
 
7. The findings indicate that SOT cluster firms may be willing to co-operate on the 
provision of training courses to develop employee skills. It is recommended that 
cluster firms and educational/training institutions act collectively (co-operate) to 
recruit the number of employees required to run industry training courses. Again, 
possibly through third party co-ordinators, e.g. Stoke-on-Trent FE/HE Colleges 
and/or Staffordshire University. 
 
8. The findings indicate that some SOT cluster firms may be willing to co-operate on 
supply chain initiatives. It is recommended that cluster firms, suppliers and 
supporting institutions work together to investigate ways to purchase inputs together 
and also to possibly backward integrate elements of the supply chain. 
 
9. The findings indicate that there is a lack of new firms entering the SOT cluster. It is 
recommended that policy makers and other interested parties investigate ways of 
stimulating new firm entry into the SOT cluster, possibly by offering incentives and 
other attractors, e.g. low rents and business loans. This recommendation is linked to 
288 
 
several other recommendations (1, 3 and 6) aimed at improving a range of conditions 
for small firms. 
 
 
7.6: Review of the Applied Theory and Contribution to Knowledge 
The main aim of this thesis was to determine the ‘strategic health’ of the SOT ceramics 
industry cluster (tableware and giftware sector). According to Porter (1990), the strategic 
health of a cluster depends on the competitive advantage of the cluster as a whole. Thus, 
the starting point for this research study was a review and evaluation of Michael Porter’s 
National Diamond framework model (Porter, 1990), which had previously been applied by 
several policy makers to determine competitive advantage in industry clusters (see chapter 
2.1). From Porter’s studies of industry clusters two key elements were identified as being 
crucial to the success or failure of an industry, or region, i.e. the roles of ‘co-operation’ and 
‘competition’ in industry clusters. In addition to Porter, other cluster theories have also 
identified co-operation and competition and their effects on innovation as important factors 
influencing the competitive advantage of clusters (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Lorentzen, 2008). Other research studies identified that co-operation and competition can 
vary across different stages of the industry life-cycle (e.g., Klepper, 1996; Swann et al., 
1998; Potter and Watts, 2011, 2014). Furthermore, many of these studies, from across the 
different academic literatures, identified common reasons why clusters decline or fail. For 
example, over consolidation in an industry (Porter, 1990; Dei Ottati, 1994; Rosenfeld, 1997), 
and negative dominant firm effects (Lorenzen, 2009; Bell et al., 2009; Sacchetti and 
Tomlinson, 2009; Tomlinson and Branston, 2017). Thus, considering the many different 
factors to be examined in determining a cluster’s competitive advantage, it was decided to 
incorporate as many of these as possible into a testable theoretical framework. However, no 
one existing framework incorporating all of these factors was identified from a review of the 
relevant literatures. 
 
 
As part of the literature review process, however, the research did identify one theoretical 
framework that, whilst including many factors relevant to competitive advantage, could be 
further adapted and developed to include other important factors that were missing. The 
original framework was developed by Andac Arikan (2009) to identify contributors to a 
cluster’s knowledge creation capability, i.e. innovative output (see chapter 2, Figure 2.2). 
Many of Arikan’s contributing factors had also been identified from the literature review as 
being important factors in determining competitive advantage in clusters. Consequently, the 
researcher adapted Arikan’s framework to include, for example, industry life-cycle stages, 
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demand conditions, absorptive capacity, historical antecedents and other influences on 
innovative output (see chapter 2, Figure 2.5). However, the newly adapted framework, upon 
application, was found to be missing two important factors influencing competitive 
advantage. This is not because the researcher had missed identifying these factors in the 
literature, but because they were either already missing or only superficially reported in the 
extant literature. Subsequently, the already adapted framework was further refined and is 
presented in figure 7.1 at the end of this section. This final framework is new and is, 
therefore, a development of existing cluster theory and, similar to Porter’s Diamond 
Framework (1990), it can be utilised by practitioners as a template for future cluster studies. 
 
 
This next section provides a critique of the theoretical framework adopted for this research 
study, it explains why/how the adapted Arikan framework was further refined after 
application to the SOT cluster and it identifies further contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge on industry clusters. 
 
 
Arikan’s original framework was initially considered useful to identify the current situation, i.e. 
what currently exists in the SOT cluster with regard to knowledge creation opportunities and 
actual innovative output. However, the framework was found to be limited as it does not 
consider historical antecedents and path dependency factors on a cluster’s knowledge 
creating abilities. These were found to be extremely important influences on the SOT 
cluster’s propensity to co-operate. For example, whilst Arikan’s original framework does 
attempt to identify the ‘need for co-operation’ that exists in a cluster at the time of analysis, it 
does not consider a cluster’s historical need for co-operation. Thus, the research considers 
this an important omission as the historical need for co-operation in a cluster may be 
identified as low, as in the case of the SOT cluster, yet the cluster may have been and may 
still be very successful. This was also found to be the case with the SOT cluster. Moreover, 
in other academic literature on clusters the ‘need’ for co-operation is either completely 
ignored, or only superficially acknowledged, with the focus instead on expounding how co-
operation is ‘essential’ to cluster success. For example, co-operation is viewed as marginally 
more important than competitive forces for competitive advantage (e.g. Porter, 1990; Dei 
Ottati, 1994; Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009). Moreover, the researcher could not 
find any examples in the extant literature of clusters who had been, or who were, successful 
and who did not co-operate, i.e. did not have extensive networks of external and internal 
linkages comprising both weak and strong ties. Consequently, it appears that the existing 
academic literature does not fully acknowledge that clusters can be successful without 
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having strong co-operative linkages. As identified previously in this chapter, the SOT 
ceramics cluster was, and still is, a very successful industry cluster, despite apparently low 
levels of co-operation. These findings somewhat contradict the findings from previous cluster 
studies as mentioned above. Thus, this research study has contributed to the extant 
literature by providing new knowledge and new perspectives on the importance of co-
operation in industry clusters. Moreover, the researcher has developed Arikan’s original 
model (see chapter 2, Figure 2.2) which is aimed at identifying knowledge creating 
opportunities, to not only include other factors identified in the various literatures as 
important to knowledge creation and competitive advantage (see chapter 2, Figure 2.4 for an 
extension of Arikan’s original model), but has, in light of the empirical research findings, 
developed the model further to include a  new determinant, ‘factors affecting the propensity 
to co-operate’. The new determinant examines other historical antecedents not included in 
Arikan’s original model. Figure 7.1 Presents the new model for analysing industry clusters 
and the new addition to the model is seen in box 16.
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Fig. 7.1: New Theoretical Framework for Analysing Industry Clusters (Source: Author, originally based on Arikan (2009)) 
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ordination) 
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provide knowledge-related benefits 
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- Path dependency 
- Specifics of work structure 
and ownership 
- Local cultural factors 
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A second gap in the literature, and where the researcher has also made a contribution, is in 
developing the literature on dominant firm effects on the competitive advantage of clusters. 
Although some previous cluster studies have acknowledged that dominant firms in clusters 
can have both positive and negative effects, the literature is limited in that dominant firm 
effects appear to be somewhat under reported in the literature. For example, dominant firm 
effects appear mostly in cluster studies under the headings of ‘cluster failure’ or ‘negative 
effects’ (e.g. Sacchetti and Tomlinson, 2009; Tomlinson and Branston, 2014) or ‘when the 
cluster stops working’ (e.g. Porter, 1990). There is little mention of positive dominant firms 
effects on clusters, with the exception of a few examples (e.g. Giuliani, 2002, 2005; 
Grandinetti, 2016). Moreover, there appear to be very few specific examples, i.e. 
documented case studies where actual dominant firms have had either a positive or negative 
influence on a cluster. In this research study, dominant firms in the SOT cluster, both past 
and present, have been focussed on. The research findings on the SOT cluster’s past 
dominant firms, in the main, support previous cluster studies regarding possible negative 
effects of large dominant firms. Therefore, this research contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge on the negative effects of large dominant firms in clusters, it also provides a case 
study example that can be utilised as a comparison case study for other cluster studies. 
 
 
A third and final contribution to the theory on industry clusters, and also to the theory on 
evolutionary economics, are the findings of the longitudinal study of the SOT cluster’s 
development between 1960 and 2016. The study documents the birth, growth and decline of 
many of the cluster’s ceramics manufacturing firms. It also details the acquisition paths of 
many of the SOT cluster’s largest firms. Thus, it provides a unique historical account of the 
evolution of the SOT cluster over a 56-year period. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, no previous similar longitudinal studies of industry cluster evolution exist, either 
for the SOT cluster, or for any other mature industry cluster. Therefore, the research findings 
fill a gap in the extant literature on the SOT ceramics cluster, and also contribute to overall 
cluster theories. 
 
 
7.7: Reflection on Methodologies 
In this section the researcher provides a reflection and review of the research methodologies 
adopted for this research study. 
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7.7.1: Reflection and Review of the Adopted Research Philosophy 
As discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis (see chapter 3.2), the research 
matched ontological and epistemological stances to the proposed research task and then 
selected a variety of appropriate methods to best achieve specific aims and objectives. After 
careful consideration of research paradigms, a post-positivist/critical realist approach was 
selected as the core paradigm for this research study. However, as the research objectives 
were linked to several competing paradigm approaches, elements of other paradigms were 
incorporated into the overall research design and a ‘mixed paradigms approach’ 
(Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006) was adopted to take account of the different quantitative 
and qualitative elements of the research (see chapter 3.3). Upon reflection, the carefully 
constructed research framework was found to be appropriate for the research, as the 
researcher was successful in combining the various quantitative (e.g. longitudinal study and 
questionnaire) and qualitative (e.g. interviews) elements to meet the research objectives 
(see Tables 4.8, 5.3 and 6.14). Moreover, the mixed paradigm and mixed/multiple methods 
approaches applied in this research are in line with a critical realism paradigm as they 
involved both deductive and inductive elements (Saunders et al., 2003). 
 
 
As previously discussed in this chapter, from an extensive review of the literature on industry 
clusters, industrial districts, production, systems and networks, and other associated 
literatures, a theoretical framework for the research was constructed (see chapter 7.6 and 
Table 2.4). The theoretical framework was tested through a case study of the SOT ceramics 
cluster. In addition, causal relationships between some of the variables were explained, e.g. 
the relationship between firm size and innovative output was analysed and evaluated (see 
chapter 6.3). This deductive approach (theory testing) was particularly successful in 
achieving objectives 1-5, and partially successful in achieving objectives 6-8. An inductive 
approach was applied to complete objectives 6-8 and to fully achieve objectives 9-11. The 
inductive approach was found to be particularly suitable in determining the reasons and 
motivations for why SOT firms did/did not co-operate (objectives 6-8), and in determining 
SOT firms views on advantages, disadvantages and motivations of dominant firms. By 
adhering strictly to the theoretical framework, and evaluating the research findings in light of 
findings from previous cluster studies, the researcher attempted to minimise researcher bias 
as much as possible, i.e. the researcher was careful not to attach personal values to the 
interpretation and evaluation of the research findings. However, as Guber and Lincoln (1994) 
state, “facts determined by the theory window will be subject to value-ladenness” (p.107), 
and therefore the researcher acknowledges that some bias may have unintentionally 
occurred in interpreting the findings. 
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7.7.2: Reflection and Review of the Adopted Mixed/multi Method Approach 
As previously noted, a mixed/multiple method approach was adopted for this research study. 
Mixed and multi-method approaches (e.g. Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Yin, 2006; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009; Bryman, 2009; Sandelowski et 
al., 2009; Small, 2011) were fully discussed and evaluated in chapter three of this thesis 
(see chapter 3.4). In this research study, the multi/mixed methods approach involved 
employing different methods to achieve different objectives and the resultant data was 
analysed using integrated data analysis techniques, e.g. integrating multiple sources of 
secondary data into a longitudinal study, and data combining techniques, e.g. combining 
questionnaire data with interview data. By using a mixed/multi methods approach the 
researcher was able to verify the findings derived from one type of data with those derived 
from another. For example: the longitudinal study findings were compared to data from 
previous SOT cluster reports; the historical review of the cluster’s ‘need for co-operation’ 
was integrated and compared to the questionnaire and interview data on co-operation; and, 
the questionnaire and interview datum were integrated and/or compared with each other. 
Thus, the ‘integrated analysis’ approach (Small, 2011) was very useful for the research in 
verifying or refuting findings from each single source. This is evidence of ‘triangulation’ 
where different kinds of data are collected to measure the same phenomenon (Yin, 2006; 
Kadushin, et al., 2008). Consequently, the integrated research findings provided a more 
compelling argument than evidence from any single method employed. Moreover, the 
interview findings on co-operation compensated for potential weaknesses in the 
questionnaire data by providing further explanation, examples and reasons why firms did/did 
not co-operate, and the interview findings on dominant firm effects re-enforced the findings 
in chapter four on dominant firms.  
 
 
7.7.3: Reflection and Review of the Case Study Design 
A single case study was adopted as the research design for this study. The single case was 
identified in the methodology chapter (see chapter 3.5) as the Stoke-on-Trent (SOT) 
ceramics industry cluster, tableware and giftware sector. The single case study approach 
has been the adopted research strategy for many previous cluster studies where the cluster 
has been considered as one single case (e.g. Porter, 1990; Dayasindhu, 2001; Richardson, 
2010; MirHosseini and Ghanbari, 2011). Therefore, the approach for this research was in 
line with the approach taken by previous cluster studies. The single case study approach is 
also in line with the critical realist approach (Robson, 2002). Moreover, the case study 
approach applied to this research study supports a mixed/multi methods approach (De Vaus, 
2001; Robson, 2002) as it involved empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon 
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i.e. the SOT cluster within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence. The case 
study approach also enabled the researcher to carry out a ‘historical review’ (Jankowicz, 
1995) of the SOT cluster, i.e. what happened to the SOT cluster in the past was described 
and then the identified issues were developed further through the primary research. 
 
 
7.7.4: Reflection and Review of the Adopted Sampling Methods 
As discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis (see chapter 3.6), only manufacturers 
who carry out all/most phases of production, i.e. core manufacturers (SMEs) of tableware 
and giftware in the SOT cluster, were selected as the total population for this research study. 
The rationale for selecting only core manufacturers for the study supports Michael Porter’s 
technique for cluster identification (Porter, 2000b) where he advocates starting with a large 
firm or concentration of like firms at the core of the industry. The total population for this 
research was identified from the longitudinal study presented in chapter four of this thesis 
(see chapter 4.3). The findings from the study identified sixteen core manufacturing SMEs 
(tableware and giftware) existing in the cluster in 2016. The researcher’s original intention 
was to survey all sixteen firms, i.e. the total population. Unfortunately, despite exhaustive 
efforts in contacting all sixteen firms, only six firms agreed to take part in the questionnaire 
and interview surveys and this is a limitation of the research. However, the six firms that did 
take part in the two surveys represent 38% of the total number of firms in the population, and 
over 60% of sales turnover and employees in the whole ceramics manufacturing cluster (see 
chapter 6.3). Therefore the number of responses, despite not capturing all sixteen firms in 
the population, was still deemed large enough to represent the SOT cluster and for confident 
generalisations to be made. Moreover, as this stage of the research involved integrating 
qualitative data with quantitative data, a relatively small sample size is deemed acceptable 
as, according to Patton (1990), qualitative studies tend to focus in-depth on relatively small 
samples (p.169). The difficulty in persuading SOT firms to take part in the surveys also 
affected the approach taken for selecting respondents for interview. It was originally intended 
to use stratified purposeful sampling techniques (Patton, 1990) to select, from the 
questionnaire responses, a number of firms suitable for interviewing (see chapter 3.6). 
However, due to the small number of questionnaire responses (six), it was decided to 
interview all six firms. The six firms were deemed truly representative of the SOT cluster as 
they comprised two small firms, two medium sized firms and two large firms. Moreover, 
these firms operate in either the domesticwares or hotelwares sectors, or in a combination of 
both (see chapter 6, Table 6.1). Consequently, the sample of interviewees still accounted for 
‘maximum variation’ (Patton, 1990).  Unfortunately, it was not possible to undertake 
‘extreme’ or ‘deviant case’ sampling (Patton, 1990) as also intended (see chapter 3.6.4) due 
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to the small number of responses, this is a further limitation of the research. The research 
did, however, attempt to present opposing views, and also to identify possible interviewee 
bias, and these are acknowledged accordingly in chapter six findings. 
 
 
7.7.5: Reflection and Review of the Adopted Data Analysis Methods 
In line with the critical realist and mixed/multi method approach taken for this research study, 
a number of different analytical techniques were utilised to analyse the different sets of data. 
For example: Microsoft Excel quantitative techniques were used to analyse the longitudinal 
study data and produce charts and tables; simple one-way frequency Microsoft Word tables 
were used to present the questionnaire data, as there were too few data points for a more 
sophisticated statistical analysis; data reduction techniques with descriptive statistics and 
narrative were used in chapter five to provide a historical analysis of co-operation in the SOT 
cluster; and, data reduction, pattern matching, descriptive statistics and narrative in light of 
theory were used in analysing interview data. The limitations of the secondary data have 
already been acknowledged in the methodology chapter of this thesis (see chapter 3.7) and 
limitations have also been identified in the primary data collection and analysis, i.e. small 
number of respondents and lack of data points for statistical analysis. However, whilst 
statistically significant results could not be obtained from the data, the researcher did identify 
relationships between several of the variables, e.g. firm size and levels of innovation and co-
operation. Moreover, the questionnaire results were invaluable in determining the questions 
for the qualitative investigation. Overall, the researcher attempted to overcome the 
weaknesses of the small number of responses by integrating the findings from the 
questionnaires with the findings from the interviews, and also with findings in other chapters 
where possible. This is further evidence of nesting and triangulation. 
 
 
7.7.6: Reflection and Review of Validity and Reliability of the Research Process 
The researcher has ensured validity and reliability in the research instruments, sources of 
data and in the research findings in several ways throughout this research study. Firstly, 
multiple secondary data sources were utilised in chapters four and five of this thesis to 
construct the longitudinal study and historical analysis of the SOT cluster. Triangulation was 
achieved by cross-referencing these sources. Secondly, by adapting a tried and tested 
research instrument, i.e. the GPrix innovation questionnaire, the researcher achieved 
‘content validity’ (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). Thirdly, the questionnaire and interview 
questions were carefully matched to the objectives and to the theoretical framework, thus 
achieving ‘construct validity’ (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). Fourthly, a pilot study was 
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conducted to ensure response and recording accuracy (see methodology chapter, 3.7.16). 
The pilot study took place between October 2015 and October 2016. Firstly, two academics 
with knowledge of the SOT ceramics industry, including one who had been involved in the 
GPrix innovation survey, appraised the questionnaire. After making adjustments to several 
questions the questionnaire was administered to one SOT cluster firm (company ‘D’, see 
Appendix 13 for company profiles). The pilot study respondent is a senior manager of a 
medium sized ceramics firm who has been employed in the industry for many years. As a 
result of this final pilot, one question was refined further to enhance validity. Finally, findings 
from all stages of the research were integrated, cross-referenced and synthesised wherever 
possible. These approaches taken by the researcher are appropriate in mixed methods 
research as they involved combining the complementary strengths and non-overlapping 
weaknesses of the quantitative and qualitative research (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006). 
The approach taken by the researcher is also in line with ‘legitimisation’ of the research 
findings (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003, 2006; Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006) as detailed 
in the methodology chapter (see chapter three, table 5.3). One limitation in the research 
instrument (questionnaire) was identified (see chapter 6.1.1), i.e. where, upon reflection, 
some of the category bands were deemed to be too broad, e.g. firm turnover and number of 
employees. In future studies the questionnaire will be adapted to include more category 
bands for respondents to select from. 
 
 
7.7.7: Reflection and Review of Generalisability and Replication of Findings 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, existing cluster studies have used a variety of 
methods to study different populations. Also, as stated in the methodology chapter of this 
thesis (see chapter 3.9), it was never the intention in this research study to closely follow 
specific procedures of other cluster studies. However, by collating and repeating elements of 
past studies on a different population, the researcher was able to identify that the results of 
these previous studies were mostly generalisable to the SOT cluster. However, there were 
some exceptions, e.g. co-operation appears not to have been a key success factor in the 
competitive advantage of the SOT cluster and, therefore, co-operation in this case is not as 
important as cluster theory indicates. Consequently, for this research study, the researcher 
designed a theoretical framework based on findings drawn from previous studies of clusters, 
industrial districts, networks and production systems (see Figures 2.2 and 2.4). The resultant 
framework is something new to cluster studies and can be likened to a ‘multi focal pattern’ 
(Tsang and Kwan, 1999). Moreover, the researcher’s theoretical framework was further 
refined and adapted through application to the SOT cluster (see Figure 7.1). According to 
Tsang and Kwan (1999), researchers’ do frequently introduce new concepts or conceptual 
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relations that help to develop theories (p.771). The researcher is not suggesting, however, 
that the research findings on the SOT cluster are generalisable to all other industry clusters, 
as every industry cluster is different. However, the researcher does put forward the newly 
adapted and refined theoretical framework as an alternative model to analyse and evaluate 
industry clusters and, therefore, it is the new model that is generalisable and capable of 
being replicated in other situations. 
 
 
7.8: Areas for Future research 
A number of areas for future research have been identified as a result of the research 
process and are identified in order of importance as follows: 
1) continue to track the evolution of the SOT cluster, i.e. continue the longitudinal/historical 
study by regularly updating the primary database (Appendix 4) and by extracting charts and 
tables as with chapter four of this thesis; 
2) extend the cluster analysis by expanding the unit of analysis from core ceramics 
manufacturers to include, decorators, suppliers and related/supporting institutions, this is in 
line with Porter’s view on analysing clusters, i.e. start with core firms and then expand 
outwards (see chapter 3.5); 
3) replicate the interview survey questions for the role of dominant firms in five years-time, 
with the aim of analysing and evaluating the cluster’s new dominant firms; 
4) replicate the interview survey questions for co-operation in the SOT cluster in five-years 
time, with the aim of identifying any improvements in co-operative activity. 
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Appendix 1: The Four Main Determinants of the National Diamond System 
 
Factor Conditions Demand Conditions 
Factor conditions are the basic inputs necessary to 
compete. 
Categories include: human resources, physical resources, 
knowledge resources, capital resources, and infrastructure. 
 
Factors can be divided into 2 main types: 
Basic factors – bestow only lower-order advantages 
because they are unlikely to provide sustainable long-term 
competitive advantage. Examples include: natural 
resources, location, climate, low-cost unskilled and semi-
skilled labour. 
Advanced factors – necessary to achieve higher-order 
competitive advantages. Examples include: technical 
communication systems, educated personnel, and R&D 
into advanced technologies. 
 
The more specialised factors are linked to innovation 
and therefore are necessary at a firm’s home base.  
The most significant and sustainable competitive 
advantage arises when a nation possesses factors that are 
both specialised and advanced but there must be 
continual investment in developing/upgrading of 
advantages. 
There are 3 broad attributes of home demand that are significant to 
competitive advantage: 
 
1. Composition of home demand. 
Home demand must give local firms a faster, clearer picture of buyer 
needs than foreign firms can obtain. Home buyers must pressure firms to 
innovate. Buyers in the home market must be sophisticated and 
demanding as this forces innovation. Home needs must not be specific to 
the nation. 
 
2. Size and Pattern of growth. 
Economies of scale leading to national competitive advantage are more 
likely within large home markets. The greater the number of independent 
buyers in a nation, the better the environment for stimulating innovation 
and competition. Rapid domestic demand growth stimulates faster 
investment, innovation and adoption of new technologies. Slower growth 
leads to incremental investment in innovation and upgrading facilities. 
Home market saturation leads to internationalisation efforts. 
 
3. Mechanisms for Internationalisation 
Foreign buyers in the home country can pull demand abroad; Home grown 
multinationals take suppliers abroad; domestic buyer lifestyles are pulled 
abroad by foreign customers wishing to emulate. 
Related & Supporting Industries Firm: Strategy, Structure & Rivalry 
Internationally competitive suppliers in a nation can create 
advantages in downstream industries by providing 
efficient, early and rapid access to the most cost-
effective inputs.  
 
A more significant advantage is home-based co-
ordination, which exploits linkages in the value chain and 
can be strengthened by having suppliers nearby.  
 
The most important benefit is in the process of innovation 
and upgrading.  
 
Competitive advantage emerges from close working 
relationships between world-class suppliers and the 
industry. The pace of innovation within the entire 
national industry is thus accelerated and transaction 
costs reduced. 
 
Related Industries - Related industries are those in which 
firms can co-ordinate or share activities in the value 
chain when competing, or those involving products that are 
complementary, e.g. sharing of technology development 
through to sharing of distribution channels that are used for 
similar products.  
 
Proximity and cultural similarity is also important in related 
industries as information flows and technical 
interchanges are made easier.  Related industry can also 
provide a source of new entrants.  
National circumstances affect the way in which firms are created, 
organised, managed and choose to compete. There are 2 areas where 
important national differences occur: 
 
1. Firm strategy and structure. 
Relates to the cultural aspects of a nation and their influence on 
management practices & approaches and on the attitudes of workers. 
There are distinct national differences in areas such as training, 
background and orientation of leaders, group versus hierarchical style, firm 
ownership and the orientation of firms toward competing globally. 
 
2.  Domestic Rivalry (DR) 
There is a strong link between vigorous DR and the creation/persistence 
of competitive advantage. This applies to fragmented and concentrated 
industries. DR pressures firms to continually improve and innovate to 
upgrade higher-order advantages.  
Strong DR promotes a wider range of products/ services covering many 
segments of the market. This acts as a defence against foreign 
penetration. In addition, the stock of knowledge and skills in the 
industry accumulates as firms imitate each other and personnel move 
among firms in the industry. Geographic concentration of rivals in a 
single city or region reflects and magnifies these benefits - 
information flows with enormous speed and the effects upon the 
industry are dynamic. 
 
Intense DR depends on new business formation to create new 
competitors and to feed the process of innovation. Entirely new firms 
can be formed through: spin-offs from firms in the industry; from supplier & 
related industries; from internal diversification into new industries. One 
spin-off encourages another, this dynamic creates more rivalry, more 
innovation and leads to new segments. 
(Source: Author, compiled from Porter, M. E., 1990) 
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Appendix 1a: The Two Variables that Influence the National Diamond 
The Role of Government The Role of Chance 
The government’s role in national competitive advantage is in 
influencing the four determinants of the diamond. Such influences 
can be either positive or negative upon the industry.  
 
Examples of how government can influence the diamond are: 
• Factor conditions – provision of subsidies, policies toward 
capital markets, and education policy. 
• Demand conditions – setting of local product standards and 
regulations that influence buyer needs. The government is also a 
major buyer in many industries.  
• Related and supporting industries – government bodies 
regulate supporting services and provide controls over advertising. 
• Strategy, structure and rivalry – capital market regulations, tax 
policy, anti-trust laws, corporate governance standards, etc. 
 
Government policy can also be influenced by the determinants. For 
example: choices about where educational investments are to be 
made will be affected by the number of local competitors; strong 
home demand for a product may lead to the early introduction of 
government safety standards. 
 
In the histories of most of the successful industries 
studied, Porter found that chance events could 
alter conditions in the diamond, which in turn 
could nullify advantages of established players.  
 
For example, major shifts in input costs or 
exchange rates can create factor disadvantages.  
 
However, chance events can also act as a 
catalyst for innovation to overcome 
disadvantages, perhaps resulting in higher-order 
advantages being gained.  
 
The nation with the most favourable diamond will 
be the most likely to convert chance events into 
competitive advantage. 
 
(Source: Author, compiled from Porter, M. E., 1990) 
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10. Appendix 2: The Inter-Play Between The Determinants Of The Diamond 
Determinant Influence of other Determinants Cluster Effect 
Factor 
 Creation 
Domestic Rivalry: 
Vigorous competitive rivalry stimulates rapid development of 
human resources, related technologies, market specific 
knowledge and specialised infrastructures. Through sustained 
investment by firms or in association with Trade associations. A 
group of domestic rivals can also trigger special programmes in 
local schools, universities, etc. 
 
Related and Supporting Industries: 
Related and supporting industries create and upgrade their own 
specialised factors. Some of these are transferable. 
 
Demand Conditions: 
High levels of demand and sophisticated demand can stimulate 
social and private investment into factor creation. 
These effects will be most pronounced 
if the rivals are all located in one city or 
region. Local firms must perceive the 
need for constantly upgrading the pool 
of factors and work to stimulate 
investment in them. Joint projects by 
Trade Associations involving all firms in 
the cluster are common. 
 
Clusters of industries draw on common 
inputs, e.g. skills. Specialised 
infrastructure is enlarged and whole 
new industries spring up to supply 
specialised infrastructure. 
Demand Domestic Rivalry: 
Demand is stimulated by local rivals investing in marketing, 
aggressive pricing, new product development, etc. Early 
saturation in the home market can lead to efforts to 
internationalise. Foreign demand is also stimulated by vigorous 
domestic rivalry through national image/reputation of the 
industry. 
 
Related and Supporting Industries: 
International demand can be enhanced through transferability of 
reputation from related industries. 
 
Factor Conditions: 
A nation with sophisticated factor creating mechanisms in an 
industry will attract foreign students and firms. This helps to 
internationalise demand. 
 
 
 
The quality of related and supporting 
firms, and proximity to the cluster, 
enhances industry competitiveness, i.e. 
the industry will challenge suppliers to 
develop, innovate and improve, thus 
improving image/reputation and 
stimulating demand. 
Related and 
Supporting 
Industries 
Domestic Rivalry: 
Aggressive domestic rivalry by a group of internationally 
successful domestic firms (selling worldwide), channels global 
demand to the domestic supplier industry. 
 
Demand Conditions: 
Where home demand is significant more and more specialised 
suppliers emerge. 
 
Factor Conditions: 
Skills, knowledge and technology ‘spill-over’ to benefit related 
and supporting industries 
 
The proximity of suppliers facilitates 
inter-change and collaboration. 
Information flows freely and innovations 
diffuse rapidly. 
Firms in one industry can enter a 
supplier industry (spin-offs). This raises 
the level of competition in the supplier 
industry, thus triggering investment, 
innovation, etc. 
Domestic 
Rivalry 
Demand Conditions: 
Buyers can backward integrate and enter an industry thus 
increasing competition. Early market penetration can also 
stimulate entry. 
 
Related and Supporting Industries: 
Firms can forward integrate into downstream or related 
industries. Resources and competences are transferred into the 
new industry forming interrelationships and linkages that are hard 
to copy. Higher order advantages can be achieved. Firms from 
supplier industries can also enter base industry. In either case 
competition increases. 
 
Aggressive rivalry in one industry in the 
cluster spreads to others. Entry from 
other industries within the cluster 
stimulates diversity in research and 
development and provides the means 
of introducing new strategies and skills. 
This leads to new ways of competing 
and new opportunities. 
(Source: Author, based on Porter, M. E., 1990)
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Appendix 3: Key Issues Relating to Co-operation in Clusters 
Key issues relating to co-ordination in clusters: Implications for the thesis 
(COOP1) (P1, P1a) 
Linkages in clusters consist of strong ties and weak ties. 
Strong ties are more formal relationships, such as alliances 
and formalised contractual agreements. Strong ties have 
benefits but are not as valuable as weak ties. Strong ties can 
also lead to technological lock-in under certain conditions. 
Weak ties are those involving tacit knowledge that is difficult to 
codify. These ties can lead to innovation and competitive 
advantage for cluster firms. 
Examine the nature, pervasiveness and 
frequency of both strong and weak ties within 
the Stoke-on-Trent ceramics cluster. 
 
Is there any evidence of technological lock-in?  
If so, what are the causes? For example, 
historical reasons and/or path dependence. 
(COOP2) (P1, P1a, P4, 4a) 
Trust is an important feature of successful industry clusters, 
especially when sunk-costs are high, i.e. transactions involving 
the developing of tacit knowledge and innovation. 
 
Trust is dependent on the cluster’s previous need for co-
ordination and on the industry structure and governance 
system. 
 
In clusters where trust is high, members are bound by rules of 
obligation. 
Determine the degree of trust within the Stoke-
on-Trent cluster. The conclusion will be based 
on the outcome of (COOP1). 
 
 
The need for co-ordination can be assumed 
on the basis of responses to (COOP 4,5) 
 
 
If it is found that trust is high in Stoke-on-Trent, 
what kind of formal and informal rules exist?  
(COOP3) (P2, P2a) 
Firms in successful clusters have a high absorptive capacity. 
 
Absorptive capacity is determined by the level of investment in 
internal resources, i.e. resources to develop intra-cluster 
linkages. 
 
Absorptive capacity is also dependent upon the industry 
structure and governance system.  
Investigate how much time/money is invested 
by Stoke-on-Trent firms in forming knowledge-
exchange relationships. 
 
Consider the answers to (COOP1,2,4,5) 
before drawing any conclusions about 
absorptive capacity of Stoke-on-Trent firms. 
 
(COOP4) (P3, P3a) 
In successful industry clusters the structure will be either: 
- Control balanced across firms of roughly equal size. No one 
firm has dominance. 
- Control concentrated into the hands of dominant firm(s), who 
act as ‘lighthouses’ within the cluster by facilitating knowledge 
transfer. 
 
In failing industry clusters, control is concentrated into the 
hands of dominant firm(s) who: 
-  Do not act as facilitators for knowledge transfer (keeping 
new-knowledge private). 
- Use their position in other ways to the detriment of the cluster, 
e.g. bargaining power. 
Determine the structure of the Stoke-on-Trent 
ceramics cluster , i.e. the number and size of 
firms; consolidation within the industry. A 
longitudinal study will be carried out to track 
the industry’s development and to identify 
existing firms. 
 
 
If dominant firms are a feature of the Stoke-on-
Trent cluster. What has been their role with 
regard to knowledge transfer within the 
cluster? 
 
 
(COOP5) (P3, P3a) 
Firms in successful industry clusters have a high need for co-
ordination. 
Determine whether the technological 
processes in the Stoke-on-Trent cluster are 
high-tech or low-tech as well as the degree of 
separability within the production system.  
(COOP6) (P5, P5a) 
Successful industry clusters will be supported by a 
sophisticated network of formal and informal supporting 
institutions such as trade associations, universities, R&D 
facilities, etc. 
Identify the evolution of supporting industries 
and institutions over time. (links to life-cycle 
analysis) 
 
Identify the degree of interrelatedness 
between these institutions and the Stoke-on-
Trent cluster firms. 
(COOP7) (P5, P5a) 
In successful industry clusters there will be evidence of extra-
cluster linkages that may involve national/international/global 
networks. 
IIentify if any Stoke-on-Trent cluster firms 
and/or supporting institutions have extra-
cluster linkages 
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Appendix 3a: Key Issues Relating to Competition in Clusters 
Key issues relating to 
competition in clusters: 
Implications for the thesis 
(COMP1) (P6, P6a) 
Vigorous domestic 
competition is a feature of 
successful industry clusters. 
  
 
 
Determine the number of firms in the Stoke-on-Trent cluster. Has the number of 
firms increased/decreased over time? How many new-entrants have there been 
over time? Assumption: more firms = more competition; fewer firms = less 
competition. Assumption: the greater the number of new firms the greater the 
potential for innovation (links to COOP4 and innovation). 
 
Determine the nature of competition in the Stoke-on-Trent cluster. Are firms in 
direct competition, i.e. do firms compete in the same segments with the same 
products? 
(COMP2) (P7, 7a) 
Positive forms of competition 
(innovation based) are a 
feature of successful 
industry clusters. 
 
Determine the bases of competition within the Stoke-on-Trent cluster, i.e. 
differentiation based competition or cost/price based competition? 
Need to link this answer to the outcomes of the research on innovation and co-
operation.  
Consider other influences on positive competition such as: the role of the 
dominant firm (see other sections); demand conditions and how they have 
changed over time (including: changes in consumer preferences; global 
competition) 
(COMP3) (P7, 7a) 
Negative forms of 
competition (cost/price 
based) are a feature of 
failing or declining industry 
clusters. 
.  
Determine the bases of competition within the Stoke-on-Trent cluster, i.e. 
differentiation based competition or cost/price based competition? 
 
Link this answer to the outcomes of the research on innovation and co-operation.  
 
Consider other influences on negative competition such as: the role of the 
dominant firm (see other sections); demand conditions and how they have 
changed over time (including: changes in consumer preferences; global 
competition) 
 
 
Appendix 3b: Key Issues Relating to Innovation in Clusters 
Key issues relating to innovation in clusters: Implications for the thesis 
(INOV1) (P8, P8a) 
Strong innovative ouptut is a feature of successful 
industry clusters. 
  
 
 
Measure innovative output in the Stoke-on-Trent 
cluster. How many firms innovate? What is the nature 
of innovation, e.g. processes, products, markets? 
What is the degree of innovation, e.g. small 
investment, significant investment, incremental, 
radical? What is the frequency of investment? 
Measuring investment will include both input and 
output indicators, such as R&D investments, 
employment, new products and new markets. 
(INOV2) (P9,9a) 
In clusters where there is high modularity in product 
technology, the need for co-ordination will be high and 
there will be a larger number of opportunities for 
knowledge transfer. 
 
In clusters where there is low modularity in product 
technology, the need for co-ordination will be low and 
there will be a low number of opportunities for 
knowledge transfer. 
Identify whether the production processes within the 
Stoke-on-Trent cluster are highly modular or not 
(COOP5).  
 
Determine whether specialisation is a feature of the 
Stoke-on-Trent cluster. 
 
 
(INOV3) (P2, P2a 
Knowledge transfer within the cluster will also depend 
on firms’ absorptive capacities. 
Absorptive capacity will be determined by COOP3, 
P2, P2a. 
 
(INOV4) (P3, P3a) 
Knowledge transfer within the cluster will also depend 
on the balance of power and control in the cluster. 
Power and control will be determined by COOP4, P3, 
P3a. 
 
(INOV5) (P5, P5a) 
Knowledge transfer within the cluster will also depend 
on the number and role of knowledge transfer 
facilitators within the cluster. 
The number and role of knowledge transfer 
facilitators will be determined by COOP6, P5, P5a. 
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Appendix 3c: Key Issues Relating to Life-cycle Theories 
 
Observations drawn from the literature work: 
 
For all stages of the life-cycle: 
• The type of innovative activity changes at different stages of the life-cycle - from product (introductory and 
rapid growth) to process (slowing growth) then back to product (stagnant growth/maturity). 
 
During the embryonic stage: 
• There will be high rates of new start-up firms, spin-off firms and firm entry. 
• Competition begins to grow and is based on product innovation. 
• Tacit knowledge is uncodified and therefore difficult to transfer outside the cluster. 
• Firms begin to develop cluster linkages. 
• The returns from clustering are high (increasing agglomeration returns). 
 
During the rapid growth stage: 
• The rates of firm entry, start-ups and spin-offs increases rapidly (by 30% or more). 
• Competition is becoming more intense and, although still mostly based on differentiation. However, the 
largest firms in the industry begin to focus on process technologies. 
• Processes are still labour intensive during this stage. Thus, labour mobility is high and facilitates knowledge 
transfer. 
• Elements of knowledge becomes codified and more easily transferable within the cluster – further facilitating 
knowledge transfer.  
• Cluster linkages grow rapidly and involve investors, trade associations and other supporting institutions. At 
this stage the cluster may resemble the ‘network of mutual dependence’ model. 
• Clustering economies are very high and are place specific. 
 
During the slowing growth (maturity) stage: 
• More knowledge becomes codified and more easily transferable across geographic space – possibly outside 
the cluster through the largest firms. 
• Due to the emergence of a dominant design, products become more standardised and produced using more 
capital intensive, mass production processes. 
• Consequently, employment reduces during this stage – reducing the opportunities for knowledge transfer 
• Some firms leave the industry (shake-out) and are not replaced by new entrants. The number of firms 
reduces. 
• The process of consolidation continues through acquisitions, mergers, etc. 
• The reduction in the number of firms reduces the number of competitive opportunities within the cluster. This 
has a negative effect on innovation. 
• For remaining firms competition is fierce within the smaller cluster and cluster firms may engage in price-
based competition. This has a negative effect on Innovation. 
• Cluster linkages may decline or grow, depending on local competitive strategies, path-dependence, etc. 
• Many firms experience decreasing returns from clustering economies. 
• The larger firms may experience increasing returns from dispersion (outside the cluster) economies. 
 
During the decline stage: 
• A large shake-out occurs, 50-80% of firms may leave the industry. This has a further negative effect on 
competition within the cluster.  
• The reduction in competitors in the cluster will result in a reduction in innovation because there are fewer 
potential sources of new ideas and innovation. 
• Surviving firms continue grow through mergers and acquisitions. 
• As incumbents continue to grow, economic power and decision-making becomes more concentrated within 
the leading firms. At this stage the cluster may resemble the ‘network of mutual dependence’ model. 
• Agglomeration economies will decrease the economic performance of firms, create a negative ‘lock-in’ effect 
and generate diminishing returns for cluster development. 
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Appendix 3d: Key Issues Relating to Failing Clusters 
Key issues relating to failing clusters: Implications for the thesis 
(FAIL1) (P5, P5a) 
Successful clusters, facing the challenges of globalisation, will have 
adopted global/local strategies characterised by a strong global 
network of agents including global agents from the core industry plus 
related and supporting industries. 
 
Failing clusters, facing the challenges of globalisation, will not have 
adopted global/local strategies. 
The challenges of globalisation with 
respect to global/local networks will 
be determined by COOP7, P5, P5a. 
 
(FAIL2) (P4, P4a, P9,P9a) 
In failing clusters the need for co-ordination has historically been low, 
therefore fewer few opportunities for knowledge transfer. 
The need for co-ordination will be 
determined by  
COOP5, INOV2, P4, P4a, P9, P9a. 
(FAIL3) (P5, P5a) 
In failing clusters opportunities for knowledge transfer are low because 
there are few mechanisms to facilitate knowledge exchange and 
transfer. 
 
Opportunities for knowledge transfer 
will be determined by  
 INOV5, P5, P5a. 
 
(FAIL4) (P2, P2a, P6, P6a, P7,7a) 
Successful clusters, facing the challenges of increasing low-cost 
competition from abroad, will have made the transition from lower-end 
segments of the market to upper-end. 
 
Failing clusters, facing the challenges of increasing low-cost 
competition from abroad, will have failed to make the transition from 
lower-end segments of the market to upper-end.  
Cluster firms’ bases for competing  
will be determined by COOP4, 
COMP 1,2,3, P2, P2a, P6, P6a, 
P7,7a. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3e: Key Issues Relating to Dominant Firms in Clusters 
Key issues relating to dominant firms in 
clusters: 
Implications for the thesis 
(DOM1) (P6, P6a) 
Failing clusters will have gone through a process of 
consolidation leading to the emergence of one/few 
dominant firms. 
The development of the SOT cluster with respect to 
consolidation and dominant firms will be determined 
by COMP1, P6, P6a. 
 
(DOM2) (P6, P6a, P7, P7a) 
Failing clusters are dominated by a few large firms 
who engage in competitive strategies resulting in a 
reduction in co-operation and innovation. 
If dominant firms within the SOT cluster are identified, 
their competitive strategies will be  determined by 
COOP4,  COMP 1,2,3, P3, P3a P6, P6a, P7, P7a. 
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Appendix 4 
Primary Database: Firms in the SOT Ceramics Manufacturing Cluster (Tableware & Giftware) – 1960 - 2016 
 Name Additional details Acquired/merged/closed Date of 
Establishment 
Still operating Original 
location 
1 William Adams & Sons Ltd 
Earthenwares, Jasper, Basalts, Parian, etc. 
(Listed in 1960s table. See Wedgwood) 
After acquisition Adamsware was still manufactured on a 
different site within the Wedgwood group 
Acquired by Wedgwood in 1966 Est. 1769 - 1966 No Tunstall & 
Stoke 
X Adderley Floral China 
 
(See S. Pearson & Sons) 
Originally a branch of Ridgway Potteries Ltd 
S. Pearson & Sons acquired Royal Doulton in 1972 
Doulton independent again in 1993 
Acquired by S. Pearson & Sons in 
1952 (see Allied English Potteries) 
Est. 1945 - 1952 No Longton 
X Adderleys Ltd 
China, earthenwares 
(See S. Pearson & Sons) 
Renamed Ridgway & Adderley in 1952. Then merged with 
Booths & Colclough in Jan 1955 and continued as Ridgway, 
Adderley, Booth & Colclough for a short time then in Feb 1955 
renamed Ridgway Potteries 
Acquired by Ridgway Potteries in 
1947 
Ridgway acquired by Allied English 
Potteries in 1964 who merged with 
Royal Doulton in 1972 
Est. 1906 - 1947 No Longton 
X Alcock, Lindley & Bloore (Ltd) 
Earthenwares (mainly teapots) 
(Listed under S. Pearson & Sons in 1970s 
table) 
Swinnertons became part of Lawley Group (S. E. Pearson & 
Son) who merged with Royal Doulton 1972 
Acquired by Swinnertons in 1959? 
 
Est. 1919 - 1959 No Hanley 
2 Allied English Potteries: 
(known as Lawley Group until 1964) 
(See also S. Pearson & Sons) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s tables) 
Holding Company S. E. Pearson & Son who merged with 
Royal Doulton in 1972 and kept the Royal Doulton name 
Acquired by Royal Doulton 1972 Est.1964 - 1972 No Various 
X Alton Towers Handcraft Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
Possibly called Alton China Co Ltd 
No further information available so assume closed down 
before 1960 
 
Closed down Est. 1950 – 1957? No Stoke 
3 Amber China Ltd. 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s and 2000s tables) 
Phoenix Works, 500 King Street, SOT, ST3 1EZ 
01782 326304 
Dissolved (see DueDil website) Est. 1983 - 2005 No Hanley 
4 Charles Amison & Co. Ltd  Closed down Est. 1889 - 1962 No Longton 
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Porcelains 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 
5 Aristocrat Florals & Fancies 
Giftware 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Pencilled into Goddens but can’t find any further details of this 
firm. 
No further information available so assume closed down by 
the end of 1960s 
Closed down Est. 1958 – 1969? No Longton 
6 Artone Pottery 
Mostly teapots 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
tables) 
Set up on an old (original) Wood & Sons teapot site Closed down Est. 1946 – 1993 
 
No Burslem 
7 Ashley Ceramics Ltd 
Tableware 
(listed in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s 
tables) 
Webberley Lane, ST3 1RJ 
Pencilled into Goddens but no further details 
Dissolved (see DueDil website) Est. 1975 - 2007 No Longton 
8  G. L. Ashworth & Bros 
Earthenwares & Ironstone 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s  tables under 
Masons Ironstone) 
Renamed Masons Ironstone in 1968 
 
Masons Ironstone in 1968 
Masons Ironstone acquired by 
Wedgwood in 1973 
Est. 1862 - 1968 No Hanley 
9 Astbury Fine Bone China of Staffordshire 
Ltd 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
tables) 
Can’t find when established – possibly 1800s 
Assume present in 1960 
Dissolved (see DueDil website) Est. 1800? – 1995 No Tunstall 
10 Avon Art Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Pencilled into Goddens 
Listed by Potteries.org as existing in 1954? 
May have been less than 10 employees but no details found. 
Closed down Est. 1930 - 1968  
 
No Longton 
11 
 
 
 
H. Aynsley & Co. Ltd 
Tablewares 
(listed in 1960s and 1970s tables) 
Also listed again 2002 – 2013 (see DueDil 
website) 
Part of the famous Aynsley family. See 
www.aynsley.info/worldpress  
Closed down 
 
Dissolved 
Est. 1873 – c1961 
 
Est. 2002 - 2013 
No Longton 
12 Aynsley China Ltd John Aynsley & Sons Ltd Acquired by Waterford in 1970. Est.1775  - 1970 No Longton 
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(listed in 1960s and 1970s tables) 
(listed as part of Wedgwood since 1970) 
 Then Acquired by Belleek Pottery 
Group Ireland 1997 
 
13 Baifield Productions 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Set up by S. Fielding & Co. Ltd 
Pencilled into Goddens no other information so assume 
closed down late 1960s 
Closed down Est.1964 – c1969 No? ? 
14 Lorna Bailey Artware 
Formerly LJB Ceramics 
(listed in 1990s table) 
Small pottery/decorator. Approximately 7-10 employees Closed down Est. 1995-1998 No Burslem 
15 Bairstow Manor Pottery 
Formerly  P. E. Bairstow & Co 
Collectables 
(see Fancies Fayre) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, tables) 
Formerly Fancies Fayre Pottery 
Renamed Bairstow Manor Pottery in 1979 
Incorporated 1982 
Liquidator appointed Jan 2013 
In liquidation Est. 1938 - 2013 No 
 
Hanley 
X Barker Bros Ltd  
China & earthenwares 
Part of Alfred Clough Ltd till c1960 Alfred Clough Est. 1876 – c1960  
 
No Longton 
16 Barratt’s of Staffordshire Ltd 
(see Royal Stafford) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
tables) 
Renamed Royal Stafford Tableware Ltd 1994 after merger 
with Royal Stafford in 1992 
Merged with Royal Stafford 1992 Est. 1943 - 1992 No Burslem 
17 Belvedere China 
Incorporated 2002 but probably existed 
before. No details found other than DueDil 
website. 
(listed in 2000s table) 
Normacot Road, Stoke. Approximately 12 employees 
01782 330899 
Dissolved Est. 2002?- 2007 No Stoke 
18 Berkshire China Co. Ltd 
Collectables 
(listed in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s 
tables) 
Changed name to Staffordshire Fine Bone China in 2004 
Assume present in 1970, possibly under another name? 
Acquired by Hugh Padley in 1986 
sold in 1997 to Mark Dicken. 
Dissolved in 2007 
Est. c1970 - 2007 
Closed down 
No Fenton 
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19 John Beswick Ltd 
Collectables 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Beswick brand now produced by John Sinclair Ltd., Sheffield. Acquired by Royal Doulton & Co. in 
1969 
Doulton acquired by Wedgwood 
2004. 
Est. 1936 - 1969 No Longton 
20 Biltons Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980 tables) 
Coloroll acquired by Staffordshire Tableware in 1990 following 
a management buy-out of Coloroll. Another management buy-
out from ST in 1995, then sold to Dubelle Foundation in 1998 
and split into Stoke Potteries Ltd and Biltons Tableware 1998  
Ltd. In 1999 dissolved. 
Acquired by Coloroll in 1986  
Acquired by ST in 1995 
Acquired by Dubelle 1998 
Dissolved 1999 
Est. 1912 – 1999 No Stoke 
21 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co. Ltd 
Collectables 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s, 
tables) 
See internet sales site 
Sutherland Works, Beaufort Road, Stoke-On-Trent, 
Staffordshire, ST3 1UB 
Could not be found in 2016. Assume 
closed down. 
Est. 1980 – c2015? No 
 
Longton 
22 Blakeney Pottery Ltd 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010 tables) 
Site Closed in 1999 but reopened in 2000 by Bernard Meakin Acquired by Bernard Meakin in 2000 
Listed as DORMANT company by 
DueDil in 2012 
Est. 1968 – 1999 
And 1999 - 2012 
No 
 
Stoke then 
Tunstall 
23 Blue John Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
No further information available so assume closed down.  Dissolved (see DueDil website). Est. 1886 - 1989 No Hanley 
X Booths & Colclough 
(see S. Pearson & Son) 
Colclough China Ltd. 1937-1944 who were acquired by S 
Pearson & Son 1944 who also owned Booths. 
1948 Colclough merged with Booths to become Booths & 
Cloclough  but still owned by S. Pearson so not listed. 
S Pearson acquired by Royal Doulton 
1972 
Est. 1948 - 1972 No Longton 
24 E. Brain & Co. Ltd 
(see Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 
Took over Coalport 1958 continued in Coalport name until 
acquired by Wedgwood. Coalport ware is still produced 
Acquired by Wedgwood in 1967 Est. 1903 - 1967 No Fenton then 
Barlaston 
25 Sampson Bridgwood & Son Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Churchill) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
JAS Broadhurst renamed Churchill Hotelware 1985 Acquired by J A S Broadhurst 1964 Est. 1805 - 1964 No Longton 
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26 Emma Bridgewater 
Bridgewater Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s, 
2016 tables) 
250 employees in 2016 
 
Lichfield Street, 
Hanley, 
Stoke-on-Trent, 
ST1 3EJ, 01782 201328 
 
 Est. 1984 - present Yes Hanley 
27 British Anchor Pottery 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s and 1970s tables) 
 Closed down Est. 1884 – c1970 No Longton 
28 James Broadhurst & Sons Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables then 
under Churchill Tableware from 1990s 
onward ) 
Roper family acquired half share in 1922 then renamed 
Churchill Tableware in 1984/5 
Renamed Churchill Tableware 
1984/85 
Est. 1862 - 1984 No Longton then 
Fenton 
29 Broadhurst Bros.  
Earthenwares 
(Argyle China Co.) 
(listed in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s 
tables) 
Known as Argyle China Co. 
Listed as dissolved by DueDil 
Dissolved Est. c1977 – 2007 
 
No Burslem 
30 Burgess & Leigh Ltd 
(became Burleigh Pottery) 
(see Burleigh/ Burgess, Dorling & Leigh 
Ltd) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, tables then 
under Burleigh onwards) 
(see Denby Pottery Group) 
 Acquired by Dorling 1999 
Now part of Denby Pottery Group 
since 2009 
Est. 1867 - 1999 No Burslem 
31 Burleigh Pottery. Formerly Burgess 
Dorling & Leigh Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(operating as Burleigh Pottery) 
(listed in 1990s table) 
Formerly Burgess & Leigh. 
Renamed Burgess, Dorling and Leigh in 1999 
Then Burleigh Pottery 
Listed here under Denby  since 2009 
Acquired by Denby Pottery from 
Derbyshire in 2009. Ownership is 
now outside the SOT cluster. 
Est. 1999 - 2009 No Burslem 
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32 Cameleon China Ltd. 
(listed in 1990s, 2000s tables) 
Boundary Works 492-500, King St Longton 
Stoke-On-Trent Staffordshire ST3 1EZ 
Tel: 01782 321332 (no longer in service) 
Decorators only since 2000. May have had less than 10 
employees. 
Closed down Est. 1998 - 2004 No Longton then 
Trentham 
33 Cara China Co 
Jewellery, collectables 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s tables) 
01782 642973 
May be too small? 
Previously owned by Bridgwood family. 
 Est. 1945 – c2015 No 
 
Longton  
34 Carlton Ware Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 
Carltonware name acquired by Grosvenor Ceramic Hardware Acquired by Arthur Wood Group 
1967 
Est. 1958 - 1967 
 
No Stoke 
35 Caverswall China 
Previously owned by Thomas Goode 
(manufacturing) Co. Ltd 
Fine Bone China 
(listed in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 
2010s, 2016 tables) 
Caverswall China (Brand Name) 
Thomas Goode is a retailer based in Mayfair London. 
Trevor Johnson (worked for Thomas Goode) bought out 
business from Thomas Goode…year? 
Berryhill Road, SOT. 01782 652800 
 Est. 1973 - present Yes 
 
Stoke 
36 Chapmans Longton Ltd 
China 
(see S Pearson & Sons) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 Acquired by Allied English Potteries 
1966 (S Pearson & Sons)  
S Pearson & Sons merged with 
Royal Doulton 1972 
Est. 1916 - 1966 No Longton 
37 Churchill China PLC 
Hotelwares 
Earthenwares 
(listed under James Broadhurst in 1980s 
table then as Churchill onwards) 
(listed in 1990s, 2000s, 2010, 2016 tables) 
Formerly called Sampson Bridgwood who were acquired by J 
A S Broadhurst in 1964. Named changed to Churchill 
Hotelware in 1985. 
1994 Churchil Fine Bone China Division created. 
500 employees 
 
 Est. 1985 - present Yes 
 
Longton then 
Tunstall and 
Sandyford 
38 Clough’s Royal Art Pottery 
Earthenwares 
Formerly Alfred Clough Est.1913 – 1961 
Part of Federated Potteries with W. H. Grindley 
Acquired by Coloroll in 1985 Est. 1961 - 1985 No Longton 
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(see Federated Potteries) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
 
X Cartwright & Edwards Ltd 
Earthenwares and Bone China 
(see Federated Potteries) 
Subsidiary of Alfred Clough (Federated Potteries) but still 
produced under the Cartwright & Edwards name. 
Federated Potteries acquired by Coloroll in 1985 
Acquired by Alfred Clough in 1955 
 
Est. 1859 - 1955 No Longton 
X Coalbrook Potteries Pencilled into Goddens. 
Possibly part of Coalport? 
 Est. 1937 – 19?? No Shelton 
X Coalport Porcelain Works 
Porcelains 
(see E. Brain & Sons and Wedgwood) 
At  SOT  from 1926 – 1959. Coalport (Shropshire) was 
acquired in 1926 by Cauldon Potteries who were 
subsequently acquired by E. Brain & Sons in 1959. E. Brain & 
Sons acquired by Wedgwood in 1967. Coalport was still 
produced at Wedgwood 
Cauldon Potteries 1926 
 
Est. 1795 - 1926 
 
No Shelton then 
Stoke, Fenton 
then Barlaston 
X Cobridge Stone 
Stoneware 
(listed under Moorcroft) 
 
Part of Moorcroft Group Moorcroft group Est. 1997 - 2005 No 
 
Cobridge 
39 Collectible World Studios 
Giftwares 
(listed in 1990s, 2000s tables) 
Formerly Lilliput Lane 
Collectible World since 1993. 50-99 employees. 
Production shifted overseas Est.1993 - 2008 No 
 
Hanley 
X Coloroll Ceramics Division 
(see Staffordshire Tableware Ltd) 
(listed in 1980s tables under Biltons) 
Formerly Biltons Ltd prior to 1986 
Management Buyout of Biltons from Coloroll in 1990 renamed 
Staffordshire Tableware Ltd 
Acquired by Staffordshire Tableware 
1990 
1986 - 1990 No Stoke 
X Thomas Cone Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Keele Street Pottery) 
Keele Street Pottery name changed to Staffordshire Potteries 
Ltd in 1950 who were renamed Staffordshire Tableware in 
1990 
Acquired by Keele Street Pottery Co. 
Ltd. c1948  
Est. 1892 - c1948 No Longton 
X Conway Pottery Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Keele Street Pottery) 
Keele Street Pottery name changed to Staffordshire Potteries 
Ltd in 1950 who were renamed Staffordshire Tableware in 
1990 
Acquired by Keele Street Pottery Co. 
Ltd. c1948 
Est. 1930 - c1948 
 
No Fenton 
40 Susie Cooper China Ltd Susie Cooper name continued till 1980 Acquired by Wedgwood 1966 Est. 1950 - 1966 No Longton 
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Earthenware & China 
(see Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
Part of Wood & Sons Group. 
Previously called Bursley Ltd. 
 41 Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Included Windsor Pottery from 1911 and Crown Clarence 
pottery from 1946. Acquired Longton Ceramics (formerly 
Shaw & Copestake) in 1984. Subsequently operated as 
Crown Winsor 
Name changed 1911 - 1989 No Longton 
42 W. T. Copeland & Sons 
Porcelain, Parian, Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s and 1970s tables) 
Formerly Spode 1784-1833 
Then part of Copeland & Garrett 1833 -1932 
W T Copeland & Sons from 1932 
Merged with Royal Worcester in 1970 and name changed to 
Spode.(Royal Worcester was not part of SOT cluster so not 
included here after 1970) 
Then part of Royal Worcester known as The Porcelain & Fine 
China Co’s. Ltd 
Now owned by Portmeirion. 
Merged with  Royal Worcester 1970 
Then London International 1980s 
Then Derby International late 1980s 
Acquired by Portmeirion 2008 
Est. 1932 – 1970 
 
 
No Stoke then 
moved to 
Worcestershire 
43 Elijah Cotton (Lord Nelson Pottery) 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
 Closed down Est. 1880 – 1981 
 
No Hanley 
44 Crownford China 
(See Taylor & Kent and Elizabethan) 
(listed in 1980s and 1990s tables) 
A merger between Taylor & Kent Ltd and Rosina China 
resulted in a new company name - Crownford China. 
Acquired by Churchill China in 1994. 
Acquired by Churchill China in 1994. Est. 1989 – c1994 No Longton 
X Crown Staffordshire Porcelain Co. Ltd 
Bone China 
Previously T. A. & S. Green 
Subsequently Crown Staffordshire China Co. Ltd 
Name changed Est. 1889 - 1948 No Fenton 
45 Crown Staffordshire China Co. Ltd 
Bone China 
(see Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Crown Staffordshire name not used after 1985 – Coalport 
name used instead.  
Acquired by Semart Importing 
(America) 1964 
Acquired by Wedgwood in 1973 
Est. 1948 - 1964 No Fenton 
46 Crown Trent China Ltd 
China  
Crown Trent specialises in manufacturing and decorating 
china and glass for retailers and individuals, and also sells 
white bone china which can be decorated by others. 
In 2006 the company  was  sold to a 
newly-formed firm, Crown Trent UK. Est. 1980 - 2011 No Longton 
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(listed in 1980s, 1990s, 2000s and 2010 
tables) 50-99 employees 
 
In 2006, Ransat called the administrators into Crown Trent 
China after seeing its losses rise from £140,000 in 2004 to 
£275,000 the following year. 
Crown Trent UK became part of the Ransat Group again in 
2009 but only import and then decorate in SOT. Now operate 
under the name of Buttercup China. 
Crown Trent UK became part of the 
Ransat Group again in 2009 but do 
not manufacture ceramics in SOT 
(overseas production), they only 
decorate. See 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/30-
jobs-risk-firm-seeks-buyer/story-
12569658-detail/story.html [Accessed 
20 March 2017] 
 
 
 
X Crown Winsor 
(listed under Co-operative Wholesale 
Society) 
 
Originally Shaw & Copestake until 1982 when company went 
into liquidation 
1982-1984 workers co-operative bought the company and 
traded as Longton Ceramics 
Acquired by United Co-op in 1984. Traded as Crown Winsor 
Acquired by United Co-op in 1984. 
Traded as Crown Winsor 
Closed down 
Est. 1984 – 1989 
 
No 
 
Fenton 
47 Peggy Davies Ceramics Ltd 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s, 
tables) 
Less than 10 employees in 2016 
(Peggy Davies previously worked for Doulton) 
Went into administration in 2009 but re-opened in 2010.  
 Est. 1981 – present Yes but not 
included as too 
small 
 
Hanley 
48 Denby Pottery Group 
Owner Hilco 
Also owns Burgess and Leigh, Poole 
Pottery and Royal Stafford 
(only listed in 2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables, 
as not present in SOT cluster before then) 
Acquired Burgess and Leigh 2009 
Acquired Poole Pottery and Royal Stafford  2011 
Entered the SOT cluster in 2009 after acquiring Burleigh. 
 
Burleigh – Port Street, ST6 3PE 
01782 525510 
 Est. 1809 - present Yes Denby and 
Stoke 
49 Denton China (Longton) Ltd. 
China 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 Acquired by John Aynsley & Sons 
1968 
Est. 1945 - 1968 No Longton 
50 Doulton (Royal) & Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares & Porcelains 
(see S. Pearson & Son and Wedgwood) 
From 1972 operated as Royal Doulton. 
Doulton became independent again in 1993 
 
Merged with S. Pearson & Son 
(Allied English Potteries) in 1972 
Acquired by Wedgwood in 2005 
Est 1862 - 2005 No Burslem 
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(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s tables) 
51 Duchess China Ltd 
Owned by Taylor Tunnicliffe Group 
(listed under A T Finney & Sons in 1960s, 
1970s, 1980s tables then under 
Crownford in 1990s table and under 
Duchess China in 2000s, 2010s, 2016 
tables)  
Duchess china first produced in 1888.  
New company formed 2000, formerly A. T. Finney & Sons Ltd. 
Who were acquired by John Tams in 1989 then by Taylor 
Tunnicliff in 2000 and renamed Duchess China.  Taylor 
Tunnicliffe name changed in 1989 to Crownford China. 
Uttoxeter Works, ST3 1PH. 01782 313061 
Acquired John Tams 1989 Est.1947- present Yes 
 
Longton 
52 Dudson Bros. Ltd 
Hotelware 
Earthenwares & Jaspers/China 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables) 
Incorporating Dudson Hotelware  and J E Heath 
600 employees in 2012 
 
200 Scotia Rd, ST6 4JD. 01782 819337 
 Est. 1898 - present Yes 
 
Hanley then 
Tunstall 
53 Dunn, Bennett & Co. Ltd 
Earthenware 
(listed in 1960s, tables) 
Site now used by Steelite International after disposal by 
Doulton 
Acquired by Royal Doulton 1968 
Disposed of by Doulton in c1998 
Est c1878 - 1968 No Burslem 
54 Dunoon Ceramics Ltd 
China & Stoneware (mugs only) 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s, 
2016 tables) 
 
Established in Scotland first in 1974 then opened a facility in 
Staffordshire in 1980 
Closed operations in Scotland and moved to Staffordshire 
c2002. 
ST15 0RY, 01785 812322 
 Est. 1980 - present Yes Stone 
55 Elektra Porcelain Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
 Closed down Est. 1924 – 1969 
 
No Longton 
 
56 
Elizabethan Bone China 
Porcelains 
(see Taylor & Kent and Crownford) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Listed under Crownford from 1990 
Merged with Taylor Kent in 1989 and renamed Crownford 
China 
Merged Est 1875 - 1989  No Longton 
X Ellgreave Pottery Co. Ltd Founded by Wood & Sons in 1921 Closed down Est. 1921 – 1981 No Burslem 
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Earthenwares 
(subsidiary of Wood & Sons Ltd. So listed 
as part of that group) 
 
  
57 Empire Porcelain Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
 Acquired by Qualcast Ltd 1958 
Closed down in 1967 
Est. 1896 – 1967 
 
No 
 
Stoke 
58 Empress Pottery 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
No further information available so assume closed down in 
1960s 
 Est. 19?? - 1969? No Hanley 
59 English Ironstone Tableware 
Earthenwares 
(see Washington Pottery Ltd.) 
(listed in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s tables) 
Formerly Washington Pottery Ltd. 1946 – 1973 then renamed Closed down Est. 1973 – 1994 
 
No Shelton 
X Fancies Fayre Pottery 
Earthenwares 
(see P. E. Bairstow) 
Continued as P E Bairstow & Co after 1954 Name changed Est. 1946 - 1954 No Hanley 
X Federated Potteries Co. Ltd 
(listed under Wh. H. Grindley) 
With: Cartwright & Edwards Ltd; W. H. Grindley Ltd 
Renamed Grindley of Stoke Ltd until 1984 when name 
changed to Federated Potteries 
Repurchased by W. H. Grindley 1988 Est. 1984 - 1988 No  
60 Fielding & Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares, Majolica, etc. 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
 
http://www.fieldingscrowndevonclub.co.uk/history.html  Closed down Est. 1878 – 1982 
 
No 
 
Stoke 
 61 A T Finney & Sons Ltd 
 
Bone China 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables then 
under Crownford in 1990s table and 
Duchess China in 2000s) 
Includes the name Duchess China and Diamond China 
Renamed John Tams Fine Bone China Division in 1995 
following amalgamation with Royal Grafton China. John Tams 
went into receivership in 2000 but management buyout 
formed Tams Group and Duchess China sold to Taylor 
Tunicliffe in 2000. Taylor Tunnicliffe operates as Crownford 
China.  
Crownford acquired by Churchill China in 1994. 
Acquired by John Tams 1989 
 
Then by Taylor – Tunnicliffe 
(Crownford) in 2000. Trading as 
Duchess China 
Est. 1947 - 1989 No Longton 
356 
 
X Finsbury China Ltd. 
Thimbles and china collectibles 
Too small 
01782847979 
3 employees EXCLUDE 
SIC 2621 Est. 1977- present Yes Fenton 
62 Five Towns China Co. Ltd 
Porcelains 
(listed in 1960s tables only) 
Listed in Goddens but no information available. Assume closed down Est. 1957 – 19?? No Middleport 
63 Ford & Sons (Crownford) Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
Formerly Ford & Sons Ltd 1893-1938 Closed down Est. 1938-1965 
 
No 
 
Burslem 
64 J Fryer & Son Ltd. 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
tables) 
 Acquired by Cortman Ltd and LJB 
Ceramics in 1998 
Est.1945 - 1998 No Tunstall 
65 Furnivals Ltd 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
Barratts name changed to Royal Stafford Tableware after 
acquisition of Royal Stafford in 1994 
Acquired by Barratts of Staffordshire 
Ltd in 1967 
Est. 1890 – 1967 No Cobridge 
X Gift Match China Ltd. 
Too small 
Now called Foley China, Decorators only. TOO SMALL SIC2621 Est. 2003 – 2013  No Tunstall 
66 Gladstone China (Longton) Ltd 
China 
(listed in 1960s and 1970s tables) 
Called Thomas Poole and Gladstone China from 1952 Closed down Est. 1939 – c1971 
 
No 
 
Longton 
67 Grenville Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Last known date of production 1964 Closed down Est. 1946 – c1964 
 
No 
 
Tunstall 
68 Grimwades Ltd 
Earthenwares, Majolica, jet, etc. 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Acquired by Howard Pottery in 1963 
Howard Pottery was acquired by Taunton Vale in 1974. They 
were subsequently acquired by Staffordshire Potteries in 1979 
who in turn were taken over by Coloroll in 1986. Became 
independent again in 1990 as ‘Royal Winton’. Acquired by 
current owners in 1995 
Acquired by Howard Pottery in 1963  Est. 1900 -1963 No Hanley 
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Trading as Royal Winton from 1995 
X Grindley Hotel Ware Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares & Ironstone 
 
Part of W.H. Grindley & Co. Ltd Acquired by Dudson Bros. in 1953 Est. 1908 – 1953 No Tunstall 
69 W H Grindley & Co. Ltd. 
 
Earthenwares & Ironstone 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
tables) 
In 1982 became part of Federated Potteries until 1988 when 
repurchased by W H Grindley. 
In 1991 in hands of receivers and acquired by Woodlands 
Pottery (?) (still operating in 1995) 
Acquired by Alfred Clough in 1960 
and renamed Grindley of Stoke 
(Ceramics) Ltd.  
Est. 1880 – 1960 
And 1988 - 1995 
No Tunstall 
70 Hammersley & Co. Ltd 
China 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Trade name continued to be used by Copeland until 1982, 
then by Palissy until 1989 and afterwards by Aynsley Pottery 
Acquired by W T Copeland in 1966 Est. 1887 - 1966 No Longton 
X J E Heath Ltd 
Earthenwares 
 Acquired by Dudson Bros. in 1951 Est. 19?? – 1951 No Burslem 
X Heron Fine China 
Too small 
Small pottery Could not find this firm. Assume 
closed down. 
Est. 1979 – ?  No Fenton 
71 Holland Studio Craft  Ltd 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s tables) 
 Acquired by Royal Doulton in 1996 Est. 1986 - 1996 No Fenton 
72 Howard Pottery Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Staffordshire Potteries) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s  tables) 
Previously Howard Group bought Gibson & Sons in 1949 and  
Grimwades in 1963 
Howard acquired by Taunton Vale in 1974 
Taunton Vale acquired by Staffordshire Potteries in 1979 
 
Acquired by Taunton Vale in 1974 Est. 1925 – c1974 No Shelton 
73 Hudson & Middleton Ltd 
China 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables) 
Previously William Hudson (1889 – 1942) and J. H. Middleton 
(1889 – 1941) 
Went into Administration in 2009. Management buyout by new 
company (Mike Shirley new owner) Hudson’s Fine Bone 
China in 2009 
22 employees in 2009. 
Closed down 2016. See: The 
Sentinel, (2017), 25 jobs lost after 
historic Longton pottery firm Hudson 
and Middleton shuts suddenly – 
again, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/25-
jobs-lost-after-historic-longton-
pottery-firm-hudson-and-middleton-
Est. 1941 - 2017 No 
 
Longton 
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Closed down June 2017. shuts-suddenly-again/story-
30374667-detail/story.html. 
[Accessed 16 July 2017] 
74 Johnson Bros. (Hanley) Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 Acquired by Wedgwood in 1968 Est. 1883 - 1968 No Hanley and 
Tunstall 
75 A B Jones & Sons Ltd 
China & Earthenwares 
(see Royal Grafton and John Tams) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
tables) 
Acquired by Crown House Glass in 1966 
Known as Royal Grafton China from 1985 
Crown House Glass acquired by Crown Lynn New Zealand in 
1971. Management Buy-out in 1985, name changed to Royal 
Grafton China. Acquired by John Tams in 1992 
 
Acquired by Crown House Glass in 
1966 
Est. 1900 - 1992 No Longton 
X Keele Street Pottery Co. Ltd 
China & Earthenwares 
(see Staffordshire Potteries and 
Staffordshire Tableware) 
1947-1949  Acquisition of other companies:  
Paramount Pottery Ltd 
Winterton Pottery Ltd 
Thomas Cone Ltd 
Collingwood Bone China Ltd 
 Conway Pottery Ltd 
Piccadilly Pottery 
Lawton Pottery, Tunstall 
Name changed to Staffordshire 
Potteries in 1950 
Est. 1915 - 1950 No Tunstall 
76 James Kent Ltd 
Originally China & Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Still trading as James Kent but now producing specialist 
(commercial) ceramics 
Acquired by Hadida Fine Bone China 
in 1989 
Now commercial ceramics 
Est. 1897 - 1989 No Longton 
77 William Kent (Porcelains) Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Formerly William Kent 1894 – 1944. 
After 1962 continued to produce commercial ceramics only 
Now commercial ceramics Est. 1894 - 1962 No Burslem 
78 Kirkhams Ltd 
Porcelains 
(see Portmeirion) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Portmeirion acquired A. E. Grey (pottery decorators) in 1961, 
they  merged A. E. Grey with Kirkhams to form Portmeirion 
Acquired by Portmeirion in 1961 Est. 1946 - 1961 No Stoke 
79 Roy Kirkham & Co Ltd 
China 
Incorporated in 1976 
Call to see how many employees. 
 Est. 1970? - present Yes Tunstall 
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(listed in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 
2010s, 2016 tables) 
ST6 5DB. 01782 837065 
80 Lancaster & Sandland Ltd. 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Formerly Lancaster & Sons Ltd. 1899-1944 Closed down Est. 1944 – 1968 
 
No Hanley 
81 Lingard Webster & Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s tables) 
Formerly Colclough & Lingard 1887 - 1900 Closed down Est. 1900 – c1972  No Tunstall 
82 Little Acorns Pottery 
Studio Potter 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s, 2000s tables) 
Founded around 1980 
 
May be too small but no details found. 
Closed down in 2009 Est. 1980-2009 No 
 
Hanley 
83 Longton New Art Pottery Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Still operating in 1962 
 
May be too small but no details found. 
Closed down Est. 1932 – c1965 No Longton 
84 John Maddock & Sons Ltd 
Earthenwares, Ironstone, etc. 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Maddox Genealogy, (2017), John Maddock, [ONLINE]. 
Available at: 
http://www.maddoxgenealogy.com/famous/fam_john_maddoc
k_c1807.htm. [Accessed 20 July 2017] 
Closed down Est. 1855 – c1987 No Burslem 
85 Mason’s Ironstone China 
(see Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s tables) 
Formerly G. L. Ashworth & Bros 1862 - 1968 Acquired by Wedgwood in 1973 Est. 1968 - 1973 No Shelton 
86 Alfred Meakin Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Myott, Son & Co.and Churchill) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s tables) 
1976 renamed Myott-Meakin 
Churchill acquired Myott-Meakin in 1991 
Acquired by Myott Son & Co. Ltd in 
1976 
Est. 1875 - 1976 No Tunstall 
87 J & G Meakin Ltd 
Earthenwares & Ironstones 
(see Midwinters and Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s and 1970s tables) 
1968 Meakin acquired Midwinters Acquired by Wedgwood 1970 Est. 1851 - 1970 No Hanley 
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88 Melba Wain Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
tables) 
Formerly H A Wain & Sons Ltd - renamed Melba-Wain Ltd 
Still operating in 1998, assume closed down c2000 
Closed down Est. 1946 – c2000 No Longton 
89 W R Midwinter Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see J & G Meakin) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Midwinter acquired Arthur J. Wilkinson Ltd in 1964 
J & G Meakin acquired Midwinter in 1968 
Wedgwood acquired Meakin in 1970 
Acquired by J & G Meakin in 1968 Est. 1910 - 1968 No Burslem 
90 G E Milner 
China 
(listed in 1960s table) 
No further information available so assume acquired in 1960s Acquired by Allied Insulators in 19??. 
Now called Fairey Industrial 
Ceramics Ltd 
Est. 1957 – 19?? No Burslem 
91 Minton & Co 
Earthenwares 
(see Royal Doulton) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 Acquired by Royal Doulton in 1968 Est. 1793 - 1968 No Stoke 
92 W Moorcroft  PLC 
Earthenwares 
(see Cobridge Stone) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables) 
 
Sister company: Cobridge Stoneware 
 
ST6 2DQ. 01782 820500 
 Est. 1913 - present Yes 
 
Burslem then 
Cobridge 
93 Moorland Pottery 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables) 
Site was formerly Studio Szeiler Ltd 
Small studio potter. SIC 3663 
 Est. 1960 - present Yes 
Not included. Too 
small. 
 
Burslem 
94 Myott-Meakin Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Churchill) 
Formerly Myott, Son & Co. Ltd - renamed Myott-Meakin 
following acquisition of Alfred Meakin in 1977 
Interpace USA then Churchill 
Tableware in 1991 
Est. 1898 - 1991 No Stoke then 
Cobridge then 
Hanley 
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(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
tables) 
95 Nanrich Pottery 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
tables) 
Assume present in 1960 Acquired by John Tams in 1991 Est.  ? - 1991 No Longton 
96 New Chelsea China Co. Ltd 
China 
(see R. H. & S. L. Plant and Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s,  table) 
RH & SL Plant acquired by Wedgwood in 1966 – renamed 
Royal Tuscan in 1971 – renamed Wedgwood Hotelware in 
1980s 
Acquired by R H & S L Plant in 1961 Est. 1912 - 1961 No Longton 
97 Newport Pottery Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Midwinter) 
(listed in 1960s,  table) 
Midwinter subsequently acquired by Meakin in1968 who was 
later acquired by Wedgwood in 1970 
Acquired by W R Midwinter in 1964 Est. 1920 - 1964 No Burslem 
98 Paragon China Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see T. C. Wilde and S. Pearson) 
(listed in 1960s,  table) 
S Pearson & Son Holding Company for Allied English 
Potteries (known as Lawley Group until 1964) 
S Pearson & Son acquired by Royal Doulton in 1972 
Acquired by T C Wilde in 1960. T C 
Wilde merged with Lawley Group in 
1964 to form Allied English Potteries 
(S. E. Pearson) 
Est. 1920 - 1960 No Longton 
X S. E. Pearson & Son: 
(see Allied English Potteries and Royal 
Doulton) 
(listed under Allied English Potteries 
1960s, 1970s tables) 
 
Known as Lawley Group until 1964. Merged with T C Wild in 
1964 to form Allied English Potteries. Merged with Royal 
Doulton in 1972   
Lawley Group/Allied English Potteries: 
Adderleys Ltd 
Alcock, Lindley & Blore Ltd 
Booths & Colclough Ltd 
Lawleys (retailers) 
Paragon China Co. Ltd 
Ridgway Potteries Ltd 
Royal Albert Ltd 
Royal Crown Derby Ltd 
Swinnertons 
T. C. Wilde 
Merged with Royal Doulton 1972 Est. 19?? - 1972 No Various 
99 R. H. & S. L. Plant Ltd 
China 
Renamed Royal Tuscan in 1971 
Renamed Wedgwood Hotelware in 1980s 
Acquired by Wedgwood in 1966 Est. 1898 - 1966 No Longton 
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(see Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s,  table) 
100 Polyanna (Walpole Fine Bone China) 
Too small 
  Est. ? - Present Yes but not 
included. Too 
small. 
 
101 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s,  1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables) 
Susan Williams-Ellis (a designer) bought A E Gray & Co. Ltd 
in 1960 and Kirkhams Ltd in 1961 and merged to form 
Portmeirion. 
ST4 7QQ. 0182 744721 
 Est. 1961 - present Yes 
 
Stoke  
102 Price and Kensington Potteries Ltd 
Earthenwares 
Brand is now part of the Rayware Group, 
includes Arthur Wood and Mason Cash 
(listed in 1960s,  1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000stables) 
Price Brothers from 1896 
Price Bros. (Burslem) Ltd. From 1903 – 1961 
Amalgamation of Price Bros. and Kensington Pottery in 1962 
In 1989 Price & Kensington bought Arthur Wood. 
Price Bros. became part of Arthur 
Wood Group c1950. 
 
Est. 1962 -2009 Yes 
 
Burslem then 
Longport 
103 Pyramid Pottery Co. Ltd 
(listed in  2000s table) 
SIC2625 
May have had less than 10 employees – details not known. 
Closed down Est. 2005-2009 No Tunstall 
104 Ravensdale Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1990s, 2000s tables) 
Liquidator 2006. (duedil.com)  
Dissolved 2008 
May have had less than 10 employees – details not known. 
Closed down Est 1999 - 2006 No 
 
Tunstall 
 
105 
Raywear Group 
(entered SOT cluster in 2009 after 
acquiring Price Kensington brand. Listed 
in 2000s, only as not producing in SOT 
now) 
 
Acquired Price and Kensington brand in 2009. 
Also own Mason-Cash brand. 
Production is in SOT cluster – unknown? 
 Est. 2009 - present Yes but not 
included as not 
producing in SOT 
? 
X Repeat-Repeat 
Small pottery 
(less than 10 employees so exclude) 
Crown House, Old Mill St 
Stoke-On-Trent Staffordshire ST4 2RP 
Tel: 01782 845870 
Too small to include Est. 1984 - present Yes but not 
included. Too 
small 
Stoke 
106 Regency China Ltd 
China 
Liquidator 2004 
Dissolved 2007 
Closed down Est. 1953 – 2007  No 
 
Longton 
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(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s tables) 
 
107 
A. G. Richardson & Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Wedgwood) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s tables) 
 Acquired by Wedgwood in 1974 Est. 1915 - 1974 No Tunstall and 
Cobridge 
 
108 
Ridgway Potteries Ltd 
(subsidiary of Allied English Potteries) 
(see S. E. Pearson and Royal Doulton) 
(listed in 1960s table under Allied English 
Potteries) 
Potteries in the Ridgway Group included:  
Booths, Church Bank Pottery, Tunstall. 
Colcloughs, Regent Works, Longton 
Paladin Works, Fenton 
North Staffordshire Pottery, Cobridge 
(previously the Globe Pottery) 
Portland Pottery, Cobridge 
Bedford Works, Shelton 
Adderly Floral China, Longton 
Gainsborough Works Longton  
Part of Lawley Group until 1964 when 
they merged with T.C. Wilde to 
become Allied English Potteries (S. 
Pearson & Sons) who subsequently 
merged with Royal Doulton in 1972 
Est. 1955 - 1964  No  
 
109 
Rosina china 
China 
(see Taylor & Kent, Crownford and 
Elizabethan) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Merged with Elizabethan Fine Bone China in 1989 and 
renamed Crownford China 
Merged Est. 1941 - 1989 No Longton 
 
110 
Roslyn China 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Formerly Reid & Co. 
 
Closed down Est. 1946 - 1963 No Longton 
X Royal Crown derby 
(see S. Pearson, Royal Doulton, Steelite) 
Not listed as independent SOT pottery. 
Became part of S. Pearson & Son in 1964 
Then part of Royal Doulton Group 
Then part of Steelite International in 2012? 
Acquired by S, Pearson 1964 
Then acquired by Steelite 2000 
Est. 1964- 2012 Yes Various 
X Royal Grafton China 
(listed under  A. B. Jones until 1992 then  
John Tams) 
Formerly A. B. Jones & Sons Ltd. Acquired by John Tams 1992 Est. 1985 - 1992 No Longton 
111 Royal Stafford China 
(see Royal Stafford Tableware) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
the under Royal Stafford) 
 Acquired by Barratt’s of Staffordshire 
in 1992 and renamed Royal Stafford 
Tableware. 
Est. 1845 - 1992 No Longton 
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112 
Royal Stafford Tableware Ltd 
(see Barratts of Staffordshire and Royal 
Stafford China) 
(listed in 2000s, 2010s tables) 
Formed after acquisition by Barratts in1992 
Renamed Royal Stafford Tableware Ltd in 1994  
 
Acquired by Denby Est. 1992 - present Yes 
 
Burslem 
 
113 
Royal Stratford 
(listed in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s 
tables) 
Sold in 1999 to ? Closed down Est. 1976 - 2005 No 
 
Longton 
X Royal Winton 
Earthenware 
(see Grimwades Ltd) 
(listed with  Duchess China) 
Previously Grimwades Ltd. Still owned by Grimwades but 
trading as Royal Winton. 
Sister company is Duchess China and is part of the Taylor 
Tunnicliffe Group. Listed under Duchess China. 
Listed under Duchess Est. 1995 - 2005 Yes 
 
Longton 
 
114 
James Sadler & Sons Ltd 
Earthenware 
(see Churchill) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s tables) 
 Acquired by Churchill in 2000 Est. 1899 - 2000 No Burslem 
 
115 
Salisbury China Co. Ltd 
Bone China 
(listed in 1960s and 1970s tables) 
Formerly Wild Bros. In 1961 the company was taken over by 
Thomas Poole and moved to Chadwick Street, Longton - 
finally closed c.1970 
Wild Bros 1904-1927 
Closed down Est. 1954 - 1970 No Fenton 
 
116 
Shaw & Copestake 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Following voluntary liquidation the pottery was run by workers  
trading as Longton ceramics from 1982 – 1984 and was 
subsequently acquired by United Co-op Society in 1984 
Acquired by Longton ceramics 1982 Est.1901 – 1982 
 
No Longton 
 
117 
Shelley Potteries Ltd 
China 
(see S. E. Pearson and Royal Doulton) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 
Allied English Potteries later acquired by Royal Doulton Acquired by Allied English Potteries 
(S. E. Pearson) in 1966 
Est. 1925 - 1966 No Longton 
 Shore & Coggins Allied English Potteries later acquired by Royal Doulton Acquired by Allied English Potteries 
in 1966 
Est. 1911 - 1966 No Longton 
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118 China 
(see S. E. Pearson and Royal Doulton) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 
119 
Shorter & Son Ltd 
(see Midwinter and J & G meakin) 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Midwinter acquired J & G Meakin in 1968 
Meakin was acquired by Wedgwood in 1970 
Acquired by Midwinter in 1964 Est. 1905 - 1964 No Stoke 
 
120 
Simpsons (Potters) Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s tables) 
 Acquired by Wood & Sons 1976 Est. 1944 – 1976 
 
No Cobridge 
 
121 
Staffordshire China Ltd 
(listed in 2000s table) 
Staffordshire China Ltd. acquired Brian Wood ceramics  2003 
Company re-opened 2006? But no longer manufacture 
ceramics themselves. 
May be some link to Berkshire China. 
May have had less than 10 employees but no details found. 
Voluntary Liquidation 2005 Est. 2000 - 2005 No Fenton 
122 Staffordshire Heritage 
(not listed as not strictly tableware or 
ornamentalware) 
Normacot Road (on the end of the Hudson & Middleton 
factory) 
 Est.? - present Yes but not 
included as 
producing 
ceramic light 
fittings for 
retailers 
 
 
123 
Staffordshire Potteries Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Keele Street Pottery and 
Staffordshire Tableware) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Previously Keele Street Pottery Group. Name changed to 
Staffordshire Potteries Ltd in 1950. 
Acquired by Coloroll in 1986. Management buyout of Coloroll 
in 1990 renamed Staffordshire Tableware 
Acquired by Coloroll Group 1986 Est. 1950 - 1986  No Longton 
 
124 
Staffordshire Tableware Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Keele Street Pottery, Staffordshire 
Potteries Ltd., and Coloroll) 
(listed in 1990s table) 
Originally called Keele Street Pottery Group. Name changed 
to Staffordshire Potteries Ltd in 1950. 
Acquired by Coloroll in 1986. Management buyout of Coloroll 
in 1990 renamed Staffordshire Tableware 
Closed down Est. 1990 – 2000 
 
No Longton 
 Staffordshire Tea Set Co. Ltd Part of Biltons? Closed down Est. 1926 – c1965? No Tunstall 
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125 Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
 
126 
Steelite International P.L.C. 
(includes Royal Crown Derby since 2012) 
(listed in 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s, 
2016 tables) 
Previously Dunn Bennett  who were acquired by Royal 
Doulton in 1968 and disposed of 
In 1983 D. E. D. Johnson acquired Royal Doulton Hotelware 
and Steelite International was formed 
ST6 3RB. 01782 821000 
 Est. 1983 - present Yes 
 
Burslem 
  
 127 
Studio Hinks  
(listed in 2000s, 2010s tables) 
Spin-off from Royal Stratford 
16 employees 
Closed down Est. 2005 - 2011  Longton  
 
128 
Studio Szeiler Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
May be less than 10 employees – no details found. Closed down Est. 1951 – 1986 
 
No Hanley then 
Burslem 
 
129 
R. Sudlow & Sons Ltd. 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table) 
May be less than 10 employees – no details found. Closed down Est. 1886 - 1965 No Burslem 
 
 130 
Summerbank Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s tables) 
New owners in 1970? Closed down (see DueDil) Est. 1952 – 2001? 
 
No Tunstall 
 
131 
John Tams & Son Ltd 
(see Tams Group Ltd) 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s,  
tables) 
Acquired A T Finney (Duchess China) in 1989 and Royal 
Grafton in 1992 
 
Ownership and Name changed. Est. 1875 - 2000 No Longton 
 
132 
Tams Group Ltd 
(see John Tams & Son) 
Earthenwares 
(see Duchess China) 
(listed in 2000s table) 
Formerly John Tams & Son Ltd 
Management buy-in in 2000 formed Tams Group and Taylor-
Tunnicliffe also acquired Duchess China business from John 
Tams in 2000. 
In 2006 the group went into receivership and the Crown 
Works finally closed, ending over 160years of ceramic 
manufacturing on the site. 
Closed down Est. 2000 - 2006 No 
 
Longton 
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133 
Taylor & Kent Ltd 
Porcelains 
(see Crownford and Elizabethan) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables then 
under Crownford) 
Possibly renamed Elizabethan Bone China in 19?? Merged with Rosina China in 1989 
and renamed Crownford China 
Est. 1867 - 1989 No Longton 
 
 
134 
Taylor, Tunnicliffe & Co. Ltd 
Industrial Ceramics & Earthenwares & China 
(Listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables then 
under Crownford for 1990s. See also 
Duchess China) 
Acquired former A. T. Finney and Sons Ltd from John Tams in 
2000 and renamed it Duchess China 
Name changed to Crownford in 1989 Est. 1866 - 1989 Yes Hanley 
X The Big Tomato  
Too small to include in this survey 
See: http://www.bigtomatocompany.com/about.php. 
[Accessed 20 July 2017] 
 Est. 2003 - present Yes but not 
included. Too 
small 
 
 
135 
Thorley China Ltd 
China 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s tables) 
 Closed down Est. 1940 – 1971 
 
No Longton 
 
136 
Viking Pottery Co. 
China & Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
 Closed down Est. 1936 – 1964 
 
No Cobridge 
 
 
137 
Wade Ceramics Ltd 
(inc. George Wade & Son Ltd. And Wade, 
Heath & Co. Ltd) 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables) 
Established 1810. Wade Group renamed Wade ceramics 
1989 
Acquired by Beauford Group in 1989. 
Management buyout 1999. 
Called Wade Allied Holdings. 
Moved to new factory in 2009 
ST1 5GR.  
 Est. 1810 - present Yes 
 
Etruria 
 
138 
Washington Pottery Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see English Ironstone Tableware) 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
Subsequently English Ironstone Tableware Name changed Est. 1946 – 1973 
 
No Shelton 
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139 
J. H. Weatherby & Sons Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s tables) 
 Closed down Est. 1891 – 2000 
 
No Tunstall then 
Hanley 
 
X 
Wedgwood & Co. Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed under Enoch Wedgwood & Co. 
Ltd) 
1965 Renamed Enoch Wedgwood (Tunstall) Ltd Name changed Est. 1860 - 1965 No Tunstall 
 
140 
Enoch Wedgwood (Tunstall) Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(see Wedgwood & Co. Ltd and 
Wedgwood Group) 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
Formerly Wedgwood & Co. Ltd Acquired by Wedgwood Group in late 
1980 
Est. 1965 - 1980 No Tunstall 
 
141 
Wedgwood Group (Josiah Wedgwood & 
Sons Ltd) 
Jaspers, porcelains, parian, etc. 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, 2010s, 2016 tables) 
Acquired by Waterford Glass in the 1980s 
Acquired Royal Doulton in 2005 
Went into administration 2009. 
Bought by KPC Private Equity 2009 and named WWRD 
Holdings. 
Bought in 2015 by FISKARs Group 
Ceramics/glass firms in the Wedgwood Group  
(1974): 
Josiah Wedgwood & Sons Ltd. 
Royal Tuscan 
Coalport 
Susie Cooper 
Johnson Bros. 
William Adams 
J & G Meakin 
Midwinter 
Mason's Ironstone China 
Crown Staffordshire China 
(2005): 
Waterford Crystal 
Rosenthall 
Royal Doulton 
 
 Est. 1759 - present Yes 
 
Etruria then 
Barlaston 
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142 
Weetman Figures 
China and Earthenware 
(listed in 1960s tables) 
No further information available so assume closed down in 
1960s 
Closed down Est. 1952 – 19?? No Tunstall 
 
143 
Thomas C. Wild & Sons Ltd 
China 
(listed in 1960s table) 
Renamed Royal Albert in 1961 Acquired by S. E. Pearson & Son 
1964 then Royal Doulton in 1972 
Est. 1894 - 1964 No Longton 
 
144 
Arthur J. Wilkinson Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s table then under 
Midwinter/ Meakin. See also Wedgwood) 
Renamed W. R. Midwinter after acquisition 
J & G Meakin acquired Midwinter in 1968. 
Both companies acquired by Wedgwood in 1970 
Acquired by W. R. Midwinter in 1964 
 
Est. 1885 - 1964 No Burslem 
 
145 
Arthur Wood & Son (Longport) Ltd 
Earthenwares 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s tables) 
See Price & Kensington and Raywear Acquired by Price and Kensington 
1989 
Est. 1928 - 1989 No Longport 
 
146 
Brian WoodCeramics 
Earthenwares 
(see Staffordshire China Ltd) 
(listed in 1990s, 2000s tables) 
Deborah Wood was a founding partner of Brian Wood 
Ceramics 
Acquired by Staffordshire China Ltd 
2003 
Est. 1997 - 2003 No Longton 
X Deborah Wood Ceramics 
Earthenwares 
Too small to include in this survey. 
Formed after closure of Staffordshire China Ltd where 
Deborah Wood worked 
(see also Brian Wood ceramics)  
Deborah Wood retired to look after her young family. 
Closed down Est. 2005 - ? No 
 
Burslem 
   X Tony Wood 
Too small to include in this survey. 
Studio potter 
Assume less than 10 employees – no details found 
Too small Est. 1980 - 1991 No Various 
 
147 
Wood & Sons Ltd 
Earthenwares, Ironstones, etc. 
(listed in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s tables) 
Links to Ellgreave Pottery and Susie Cooper Pottery Co. Ltd Closed down Est. 1865 – 2005 
 
No Burslem 
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Appendix 5a 
 
UK Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers SOT: Firms Existing 1960 - 1969 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 William Adams & Sons Ltd Est. 1769 – 1966 Acquired 
2 Allied English Potteries ( Lawley Group until 1964) Est. 1964 – 1972  Acquired 
3 Charles Amison & Co. Ltd Est. 1889 – 1962 Closed down 
4 Aristocrat Florals & Fancies (assume closed down by 1960) Est. 1958 – 19?? Assume closed down 
5 Artone Pottery Est. 1946 – 1993 Closed down 
6 Astbury Fine Bone China of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 19?? – 1995 Closed down 
7 Avon Art Pottery Ltd Est. 19?? - 1968  Closed down 
8 H. Aynsley & Co. Ltd Est. 1873 – c1970 Closed down 
9 Aynsley China Ltd Est.1864 – 1971 Closed down 
10 Baifield Productions Est. 1964 – c1969 Closed down 
11 P. E. Bairstow & Co Est. 1954 – 2013 Closed down 
12 Barratts of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 1943 – 1992 Merged 
13 John Beswick Ltd Est. 1936 – 1969 Acquired 
14 Biltons Ltd Est. 1912 – 1986 Acquired * 
15 Blakeney Pottery Ltd Est. 1968 – 2012  Closed down 
16 Blue John Pottery Est. 1886 – 1989 Closed down 
17 E. Brain & Co. Ltd Est. 1903 – 1967 Acquired 
18 Sampson Bridgwood & Son Ltd Est. 1805 – 1964 Acquired 
19 British Anchor Pottery Est. 1884 – c1970 Closed down 
20 James Broadhurst & Sons Ltd Est. 1862 – 1984  Acquired 
21 Burgess & Leigh Ltd Est. 1867 – 1999 Acquired 
22 Cara China Co Est. 1945 – c2015 Closed down 
23 Carlton Ware Ltd Est. 1958 – 1967 Acquired 
24 Chapmans Longton Ltd Est. 1916 – 1966 Acquired 
25 Cloughs Royal Art Pottery Est. 1961 – 1985 Acquired 
26 Susie Cooper China Ltd Est. 1950 – 1966 Acquired 
27 Co-operative Society (Windsor Pottery; Crown Clarence) Est. 1911 – 1989 Acquired 
28 W. T. Copeland & Sons Est. 1932 – 1970 Merged 
29 Cotton Est. 1880 – 1981 Closed down 
30 Crown Staffordshire China Co. Ltd Est. 1948 – 1964 Acquired 
31 Denton China (Longton) Ltd. Est. 1945 – 1968 Acquired 
32 Doulton (Royal) & Co. Ltd Est. 1862 – 2004 Acquired 
33 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – present Still operating 
34 Dunn, Bennett & Co. Ltd Est. c1878 – 1968 Acquired 
35 Elektra Porcelain Co. Ltd Est. 1924 – 1969 Closed down 
36 Elizabethan Bone China Est. 1875 – 1989 Acquired 
37 Empire Porcelain Co. Ltd Est. 1896 – 1967  Closed down 
38 Empress Pottery  Est. 19?? – c1969  Closed down 
39 Fielding & Co. Ltd. Est. 1879 – 1982 Closed down 
40 A. T. Finney & Sons Ltd Est. 1947 – 1989 Acquired 
41 Five Towns China Co. Ltd (assume closed down in 1960s) Est. 1957 – 19?? Assume closed down 
42 Ford & Sons (Crownford) Ltd Est. 1938-1965 Closed down 
43 J Fryer & Son Ltd. Est. 1945 – 1998 Acquired 
44 Furnivals Ltd Est. 1890 – 1967 Acquired 
45 Gladstone China (Longton) Ltd Est. 1939 – 1970 Closed down 
46 Grenville Pottery Ltd Est. 1946 – c1964 Closed down 
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47 W H Grindley & Co. Ltd. Est. 1880 – 1960 
And 1988 – 1991 
Acquired* 
48 Hammersley & Co. Ltd Est. 1887 – 1966 Acquired 
49 Howard Pottery Co. Ltd Est. 1925 – c1974 Acquired 
50 Hudson & Middleton Ltd Est. 1941 – present Still operating 
51 Johnson Bros. (Hanley) Ltd Est. 1883 – 1968 Acquired 
52 A B Jones & Sons Ltd Est. 1900 – 1992 Acquired 
53 James Kent Ltd Est. 1897 – 1989 Acquired 
54 William Kent (Porcelains) Ltd Est. 1894 – 1962 Industrial ceramics 
55 Kirkhams Ltd Est. 1946 – 1961 Acquired 
56 Lancaster & Sandland Ltd. Est. 1944 – 1968 Closed down 
57 Lingard Webster & Co. Ltd Est. 1900 – c1972  Closed down 
58 Longton New Art Pottery Co. Ltd Est. 1932 – c1960s Closed down 
59 John Maddock & Sons Ltd Est. 1855 – c1987 Closed down 
60 Masons Ironstone China Est. 1968 – 1973  Acquired 
61 Alfred Meakin Ltd Est. 1875 – 1976 Acquired 
62 J & G Meakin Ltd Est. 1851 – 1970 Acquired 
63 Melba-Wain Ltd Est. 1946 –  c2000 Assume closed down 
64 W R Midwinter Ltd Est. 1910 – 1968 Acquired 
65 G E Milner (assume closed down in 1960s) Est. 1957 – 19?? Acquired 
66 Minton & Co Est. 1793 – 1968 Acquired 
67 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – present Still operating 
68 Moorland Pottery  Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
69 Myott-Meakin Ltd Est. 1898 – 1991 Acquired 
70 Nanrich Pottery (assume present in 1960) Est. 19?? – 1991 Acquired 
71 New Chelsea China Co. Ltd Est. 1912 – 1961 Acquired 
72 Newport Pottery Co. Ltd Est. 1920 – 1964 Acquired 
73 Paragon China Co. Ltd Est. 1920 – 1960 Acquired 
74 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
75 R. H. & S. L. Plant Ltd Est. 1898 – 1966 Acquired 
76 Price & Kensington Potteries Ltd Est. 1962 – 2009  Acquired 
77 Regency China Ltd Est. 1953 – 2007  Closed down 
78 A. G. Richardson & Co. Ltd Est. 1915 – 1974 Acquired 
79 Rosina China Est. 1941 – 1989  Merged 
80 Roslyn China Est. 1946 – 1963 Merged 
81 Royal Stafford China Est. 1845 – present  Still operating  
82 James Sadler & Sons Ltd Est. 1899 – 2000 Acquired 
83 Salisbury China Co. Ltd Est. 1954 – 1970 Closed down 
84 Shaw & Copestake Est. 1901 – 1982 Closed down 
85 Shelley Potteries Ltd Est. 1925 – 1966 Acquired 
86 Shore & Coggins Est. 1911 – 1966 Acquired 
87 Shorter & Son Ltd Est. 1905 – 1964 Acquired 
88 Staffordshire Potteries Ltd Est. 1950 – 1986 Closed down 
89 Staffordshire Tea Set Co. Ltd Est. 1926 – c1965? Closed down 
90 Studio Szeiler Ltd Est. 1951 – 1986 Closed down 
91 R. Sudlow & Sons Ltd. Est. 1886 – 1965 Closed down 
92 Summerbank Pottery Ltd Est. 1952 – 2001 Closed down 
93 John Tams & Son Ltd Est. 1875 – 2006 Closed down 
94 Taylor & Kent Ltd Est. 1867 – 1989  Acquired 
95 Taylor, Tunnicliffe & Co Ltd Est. 1866 – 1989 Acquired 
96 Thorley China Ltd Est. 1940 – 1971 Closed down 
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97 Viking Pottery Co. Est. 1936 – 1964 Closed down 
98 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1922 – present Still operating 
99 Washington Pottery Ltd Est. 1946 – 1973 Closed down 
100 J. H. Weatherby & Sons Ltd Est. 1891 – 2000 Closed down 
101 Enoch Wedgwood & Co Ltd Est. 1860 – 1980  Acquired  
102 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – present Still operating 
103 Weetman Figures Est. 1952 – c1960s Assume closed down 
104 Thomas C. Wild & Sons Ltd Est. 1894 – 1964 Acquired 
105 Arthur J. Wilkinson Ltd Est. 1885 – 1964 Acquired 
106 Arthur Wood & Son (Longport) Ltd Est. 1928 – 1989 Acquired 
107 Wood & Sons Ltd Est. 1865 – 2005 Closed down 
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Appendix 5b 
 
UK Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers SOT: Firms Existing 1970 - 1979 
 
 Name Date Status in 2016 
1 Allied English Potteries ( Lawley Group until 1964) Est. 1964 – 1972  Acquired 
2 Artone Pottery Est. 1946 – 1993 Closed down 
3 Ashley Ceramics Ltd Est. 1975 – 2007  Closed down 
4 Astbury Fine Bone China of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 19?? – 1995 Closed down 
5 H. Aynsley & Co. Ltd Est. 1873 – c1970 Closed down 
6 Aynsley China Ltd Est. 1864 – 1971 Acquired 
7 P. E. Bairstow & Co Est. 1954 – 2013 Closed down 
8 Barratts of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 1943 – 1992 Merged 
9 Berkshire China Co Ltd Est. c1970 – 2007  Closed down 
10 Biltons Ltd Est. 1912 – 1986 Acquired * 
11 Blakeney Pottery Ltd Est. 1968 – 2012  Closed down 
12 Blue John Pottery Est. 1886 – 1989 Closed down 
13 British Anchor Pottery Est. 1884 – c1970 Closed down 
14 James Broadhurst & Sons Ltd Est. 1862 – 1984  Acquired 
15 Broadhurst Bros.  Est. 1977 – 2007  Closed down 
16 Burgess & Leigh Ltd Est. 1867 – 1999 Acquired 
17 Cara China Co Est. 1945 – c2015 Closed down 
18 Caverswall China  Est. 1973 – present  Still operating 
19 Cloughs Royal Art Pottery Est. 1961 – 1985 Acquired 
20 Co-operative Society (Windsor Pottery; Crown Clarence) Est. 1911 – 1989 Acquired 
21 W. T. Copeland & Sons Est. 1932 – 1970 Merged 
22 Elijah Cotton Est. 1880 – 1981 Closed down 
23 Doulton (Royal) & Co. Ltd Est. 1862 – 2004 Acquired 
24 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – present Still operating 
25 Elizabethan Bone China Est. 1875 – 1989 Acquired 
26 English Ironstone Pottery (formerly Washington Pottery) Est. 1973 – 1994 Closed down 
27 Fielding & Co. Ltd. Est. 1879 – 1982 Closed down 
28 A. T. Finney & Sons Ltd Est. 1947 – 1989 Acquired 
29 J Fryer & Son Ltd. Est. 1945 – 1998 Acquired 
30 Gladstone China (Longton) Ltd Est. 1939 – 1970 Closed down 
31 W H Grindley & Co. Ltd. Est. 1880 – 1960 
And 1988 – 1991 
Acquired* 
32 Howard Pottery Co. Ltd Est. 1925 – c1974 Acquired 
33 Hudson & Middleton Ltd Est. 1941 – present Still operating 
34 A B Jones & Sons Ltd Est. 1900 – 1992  Acquired 
35 James Kent Ltd Est. 1897 – 1989 Acquired 
36 Roy Kirkham & Co Ltd Est. 1970 – present  Still operating 
37 Lingard Webster & Co. Ltd Est. 1900 – c1972  Closed down 
38 John Maddock & Sons Ltd Est. 1855 – c1987 Closed down 
39 Masons Ironstone China Est. 1968 – 1973  Acquired 
40 Alfred Meakin Ltd Est. 1875 – 1976 Acquired 
41 J & G Meakin Ltd Est. 1851 – 1970 Acquired 
42 Melba-Wain Ltd Est. 1946 –  c2000 Assume closed down 
43 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – present Still operating 
44 Moorland Pottery  Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
45 Myott-Meakin Ltd Est. 1898 – 1991 Acquired 
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46 Nanrich Pottery (assume present in 1960) Est. 19?? – 1991 Acquired 
47 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
48 Price & Kensington Potteries Ltd Est. 1962 – 2009  Acquired 
49 Regency China Ltd Est. 1953 – 2007  Closed down 
50 A. G. Richardson & Co. Ltd Est. 1915 – 1974 Acquired 
51 Rosina China Est. 1941 – 1989  Merged 
52 Royal Stafford China Est. 1845 – present  Still operating  
53 Royal Stratford Est. 1976 – 2005  Closed down 
54 James Sadler & Sons Ltd Est. 1899 – 2000 Acquired 
55 Salisbury China Co. Ltd Est. 1954 – 1970 Closed down 
56 Shaw & Copestake Est. 1901 – 1982 Closed down 
57 Staffordshire Potteries Ltd Est. 1950 – 1986 Closed down 
58 Studio Szeiler Ltd Est. 1951 – 1986 Closed down 
59 Summerbank Pottery Ltd Est. 1952 – 2001 Closed down 
60 John Tams & Son Ltd Est. 1875 – 2006 Closed down 
61 Taylor & Kent Ltd Est. 1867 – 1989  Acquired 
62 Taylor, Tunnicliffe & Co Ltd Est. 1866 – 1989 Acquired 
63 Thorley China Ltd Est. 1940 – 1971 Closed down 
64 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1922 – present Still operating 
65 Washington Pottery Ltd Est. 1946 – 1973 Closed down 
66 J. H. Weatherby & Sons Ltd Est. 1891 – 2000 Closed down 
67 Enoch Wedgwood & Co Ltd Est. 1860 – 1980  Acquired  
68 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – present Still operating 
69 Arthur Wood & Son (Longport) Ltd Est. 1928 – 1989 Acquired 
70 Wood & Sons Ltd Est. 1865 – 2005 Closed down 
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Appendix 5c 
 
UK Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers SOT: Firms Existing 1980 - 1989 
 
 Name Date Status in 2016 
1 Amber China Ltd Est. 1983 – 2005 Closed down 
2 Artone Pottery Est. 1946 – 1993 Closed down 
3 Ashley Ceramics Ltd Est. 1975 – 2007  Closed down 
4 Astbury Fine Bone China of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 19?? – 1995 Closed down 
5 P. E. Bairstow & Co Est. 1954 – 2013 Closed down 
6 Barratts of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 1943 – 1992 Merged 
7 Berkshire China Co Ltd Est. c1970 – 2007  Closed down 
8 Biltons Ltd Est. 1912 – 1986 Acquired * 
9 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
10 Blakeney Pottery Ltd Est. 1968 – 2012  Closed down 
11 Blue John Pottery Est. 1886 – 1989 Closed down 
12 Emma Bridgewater Est. 1984 – present  Still operating  
13 James Broadhurst & Sons Ltd (afterwards Churchill China) Est. 1862 – 1984  Acquired 
14 Broadhurst Bros.  Est. 1977 – 2007  Closed down 
15 Burgess & Leigh Ltd Est. 1867 – 1999 Acquired 
16 Cara China Co Est. 1945 – c2015 Closed down 
17 Caverswall China  Est. 1973 – present  Still operating 
18 Cloughs Royal Art Pottery Est. 1961 – 1985 Acquired 
19 Co-operative Society (Windsor Pottery; Crown Clarence) Est. 1911 – 1989 Acquired 
20 Elijah Cotton Est. 1880 – 1981 Closed down 
21 Crown Trent China Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
22 Peggy Davies Ceramics Est. 1981 – c2015 Acquired  
23 Doulton (Royal) & Co. Ltd Est. 1862 – 2004 Acquired 
24 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – present Still operating 
25 Dunoon Ceramics Est. 1980 – present  Still operating 
26 Elizabethan Bone China (See Crownford after 1990) Est. 1875 – 1989  Acquired  
27 English Ironstone Pottery (formerly Washington Pottery) Est. 1973 – 1994 Closed down 
28 Fielding & Co. Ltd. Est. 1879 – 1982 Closed down 
29 A. T. Finney & Sons Ltd Est. 1947 – 1989 Acquired 
30 J Fryer & Son Ltd. Est. 1945 – 1998 Acquired 
31 W H Grindley & Co. Ltd. Est. 1880 – 1960 
And 1988 – 1991 
Acquired* 
32 Holland Studio Craft  Est. 1986 – 1996  Acquired 
33 Hudson & Middleton Ltd Est. 1941 – present Still operating 
34 A B Jones & Sons Ltd Est. 1900 – 1992  Acquired 
35 James Kent Ltd Est. 1897 – 1989 Acquired 
36 Roy Kirkham & Co Ltd Est. 1970 – present  Still operating 
37 Little Acorns Pottery  Est. 1980 – 2009 Closed down 
38 John Maddock & Sons Ltd Est. 1855 – c1987 Closed down 
39 Melba-Wain Ltd Est. 1946 –  c2000 Assume closed down 
40 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – present Still operating 
41 Moorland Pottery  Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
42 Myott-Meakin Ltd Est. 1898 – 1991 Acquired 
43 Nanrich Pottery (assume present in 1960) Est. 19?? – 1991 Acquired 
44 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
45 Price & Kensington Potteries Ltd Est. 1962 – 2009  Acquired 
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46 Regency China Ltd Est. 1953 – 2007  Closed down 
47 Rosina China Est. 1941 – 1989  Merged 
48 Royal Stafford China Est. 1845 – present  Still operating  
49 Royal Stratford Est. 1976 – 2005  Closed down 
50 James Sadler & Sons Ltd Est. 1899 – 2000 Acquired 
51 Shaw & Copestake Est. 1901 – 1982 Closed down 
52 Staffordshire Potteries Ltd Est. 1950 – 1986 Closed down 
53 Steelite International  Est. 1983 – present  Still operating  
54 Studio Szeiler Ltd Est. 1951 – 1986 Closed down 
55 Summerbank Pottery Ltd Est. 1952 – 2001 Closed down 
56 John Tams & Son Ltd Est. 1875 – 2006 Closed down 
57 Taylor & Kent Ltd Est. 1867 – 1989  Acquired 
58 Taylor, Tunnicliffe & Co Ltd Est. 1866 – 1989 Acquired 
59 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1922 – present Still operating 
60 J. H. Weatherby & Sons Ltd Est. 1891 – 2000 Closed down 
61 Enoch Wedgwood & Co Ltd Est. 1860 – 1980  Acquired  
62 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – present Still operating 
63 Arthur Wood & Son (Longport) Ltd Est. 1928 – 1989 Acquired 
64 Wood & Sons Ltd Est. 1865 – 2005 Closed down 
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Appendix 5d 
 
UK Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers SOT: Firms Existing 1990 - 1999 
 
 Name Date Status in 2016 
1 Amber China Ltd Est. 1983 – 2005 Closed down 
2 Artone Pottery Est. 1946 – 1993 Closed down 
3 Ashley Ceramics Ltd Est. 1975 – 2007  Closed down 
4 Astbury Fine Bone China of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 19?? – 1995 Closed down 
5 Lorna Bailey Artware  Est. 1995 – 1998  Closed down 
6 P. E. Bairstow & Co Est. 1954 – 2013 Closed down 
7 Barratts of Staffordshire Ltd Est. 1943 – 1992 Merged 
8 Berkshire China Co Ltd Est. c1970 – 2007  Closed down 
9 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
10 Blakeney Pottery Ltd Est. 1968 – 2012  Closed down 
11 Emma Bridgewater Est. 1984 – present  Still operating  
12 Broadhurst Bros.  Est. 1977 – 2007  Closed down 
13 Burgess & Leigh Ltd Est. 1867 – 1999 Acquired 
14 Cameleon China Ltd Est. 1998 – 2004  Closed down 
15 Cara China Co Est. 1945 – c2015 Closed down 
16 Caverswall China  Est. 1973 – present  Still operating 
17 Churchill China PLC (formerly listed as James Broadhurst) Est c1990 – present  Still operating 
18 Collectible World Studios Est. 1993 – 2008  Closed down 
19 Crownford China  Est. 1990 – 1994  Acquired 
20 Crown Trent China Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
21 Peggy Davies Ceramics Est. 1981 - present Still operating  
22 Doulton (Royal) & Co. Ltd Est. 1862 – 2004 Acquired 
23 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – present Still operating 
24 Dunoon Ceramics Est. 1980 – present  Still operating 
25 English Ironstone Pottery (formerly Washington Pottery) Est. 1973 – 1994 Closed down 
26 J Fryer & Son Ltd. Est. 1945 – 1998 Acquired 
27 W H Grindley & Co. Ltd. Est. 1880 – 1960 
And 1988 – 1991 
Acquired* 
28 Holland Studio Craft  Est. 1986 – 1996  Acquired 
29 Hudson & Middleton Ltd Est. 1941 – present Still operating 
30 A B Jones & Sons Ltd Est. 1900 – 1992  Acquired 
31 Roy Kirkham & Co Ltd Est. 1970 – present  Still operating 
32 Little Acorns Pottery  Est. 1980 – 2009 Closed down 
33 Melba-Wain Ltd Est. 1946 –  c2000 Assume closed down 
34 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – present Still operating 
35 Moorland Pottery  Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
36 Myott-Meakin Ltd Est. 1898 – 1991 Acquired 
37 Nanrich Pottery (assume present in 1960) Est. 19?? – 1991 Acquired 
38 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
39 Price & Kensington Potteries Ltd Est. 1962 – 2009  Acquired 
40 Ravensdale Pottery Ltd Est. 1999 – 2006  Closed down 
41 Regency China Ltd Est. 1953 – 2007  Closed down 
42 Royal Stafford China Est. 1845 – present Still operating  
43 Royal Stratford Est. 1976 – 2005  Closed down 
44 James Sadler & Sons Ltd Est. 1899 – 2000 Acquired 
45 Steelite International  Est. 1983 – present  Still operating  
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46 Summerbank Pottery Ltd Est. 1952 – 2001 Closed down 
47 John Tams & Son Ltd Est. 1875 – 2006 Closed down 
48 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1922 – present Still operating 
49 J. H. Weatherby & Sons Ltd Est. 1891 – 2000 Closed down 
50 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – present Still operating 
51 Brian Wood Ceramics Est. 1997 – 2003  Acquired 
52 Wood & Sons Ltd Est. 1865 – 2005 Closed down 
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Appendix 5e 
 
UK Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers SOT: Firms Existing in  
2000 - 2009 
 Name Date Status in 2016 
1 Amber China Ltd Est. 1983 – 2005 Closed down 
2 Ashley Ceramics Ltd Est. 1975 – 2007  Closed down 
3 H. Aynsley & Co Ltd (re-entered in 2002) Est. 2002 – 2013  Closed down 
4 P. E. Bairstow & Co Est. 1954 – 2013 Closed down 
5 Belvedere China  Est. 2002 – 2007  Closed down 
6 Berkshire China Co Ltd Est. c1970 – 2007  Closed down 
7 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
8 Blakeney Pottery Ltd Est. 1968 – 2012  Closed down 
9 Emma Bridgewater Est. 1984 – present  Still operating  
10 Broadhurst Bros.  Est. 1977 – 2007  Closed down 
11 Cameleon China Ltd Est. 1998 – 2004  Closed down 
12 Cara China Co Est. 1945 – c2015 Closed down 
13 Caverswall China  Est. 1973 – present  Still operating 
14 Churchill China PLC (formerly listed as James Broadhurst) Est c1990 – present  Still operating 
15 Collectible World Studios Est. 1993 – 2008  Closed down 
16 Crown Trent China Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
17 Peggy Davies Ceramics Est. 1981 – c2015  Closed down   
18 Denby Pottery Company (Acquired Burleigh) Est. 2009 – present  Still operating 
19 Doulton (Royal) & Co. Ltd Est. 1862 – 2004 Acquired 
20 Duchess China (See Crownford and Taylor Tunnicliffe) Est. 2000 – present  Still operating 
21 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – present Still operating 
22 Dunoon Ceramics Est. 1980 – present  Still operating 
23 Hudson & Middleton Ltd Est. 1941 – present Still operating 
24 Roy Kirkham & Co Ltd Est. 1970 – present  Still operating 
25 Little Acorns Pottery  Est. 1980 – 2009 Closed down 
26 Melba-Wain Ltd Est. 1946 –  c2000 Assume closed down 
27 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – present Still operating 
28 Moorland Pottery  Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
29 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
30 Price & Kensington Potteries Ltd Est. 1962 – 2009  Acquired 
31 Pyramid Pottery Co Ltd  Est. 2005 – 2009  Closed down 
32 Ravensdale Pottery Ltd Est. c1999 – 2006  Closed down 
33 Regency China Ltd Est. 1953 – 2007  Closed down 
34 Royal Stafford Tableware   Est. 1845 – present   Still operating  
35 Royal Stratford Est. 1976 – 2005  Closed down 
36 James Sadler & Sons Ltd Est. 1899 – 2000 Acquired 
37 Staffordshire China Ltd Est. 2000 – 2005   Closed down  
38 Steelite International  Est. 1983 – present  Still operating  
39 Studio Hinks  Est. 2005 – 2011  Closed down  
40 Summerbank Pottery Ltd Est. 1952 – 2001 Closed down 
41 John Tams & Son Ltd (Tams group Ltd from 2000)  Est. 1875 – 2006 Closed down 
42 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1922 – present Still operating 
43 J. H. Weatherby & Sons Ltd Est. 1891 – 2000 Closed down 
44 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – present Still operating 
45 Brian Wood Ceramics Est. 1997 – 2003  Acquired 
46 Wood & Sons Ltd Est. 1865 – 2005 Closed down 
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Appendix 5f 
 
UK Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers SOT: Firms Existing 
2010 - 2016 
 
 Name Date Status in 2016 
1 H. Aynsley & Co Ltd (re-entered in 2002) Est. 2002 – 2013  Closed down 
2 P. E. Bairstow & Co Est. 1954 – 2013 Closed down 
3 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
4 Blakeney Pottery Ltd Est. 1968 – 2012  Closed down 
5 Emma Bridgewater Est. 1984 – present  Still operating  
6 Cara China Co Est. 1945 – c2015 Closed down 
7 Caverswall China  Est. 1973 – present  Still operating 
8 Churchill China PLC (formerly listed as James Broadhurst)* Est 1985 – present  Still operating 
9 Crown Trent China Ltd Est. 1980 – c2011 Closed down 
10 Peggy Davies Ceramics (still operating? but less than 10 
staff) 
Est. 1981 – present Not included as too small  
11 Denby Pottery Company (Acquired Burleigh) Est. 2009 – present  Still operating 
12 Duchess China (See Crownford and Taylor Tunnicliffe) Est. 2000 – present  Still operating 
13 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – present Still operating 
14 Dunoon Ceramics Est. 1980 – present  Still operating 
15 Hudson & Middleton Ltd Est. 1941 – present Still operating 
16 Roy Kirkham & Co Ltd Est. 1970 – present  Still operating 
17 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – present Still operating 
18 Moorland Pottery  Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
19 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
20 Royal Stafford Tableware ( formerly Royal Stafford China 
until 1992) 
Est. 1845 – present Still operating  
21 Steelite International  Est. 1983 – present  Still operating  
22 Studio Hinks  Est. 2005 – 2011  Closed down  
23 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1922 – present Still operating 
24 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – present Still operating 
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Appendix 5g 
 
UK Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers SOT: Firms Existing in 2016 
 
 Name Date Status in 2016 
1 Emma Bridgewater Est. 1984 – present  Still operating  
2 Caverswall China  Est. 1973 – present  Still operating 
3 Churchill China PLC (formerly listed as James Broadhurst)* Est 1985 – present  Still operating 
4 Denby Pottery Company (Acquired Burleigh) Est. 2009 – present  Still operating 
5 Duchess China (See Crownford and Taylor Tunnicliffe) Est. 2000 – present  Still operating 
6 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – present Still operating 
7 Dunoon Ceramics Est. 1980 – present  Still operating 
8 Hudson & Middleton Ltd (NEWS: Closed down June 2017) Est. 1941 – present Closed June 2017 
9 Roy Kirkham & Co Ltd Est. 1970 – present  Still operating 
10 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – present Still operating 
11 Moorland Pottery  (less than 10 employees) Est. 1960 – present  Still operating but not 
included. Too small 
12 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
13 Royal Stafford Tableware Est. 1845 – present  Still operating 
14 Steelite International  Est. 1983 – present  Still operating  
15 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1922 – present Still operating 
16 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – present Still operating 
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Appendix 6 
 
SOT Ceramics Tableware & Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants  
1960-2016 
 
 
6 a) SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1960-1969 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Allied English Potteries ( Lawley Group until 1964) Est. 1964 – 1972  Acquired 
2 Baifield Productions (assume closed down c1969)  Est.1964 – 1969? Assume closed down 
3 Blakeney Pottery Ltd  
(re-opened by Meakin 1999) 
Est. 1968 – 1999 
Then 1999 – 2012  
Closed down 
4 Clough’s Royal Art Pottery Est. 1961 – 1985  Acquired 
5 Mason’s Ironstone China Est. 1968 – 1973  Acquired 
6 Moorland Pottery Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
7 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – present  Still operating 
8 Price and Kensington Potteries Ltd Est. 1962 – 2006 Acquired 
 
 
 
6 b) SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1970-1979 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Ashley Ceramics Ltd Est. 1975 – 2007  Closed down 
2 Berkshire China Co Ltd Est. c1970 – 2007  Closed down 
3 Broadhurst Bros.   (Argyle China Co.) Est. c1977? – 2007 Closed down 
4 Caverswall China Est. 1973 – present   Still operating 
5 English Ironstone Pottery (formerly Washington Pottery) Est. 1973 – 1994 Closed down 
6 Roy Kirkham & Co. Ltd Est. 1970 – present  Still operating 
7 Royal Stratford Est. 1976 – 2005  Closed down 
 
 
6 c) SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1980-1989 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Amber China Ltd Est. 1983 – 2005  Closed down 
2 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co. Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015  Closed down 
3 Emma Bridgewater (Bridgwater Pottery Ltd) Est. 1984 – present  Still operating 
4 Crown Trent  Est. 1980 – 2009  Import & decorate since 2009 
5 Peggy Davies Ceramics Ltd Est. 1981 – present  Still operating 
6 Dunoon Ceramics Ltd Est. 1980 – present  Still operating 
7 Holland Studio Craft Ltd Est. 1986 – 1996  Acquired 
8 Little Acorns Pottery (assume Est. 1980) Est. c1980 – 2009   Closed down 
9 Steelite International P.L.C. Est. 1983 – present  Still operating 
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6 d) SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1990-1999 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Lorna Bailey Artware Est. 1995 – 1998  Closed down 
2 Cameleon China Ltd Est. 1998 – 2000  Closed down 
3 Churchill China PLC (formerly listed as Broadhurst Bros) Est 1985 – present  Still operating 
4 Collectible World Studios Est.1993 – 2008 Production shifted o/seas 
5 Crownford China Est. 1990 – 1994  Acquired 
6 Ravensdale Pottery Ltd Est. 1999 – 2006 Closed down 
7 Brian Wood Ceramics Est. 1997 – 2003  Acquired 
 
 
6 e) SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 2000-2009 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 H Aynsley & Co. Ltd (present also 1973 – 1961) Est. 2002 – 2013  Closed down 
2 Belvedere China Est. 2000 – 2007  Closed down 
    
3 Denby Pottery Company (Acquired Burleigh) Est. 2009 – present  Still operating 
4 Duchess China Est. 1947 – present    Still operating 
5 Pyramid Pottery Co. Ltd  Est. 2005 – 2009  Closed down  
6 Staffordshire China Ltd  Est. 2000 – 2005  Closed down 
7 Studio Hinks Est. 2005 – 2011   Closed down 
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 Appendix 7 
 
UK Ceramics Manufacturing Industry SOT: Origin of New Entrants  
1960-2016 
 
 Old name Additional details New Entrant Origin 
1 Allied English Potteries (1964-1972) Formerly existed as Lawley Group under S E Pearson & Son Name change 
2 Amber China (1983-2005) Phoenix Works Not known 
3 Ashley Ceramics Ltd (1975-2007)  Not known 
4 Aynsley (H) & Co. Ltd (2002-2013) Also known between 1876 and 1961 New entrant 
5 Baifield Productions (1964-69) Set up by S. Fielding & Co. Ltd who were operating from 1879 - 1982 Spin-off 
6 Belvedere (2000-2007)  Not known 
7 Berkshire China Co Ltd (1970-2007)  Not known 
8 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co. Ltd 
(1980-c2015) 
See internet sales site Not  known 
9 Blakeney Pottery Ltd (1968-2012)  Site Closed in 1999 but reopened in 2000 by Bernard Meakin Not known 
10 Bridgewater Pottery Ltd Emma 
Bridgewater 1984-present) 
 New entrant 
11 Broadhurst Bros. (1977-2007) Known as Argyle China Co. Not  known 
12 CameleonChina Ltd (1998-2004)  Not Known 
13 Caverswall China (1973-present) Thomas Goode Co. Ltd. Caverswall China (Brand Name) Not known 
14 Churchill China PLC (1985-present) Formerly Sampson Bridgwood and then part of J A S Broadhurst Spin-off 
15 Clough’s Royal Art Pottery (1961-1985) 
(see Federated Potteries) 
Formerly Alfred Clough Est.1913 – 1961 
Part of Federated Potteries with W. H. Grindley 
Name change 
16 15Collectible World Studios (1993-
2008) 
Formerly Lilliput Lane Name change 
17 Crownford China (1989-1994) 
(See Taylor & Kent and Elizabethan) 
A merger between Taylor & Kent Ltd and Rosina China resulted in a 
new company name - Crownford China 
Name change after merger 
18 Crown Trent China (1980-2010)  Not Known 
19 Peggy Davies Ceramics (1981-present) Liverpool Road Pottery New entrant 
20 Denby Pottery Group (in SOT 2009-
present) 
Acquired Burgess and Leigh (Burleigh) in 2009 Name change after 
acquisition 
21 Duchess China (1947-present) 
(see John Tams and Taylor Tunnicliffe) 
Formerly A. T. Finney & Sons Ltd. Who were acquired by John Tams 
in 1989 then by Taylor Tunnicliff in 2000 and renamed Duchess 
China 
Name change after 
acquisition 
22 Dunoon Ceramics Ltd (1980-present) Were based in Scotland. Moved into SOT in 1980. Later closed 
Scottish operations.  
New entrant 
23 English Ironstone Pottery (1973-1994) Formerly Washington Pottery Name change 
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24 Holland Studio Craft (1986-1996)  Not known 
25 Kirkham (Roy) (1970-present)  Not known 
26 Little Acorns Pottery (1980-2009) Assume present in 1970 New entrant 
27 Lorna Bailey Artware (1995-1998) LJB Ceramics –renamed Lorna Bailey Artware in Feb 2003 Spin-off 
28 Mason’s Ironstone China (1968-1973) 
(see Wedgwood) 
Formerly G. L. Ashworth & Bros 
Acquired by Wedgwood 
Name changed 
29 Moorland Pottery (1960-present) Site was formerly Studio Szeiler Ltd New entrant 
30 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd (1961-
present) 
Susan Williams-Ellis (a designer) bought A E Gray & Co. Ltd in 1960 
and Kirkhams Ltd in 1961 and merged to form Portmeirion 
New entrant 
31 Price and Kensington Potteries Ltd 
(1962-2006) 
Price Brothers from 1896 
Price Bros. (Burslem) Ltd. From 1903 – 1961 
Amalgamation of Price Bros. and Kensington Pottery in 1962 
In 1989 Price & Kensington bought Arthur Wood out 
Name changed after 
merger 
 
32 Pyramid Pottery (2005-2009)  Not known 
33 Ravensdale Pottery Ltd (1999-2006)  New entrant 
34 Royal Stratford (1976-2005)  Not known 
35 Staffordshire China Ltd. (2000-2005)  Not known 
36 Steelite International PLC (1983-
present) 
Previously Dunn Bennett who were acquired by Royal Doulton in 
1968 and disposed of. In 1983 D. E. D. Johnson acquired Royal 
Doulton Hotelware and Steelite International was formed 
Spin-off 
37 Studio Hinks (2005-2011) Spin-off from Royal Stratford Spin-off 
38 Brian WoodCeramics (1997-2003) 
 (see Staffordshire China Ltd) 
Deborah Wood was a founding partner of Brian Wood Ceramics Spin-off 
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Appendix 8 
 
SOT Ceramics Tableware & Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants Narrow 
Definition 1960-2016 
 
 
 
SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1960 – 1969  
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Baifield Productions Est. 1964 – c1969 Closed down 
2 Moorland Pottery  Est. 1960 – present  Still operating 
3 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 - present Still operating 
 
 
 
SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1970 – 1979  
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Dunoon Ceramics Ltd Est. 1980 - present Still operating 
2 Peggy Davies Ceramics Ltd Est. 1980 – c2015 Still operating 
 
 
 
SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1980 – 1989 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Emma Bridgewater Est. 1984 – present  Still operating  
2 Little Acorns Pottery  Est. 1980 – 2009  Closed down 
3 Steelite International P.L.C. Est. 1983 - present Still operating 
 
 
 
SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 1990 - 1999 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 Lorna Bailey Artware Est. c1998 - present Still operating 
2 Churchill China Ltd Est. 1990 - present Still operating 
3 Ravensdale Pottery Ltd Est. 1999 – 2006  Closed down  
4 Brian Wood Ceramics Est. 1997 - 2003 Acquired 
 
 
 
SOT Ceramics Tableware/Giftware Manufacturers: New Entrants 2000 - 2010 
 
 Name date Status in 2016 
1 H Aynsley & Co Ltd Est. 2002 – 2013  Closed down 
2 Studio Hinks  Est. 2005 - 2011 Closed down  
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Appendix 9: Innovation & Co-operation Questionnaire 2016 
 
North Staffordshire Ceramics (Tableware & Giftware Sector) 
Innovation Survey 2016 
  
 
 
This Innovation survey will be completed in a face-to-face interview with the researcher: 
Lorraine Limbrick 
Senior Lecturer 
The Business School 
B362 Brindley Building 
Leek Road 
Stoke-on-Trent 
Staffordshire 
ST4 2DF 
 
 
 
 
Innovation Survey 2016                                                               (Version 2:  November 2016) 
 
This survey collects information about product and process innovation as well as organisational and marketing innovation 
during the five-year period 2010 to 2015 inclusive. Most questions cover new or significantly improved goods or the 
implementation of new or significantly improved processes, logistics or distribution methods. Organisational and 
marketing innovations are covered in section 4. In order to be able to compare enterprises with and without innovation 
activities, we request all enterprises to respond to all questions, unless otherwise instructed. If you don’t know the answer 
to a question or think one is not relevant, just leave that particular question unanswered. 
 
 
Person we should contact if there are any queries regarding the form: 
 
Name:               _____________________________________  
Job title:            _____________________________________ 
Organisation:    _____________________________________ 
Phone:              _____________________________________ 
E-mail:              _____________________________________ 
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1. General information about your enterprise 
 
Name of enterprise    
Name of Owner    
Address    
Postal code    Main activity    
 
 
1.1 Is your enterprise part of an enterprise group? (A group consists of two or more legally defined enterprises 
under common ownership. Each enterprise in the group may serve different markets, as with national or regional 
subsidiaries, or serve different product markets. The head office is also part of an enterprise group.)  
 
Yes    In which country is the head office of your group located? ______________________ 
No  
 
If your enterprise is part of an enterprise group, please answer all further questions only 
for your enterprise in [your country]. Do not include results for subsidiaries or parent 
enterprises outside of [your country] 
 
 
1.2  What was your enterprise’s total turnover for 2010 and 2015?141 Turnover is defined as the market 
sales of goods and services (Include all taxes except VAT142). 
 2010 2015 
Less than £500,000   
Between £500,000 - £1,000,000   
Between £1,000,000 and £2,000,000    
Between £2,000,000 and £5,000,000   
Between £5,000,000 and £10,000,000   
Between £10,000,000 and £20,000,000   
More than £20,000,000   
 
1.3  What was your enterprise’s total number of employees in 2010 and 2015?143 
 2010 2015 
Less than 10   
Between 10 and 49   
Between 50 and 249    
More than 249   
 
 
                                                 
141 Give turnover in ‘000 of national currency units to nine digits. 
142 For Credit institutions: Interests receivable and similar income; for Insurance services: Gross premiums written 
143 Annual average. If not available, give the number of employees at the end of each year. Give figures to six digits. 
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1.4  Does your enterprise undertake all phases of the production process? 
 Yes No 
Manufacture blanks only   
Manufacture and decorate/glaze   
Decorate/glaze only   
Packaging of manufactured products   
Other not listed here*   
All of the above   
 
* Please explain_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
1.5  In which geographic markets did your enterprise sell goods or services during the five years 
2010 to 2015?  
 Yes No  
Local / regional within [your country]    
National     
Other European Union (EU) countries, EFTA, or EU candidate countries*     
Other countries    
*: Include the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Switzerland, Turkey, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
 
1.6  Were any of these markets new to your enterprise during the five years 2010 to 2015? 
  
 Yes No   Year 
Local / regional within [your country]      ........................... 
National       ........................... 
Other European Union (EU) countries, EFTA, or EU candidate countries*      ........................... 
All other countries     ........................... 
 
1.7  In which one of the following sectors is your main activity? 
     
Domesticwares only    
Hotelwares only    
Both domesticwares and hotelwares   
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1.8  Which segments of the market are your products positioned in? (relative to competitors). Tick all boxes 
that apply. 
  Hotelwares Domesticwares  
Low price range    
Medium price range    
Premium price range    
    
 
1.9  Has your market positioning within segments changed over the five years 2010 to 2015?  
 
Yes     
No    
 
 If no, go to question 2.0, otherwise: 
 
1.10  Please indicate how your positioning has changed. 
   
From Low price range – Medium price range    
From Low price range – Premium price range    
From Medium price range – Low price range    
From Medium price range – Premium price range    
From Premium price range – Low price range  
From Premium price range – Medium price range  
 
  
394 
 
2.  Product innovation  
 
A product innovation is the market introduction of a new good or a significantly improved good with respect 
to its capabilities, such as improved benefits, user friendliness, components or sub-systems. The innovation 
(new or improved) must be new to your enterprise, but it does not need to be new to your sector or market. It 
does not matter if the innovation was originally developed by your enterprise or by other enterprises. 
 
 
2.1 During the five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise introduce: 
  Yes No 
New or significantly improved goods. (Exclude the simple resale of new goods purchased from other 
enterprises and changes of a solely aesthetic nature.)     
 
     If no go to question 3.1, otherwise: 
 
2.2   Who developed these product innovations?  
 
Select the most appropriate option only 
Mainly your enterprise or enterprise group  
Your enterprise together with other enterprises or institutions  
Mainly other enterprises or institutions  
 
 
 
2.3  Were any of your product innovations during the five years 2010 to 2015? 
 Yes No 
New to 
your 
market?   
Your enterprise introduced a new or significantly improved product onto your 
market before your competitors (it may have already been available in other 
markets) 
  
Only new to 
your firm?  
Your enterprise introduced a new or significantly improved product that was already 
available from your competitors in your market 
  
 
 
2.4  Using the definitions above, please give the percentage of your total turnover in 2015 from: 
Product innovations introduced during 2010 to 2015 that were new to your market 
      
     % 
Product innovations introduced during 2010 to 2015 that were only new to your firm 
      
     % 
Products that were unchanged or only marginally modified during 2010 to 2015 (include the resale of 
new products purchased from other enterprises) 
      
   % 
     
Total turnover in 2015 1 0 0 % 
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3.  Process innovation 
 
A process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved production process, 
distribution method, or support activity for your goods or services. The innovation (new or improved) must be 
new to your enterprise, but it does not need to be new to your sector or market. It does not matter if the 
innovation was originally developed by your enterprise or by other enterprises. Exclude purely organisational 
innovations. 
 
 
3.1  During the five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise introduce:  
 Yes No 
New or significantly improved processes for manufacturing  your goods   
New or significantly improved logistics, delivery or distribution processes   
New or significantly improved supporting activities for your processes, such as maintenance systems or 
operations for purchasing, accounting, computing and marketing planning 
  
 
     If no to all options, go to section 4, otherwise: 
 
3.2  Who developed these process innovations?  
 
Select the most appropriate option only 
Mainly your enterprise or enterprise group  
Your enterprise together with other enterprises or institutions  
Mainly other enterprises or institutions  
 
 
 
 
If your enterprise had no product or process innovations or innovation activity 
during 2010 to 2015 (no to all options in questions 2.1 and 3.1), go to section 8.  
Otherwise, go to section 4. 
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4. Other Innovation activities and expenditures 
 
Innovation activities include the acquisition of machinery, equipment, software, and licenses; engineering and 
development work, training, marketing and R&D144 when they are specifically undertaken to develop and/or 
implement a product or process innovation. 
 
4.1  During the Five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise engage in the following ORGANISATIONAL 
innovation activities? 
 Yes No 
 New business practices for organising procedures (e.g. supply chain management, business re-
engineering, knowledge management, lean production, quality management, etc.) 
  
   
 New methods of organising work responsibilities and decision making (e.g. first use of a new system 
of employee responsibilities, team work, decentralisation, integration or de-integration of 
departments, education/training systems, etc.) 
  
 
  
 New methods of organising external relations with other firms or public institutions (e.g. first use of 
alliances, partnerships, outsourcing or sub-contracting, etc.) 
  
 
Other, please specify:  
............................................................................................................................. 
 
 
  
 
 
4.2 During the Five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise engage in the following MARKETING innovation 
activities? 
 Yes No 
 Significant changes to the aesthetic design or packaging of a good or service   
   
 New media or techniques for product promotion (e.g. first use of a new advertising medium, 
introduction of loyalty cards, etc.) 
  
   
 New methods of pricing goods or services (i.e. first time use of variable pricing by demand, discount 
systems, etc.) 
  
 
 
  
New methods for sales channels (i.e. first time use of franchising or distribution licenses, direct 
selling, exclusive retailing, new concepts for product presentation, e-commerce facilities, etc.) 
Other, please specify:  
............................................................................................................................. 
 
 
  
 
Other, please specify:  
............................................................................................................................. 
 
  
 
 
4.3  Please estimate (approximately) the total amount of expenditure on all of your innovation activities as a 
share of turnover in 2015. 
 
0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-25% 26-50% >50% 
       
 
4.4  Five years ago did you devote....? 
Fewer resources to 
innovation 
About the same resources to innovation More resources to 
innovation 
   
                                                 
144 Include basic R&D as an innovation activity even if not specifically related to a product and/or process innovation 
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5. Importance of innovation 
 
5.1 How important were each of the following effects of your product, process, organisational and marketing 
innovations introduced during the five years 2010 to 2015? 
 
  Degree of importance of effect 
  Essential Highly 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not  
important 
Product  
oriented 
effects 
Increased range of products     
Entered new markets or increased market share     
Improved quality of products      
      
 
Process 
oriented 
effects 
Improved flexibility of production     
Increased capacity of production     
Reduced labour costs per unit output     
Reduced materials and energy per unit output     
      
Other 
effects 
Reduced environmental impacts or improved 
health and safety 
    
Met regulatory requirements     
 Speeded up decision making     
 Developed knowledge sharing capabilities (inside 
and outside your enterprise) 
 
    
 
5.2    How many job positions have been created, sustained or lost in your company as the result of 
introducing new or substantially improved products or processes since 2010? 
 0 1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 >50 
Jobs created         
Jobs sustained         
Jobs lost         
 
 
5.3    How important are the following innovation capabilities for your firm’s survival and performance? 
 Of no 
importance 
Slightly 
important 
Important Highly 
important 
Essential 
Product innovation      
Process innovation      
Marketing innovation      
Organisational innovation      
 
Other, please specify 
 
.................. 
 
................. 
 
.................. 
 
.................. 
 
.................. 
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5.4    How would you judge your firm’s innovation capabilities within your industry in the past and now, 
regarding? 
 
In the past (2010) Lagging Average Above average Leading 
Product innovation     
Process innovation     
Marketing innovation     
Organisational innovation     
 
Other, please specify 
 
.................. 
 
................. 
 
.................. 
 
.................. 
 
Now (2015) Lagging Average Above average Leading 
Product innovation     
Process innovation     
Marketing innovation     
Organisational innovation     
 
Other, please specify 
 
.................. 
 
................. 
 
.................. 
 
.................. 
 
 
5.5    What proportion of your current sales by value comes from new or substantially improved products or 
processes introduced since 2010? 
 
0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-25% 26-50% >50% 
       
 
 
5.6  During the five years 2010 to 2015, did your enterprise receive any public financial support for innovation 
activities from the following levels of government? Include financial support via tax credits or deductions, 
grants, subsidised loans, and loan guarantees. Exclude research and other innovation activities conducted entirely 
for the public sector under contract. 
 
 Yes No 
Local or regional authorities   
Central government (including central government agencies or ministries)   
The European Union (EU)   
 
Other (please state)……………………………… 
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6. Sources of information and co-operation for innovation activities 
 
6.1   From 2010 to 2015 did your enterprise co-operate on any of your innovation activities with other enterprises 
or institutions? 
 
  Yes No 
    
If no please go to section 7, otherwise: 
 
 
6.2  Please indicate the types of innovation co-operation partner (s) with whom you have collaborated IN YOUR 
REGION (i.e. the Stoke-on-Trent Industry cluster). 
  
 
 
 
 
Degree of co-operation 
 Information source  High Medium Low Not used 
Internal  Within your enterprise or enterprise group     
      
Market 
sources 
 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components, or software     
Clients or customers     
Competitors or other enterprises in your sector      
Consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes     
      
Institutional 
sources 
Universities or other higher education institutions     
Government or public research institutes     
      
Other 
sources 
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions     
Scientific journals and trade/technical publications     
Professional and industry associations     
 
 
6.3  Please indicate the types of innovation co-operation partner (s) with whom you have collaborated IN OTHER 
UK LOCATIONS. 
 
 
 
   
Degree of co-operation 
 Information source  High Medium Low Not used 
      
Market 
sources 
 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components, or software     
Clients or customers     
Competitors or other enterprises in your sector      
Consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes     
      
Institutional 
sources 
Universities or other higher education institutions     
Government or public research institutes     
      
Other 
sources 
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions     
Scientific journals and trade/technical publications     
Professional and industry associations     
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6.4  Please indicate the types of innovation co-operation partner (s) with whom you have collaborated 
OVERSEAS (i.e. not in the UK). 
 
 
 
  Degree of co-operation 
Tick ‘not used’ if no co-operation was obtained from a source. 
 Information source  High Medium Low Not used 
Internal  Within your enterprise or enterprise group     
      
Market 
sources 
 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components, or software     
Clients or customers     
Competitors or other enterprises in your sector      
Consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes     
      
Institutional 
sources 
Universities or other higher education institutions     
Government or public research institutes     
      
Other 
sources 
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions     
Scientific journals and trade/technical publications     
Professional and industry associations     
 
 
6.5  Please indicate the areas where you have collaborated. 
  
 
 
  
Type of co-operation 
 
 Information source  Information 
only 
Product design 
and materials 
Process 
developments 
Internal  Within your enterprise or enterprise group    
     
Market 
sources 
 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components, or software 
   
Clients or customers    
Competitors or other enterprises in your 
sector  
   
Consultants, commercial labs, or private 
R&D institutes 
   
     
Institutional 
sources 
Universities or other higher education 
institutions 
   
Government or public research institutes    
     
Other 
sources 
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions    
Scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications 
   
Professional and industry associations    
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6.6  Please indicate the nature of the collaborative relationship (i.e. formal or informal; short-term or long-term). 
  
 
   
Type of relationship 
 
 
 
 
Information source  Formal 
contractual 
relationship 
Informal 
relationship 
Long-term 
relationship 
(more than 1 
year) 
Short-term 
relationship 
(less than 1 
year) 
Internal  Within your enterprise or 
enterprise group 
    
      
Market 
sources 
 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components, or software 
    
Clients or customers     
Competitors or other enterprises in 
your sector  
    
Consultants, commercial labs, or 
private R&D institutes 
    
      
Institutional 
sources 
Universities or other higher 
education institutions 
    
Government or public research 
institutes 
    
      
Other 
sources 
Conferences, trade fairs, 
exhibitions 
    
Scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications 
    
Professional and industry 
associations 
    
 
 
6.7  Are there any other types of collaborations not listed above that you have taken part in? 
 
      No                Yes                      
             
                 
 
If yes, please list in order of importance  
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.8  Five years ago, did your enterprise engage in ……….? 
 
Fewer collaborative        About the same            More collaborative       
Projects                                    Projects                   Projects 
             
                                                                                 
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6.9  Which type of co-operation partner did you find the most valuable for your enterprise’s innovation 
activities?  
 
Please state:_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
6.10 Did your enterprise during the five years 2010 to 2015 receive any public support for your innovation 
activities? 
 
  Yes No 
    
     If no go to section 7, otherwise: 
 
 
6.11 If yes, and if you know, please tick the source(s) of this funding? 
 Yes No 
Local or regional authorities   
Central government (including central government agencies or ministries)   
The European Union (EU)   
 
             Other? Please state____________________________________________ 
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7. Factors hampering innovation activities 
 
7.1 During the five years 2010 to 2015 were any of your innovation activities or projects?  
 Yes No 
Abandoned in the concept stage   
Abandoned after the activity or project was begun   
Seriously delayed   
 
 
7.2 During the five years 2010 to 2015, how important were the following factors for hampering your innovation 
activities or projects or influencing a decision not to innovate? TO BE ANSWERED BY ALL. 
  Degree of importance 
  High Medium Low Factor not experienced  
Cost 
factors 
Lack of funds within your enterprise or group     
Lack of finance from sources outside your enterprise     
Innovation costs too high     
      
Knowledge 
factors 
Lack of qualified personnel      
Lack of information on technology     
Lack of information on markets     
Difficulty in finding cooperation partners for innovation     
      
Market 
factors 
Market dominated by established enterprises     
Uncertain demand for innovative goods or services     
      
Reasons 
not to 
innovate 
No need due to prior innovations     
No need because of no demand for innovations     
  
 
 
 
END OF QUESTIONS 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. If required, would you agree to a 
longer (approximately 45mins-1hour) interview? 
 
         Yes     No  
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Appendix 10: Questionnaire Sections Mapped to the Research Objectives 
 
Questionnaire section 1 – General Information 
In this section general information about the company will be gathered. For example, information 
that will help to determine firm ownership and size in terms of the number of employees, it will 
also identify firm turnover. This approach, along with other data gathered from the questionnaire, 
will assist in determining the sample for stage 4 of the research (objectives 9 and 10 - semi-
structured interviews). Section 1 is also aimed at gathering information about markets, segments 
and positioning within segments, e.g. whether firms operate in domestic and/or international 
markets and, whether firms operate in low price or premium price segments. This information will 
be mapped back to objective 2, to reinforce or refute earlier findings on competitive activity. A 
final aim of section 1 is to determine the degree of vertical integration apparent within cluster 
firms, e.g. whether firms carry out all phases of the production process or if there is evidence of 
specialisation. This information will achieve objective 6 and, will contribute to the findings on the 
identification of the ‘need for co-operation’. 
 
Questionnaire section 2 – Product Innovation 
In this section information about innovative activity relating to new or significantly improved 
products will be gathered. For example, questions are aimed at identifying new to market 
products as well as new to firm products. Furthermore, this section also aims at identifying 
whether such innovations were developed internally or externally, it also aims to identify the 
success of such innovations in terms of their contribution to turnover. This section will partially 
achieve objective 7 (determining the output of innovative activity). 
 
Questionnaire section 3 – Process Innovation 
In this section information about the implementation of significantly improved production 
processes, distribution methods and support activities for the firm’s products will be gathered. For 
example, questions are aimed at identifying whether innovations were made in improved product 
manufacturing processes, and/or in logistics and distribution processes. It also aims at identifying 
whether such innovations were developed internally or externally. This section will partially 
achieve objective 7 (determining the output of innovative activity). 
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Questionnaire section 4 – Other Innovation Activities and Expenditures 
This section seeks to gather information about activities that support the development and 
implementation of product and process innovations. The questions cover the following; 
organisational innovation activities, such as new business practices, work organisation and 
methods of organising external relations; and, marketing innovation activities, such as new 
methods for promoting products, pricing products and selling products. This section also seeks 
information about total expenditure on all innovation activities as a percentage of firm turnover (in 
2015), as well as information about whether that expenditure has increased/decreased over the 
period in question. This section will partially achieve objective 7 (determining the output of 
innovative activity). 
 
Questionnaire section 5 – The Importance of Innovation 
This section is aimed at gathering information about the effects of innovation and their importance 
to the firm. The questions categorise a number of possible effects. For example, increased range 
of products, entry into new markets, greater flexibility, and reduced labour costs. Firms are asked 
to rate the effects in terms of their importance. This section also seeks to discover the effects of 
innovations on: turnover, by identifying the percentage of turnover attributable to new innovations; 
and employment, by identifying the number of jobs created, sustained or lost as a result of 
introducing new innovations. The questions in this section are mostly aimed at partially achieving 
objective 7 (identifying innovative activity and determining the success of innovative activity). 
However, questions in this section are also aimed at identifying whether the firm’s innovation 
capabilities (absorptive capacity) have increased/decreased over time. This information is linked 
to objective 8 and will contribute to the analysis of the cluster’s knowledge creation capabilities. 
 
Questionnaire section 6 – Sources of Information and Co-operation for Innovation 
Activities 
This section is aimed at gathering information about the extent, types and depth of knowledge 
exchange relationships taking place within and outside the SOT cluster. The questions are 
divided into three main categories: 1) relationships with entities existing within the SOT cluster; 2) 
with other entities based in the UK; and, 3) with entities from outside the UK. The same questions 
will be asked for each of the three categories, e.g. whether relationships are with other ceramics 
manufacturers, with suppliers, with R&D institutions or with Trade Associations. Another set of 
questions in this section is aimed at discovering whether the identified relationships are formal 
(contractual) or informal and, whether they were short-term (less than 1year) or long term (more 
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than 1 year). A further set of questions is aimed at determining the types of innovation that firms 
have collaborated on, e.g. product, process, etc. The final set of questions in this section is aimed 
at determining what firms consider to be the most valuable of the identified relationships and, 
whether the number of collaborative relationships increased or decreased over the period 2010 – 
2015. The questions in this section are aimed at partially achieving objective 8. However, in order 
to fully understand the nature and depth of relationships, i.e. whether relationships can be 
identified as ‘strong ties’ or ‘weak ties’ (see proposition 1), some of the findings from this section 
of the questionnaire will need to be explored in much more depth in stage 4 of the research 
(qualitative research stage).  
 
Questionnaire section 7 – Factors Hampering Innovation Activities 
This final section of the questionnaire is aimed at identifying some of the main reasons why firms 
in the SOT cluster may decide not to innovate. Questions are categorised into different sets of 
factors, e.g. cost factors, knowledge factors, market factors. Data on the importance of specific 
factors on decisions not to innovate will be collected by using a Likert scale of degrees of 
importance. The questions in this section are aimed at partially achieving objective 8. However, 
as with section 6, in order to clarify and to fully understand the reasons why firms decide whether 
to innovate or not, some of the findings from this section of the questionnaire will be explored in 
much more depth in stage 4 of the research (qualitative research stage). 
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Appendix 11: Example of Questionnaire and Interview Survey Covering Letter 
 
 
Staffordshire University Business School 
Room B362 
Brindley Building 
Leek Road 
Stoke-on-Trent 
Staffordshire 
ST4 2DF 
08/10/2016 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Lorraine Limbrick and I’m a senior Researcher at Staffordshire University’s Business 
School. I’m currently carrying out research into the North Staffordshire ceramics cluster, 
focussing specifically on the industry’s core manufacturers.  
 
It is my intention to survey all of the current core ceramics manufacturing firms in the North 
Staffs area. To do this I have formulated a questionnaire and I’m currently in the process of 
contacting relevant firms to see if they will take part in the survey. The survey is aimed at 
identifying innovation and collaboration initiatives within the industry over the period 2010-
2015. 
 
As some of the questions in the questionnaire may require further explanation or clarification, I 
would like to be present when the questionnaire is being completed. This is  so that I can guide 
the respondent through the questions. Ideally, the questionnaire should be completed by a 
senior manager, or owner, in the company. So far, five leading Stoke-on-Trent ceramics 
companies have agreed to take part in the survey. 
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If you agree to take part then I would like to assure you that the results of the survey will remain 
anonymous, i.e. no firms will be named in the findings from the questionnaire survey. Firms will 
be allocated a letter, e.g. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, etc. and will only be discussed in categories, e.g. small firms, 
medium sized firms or large firms. It is also my intention to make the results of the survey 
available to ceramics firms and other interested parties, such as the BCC and local government. I 
would be very happy to personally email/post the findings of the survey to all firms taking part 
before the results are formally published. 
 
I would like to ask if your firm would take part in the survey? If you would like to take part, can 
we please arrange an appointment to complete the questionnaire? I estimate that the 
questionnaire should take about half-an-hour to complete. My contact details are: 
Mobile: [anonymised] 
Email: l.limbrick@staffs.ac.uk 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Lorraine Limbrick 
(Senior Lecturer in Strategy, Enterprise and International Business) 
The Business School 
Staffordshire University 
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Appendix 12: Interview Schedule 
 
Q1. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate with each other on product 
innovations? 
Q2. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate with other firms on process 
innovations? 
Q3. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate with other non-ceramic firms and 
institutions? 
Q 4. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate more or less now than 10 years 
ago? 
Q5. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers see themselves as part of one whole 
industry cluster? 
Q6. What effect did the SOT cluster’s past dominant firms, e.g. Wedgwood and 
Royal Doulton, have on the rest of the SOT cluster? 
Q7. Why do you think that Wedgwood and Royal Doulton acquired so many other 
pottery companies between 1960 and 1990? 
Q8. Overall, do you think Wedgwood and Royal Doulton were good for the SOT 
ceramics cluster? 
Q9. What do you think the role of the SOT cluster’s NEW dominant firms, e.g. 
Steelite, Portmeirion, etc., is/should be? 
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Appendix 13: Questionnaire & Interview Company Profiles (Q1 – Q1.9 plus Q2.1, Q3.1 & Q4.1) 
  Company ‘A’ 
 
Company ‘B’ Company ‘C’ Company ‘D’ Company ‘E’ Company ‘F’ 
Q Company ownership Private Publicly quoted Private Private Private Private 
1 Part of a group YES YES NO NO YES NO 
1.1 Head office location UK (Stoke) UK (Stoke) UK (Stoke) UK (Stoke) UK UK (Stoke) 
1.2 Turnover 2010 £20,000,000 + £20,000,000 + £10,000,000 - 
£20,000,000 
£20,000,000 + £500,000 - £1,000,000 Less than £500,000 
1.2 Turnover 2015 £20,000,000 + £20,000,000 + £10,000,000 - 
£20,000,000 
£20,000,000 + £500,000 - £1,000,000 £500,000 - £1,000,000 
1.3 Employees 2010 249 + 249 + Between 50 - 249 Between 50 - 249 Between 10 - 49 Between 1 - 9 
1.3 Employees 2015 249 + 249 + 249 + Between 50 - 249 Between 10 - 49 Between 1 - 9 
1.4 Does your firm undertake all 
phases of production? 
YES YES YES – except slips YES – except slips & 
glazes 
YES YES 
1.5 Which geographic markets do 
you operate in? 
ALL - 
Regional/national/Europe 
and other 
ALL - 
Regional/national/Europe 
and other 
ALL - 
Regional/national/Europe 
and other 
ALL - 
Regional/national/Europe 
and other 
ALL - 
Regional/national/Europe 
and other 
National 
1.6 Where any of these new markets 
between 2010-2015? 
NO NO NO YES – Germany, France, 
Australia, Japan 
YES – EU and other 
countries 
NO 
1.7 Your main activity? Hotelwares Domesticwares Domesticwares Domesticwares & 
commercial 
Domesticwares & 
hotelwares 
Domesticwares 
1.8 Your market positioning? ALL – 
low/medium/premium 
Medium Premium ALL – 
low/medium/premium 
Premium Premium 
1.9 Change in market positioning 
2010-2015 
NO NO NO NO NO NO 
2.1 Product innovations 2010-2015? 
 
YES - various YES - various YES - various YES - various YES - various YES - various 
3.1 Process innovations 2010-2015? YES – robotic pressure 
casting; ERP system 
YES – not stated YES – now making own 
moulds; new shapes 
YES – pressure casting; 
super-heated steam 
drying 
NO YES – developing clay 
technology/firing 
4.1 Other organisational innovations 
2010-2015? 
YES – ERP; website 
development 
YES – not stated YES – website 
development; Social 
media; investment in 
skills; boxing & packaging 
YES – lean production 6 
sigma; social media 
YES – supply chain 
system; work 
organisation; marketing; 
design & packaging; 
social media; sales 
channels 
NO – apart from social 
media 
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Appendix 14: Ethical considerations in this research study 
1 Research participants should not be subjected to harm in any ways whatsoever. 
The use of offensive, discriminatory and other unacceptable language was avoided in the 
formulation of the covering letter, questionnaire and interview questions (see 3.7.15, 3.7.19 and 
copies of documents in appendices ?, ? and ?) 
2 Respect for the dignity of research participants should be prioritised. 
Voluntary participation of respondents in the research was important. During the questionnaire 
and interview process, all respondents were treated with courtesy and professionalism by the 
researcher. Respondents were also informed that they could abandon the research and withdraw 
responses at any point. 
3 Full consent should be obtained from the participants prior to the study. 
The concept of ‘informed consent’ was applied to the research through explaining to senior 
managers the aims and objectives of the research, the duration of the research, the purpose and 
possible consequences of the research and the dissemination strategy (see 3.7.15 and 3.7.19 
and covering letter, appendix ?). 
4 The protection of the privacy of research participants has to be ensured. 
All participants were ensured anonymity. Senior managers were verbally notified at the beginning 
of the questionnaires and interviews that their company would be identified as either ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, 
etc. Respondents were also informed that they could abandon the research and withdraw 
responses at any point. 
5 Adequate level of confidentiality of the research data should be ensured. 
It was explained to the participants that the research findings would be published. and permission 
was sought to proceed with the questionnaire and interviews in light of this. 
6 Anonymity of individuals and organisations participating in the research has to be 
ensured. 
All participants were ensured anonymity. Senior managers were notified at the beginning of the 
questionnaires and interviews that their company would be identified as either ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, etc. 
7 Any deception or exaggeration about the aims and objectives of the research must be 
avoided. 
The aims and objectives were carefully constructed from the theoretical framework, which was 
based on an extensive review of the academic literature. 
8 Affiliations in any forms, sources of funding, as well as any possible conflicts of interests 
have to be declared. 
There were no sources of funding or conflicts of interests in this research study. 
9 Any type of communication in relation to the research should be done with honesty and 
transparency. 
All communications by email and/or post are available for inspection. (see covering letter in 
appendix ?) 
10 Any type of misleading information, as well as representation of primary data findings in a 
biased way must be avoided. 
Findings were carefully mapped to the theoretical framework and thus discussed and evaluated in 
light of theory, thus reducing the potential for bias as much as possible. 
11 Reciprocity – the idea that the research should be of some mutual benefit to researcher 
and participant. 
All participants were informed that the research findings would be made available to them (see 
covering letter, appendix?) 
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Appendix 15: Chapter 5 Findings Summarised 
Antecedents of Knowledge Creation Life-cycle Stage (√ = some evidence 
X = no evidence) 
Discussion Opportunities for Knowledge Creation 
Breadth of Knowledge (5.2) 
 
Circa 1700s-1960 
• Highly skilled workers 
• Skills take many years to learn 
• Wide range of product skills 
• Task specific 
• Tacit knowledge 
• Knowledge often unique to the firm – concentrated 
within a single pottery 
• Wide product range per manufacturer 
• Complexity of knowledge is high 
 
 
Circa 1960s-2008 
• Some attempts to simplify tasks 
• Some automated processes introduced 
• Multiple skilling of employees 
• Fewer employees needed 
• Two main skills groups emerge – Higher Order and 
Lower Order 
• New skills developed and aimed at increasing flexibility 
and responsiveness 
• Many mergers and acquisitions take place 
• Many factories are closed and unemployment is high 
 
Note: Only some technological processes were automated at this 
stage (i.e. become component knowledge). Many processes 
remained extremely difficult to automate. 
 
 
Circa 2008 – present 
• Many highly specialist skills lost within firms through 
streamlining and automation 
• Many highly specialised skills lost in the SOT ceramics 
cluster as a whole through consolidation and job losses 
• Evidence indicates a focus on product innovation 
• Worker mobility within the cluster increases due to high 
unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
Rapid Growth 
According to theory, Focus should be on product 
innovation. There’s some evidence of this 
happening. 
√ 
 
According to theory horizontal inter-firm linkages 
should be strong at this stage. There’s no 
evidence of this happening. 
X 
 
 
Slowing growth and then mature phase 
According to theory, focus should be on process 
innovations. There’s some evidence of this 
happening but mostly in larger firms. 
√ 
1979-2008 decline phase 
According to theory, focus should be on product 
innovations. There’s no strong evidence of this 
happening at this stage. 
X 
According to theory horizontal inter-firm linkages 
should be strong at this stage. There’s no 
evidence of this happening. 
X 
 
 
2008-present, re-generation phase 
According to theory, Focus should be on product 
innovation. There’s evidence of this happening. 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
Highly systemic architectural knowledge and 
unique to the firm. Thus, little need for inter-
firm cooperation.  
Knowledge was also difficult to transfer 
inside the firm due to the task specific nature 
of knowledge. 
Firms may also have wanted to keep 
knowledge private for competitive reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge becomes less complex. Some 
knowledge becomes more technical 
(mechanised) and tangible (through routines 
and instructions). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge becomes less complex. Some 
knowledge becomes more technical 
(mechanised) and tangible (through routines 
and instructions). According to theory, 
horizontal inter-firm linkages should be 
strong at this stage. 
 
 
 
 
Low number of opportunities 
Architectural knowledge = 
Few opportunities for knowledge exchange outside 
the firm (external). 
 
Few opportunities for knowledge exchange inside 
the firm (internal) due to task specificity and 
protection of knowledge by worker families. 
 
Lack of mobility reduces opportunities for external 
knowledge exchange 
 
 
Increased number of opportunities for internal 
knowledge exchange (limited) 
Opportunities for knowledge exchange increase 
marginally as only some processes are automated. 
 
 
 
Fewer opportunities for external knowledge 
exchange between firms 
Consolidation effects reduce opportunities for 
external knowledge exchange as there are fewer 
firms overall. Some opportunities though through 
increased worker mobility. 
 
 
 
Increased opportunities for internal knowledge 
exchange (limited) 
Increased firm size (groups of firms) increases 
internal knowledge exchange opportunities but 
mostly for the largest firms.  
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Degree of Modularity (5.3) 
 
Circa 1700s-1960 
• Evidence indicates that most manufacturers carry out 
all/most phases of production 
• Production processes, although highly complex and 
distinct, were inseparable 
• The production sequence was composed of many 
interdependent phases 
• The level of mechanisation was low 
• Attempts to codify the diversity of activities failed 
 
 
 
Circa 1960s-2008 
• Attempts to simplify processes 
• Some of the largest firms adopt Fordist methods for 
some processes, e.g. introduced automatic and semi-
automatic machines for some processes (low level 
standardisation) 
• Reduction in model ranges (rationalisation) 
• Some vertical disintegration takes place in the early 
production processes, e.g. some outsourcing to 
specialist firms (e.g. clay, print, colour, glaze) 
 
2008-present 
• Continued investment in automation of some processes 
• Introduction of flexible specialisation methods 
• Process remains highly integrated 
 
 
 
 
 
Rapid Growth 
According to theory, Focus should be on product 
innovation.  
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing growth and then mature phase 
According to theory, focus should be on process 
innovations. 
√ 
1979-2008 decline phase 
According to theory, focus should be on product 
innovations. 
√ 
 
2008-present, re-generation phase 
According to theory, Focus should be on product 
innovation. horizontal inter-firm linkages should 
be strong at this stage. 
√ 
 
 
 
 
Tasks and processes are distinct and 
appear to be modular, but processes are 
complex, highly interdependent and often 
firm specific. 
 
Opportunities for internal knowledge 
exchange are greatly reduced due to the 
unique and peculiar way work was 
organised, i.e. although interdependent, 
knowledge was specific to individuals. 
 
 
The breakdown of some task divisions aids 
the flexible use of labour although the 
majority of processes remain interdependent 
and highly inseparable. 
 
Outsourcing of some processes increases 
knowledge exchange opportunities. 
 
 
 
Low number of opportunities 
Modularity should lead to increased opportunities 
for knowledge exchange. However, highly 
interdependent processes reduce opportunities for 
external knowledge exchange. 
 
Increased opportunities for internal knowledge 
exchange (limited) 
Increasing (limited) opportunities for internal 
knowledge exchange, but limited externally due to 
inseparability. 
 
 
Fewer opportunities for external knowledge 
exchange between firms 
Increasing opportunities for external knowledge 
exchange with suppliers. 
 
Increased opportunities for internal knowledge 
exchange (limited) 
As some task divisions are broken down. 
Technological Dynamism (5.4) 
 
Circa 1700s-1890 
• Small and incremental advances during this period  
• Firms operate in separate market niches 
• Domestic competition is indirect 
 
Circa 1890-1960 
• The Clean Air Act (1956) and the introduction of natural 
gas in 1960 changed firing technology 
• Significant changes in pressing and firing technology 
introduced (mostly by large firms) 
• No evidence of radical product innovations taking place 
during this period. 
 
 
Rapid Growth 
According to theory, Focus should be on product 
innovation.  
√ 
 
 
slowing growth and then mature phase 
According to theory, focus should be on process 
innovations. 
√ 
 
 
 
 
Low technological dynamism and little need 
for cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The First Technological Revolution: 
increasing technological dynamism, but 
mostly within the largest firms. 
 
 
Low number of opportunities for knowledge 
exchange. 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasing number of opportunities for external 
knowledge exchange between firms (limited) 
With suppliers, but limited to the largest firms. 
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Circa 1960-1978 
• Some adoption of Fordism principles (some 
standardisation) 
• Job de-skilling 
• Simplification of some processes 
• Mergers and acquisitions are frequent 
• Firms focus more on process innovations 
 
 
 
 
Circa 1979-2008 
• External environment becomes more unstable due to 
globalisation and recession effects 
• Changes in consumer spending and demand 
• UK ceramics sales peak in 1978 then decline rapidly 
over the next few years 
• Continued investment in automation of some processes 
• Introduction of flexible specialisation methods 
• Switch in focus to fast response to rapidly changing 
fashions 
• More product innovations aimed at serving market 
niches 
• Mergers and acquisitions continue 
• Some of the largest firms locate production overseas 
 
 
 
Circa 2008-date 
• Evidence indicates increasing investment in technology, 
factories and marketing (to be explored further in stage 
3 of the research) 
• A few new start-up firms have entered the industry (not 
clear how many or how big) 
• Evidence of a strong revival in tableware and giftware – 
exports have been rising (see chapter 4. to be explored 
further in stage 3 of the research) 
• Some evidence of product innovations (to be explored 
further in stage 3 of the research) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
slowing growth and then mature phase 
According to theory, focus should be on process 
innovations. 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1979-2008 decline phase 
According to theory, focus should be on product 
innovations. 
√ 
 
There is also evidence at this stage of increasing 
process innovation. 
√ 
 
 
 
 
2008-present, re-generation phase 
According to theory, focus should be on product 
innovations. 
√ 
 
 
 
Some knowledge becomes codified and 
capable of being transferred across 
geographic space. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions increase 
opportunities for internal (within the group) 
knowledge transfer but reduce external 
knowledge transfer opportunities because 
there are far fewer firms (consolidation 
effects). 
 
 
The Second Technological Revolution: 
evidence of increased investment in 
automation but mostly by the largest firms. 
Evidence indicated little large-scale 
investment by SMEs. 
  
Mergers and acquisitions continue. The 
switch to high quality, low volume production 
is mainly carried out by SMEs but they 
tended to be owned by large groups or were 
subcontractors of large firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some new start-up firms have entered the 
industry. 
 
Some evidence of growth in inter-firm co-
operative activity (see 5.5). 
 
Increasing number of opportunities 
Increases internal opportunities for knowledge 
transfer but mostly for the largest firms. 
 
Fewer opportunities for external knowledge 
transfer between firms. 
Fewer firms = fewer external opportunities. 
 
Increased opportunities for internal knowledge 
exchange 
Mostly within the larger firms. 
 
 
Fewer opportunities for external knowledge 
transfer between firms 
 
Consolidation effects reduce opportunities for 
external knowledge exchange as there are fewer 
firms overall. Although, there are some external 
knowledge exchange opportunities with 
subcontractors. 
 
Increased opportunities for internal knowledge 
exchange 
Increased firm size (groups of firms) increases 
internal knowledge exchange opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
Increased opportunities for internal knowledge 
exchange 
New firms in the industry provide some 
opportunities for knowledge exchange. 
415 
 
 
 
Other Influences on Knowledge Exchange (5.5 & Table 5.1) 
 
Circa 1700s - 1960 
• Worker families. Several generations in one firm. 
• Little worker movement between firms or between pottery towns 
(e.g. Burslem, Longton, Fenton, etc.). 
• Workgroups were mostly self-governing units with little supervision. 
Power and knowledge kept within workgroups. 
• Some manufacturers offered incentives to tie workers to the firm. 
• Workers often knew more than management. 
• Management begin to reform shop floor processes. 
• Worker opposition to changes. 
• Relationships between hierarchically ordered workgroups are 
competitive and often deeply antagonistic. 
• Family structure of pottery firm ownership minimises the loss of 
recipes and technical knowledge. 
• Some evidence of inter-firm co-operation by owners and managers 
through membership of The Potteries Club. 
• There are many supporting institutions during this phase (see table 
5.1) but it’s not clear how many firms use their services. 
 
 
Circa 1960-2008 
• Worker family units begin to break up in the late 1970s. 
• Family ownership begins to break down from the late 1970s 
onwards. 
• Some firms transfer ownership to multi-product corporations from 
outside the region. 
• Very few new supporting institutions at this stage (see table 5.1) 
 
 
Circa 2008-present 
• Shift in management recruitment from inside the cluster/industry to 
outside, drawing from across manufacturing and other sectors. 
• Evidence indicates that cluster firms are making greater efforts to 
encourage networking and collaboration (to be explored further in 
stage 3 of the research). 
• Some of the new ‘lead’ firms have been advising and supporting 
others (to be explored further in stage 3 of the research). 
• Some new supporting institutions during this phase (see table 5.1). 
 
 
 
Rapid Growth 
According to theory, Focus should be 
on product innovation.  
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing growth and then mature 
phase 
According to theory, focus should be 
on process innovations. 
√ 
 
1978-2008 decline phase 
According to theory, focus should be 
on product innovations. 
√ 
 
2008-present, re-generation phase 
According to theory, Focus should be 
on product innovation.  
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge is unique to the 
firm. 
Knowledge is protected within 
firms and within groups, e.g. 
owner families and worker 
families. 
 
Low mobility of workers is not 
good for knowledge exchange. 
 
There is evidence of worker 
opposition to changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationships are based on 
dominance and independence. 
 
Consolidation and job losses 
in the industry increase worker 
mobility. 
 
 
 
 
There is some evidence of 
increasing co-operation 
through initiative such as the 
Ceramics Biennial and the 
Ceramic Skills Academy 
 
 
 
Fewer opportunities for external knowledge transfer 
between firms and also within firms. 
Knowledge is protected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fewer opportunities for external knowledge transfer 
between SOT cluster firms (owners) 
Due to general mistrust between firms. 
 
Increased opportunities for knowledge transfer between 
firms (workers) 
Workers move between firms. 
 
Increased opportunities for external knowledge exchanges 
(between SOT firms and overseas firms) 
Due to transference of ownership and outsourcing of production. 
 
Increased opportunities for external knowledge exchange 
Due to management recruitment from outside of the SOT cluster. 
 
Increased opportunities for external and internal knowledge 
exchange 
Due to greater efforts to co-operate with other firms (mostly 
suppliers) and supporting institutions. 
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Appendix 16: Notes to Accompany Table 5.1 
 
Staffordshire University was established in 1901 as a centre to support the ceramics industry. 
After several stages of expansion and development it became North Staffordshire Technical 
College in 1924. In 1992 it became Staffordshire University. (Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Staffordshire_University, Accessed: 30/06/16) 
 
The Ceramic and Allied Trades Union (CATU) can trace its origin from the formation of the 
National Amalgamated Society of Male and Female Pottery Workers (NASMFPW) in 1906. The 
name was changed to the National Society of Pottery Workers (NSPW) in 1917. The National 
Society of Pottery Workers became 'CATU' in 1970, in 2006 the name was changed to UNITY. 
(Source: http://archiveshub.ac.uk/data/gb1008-tu/ceramic, Accessed: 30/06/16) 
 
CERAM - In April 1948 the British Ceramic Research Association was created by the fusion of the 
British Refractories Research Association, which had been in existence since 1920 and the 
British Pottery Research Association, which was founded in 1937. In February 2014 Ceram, M+P 
Labs and CICS joined together under the name Lucideon. (Source: www.thepotteries.org, 
Accessed: 29/06/16) 
Keele University is a public research university located about 3 miles (4.8 km) from Newcastle-
under-Lyme, Staffordshire, England. Keele was granted university status by Royal Charter in 
1962 and was originally founded in 1949 as the University College of North Staffordshire. 
(Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keele_University, Accessed: 30/06/16) 
 
The Institute of Clay Technology (ICT) was formed in 1927 as the National Association of 
Clayworks Managers, originally with a particular emphasis on management and production 
matters. Over the years the Institute adapted to changes in the industry, growing to embrace all 
clay industry related disciplines, from materials extraction, through production, marketing, finance, 
administration, management and strategy. The ICT merged with IOM3 in 2006. (Source: 
http://www.iom3.org/history-institute, Accessed: 27/07/16) 
 
The Hothouse Design Centre was established as part of the Stoke-on-Trent Urban Pilot Project 
which was a regeneration initiative based on the concepts of design and heritage. It aimed to 
rejuvenate a run-down industrial area in the south of the city by creating a new, vibrant and 
historically valuable quarter specialised in the ceramics industry. At the same time, measures 
were taken to conserve the area’s industrial heritage. Work to implement the project began in 
January 1992 and finished in June 1995. (Source: 
417 
 
http://www.stoke.gov.uk/ccm/content/business/general/business-centres/st-james-house-.en, 
Accessed: 27/07/16) 
 
The Sutherland Institute was built in 1897.  It is a Grade II-listed building which was once a 
technical college, intended to promote and support the industries of its day: coal, steel and 
ceramics. (Source: http://www.stoke.gov.uk/ccm/content/business/general/business-
centres/sutherland-institute.en, Accessed: 27/07/16) 
 
Ceramic Skills Academy – an information hub and educational and training resource for those 
working in and aspiring to work within the ceramic industry.  Owned and led by leading ceramics 
businesses, the programme has been part-funded by the UK Commission for Employment and 
Skills through the Growth and Innovation Fund. CSA mission is to ensure that those skills that set 
UK ceramics apart from the rest of the world do not become lost. Specialist knowledge and 
resources are maintained and passed to future generations. (Source: 
http://www.ceramicskillsacademy.co.uk/, Accessed 27/07/16) 
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Appendix 17: Drivers of Demand for China & Earthenware in the UK Market 
 
Positive drivers 
• Overall UK demand for china and earthenware is predicted to increase. (MINTEL 2008, 2010; 
KEYNOTE, 2011, see also section 4.4 of this thesis). 
• Considerations of style and fashion are playing a larger part in the market, demanding more of 
producers in design terms and opening up new opportunities to provide a wider range of pieces, a 
faster purchasing cycle and promoting overall volume growth (MINTEL 2008, 2010, 2014; FWC, 
2008; CBI 2010, 2014145). 
• Designer names and celebrity endorsements are being used to develop and promote brand 
extensions (MINTEL, 2008, 2014). 
• The UK population was 61.2 million in 2008 (MINTEL 2008). In 2016 it was estimated at 65.4 million 
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/population accessed 16/05/17). 
• The total number of households in the UK is increasing. In 2003 there were 25.24m households, in 
2008 there were 26.54m (MINTEL, 2008). The number of households is expected to grow by 30% 
between 2006 and 2031, with the majority of them being one-person households (CBI, 2011). 
• The number of consumers within the important age brackets of 45-65+ is increasing. In 2003 there 
were 21.8m, in 2008 there were 22.9m (MINTEL, 2008), in 2015 there were 28.2m. 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/281174/uk-population-by-age/ accessed 16/05/17) 
• Despite the ongoing (2008-date) economic crisis the UK remained one of the most vibrant and 
promising markets for ceramic tableware and kitchenware, especially in the mid-upper and premium 
segments (CBI, 2010). The EU has a competitive advantage in producing high quality value-added 
ceramics, which is a product of specialised SMEs pursuing differentiated production and marketing 
strategies (FWC, 2008). 
• There has been a big increase in the number of people eating out and this is set to continue 
(http://www.bighospitality.co.uk/Trends-Reports/UK-diners-to-spend-54.7bn-on-eating-out-by-2017). 
 
Negative drivers (with some positives) 
• There has been a rapid increase in imports of comparable low-cost tableware from non-EU emerging 
economies (FWC, 2008), e.g. UK imports of china and earthenwares rose by 38% between 1999 and 
2003 and by 25.8% between 2003 and 2007 (MINTEL 2004, 2008). UK imports from developing 
countries rose from 59.5% in 2005 to 68.3% in 2009. 
• UK exports of china and earthenwares fell by 10% between 1999 and 2003 and by 27% between 
2003 and 2008 (MINTEL 2004, 2008). However, UK exports rose between 2007 (£162.1m) and 2016 
(£198.2m) by 22%. 
• In 2003 the balance of trade for ceramic imports/exports was positive, albeit declining, at +£67 
million, by 2008 it was negative at -£35m (MINTEL 2004, 2008). In 2016 it was still negative at -
£80.1m (HMRC Trade Statistics, accessed 18/05/17. See Fig. 4.19) 
• UK demand for UK Manufacturers’ products declined from £567 million in 1998 to £416million in 2002 
(MINTEL, 2004). UK demand for UK Manufacturers’ products was £170.0m in 2008 but this figure 
had risen to £218.9 by 2015 (See Fig. 4.20). 
• A large part of ceramics production is derived from the construction/housing sectors and the 
economic downturn has badly affected these sectors (FWC, 2008; CBI, 2010). 
• Lifestyle changes have meant that today’s (younger) households are far less willing to spend money 
on expensive high-quality tableware (FWC, 2008; MINTEL 2014). At the lower end of the market the 
life-cycle of products is much shorter (12-18months), this gives an opportunity to low-cost/price 
producers from developing economies, e.g. China (CBI, 2011: MINTEL 2014). 
(Source: Author, collated from various sources as referenced) 
                                                 
145 CBI, 2014, CBI Product Factsheet: Ceramic dinnerware in Europe, [ONLINE]. Available at: 
https://www.cbi.eu/sites/default/files/market_information/researches/product-factsheet-dinnerware-europe-home-decoration-textiles-2. [Accessed 
10 July 2017] 
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Appendix 18: SWOT analysis for the SOT Cluster in 2016 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
• The SOT cluster has a very long history and good reputation (Global and 
domestic) (see 6.6.1-6.6.3) 
• The SOT cluster is currently in a rejuvenation phase of the industry life-cycle 
(see 5.6.3) 
• The SOT cluster benefitted for a long time by having large successful firms in 
the cluster who were responsible for many of the industry’s technological 
advances and technical standards, thus giving the cluster a strong 
technological base. However, the cluster’s past dominant firms also had a 
negative effect on the cluster in terms of power and control (Is also a 
weakness due to the effects this had on trust between firms) (see 6.6.1-6.6.3 
and 4.5.2) 
• Despite a decline in the number of suppliers, the supply base in SOT is still 
strong and ceramics firms can take advantage of fast and early access to 
supplier inputs and technologies (cluster/agglomeration benefits) (see 6.6.1) 
• The majority of the SOT cluster’s largest firms are performing well and have 
increased revenue, profits and employees over the last seven years. The 
success of the cluster’s largest firms attracts buyers and suppliers and thus 
other cluster firms benefit ( see Table 4.2 and 6.6.4) 
• The majority of the SOT cluster’s ceramics manufacturers follow niche 
strategies and operate in the mid-upper and premium segments. Cluster firms 
have a competitive advantage in producing high quality value-added products 
which is evidence of differentiation (see Appendix  17 and 6.5) 
• The SOT cluster has increased both domestic sales and exports over recent 
years. Despite declining sales in traditional export markets, sales to new 
markets are growing significantly (see Figures 4.20-4.21 and Table 4.6) 
• The SOT cluster’s new dominant firms are seen as a strength of the cluster 
as the industry is now less hierarchical and power and control are more 
evenly balanced. The new dominant firms appear to be more cluster focused 
than the past dominant firms (see 6.6.4 and 4.4.3, 4.5.2) 
• The cluster still has a strong supplier base in SOT although this has 
diminished (see weaknesses) (see 6.6.1-6.6.3) 
• SOT cluster firms are ‘excellent’ at product innovation, evidenced by strong 
innovative output for all SOT survey firms (see 6.3.1) 
• SOT cluster firms are ‘strong’ in process innovations. However, mostly by the 
cluster’s largest firms. Firms do co-operate with suppliers on process 
innovations and thus knowledge may diffuse throughout the cluster over time 
(see 6.3.2) 
• SOT cluster firms carry out high levels of innovation in marketing, especially 
in packaging design, new media and promotions (See 6.3.3) 
• SOT cluster firms are devoting more resources to innovation now (2015) than 
they did in the past (2010) (see 6.3.4) 
• SOT cluster firms appear to be receiving a high return on their new innovation 
investments (16-50% of sales by value for SOT survey firms) (see 6.3.4) 
• SOT cluster firms have significantly improved on all of their innovation 
capabilities since 2010 (product, process, marketing and organisational). The 
two largest firms in the cluster are industry leaders in product innovations 
(see 6.3.4) 
• SOT cluster firms have a strong sense of identity and independence and this 
is reflected in strong brands (see 6.4.2) 
• SOT cluster firms regularly manufacture ceramics products for each other 
and this can result in knowledge exchanges between cluster firms (see 6.4.2) 
• There are many supporting institutions in the SOT cluster 
(cluster/agglomeration benefits). The biggest SOT cluster firms are members 
of the BCC and other trade/professional associations. This is evidence of 
some co-operation and opportunities for knowledge exchange (This is also an 
opportunity) (see 6.4.4) 
• SOT cluster firms perceive each other as competitors even though they 
operate in separate market niches. This is a stimulus for product innovation 
(is a threat too) (see 6.5.1) 
• SOT cluster firms see developing knowledge sharing capabilities outside their 
organisation as ‘essential’ or ‘highly important’, however, they do not appear 
to co-operate much with external firms and organisations. This is a strength 
and a weakness (see 6.3.4) 
• Consolidation in the industry led to the demise of 
many well-known pottery brands. This led to a 
significant reduction in knowledge creating 
opportunities (see 6.6.1-6.6.3 and 4.3) 
• Due to the shrinkage in the SOT cluster and the 
demise of the two largest firms (W&D), many supply 
firms have left the cluster. This reduces cluster 
benefits and reduces knowledge creating 
opportunities (see 6.6.1-6.6.3 and 4.5.1) 
• Consolidation in the cluster, coupled with some large 
firms shifting production overseas, resulted in the loss 
of many jobs in the cluster and thus the loss of tacit 
knowledge, i.e. specialised employee knowledge left 
the cluster (see 6.6.1-6.6.3 and ) 
• Consolidation in the cluster has led to a reduction in 
local competitive rivalry, simply because there are 
fewer firms to compete (see chapter 4.5.1) 
• Since 1960, there have been very few new entrants 
of any size into the SOT cluster.  This is a weakness 
of the cluster and also a threat to the long-term 
survival of the cluster(see 4.5.3) 
• The cluster’s past dominant firms (W&D) may be 
responsible for the hierarchical mode of governance 
that existed in the cluster up to 2008 and this may 
have contributed to the general mistrust that cluster 
firms have for each other (This is also a threat) (see 
6.4.4 and 4.2.4, 4.5.2) 
• Cluster firms see developing knowledge sharing 
capabilities outside their organisation as ‘essential’ or 
‘highly important’, however, they do not appear to co-
operate that much with external firms and 
organisations (see 6.3.4) 
• Cluster firms do not co-operate on their product 
innovations (some co-operation with suppliers and 
customers only) (see 6.3.1) 
• Smaller cluster firms do not appear to carry out as 
much process innovation as larger firms in the 
cluster. It could be that they do not have a 
requirement for process innovations though due to 
their size and the nature of their technologies (This is 
also an opportunity) (see 6.3.2 and 5.4.2) 
• Cluster firms tend to be weakest at introducing new 
methods for organising external relations, i.e. co-
operation (This is also an opportunity) (see 6.3.3) 
• The smallest firms in the cluster experience the most 
factors hampering their innovations, e.g. lack of 
qualified personnel, lack of information on 
technologies and financing/cost issues (This is also 
an opportunity) (see 6.3.4) 
• Many cluster firms appear not to take advantage of  
government support that may be available to them 
(This is also an opportunity) (see 6.3.4) 
• Cluster firms tend not to co-operate much with 
consultants, private and public research and 
development institutes (This is also an opportunity) 
(see 6.4.1) 
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• The SOT cluster’s largest firms tend to co-operate more with suppliers and 
customers. These relationships are classed as ‘weak’ ties and are considered 
beneficial to innovation (see 6.4.1) 
• SOT cluster firms are very protective about their intellectual property and 
ideas and they don’t share these with other cluster firms. This is good for 
product innovation (see 6.4.2) 
Opportunities Threats 
• Knowledge creating opportunities (co-operations) have historically been low 
in the SOT cluster, although they have increased a little since 2005 and 
there is an opportunity for cluster firms to take advantage of those 
opportunities and to develop further opportunities (see 5.6.3 and 6.7.2) 
• Some SOT cluster firms (largest) co-operate to a degree with suppliers. The 
opportunity is for smaller firms to co-operate more with suppliers on their 
process innovations (see 6.3.2) 
• SOT cluster firms have an opportunity to investigate new methods for 
organising external relations, i.e. co-operation (see 6.3.3) 
• The smallest firms in the SOT cluster experience the most factors hampering 
their innovations, e.g. lack of qualified personnel, lack of information on 
technologies and financing/cost issues. There is an opportunity to co-operate 
with supporting institutions to investigate ways of overcoming these 
problems (see 6.3.4) 
• There are opportunities for SOT cluster firms to co-operate on finding ways 
of promoting ‘made in Stoke-on-Trent’ (see 6.7.2) 
• There is an opportunity for SOT cluster firms to co-operate with policy 
makers and supporting institutions to take advantage of any government 
financial support that may be available to them (see 6.3.4) 
• There is an opportunity for smaller SOT cluster firms to become more 
involved with the BCC and other supporting institutions over a range of 
industry related issues (see 6.4.4) 
• There is an opportunity for SOT cluster firms and educational/training 
institutions to act collectively (co-operate) to provide the number of 
employees required to run industry training courses (see 6.4.4) 
• There is an opportunity for cluster firms to co-operate on ways to purchase 
inputs together and also to possibly backward integrate elements of the 
supply chain (see 6.4.6) 
• There is an opportunity for policy makers and other interested parties to 
investigate ways of stimulating new firm entry into the SOT cluster (see 6.5.1) 
• Global competition - there has been a rapid increase 
of imports of comparable low-cost tableware from EU 
and non-EU economies in recent years. SOT cluster 
firms also face stiff competition in overseas markets 
(see Figure 4.19, 6.5.1 and appendix 17) 
• Cluster firms perceive each other as competitors 
even though they operate in separate market niches. 
This is a stimulus for product innovation. However, 
intense competition may lead to negative, price based 
forms of competition (see 6.5.1) 
• Since 1960, there have been very few new entrants 
of any size into the SOT cluster. This is seen as a 
threat to the long-term survival of the cluster(see 
4.5.3) 
• Cluster firms do not trust each other and this is not 
good for co-operation and knowledge creating 
opportunities. This is a weakness and a threat (see 
6.4.4) 
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Appendix 19: Interview Responses Mapped to Themes on Co-operation and Dominant Firm Effects 
SECTION ONE - CO-OPERATION 
Q1. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate with each other on product innovations? 
YES 
B – yes, in some ways, but it’s not formal. 
D – Yes, we do co-operate. We do work together, not as well as we could. 
F – Yes, I think people do cooperate. 
NO 
A - I don’t think they cooperate at all. 
C – I don’t think we co-operate. 
E - My experience is no -- very, very limited.  
F - I don’t know if that’s just the nature how the industry’s always been, but I 
don’t think there was a lot of collaboration or cooperation. 
Ways that firms co-operate: 
B – We’ve all been around each other’s factories. I’ve been around every pottery in 
Stoke except (anonymous company). So there is co-operation there, or at least it’s 
not hidden. 
B – We all see each other’s stands when we go to the NEC or when we go to 
Ambiente – the big trade fairs. I would say though that some firms look a bit too 
closely because some of their patterns look quite similar to ours. 
B – Some of our ceramic products are made by other manufacturers here in Stoke. 
C - We do co-operate with (anonymous company), now I think about it. So, we 
make some of our pottery at (anonymous company). I think there is a little bit of 
co-operation there because they make for us, and I think we have had some 
decorations as well. 
D - I do. I do cooperate – you know, we have done – we’ve manufactured products 
in the past for other – sort manufacturers, such as Portmeirion and people like 
that. 
D - We’ve also bought from suppliers (other ceramics mfs.) where we have not 
been able to produce it because we’ve been under pressure from ??.  It’s been 
something that our customer wanted.   
D - That which they (ceramics mfs.) don’t make themselves I know, it’s made 
elsewhere in Stoke-on-Trent and I know that other people do the same thing. 
D - Well, you know, this is confidential, I know (ceramics mf. company kept 
anonymous) buy product from (ceramics mf. company kept anonymous). 
D – With other ceramic manufacturers we don’t have any secrets.  We say come 
and see.  Come and have a look.  We don’t care. Most of the guys who we’ve done 
it with, reciprocated with visits. So the technical teams and the production teams 
have been around the other factories. 
F - We have done some cooperation but it’s tended to be with all the other 
manufacturers and it hasn’t always been that successful because, say we wanted a 
Reasons why firms do not co-operate: 
A - I think that’s actually healthy not to [co-operate] because ways that companies 
actually maintain their own sense of identity purposes is to keep everything kind 
of very tight and secret. 
A – For some, innovation comes about by stealing little bits off all the people. That 
leads to a market place that’s just full of many derivatives of the same products 
and we have seen that happen to us. 
A - We will innovate something new and it becomes massively successful and 
everybody obviously wants a piece of that success and they just do very poor 
knock-offs of the same thing. 
A - it’s sad really because it means the individual factories that are involved in 
that, lose something of their own identity in the mad scramble to have a 
successful product that was originally initiated by somebody else. 
B – Because potters have been stealing off each other for 250 years. 
C - I think the nature of being an entrepreneur and setting up a business is 
probably you’re quite independent. 
C - And I just said I don’t think we do cooperate, we don’t un- cooperate but we 
were not in deadly competition with Wade’s or with Portmeirion or anyone.  
We’re friendly with them but we wouldn’t ring up and say, “Oh, we don’t know 
what to do about this customer or that one.” 
D – Do people share product ideas? No, and I wouldn’t expect that to happen 
because that’s you know – that’s it like intellectual property and stuff. They’re 
very protective of their own designs and their own innovations, I understand that. 
E - My experience is no, very, very limited. They always talk. They kind of talk but 
then I’ve never seen it in my 32 years I’ve been in the ceramic industry. No, I’ve 
never seen it. 
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component part of something making a certain way, a particular part and we will 
do the rest of it.  We’d find that the quality wasn’t good enough.  So what you tend 
to do is you find problems. You end up buying you then glaze it.  You then glaze it 
and we find out that most often the quality is poor. 
 
E - That culture is there, that by sharing, you almost say well, I don’t want them to 
have my ideas because my ideas made me survive, I don’t want to pass them on 
or show people. 
E - They [Mfs.] would arrange for instance, factory tours so you would have gone 
and visited (anonymous company and anonymous company).You wouldn’t show 
anybody around the factory now from within the industry. Simply due to what 
you think is competition. 
F - We try to collaborate with various people because of our production capacity 
problem, because it was only small and we’ve approached bigger people but the 
problem with that is that because they are going to make a margin which is fine, 
the product then becomes too expensive. So we couldn’t do that.  So as a 
consequence, we have to source overseas to get as good a price we could. 
F - I think most companies are very, very protective about their IP, about the 
product development. And they don’t want to share that. 
Q2. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate with other firms on process innovations? 
YES 
D – Yes, we all do. 
F – yes we do with suppliers, e.g. on ceramic bodies. 
B – Sometimes, but it’s not formal. 
NO 
A – I don’t think they co-operate at all. I think what they do is they go to the same 
suppliers for the same kind of end results.   
C – We are more inclined to do things by ourselves. 
Ways that firms co-operate: 
B – Because we are a cluster, most of the pieces of machinery are from local firms, 
e.g. kilns. For example, last year we put in a new kiln, the new technology put into 
that will get transmitted elsewhere, and you know it will. 
F - This company I’m working with now on producing this new body. It’s a stronger 
body so the benefit for this guy working with me is that as a small company, I 
might not going to be buying big volumes of it, but if that system works, he’s then 
got a fantastic opportunity to market that to loads of people. So, the benefits are 
there, it’s a win-win for both of us, that’s why it works. 
Reasons why firms do not co-operate: 
A - There’s a mad scramble at the moment for entry into digital direct printing. I 
was at Ambiente  in February and we [ceramics mfs.] were all on the same stand 
looking at the same kind of products. But, we are not talking to anybody, you 
know, any of our competitors about it, we are doing our own thing with it and 
suspect that they do the same thing as well. 
C - We are more inclined to do our thing ourselves. It’s not through a kind of 
isolationist approach, it’s just because what we do is so different from what 
everybody else does. 
Q3. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate with other non-ceramic firms and institutions? 
YES 
A - It seems to go through phases. 
B – Yes, with BCMF and suppliers. 
C – Yes but limited. 
D – Yes. 
F – Yeah, I would say so. 
NO 
E – No, I don’t think so. 
Ways that firms co-operate: 
A - You know, I’ve been here for 20 something years and when the market changes 
you might need some input in that area, you go and seek it out and those 
Ways/ Reasons why firms do not co-operate: 
D - I’m frustrated at it, as a matter of fact, that the industry won’t get together for 
more training. Because we’ve all got similar issues……..we’ve all got our own 
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relationships are formed and I think that’s happened fairly recent with digital 
printing. You know, because it’s a new exciting innovative area. So, we’ve kind of 
engaged with universities that are actually doing research projects in that area, 
just so we understand what’s going on. 
B – Well, we’re all part of the BCMF (BCC) which is a good talking shop and where 
it benefits us we will co-operate. 
B – We do co-operate a lot with customers, e.g. on market specific product 
development. 
B – We get our clay here from Stoke, We get our glaze from here in Stoke. 
Increasingly we’re getting our lithographs locally, whereas we used to get most of 
them in Germany. And largely, most of our equipment comes from Stoke. 
C – I know people who buy together. There are some people [ceramics mfs.] who 
own one of the clay companies together. We are neither of those… but there are, I 
know, people doing both of those things. 
D - Well, again I don’t know what other people said, but by default, we all do 
because we all deal with most of the big (inaudible)… and Americans --- and we sit 
here on the BCMF committee and so they do things that are – if they think that 
something is innovative for the industry, then we all take part of that invention so 
it isn’t that there’s no cooperation.  It might not be, you know Steelite and Dudson 
talking to Wade, but by default those people are involved in that committee ….but 
whatever comes after that, it’s beneficial.  We all share it. 
D - Yes, at the confederation BCMF (BCC). This again, you know, these people who 
sit on the board at BCMF, I’m not one of them but they are from different 
companies….there was a meeting last Friday…..and (anonymous company and 
anonymous company) also had people walk in for the actual meeting, so they’re all 
there together in a common room, talking about common interests. They 
[ceramics mfs.] all sit on various committees, I just think they have never really 
understood what they’re doing is co-operating. The same goes for Lucideon, which 
used to be called Ceram, and Ceram was basically kept going by the industry. We 
paid the membership fee, you got 70 days of their time and ideas, that were 
shared, and so I just think the industry is always as they used to be. I myself used 
to be a director at ACTD [Association for Ceramic Training Development] as it was 
called, the ceramic training center. 
D - They (ceramics mfs.) all sit on various committees, I just think they have never 
really understood what they’re doing is co-operating.  And the same goes for 
Lucideon, which used to be called Ceram and Ceram was basically kept going by 
the industry.  We paid the membership fee and you got 70 days of their time and 
personal recipes, we’re all using slightly different bodies and different mixtures 
and different whatevers, but the bottom line is, clay is clay. The techniques are 
almost exactly the same. There’s nobody big enough in the city, I believe, that 
could put 15 people on a course like that. So we should co-operate. 
D – The problem is, most of the industry won’t buy into that (co-operation on 
training).   They pay lip service to it too and they say all the right things and then 
when it comes to making a decision or trying to sort out you put your hand in your 
pockets, they all run away.  It’s like – well that isn’t exactly what we want, you 
know?  Well that isn’t exactly what we want.  We want some of this and that and 
this and that. 
E - I think back in the day, when the ceramic industry was big, we had the British 
Pottery Managers Association, and that would have been everybody from all the 
factories who would have been talking. 
F - The thing about us as a small company is that we do everything in-house we’ve 
got to.  Anything within the industry we can do.  We can monoblock case design 
so we could originate.  We do a lot of hard work or processing or building, what 
we don’t do is printing.  We also make moulds outside.  That is the only thing we 
don’t do so we traditionally have not done that. 
F - You know, we’ve not used outside resources because when I have used it in 
the past, I found that the actual technology and processes didn’t work for us. At 
one time I used Ceram, good people, you know, the expert of ceramic industry, 
we used them to develop an angle and it was useless. Yes, it didn’t work, they 
didn’t do the job. They never came back and never followed it through. For them, 
they’d be getting paid so much for doing it. They do the job, thanks very much. 
We’d rather do it ourselves with the suppliers we’ve got.  The glaze suppliers too 
do it all the time, the clay suppliers.  I think it’s a bit too academic, yeah. 
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ideas were shared and so I just think the industry is always as they used to be. I 
used to be a director at ACTD as it was called, the ceramic training center. 
D – We put on a University course. We had 11 people on that course, which was 
unbelievable.  It was very specific and it wasn’t really a ceramics course, it was a 
leadership course.  But we did it because we thought it was worthwhile, but it’s 
very rare you could do that.   
F I think, you know, in the last 20 years, there has been enormous co-operation 
with overseas manufacturers. Because people like Doulton, and Wedgwood in 
particular, who were seen as the kind of policy, you know. So they co-operated 
with lots of manufacturers and basically exported that expertise and where has it 
got them. 
 
Q 4. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers co-operate more or less now than 10 years ago? 
YES 
B – Probably more. 
NO 
A - I think they probably co-operate less. 
D – Probably co-operate less. 
E - No.  I think it got worse.  
F - I’d say less. 
 
Reasons why firms co-operate MORE now than 10 years ago: 
B – Wedgwood have been gone in that time and I don’t think they co-operated 
much. The BCF now pulls us together more tightly now and therefore that helps 
co-operation, so probably more.  
Reasons why firms co-operate LESS now than 10 years ago: 
A - I think because competitions increased and people are just being very 
protective about what they do and they just don’t want to give anything away at 
all competitively to anybody else. 
A - Less local competitors but you know on the global stage, there’s many more 
people entered the industry. You know, from lots of different countries that 
weren’t even on the radar before. You know, these countries are making quality 
products. So I think competition’s actually increased and I think that’s forced 
people into being much more protective about letting their competitors see what 
their activities are and what their… 
A -  I think nobody trusts anybody basically. I think there’s just been a long history 
of, you know, general mistrust of anybody else’s activity and you know a rise to 
kind of steal. 
A - There’s just a great opportunity to come up with a key kind of product that will 
kind of wow the whole industry but you’re the first to market with and I think that 
drives a protective kind of standpoint with practically everything that pottery 
manufactures do.  
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D - No.  I would say it’s always been as it is and if anything it’s probably worse now 
than it was.  I think in the old days when the companies were bigger, there was 
more competition, and there was probably more co-operation.  
E - I think back in the day, when the ceramic industry was big, we had the British 
Pottery Managers Association, and that would have been everybody from all the 
factories who would have been talking. You would have known people from those 
factories as well and they would arrange for instance, factory tours so you would 
have gone and visited Wedgwood and Churchill. You wouldn’t show anybody 
around the factory now from within the industry. Simply due to what you think is 
competition. 
E - I think it was as if the shrinking of the industry almost made you just kind of 
close your ranks in effect because, you know, it was just your business that wanted 
to survive and it was very much - if we are surviving, it’s only about surviving. 
E - It’s always described as a peculiar industry and I don’t know whether it might 
be the fact as well, that it was very much owned by families. So, you know, it was 
the Dudson’s, the Ropers at Churchill…and it was almost like, you know, it’s the 
case of ‘I know I’m better than you’….and, you know, they were almost like kids at 
times.  Because I’ve seen that personally, you know. 
F - I think there’s less companies that’s why. Yeah, that’s why. And you know, 
companies are all still going belly up, still gone through a really bad 25 years, you 
know. 
 
Q5. Do SOT ceramics manufacturers see themselves as part of one whole industry cluster? 
YES 
A - I think they see themselves as that but I don’t actually think they have a voice 
which is built. 
D - When it suits them (e.g. collective bargaining with trade unions in the past). 
 
NO 
E - I wouldn’t say that.  No, definitely.  Definitely not, no. 
Ways that firms act as one cluster: 
 
Reasons why firms may not act as one cluster: 
A - It’s like there’s not enough companies to achieve critical mass….I think 
companies tend to work much more in isolation now than they have in the past. 
D - But you see, I think, I do believe that the industry would be stronger if we all 
got together and did a big thing about making in Stoke-on-Trent. But you know, 
that’s – there’s got to be strength in made in Stoke-on-Trent.  Stoke-on-Trent likes 
to sell itself as a city as the world capital of ceramics. If that’s the situation 
shouldn’t we all be singing from the rooftops that we’re in Stoke-on-Trent? 
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E - You see, they see themselves certainly as individuals and ‘we are going to do 
better than (anonymous company)’ or ‘better than (anonymous company)’ or 
‘better than (anonymous company)’, they definitely see themselves as that. 
 
SECTION TWO – DOMINANT FIRMS 
Q6. What effect did the SOT cluster’s past dominant firms, e.g. Wedgwood and Royal Doulton, have on the rest of the SOT cluster? 
Advantages to the cluster: 
A - Having companies like that in the locale mean that everybody kind of benefits 
because it’s good for the service industries, the service sales factories, you know.  
The clay suppliers, the glaze suppliers, the colour suppliers, the machinery people. 
A – It’s good for the workforce as well. 
A - Also for tourism, you know, people come and they want to visit Wedgwood. 
B – Well, I suppose a heavy ballast to the cluster makes it a cluster because of the 
gravitational pull. It’s like, I’m here, I’m big, I’m important, I can employ these 
people, come in and set up then. You can steal employees off that, or maybe 
processes or ideas, or the same supply chain. So, it’s important to have the 
heavyweight ones in the middle. They bring that benefit, they bring the 
reputational benefit, but really, they bring the supply chain and the skill base 
benefit more than anything. 
C - They used to do a lot of training in the old days, we used to get everyone really 
trained by them. Because they had huge training budgets…..you know, Nile Street 
had 3,000 people working there. Well, at least they trained brilliant craftsmen. So, 
yes, they were very, very useful. 
D - Wedgwood and Doulton would also be the ones leading the discussions with 
the unions on who what pay rises and what levels would agree. 
D - They drove growth and pottery was probably at its absolute peak in those 
years, in those mid 70’s years.  The ceramics industry probably employed more 
people than it had ever done.  Even though technology had progressed from back 
in the early 19th and 20th centuries when it first kicked off and I think probably it 
was at its most successful overall as an industry.  So if you look back at the 
turnover, and what was being manufactured in the city, the number of people 
employed and therefore the prosperity brought to the local community, not just 
the people employed in the ceramics companies but in all the suppliers and 
support industries around. But also, at the same time, it did put the smaller firms 
under pressure. 
D - The bigger companies would obviously help the suppliers to develop new 
techniques and technologies and so I’m sure there was a lot of cross-fertilization in 
Disadvantages to the cluster: 
A - Wedgwood and Doulton between them were buying so much raw materials, 
they can obviously get it at much cheaper price than you know a 10-person 
operation could.   
A - And then you know, taking the manufacturing heart out of the UK and putting it 
somewhere else. People buy the history and the romance around the product 
rather than the product itself, and if you have not got that anymore, you haven’t 
really got a product and I think that was something that got lost in that era. 
B – Wedgwood swallowed up 54 brand names. So that was a disadvantage. 
C - We know that both did huge damage to the industry.  Wedgwood and Doulton 
got rid of all of the major competitors and did massive damage of shutting down 
companies like Mason’s or like that.  So I think, you know, very bad. 
C - Outsourcing manufactures in Indonesia and Malaysia, all those places that 
basically completely trashed the jobs here. 
C - And Doulton, you know, what they did -- they were very big and then they were 
very inflexible so they didn’t spot the changes in habits and taste because they 
were too big to notice. So, I think again, that’s bad and a bit of anti-innovation. 
D – After acquisition they sold land, then liquidised assets and they moved the 
production to Wedgwood or to overseas or to whatever they did and, but that’s 
inevitable, the industry contracted.  Had the industry still been as buoyant as it 
was in the 70’s, I mean back in the 70’s with Wedgwood you’re talking about £100 
million or some £120 million turnover.  Doulton, I think did the same thing one 
year with £249 million turnover.  I mean they were big, big companies. 
D - I don’t think there were any benefits for the people (ceramic firms) who 
weren’t in the group, really. 
D - As the industry started to struggle, this is where they weren’t good for the 
industry. They were too long waking up to the fact that the industry had changed 
and you know. The management became lethargic and comfortable and cocky and 
arrogant and made a lot of wrong decisions and it ended up costing the industry a 
lot of jobs. Because they were in this mindset that what we’ve always been, the big 
boy you know.  Wedgwood didn’t believe that anybody could make a product 
better than they did.   
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few of the guys who make the prints, or who supply the clay, or who supplies – 
you know, glazes, etcetera. 
E - They were good trainers of people so they were seen as the Rolls Royce of the 
industry and they trained a lot of people and we have all benefited.  They probably 
kept the college courses going because they were probably setting on 20 or 30 
people a year and then the likes of Steelite or Churchill at that time might only 
have one or two, so if they (Wedgwood and Doulton) hadn’t been there, the 
college courses wouldn’t have run in the first place, so I think, that would have 
been a benefit.   
E - And at that time, they set levels of efficiencies, they set levels of productivity, 
they set levels of quality and that is very good that the rest of the industry have 
something to aspire to. 
E - They were always looking at innovations, so from machinery point of view, so 
they would’ve gone to Ceram research, etcetera.  They would have backed the 
project. They would’ve done the research with Ceram. They would’ve gone to the 
manufacturer of machinery and then the machinery would’ve been available to 
everybody. So, that would’ve been why the printing processes evolved with 
printing machinery, why pressure casting evolved, why roller making evolved from 
A-rolls or B-rolls or C-rolls.  I think without the bigger firms and having that 
investment into research to say yes, this is the way for all with that, a lot of the 
techniques wouldn’t have advanced as fast as they did. It’s certainly moved it (the 
industry) forward a little bit. 
E - They are a brand.  If somebody says Royal Doulton, or Wedgwood, people know 
that straight away don’t they. Whether people would know straight away they’re 
from Stoke-on-Trent, I don’t know. If it was in the internet, if you put Wedgwood 
in Google say, it would say Stoke-on-Trent wouldn’t it. 
 
 
E - I suppose they set benchmarks in terms of pricing and wages, and so you would 
have to follow that and maybe a smaller business wouldn’t have been able to 
compete with that.  So maybe the pool of labour, we wouldn’t have been able to 
pay the wages that Wedgwood would’ve paid, so you wouldn’t get those people in 
and maybe we wouldn’t have attracted the best pool of talent.  So, the pool of 
talent will be all going to Wedgwood and Doulton maybe, and we wouldn’t have 
seen that. 
F - There were no advantages, they had a negative effect. Because what you got is 
two big players, and they were both vying with each other for dominance. What 
they did was, any small independent company that came up for sale or they 
wanted to buy, they would buy them. As a consequence, the whole of Stoke-on-
Trent was either owned by Doulton or Wedgwood. All these great little companies 
became part of the overall Wedgwood brand, or the overall Doulton brand. Often 
they just destroyed them really and of course, you know, they [acquired firms] 
were not independent anymore. They were not making their own decisions so, as 
a consequence, you get a pretty bland environment, and non-competitive, and it 
just wasn’t healthy for Stoke. Not innovative enough you know, because often 
those factories had their very own fashion as well. 
Q7. Why do you think that Wedgwood and Royal Doulton acquired so many other pottery companies between 1960 and 1990? 
Reasons for acquisitions: 
A – I really can’t speculate on that.  
B – Because they could. I think it was driven by cost efficiency, which is to feed the 
big factory. Also, taking the brand names, because they didn’t want other people 
to do it and because they wanted to put the volume production through. 
Nowadays the same reasons would apply but I think the profit motive would be 
stronger.  
D - You know, Wedgwood was big and strong and a lot of the smaller potbanks 
were struggling a little bit.  It was all consolidation and bringing them together.  I 
Effects on acquired firms: 
A - My experience of that whole thing was all I saw was a kind of dilution of the 
businesses that they acquired and you know, all those great names when they 
became part of a corporate entity, they kind of loss their own identity and became 
weaker for it. 
A - Some of these bigger companies just became so focused on profitability and 
driving down the cost to the detriment of the product that they actually forgot 
what their customer was actually buying. 
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suppose it was companies who want to take over what they see as competitors or 
minions or different ways of extending their range or whatever.  So I think Doulton 
and Wedgwood both went through that phase.   
C - It was a campaign to get rid of competition and simultaneously they then put in 
the hands of too few players some decision making, like outsourcing 
manufacturing to Indonesia and Malaysia, all those places that basically 
completely trashed the jobs here. 
C - They didn’t just get rid of business it’s like, you know, Wedgwood just bought 
to shut down. That was the strategy. I don’t have any doubt about it.  I don’t think 
there’s any question of it. In my mind, I’ve always known that was absolutely it. 
E - I’m guessing.  I mean, because I have been around -- I was in the industry from 
’85, but I would’ve imagined that it’s – most of it profit led, surely because, you 
know, if you’re making money, you’ve got money around, what am I going to do 
with that money?  Well, I’ll buy another pottery firm. So, rather than to go and buy 
a different businesses, it is the business I know and if we can acquire another 
pottery manufacturer and actually pick on certainties so we can make savings, 
hopefully then we can be more profitable. Top sales line goes up without us having 
to invest in a lot of sales.  You can invest in your own products and sales routine or 
you can buy one that is already there. The turn-over is guaranteed and if you put 
the two businesses together and make savings.  
F - They (Wedgwood & Doulton) were both vying with each other for dominance.  
So what they did, any small independent company that came up for sale, they 
wanted to buy, they would buy them, so as a consequence, eventually, the whole 
of Stoke-on-Trent was either owned by Doulton or Wedgwood. 
F - Because they were competing against each other.  They were trying to get more 
market share. It is about snapping up another company, you know. I mean, 
Wedgwood bought Enoch Wedgewood, which was spelled with an E, so 
Wedgwood bought that to shut it down because they didn’t like another 
Wedgwood on the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
C - We know that both did huge damage to the industry. Wedgwood and Doulton 
got rid of all of the major competitors and did massive damage of shutting down 
companies like Mason’s or like that. So I think, you know, very bad. 
D - If you (an acquired firm) had a bad year, you’d be part of the group, and if the 
group had a good year, you know, you could survive that bad year and go back.  
But they were able to survive that because of the Wedgwood brand, if you like, 
supported that – you know, the fact that it didn’t – it’s a year when perhaps it 
didn’t make a profit, it would’ve required to stay in existence under its own steam. 
D - Wedgwood did invest a lot of money into the factories that probably wouldn’t 
have happened without them. You know, new technology back then, I mean, it 
wasn’t a very technological industry back then and it still isn’t now, really. But 
where there were opportunities, Wedgwood invested in all the factories, not just 
in Barlaston. 
E - There’s less competition. Competition can be a good thing and a bad thing, 
can’t it? It would’ve been less competition but certainly they should’ve taken 
advantage of that being a big manufacturer. They should’ve been able to really 
drive efficiency. So, the lack of competition would’ve made it more difficult and so 
everybody who was buying just would’ve gone to Doulton and Wedgwood first 
because they were seen as the ones always kind of making a monopoly and 
everybody else is just the little fish in the big sea I suppose. 
F - So all these great little companies (acquisitions) became part of the overall 
Wedgwood brand or the overall Doulton brand, and often, they just destroyed 
them really and of course, you know, they (acquired firms) are not independent 
anymore.  They’re not making their own decisions.  So as a consequence, you get a 
pretty bland environment, and non-competitive and it just wasn’t healthy for 
Stoke. Not innovative enough you know, as often these factories had their very 
own fashion as well. 
F - I will say no, they didn’t share knowledge. They were incredibly protective, you 
know. It was like a closed shop really.  I mean when they went bump, and all 
companies were shut down and they made these people redundant, I think 
probably most of them didn’t get back into the industry because that was getting 
smaller anyway so they’d go into other industries and get out of it, you know. 
Q8. Overall, do you think Wedgwood and Royal Doulton were good for the SOT ceramics cluster? 
YES 
B – At times in their lives, yes, e.g. industry reputation and the supply chain, but in 
later years they were bad, they were very badly run in the end. 
NO 
A - I don’t think they were. 
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D - In some ways, yes.  In some ways, no. 
E - Yeah, yeah, definitely.   
C - I would say that in terms of the industry, of the city, I don’t think they have 
been particularly useful to it. But brilliant for skills. 
D - In some ways, yes.  In some ways, no. 
F - No, had a negative effect. 
 
Q9. What do you think the role of the SOT cluster’s NEW dominant firms, e.g. Steelite, Portmeirion, etc., is/should be? 
A – We’ve tried to be good neighbours. 
A – Our former CEO was always very, very positive about the industry in general and he saw himself really as kind of like -- you know, if he could make things better 
somehow, he would go out of his way to try to find a way to do that. If the industry in general is strong, everybody benefits.  You know, because it removes all the 
uncertainly of certain suppliers going out of business or certain key elements of the industry not being available anymore which is no good to anybody. 
A - The biggest thing we can bring to the industry is again stability. You know, the more successful we are the more successful everybody around us will be which just 
brings more confidence and stability and if everybody kind of grows along with us, that brings other people into the periphery as well. 
B – I think we’re a good employer. I don’t want to use the word ‘paternal’ but it’s the word that comes out, and that’s an important role. We have an ambassadorial role 
as well – we’re publicly quoted so we spend a great deal of time talking to the City and pushing the right levers. There’s a brand protection role too for the Potteries. I 
kind of think we are more of a lighthouse and a gatekeeper, but that doesn’t mean keeping others out. We (current large ceramics firms) have less control over the 
industry than the biggest firms in the past, we’re not the same at all.  
C - They make good sound jobs.  They’ve stocked the manufacturing in Britain, they’ve behaved in a principle way and employed well. 
D - We don’t compete as such.  But we talk.  You know, we just – I think it benefits a bit for the industry.  And if the industry’s strong, then we’re all strong, if we do 
something, and If we’re really good at what we do, we’re all stronger together. 
E - Of course, if they’ve kept the industry going in Stoke-on-Trent they’ve done something right, and they’re hopefully now becoming more profitable. If then they can 
invest their profits into the business and, whether that be training, marketing their businesses, marketing the made in Stoke-on-Trent ceramic brands, that’s going to be 
good, isn’t it? It’s going to be good. 
 
 
SECTION THREE – VIEWS ON INNOVATION, SUCCESS FACTORS AND COMPETITION 
Views on opportunities for innovation: 
A - The great thing about ceramics is just how much you can push the material. You know, it’s a fantastic medium for constant innovations, there are always new ways of 
doing things, different combinations of things that can come together. There’s always a chance you’ll steal a march on your competitors by coming up with some magic 
formula, not just in terms of chemistry but in terms of you know, shape and design innovation. 
A - I think that the pottery industry is a very strange industry in that -- traditionally, it was always run by people who understood pots.  You know, they knew how to 
make a pot, they knew what was involved in the craft of pottery because pottery isn’t engineering.  You know, there’s almost like a dark art to it that isn’t written. 
 
Views on success factors for firms: 
A - I think that is indicative of the people that survived because they found a niche. They stuck to it and they fine-tuned it, they’ve honed it and they’ve innovated within 
that niche. They’ve got a strong identity and it’s the thing that people buy into. I think the companies that survive are the ones that have had a very strong sense of self 
and purpose and that’s something, people don’t buy pots, they buy a dream or they buy, you know, the romance of the product, they buy the sizzle not the sausage. 
F – We’re still here today, particularly in niche companies like the table work, the hotel work, companies who still choose particular countries that really have a huge 
market to go at. It is a growing market, you know. They get fantastic margin off the product. They are not dealing directly with retail because that’s hard, you’ve got to 
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make sure that retail has a good margin. So, that is the difference between their business and ours and that’s why they have enormous success, when that’s finally done 
really well, you know. 
 
Views on competitors and competition: 
A - I think because competitions increased and people are just being very protective about what they do and they just don’t want to give anything away at all 
competitively to anybody else. 
A - Less local competitors but you know on the global stage, there’s many more people entered the industry. You know, from lots of different countries that weren’t 
even on the radar before. You know, these countries are making quality products, so I think competition has actually increased, and I think that has forced people into 
being much more protective about letting their competitors see what their activities are. A lot of pottery manufacturers are actually competing with holiday companies 
or electronics companies, their biggest competitor problem is Apple or Samsung. You know, that is the reality of it 
A – Competition in the hospitality area, I think it’s incredibly strong. Our key competitors are local.  And you know, there’s also competition coming in from abroad via 
our own distributors as well. 
B – Our competitors include people (overseas) who produce for the likes of John Lewis or House of Fraser or Debenhams, It’ll include Marks and Spencer and at the 
lower end products sold in Sainsbury’s and Tesco. It would also include in the UK Bridgewater and Wedgwood (you’re never quite sure whether they’re competitors or 
not or where they are in life). And Churchill increasingly within consumerware, given that what we make is consumerware rather than hotelware. There are dozens of 
overseas competitors – worldwide.  
C - No, we don’t really compete with any them (other SOT ceramics firms) much. They’re bigger and more mechanised than us. So, we’re both kind of non-competitive 
or committed that easily to each other. 
D - I think in the old days when the companies were bigger, there was more competition (local). 
D – We don’t have any competitors in the UK, we’ve got one in Germany, one in France. You know, we don’t really compete with anybody in Stoke. 
D - You know, we don’t really compete with anybody in Stoke.  Moorland’s a little company, but they have a really unique offer.  So it’s not, yeah, okay.  You can sell 
mugs.  Dunoon, they sell mugs.  Emma’s sort of design led and I suppose if anyone competes with them it’s Portmeirion. It’s perhaps Emma but really she doesn’t offer 
the full range that they offer.  So perhaps there isn’t as much direct competition as there used to be. Yeah, and therefore it was perhaps a bit tougher in the past and 
perhaps really, the industry is a little bit more I mean, Portmeirion and Spode don’t really compete head to head with Steelite and Dudson. 
E - We haven’t got a lot of competition because we are kind of in a niche with our supply really, but we’ve got (anonymous company) which I think is another small 
business. They import product from China and they decorate in the UK. 
F - So all these great little companies (acquisitions) became part of the overall Wedgwood brand or the overall Doulton brand, and often, they just destroyed them really 
and of course, you know, they (acquired firms) are not independent anymore.  They’re not making their own decisions.  So as a  consequence, you get a pretty bland 
environment, and non-competitive and it just wasn’t healthy for Stoke. Not innovative enough you know, as often these factories had their very own fashion as well. 
 
Views on trust: 
A - I think nobody trusts anybody basically. I think there’s just been a long history of, you know, general mistrust of anybody else’s activity and you know a rise to kind of 
steal. 
B – Would you say that ceramics firms don’t trust each other then? Yes, it will be that in part. 
E - That culture is there, that by sharing, you almost say well, I don’t want them to have my ideas because my ideas made me survived, I don’t want to pass them on or 
show people. 
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F - But, I think my experience from working for myself for 30 years is that, you know, they’re not be trusted to be honest. The other manufacturers?  Yeah, say we went 
to a firm with a really good idea, it really sells well, would you like to license it? I tried things out like in the past but you end up not getting paid.  You know, so it is not 
professional enough. 
 
Views on other cluster benefits and opportunities for co-operation: 
C - You make instate because you want to have people working for you who already worked in the industry or his grandmother or his father or his mother used skills as a 
traditional in the areas. You don’t have to start anybody from scratch. You want to be near the places that make the kilns – that made the glaze, that made the molds, 
that fix the machines, that deliver pottery, that know how to make packaging for pottery.  You need to be in an area where there is a structure in place to service that 
industry.  So, it’s very much easier to do that.  You want to be able to recruit when people leave.  You want to get new people to come in quickly again. 
D - People would sort of change jobs and move from Doulton to Wedgwood to Dudson – you know, and so there’s always this sort of – you know, there was like a pool 
of personnel and people rotated. I mean, lots of industries are sort of incestuous but the ceramics industries is incestuous, you get the same guy popping up in four 
different brands, own by four different of companies. Doing the same job.  And so we know what ? have done in the past and what ? were doing and, you know, what ? 
have done whatever it is. 
E - Do you think there are any areas where the manufacturers should’ve worked more closely together? Yeah, definitely, it’s the supply chain, so that’s the glaze 
manufacturers, refractory manufacturing, colour supply, colour technology, because all of that supply chain’s just disappeared. Things like ceramic and kiln furniture, 
what used to be five or six manufacturers in Stoke-on-Trent, there are none now, it’s all imported by one firm. I’m sure there’s an opportunity, if we did get together, to 
set up manufacturing in Stoke-on-Trent of ceramic and kiln furniture, by all of us putting some money in. We could see benefits from that ship by being in control over 
what they sell rather than the third party being in control only to put their margin on. 
E – But you see, I think, I do believe that the industry would be stronger if we all got together and did a big thing about making in Stoke-on-Trent. But, you know, there’s 
got to be strength in made in Stoke-on-Trent. Stoke-on-Trent likes to sell itself as a city as the world capital of ceramics. If that’s the situation shouldn’t we all be singing 
from the rooftops that we’re in Stoke-on-Trent? We could all grow 10%. Fabulous, If we would all grow 20%. 
E - I know they’re starting to look at it now but education and training is another one where cooperation definitely needs to be done because, you know, colleges and 
the universities run courses.  They’ve got to make money.  They’ve got to have a number of people.  So, you can’t just run a course for Churchill, because there might 
only be three people, you can’t just run a course for Steelite with another three, but by putting the threes together, you end up with 12 or 20 people. 
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Appendix: 20 
 
SOT: Firms Existing in 2016. Contact efforts made. 
 Name date Status  
1 Birchcroft Fine Bone China Co. Ltd Est. 1980 – 
present  
No longer in business. 
2 Emma Bridgewater (Bridgewater Pottery Ltd) Est. 1984 – 
present  
Questionnaire and Interview completed 
 Cara China Co Est. 1945 – 
present  
Not found 
3 Caverswall China Est. 1973 – 
present  
Questionnaire completed 
Email sent regarding interview – 21/2/17 
Interview arranged with Paul Smith – 1st March 2017 3pm - 
completed 
4 Churchill China PLC (formerly James Broadhurst 
& Sons) 
Est. 1862 – 
present  
Letter and Email sent to David O’Connor CEO  21/2/17– no reply 
Email reply – request rejected 21/2/17 
5 Peggy Davies Ceramics Ltd Est. 1981 – 
present  
Letter sent in December – no reply 
Visit to factory February – no reply 
Letter through door February – no reply 
6 Denby Pottery (present in SOT after 2009 as 
BURLEIGH) 
Denby owned by HILCO who also own Poole 
Pottery (now made in SOT) and Royal Stafford 
Est. 1809 – 
present  
Letter sent in December – no reply (Steven Moore) 
Emailed general request via website (Burleigh) – 21/2/17 
Try Norman Tempest MD of Poole and Royal Stafford – no response 
7 Duchess China (see Crownford/Taylor-
Tunnicliffe) 
Est. 1947 – 
present  
Email sent 7/2/17 – general enquiry on website 
(Chris Carnell, General Manager) 
Request rejected 10/2/17 
Further request emailed – 21/2/17 No reply 
8 Dudson Bros Ltd Est. 1898 – 
present  
Letter and email sent to Danny Goodall 2/2/17 – no reply 
9 Dunoon Ceramics Ltd (part of SOT cluster since 
1980) 
Est. 1980 – 
present  
Email sent with questionnaire to Peter Smith MD 7/2/17 No reply 
10 Hudson & Middleton Ltd 
(Just been acquired by Times Square, Mark Chilton 
MD (since going into liquidation)) 
Est. 1941 – 
present  
Emailed general request via website 7/2/17 – no response 
Letter through door – 9/2/17 – no response 
Emailed general request via website 21/2/17 – No reply 
Factory closed down June 2017 
11 Roy Kirkham & Co. Ltd Est. 1970 – 
present  
Emailed general request via website 21/2/17 
Letter posted to Ian Kirkham (MD) – 21/2/17 No reply 
12 W Moorcroft PLC Est. 1913 – 
present  
Visit to factory October 2016 – no response 
Letter sent to Hugh Edward 21/2/17 – no reply 
13 Moorland Pottery Est. 1960 – 
present  
Questionnaire & Interview completed 
14 Portmeirion Potteries Ltd Est. 1961 – 
present  
Interview arranged with Dick Steele 7/4/17 - completed 
 Raywear Group (acquired price Kensington 
2009) 
Est. 2009 – 
present  
Still operating but not included as manufacture overseas 
15 Steelite International PLC Est. 1983 – 
present  
Interview arranged with Andrew  Klimecki 23/2/17 –  completed 
16 Wade Ceramics Ltd Est. 1810 – 
present  
Questionnaire & Interview completed 
17 Wedgwood Group  Est. 1759 – 
present  
Email sent and response 4/2/17 Awaiting further reply 
Email sent – 21/2/17 
(Dik Delaney Design Director) 
No response 
18 Walpole Fine Bone China (Pollyanna) Est? Contacted several times by email but no response. Too small? 
19 Staffordshire Heritage  Visited factory and left questionnaire – 9/2/17 
Email sent – 21/2/17 No reply. 
Not included as they make ceramic light fittings for trade. 
 
